India's Struggle For Independence Part 14

It must be emphasized at this stage that though, by the late 1920s, the dominant section of the Indian capitalist cla.s.s began to support the Congress, the Indian national movement was not created, led or in any decisive way influenced by this cla.s.s, nor was it in any sense crucially dependent on its support. In fact, it was the capitalist cla.s.s which reacted to the existing autonomous national movement by constantly trying to evolve a strategy towards it. Further, while the capitalist cla.s.s on the whole stayed within the nationalist camp (as opposed to lining up with the loyalists), it did so on the most conservative end of the nationalist spectrum, which certainly did not call the shots of the national movement at any stage.

However, the relative autonomy of the Indian national movement has been repeatedly not recognized, and it has been argued that the capitalists, mainly by using the funds at their command, were able to pressurize the Congress into making demands such as a lower Rupee-Sterling ratio, tariff protection, reduction in military expenditure, etc., which allegedly suited only their cla.s.s.22 Further, it is argued that the capitalists were able to exercise a decisive influence over the political course followed by the Congress, even to the extent of deciding whether a movement was to be launched, continued or withdrawn. The examples quoted are of the withdrawal of civil disobedience in 1931 with the Gandhi-Irwin Pact and the non-launching of another movement between 1945-47.23 These formulations do not reflect the reality, and this for several reasons. First, a programme of economic nationalism vis-a-vis imperialism, with demands for protection, fiscal and monetary autonomy, and the like, did not represent the interest of the capitalist cla.s.s alone, it represented the demands of the entire nation which was subject to imperialist exploitation. Even the leftists - Nehru, Socialists, and Communists - in their struggle against imperialism had to and did fight for these demands.

Second, the detailed working out of the doctrine of economic nationalism was done by the early nationalism nearly half a century before the Indian capitalists got const.i.tuted as a cla.s.s and entered the political arena and began fighting for these demands. So there was no question of the Congress being bought, manipulated or pressurized into these positions by the capitalist cla.s.s.

Third, while it is true that the Congress needed and accepted funds from the business community, especially during const.i.tutional (election) phases, there is no evidence to suggest that through these funds the businessmen were able to, in any basic way, influence the party's policy and ideology along lines which were not acceptable to it independently. Even the Congress dependence on funds (in the days when it was a popular movement) has been grossly exaggerated. The Director of the Intelligence Bureau, in reply to a query from the Viceroy, noted in March 1939, 'Congress has also very important subst.i.tutes for regular finance. The "appeal to patriotism" saves a lot of cash expenditures . . . Both for normal Congress activities and for election purposes, the moneybags (capitalists) are less important than the Gandhian superst.i.tion . . . local Congress organizations can command so much support from the public . . . that they are in a position to fight elections without needing much money.'24 In non-election phases, an overwhelming majority of Congress cadres maintained themselves on their own and carried on day-to-day agitations with funds raised through members.h.i.+p fees and small donations.

Gandhiji's position on capitalist support is very revealing in this context. As early as 1922, while welcoming and even appealing for support from merchants and millowners, he simultaneously maintained that, 'whether they do so or not, the country's march to freedom cannot be made to depend on any corporation or groups of men. This is a ma.s.s manifestation. The ma.s.ses are moving rapidly towards deliverance and they must move whether with the aid of the organized capital or without. This must therefore be a movement independent of capital and yet not antagonistic to it. Only if capital came to the aid of the ma.s.ses, it would redound to the credit of the capitalists and hasten the advent of the happy day.'25 (Gandhiji's att.i.tude towards the capitalists was to harden further over time, especially during World War II when a large number of them were busy profiteering while the national movement was facing untold repression and the people shortages and famines).

Lastly, as for the capitalists' determining the course of the Congress-led movements (many of them in specific areas led or supported by socialists and Communists), again there is little evidence to support this view. The Congress launched or withdrew movements based on its own strategic perceptions arising out of its understanding of the nature of the colonial state and its current postures, the organizational, political and ideological preparedness of the people, the staying power of the ma.s.ses, especially when faced with repression, and so on. It did not do so at the behest, and not even on behalf of the capitalist cla.s.s. In fact, almost each time the Congress launched ma.s.s movements, e.g., in 1905-08, 1920-22, 1930, 1932 and 1942, it did so without the approval of either the capitalist cla.s.s as a whole or a significant section of it. However, once the movements were launched, the capitalist cla.s.s reacted to it in a complex and progressively changing fas.h.i.+on, as discussed above.

Quite significantly, the Indian capitalists never saw the Congress as their cla.s.s party or even as a party susceptible only to their influence. On the contrary, they saw the Congress as an open-ended organization, heading a popular movement, and in the words of J.K. Mehta, Secretary, Indian Merchants' Chamber, with 'room in it for men of all shades of political opinion and economic views,'26 and therefore, open to be transformed in either the Left or the Right direction.

In fact, it was precisely the increasing radicalization of the Congress in the Left direction in the 1930s, with the growing influence of Nehru, and the Socialists and Communists within the Congress, which spurred the capitalists into becoming more active in the political field. The fear of radicalization of the national movement, however, did not push the capitalists into the 'lap of imperialism,' as predicted by contemporary radicals and as actually happened in some other colonial and semi-colonial countries. Instead, the Indian capitalists evolved a subtle, many-sided strategy to contain the Left, no part of which involved a sell-out to imperialism or imperial interests.

For example, when in 1929 certain capitalists, to meet the high pitch of Communist activity among the trade unions, attempted to form a cla.s.s party, where European and Indian capitalists would combine, the leaders of the capitalist cla.s.s firmly quashed such a move. As G.D. Birla put it, 'The salvation of the capitalists does not lie in joining hands with reactionary elements' (i.e., pro-imperialist European interests in India) but in 'cooperating with those who through const.i.tutional means want to change the government for a national one' (i.e. conservative nationalists).27 Similarly, in 1928, the capitalists refused to support the Government in introducing the Public Safety Bill, which was intended to contain the Communists, on the ground that such a provision would be used to attack the national movement.

Further, the capitalists were not to attempt to 'kill Bolshevism and Communism with such frail weapons' as frontally attacking the Left with their cla.s.s organizations which would carry no weight with 'the ma.s.ses' or even the 'middle cla.s.ses.' As Birla explained, 'I have not the least doubt in my mind that a purely capitalist organization is the last body to put up an effective fight against communism.'28 A much superior method, he argued later (in 1936), when Nehru's leftist att.i.tude was seen as posing a danger, was to 'let those who have given up property say what you want to say.' The strategy was to 'strengthen the hands' of those nationalists who, in their ideology, did not transcend the parameters of capitalism or, preferably, even opposed socialism.29 The capitalists also realized, as G.L. Mehta, the president of FICCI, argued in 1943, that 'A consistent . . . programme of reforms' was the 'most effective remedy against social upheavals.'30 It was with this reform perspective that the 'Post War Economic Development Committee,' set up by the capitalists in 1942, which eventually drafted the Bombay Plan, was to function. Its attempt was to incorporate 'whatever is sound and feasible in the socialist movement' ana see 'how far socialist demands could be accommodated without capitalism surrendering any of its essential features.'31 The Bombay Plan, therefore, seriously took up the question of rapid economic growth and equitable distribution, even arguing for the necessity of partial nationalization, the public sector, land reform and a series of workers' welfare schemes. One may add that the basic a.s.sumption made by the Bombay planners was that the plan could be implemented only by an independent national Government.

Clearly the Indian capitalist cla.s.s was anti-socialist and bourgeois but it was not pro-imperialist.

The maturity of the Indian capitalist cla.s.s in identifying its long term interests, correctly understanding the nature of the Congress and its relations.h.i.+p with the different cla.s.ses in Indian society, its refusal to abandon the side of Indian nationalism even when threatened by the Left or tempted by imperialism, its ability to project its own cla.s.s interests as societal interests, are some of the reasons (apart from the failure of the Left in several of the above directions) which explains why, on the whole, the Indian national movement remained, till independence, under bourgeois ideological hegemony, despite strong contending trends within it.

30.

The Development of a Nationalist Foreign Policy

In the course of their own anti-imperialist struggle, the Indian people evolved a policy of opposition to imperialism as also the expression and establishment of solidarity with anti-imperialist movements in other parts of the world. From the beginning, the Indian nationalists opposed the British policy of interfering in the internal affairs of other countries and the use of the Indian army and India's resources to promote, extend and defend British imperialism in Africa and Asia.

The broad basis for the nationalist foreign policy was laid in the initial years of the national movement, which coincided with a particularly active phase of British imperial expansionism. From 1878 onwards, the Government of India undertook a number of large-scale military expeditions outside India's frontiers and its armed forces were used in some of the wars waged by the British Government in Asia and Africa. These wars and expeditions were a major source of the rapid and ma.s.sive increase in India's military expenditure. The early Indian national leaders condemned India's involvement in each of these wars and expeditions because of the financial burden of the Indian people, and on grounds of political morality, and also on the basis that these involved not Indian interests and purposes but British imperialist schemes of territorial and commercial expansion. They invariably demanded that the British Government should bear their entire cost. They also argued that India's interests would be best secured by a policy of peace.

The Second Afghan War was waged in 1878-80. Voicing the Indian opinion, Surendranath Banerjea publicly branded the war as an act of sheer aggression and 'as one of the most unrighteous wars that have blackened the pages of history.'1 The Indians demanded that since the unjust war was waged in pursuance of Imperial aims and policies, Britain should meet the entire cost of the war. The Amrita Bazar Patrika of 19 March 1880 wrote in its usual vein of irony: 'Nothing throws an Englishman into a pa.s.sion as when his pocket is touched and nothing pleases him more than when he can serve his own interests at the expense of others.'

In 1882, the Government of India partic.i.p.ated in the expedition sent by England to Egypt to put down the nationalist revolt led by Colonel Arabi. Condemning the 'aggressive' and 'immoral' British policy in Egypt, the Indian nationalists said that the war in Egypt was being waged to protect the interests of British capitalists, merchants and bond-holders.

At the end of 1885, the Government of India attacked and annexed Burma. With one voice the Indian nationalists condemned the war upon the Burmese people as being immoral, unwarranted, unjust, arbitrary and an act of uncalled for aggression. The motive force behind the policy was once again seen to be the promotion of British commercial interests in Burma and its northern neighbour, China. The nationalists opposed the annexation of Burma and praised the guerrilla fight put up by the Burmese people in the succeeding years.

In 1903, Lord Curzon launched an attack upon Tibet. The nationalist att.i.tude was best summarized by R.C. Dutt's denunciation of the 'needless, cruel, and useless war in Tibet,' once again motivated by commercial greed and territorial aggrandizement.2 Above all, it was the expansionist, 'forward' policy followed by the Government during the 1890s on India's north-western frontier that aroused the Indians' ire. Claiming to safeguard India against Russian designs, the Government of India got involved, year after year, in costly expeditions leading to the deployment of over 60,000 troops against rebellious tribesmen which led to the annexation of more and more new territory and, at the same time, to the continuous draining of the Indian treasury. The Indians claimed, on the one hand, that Anglo-Russian rivalry was the result of the clash of interests of the two imperialisms in Europe and Asia, and, on the other hand, that Russian aggression was a bogey, 'a monstrous bugbear,' raised to justify imperialist expansion. The nationalists justified the resistance put up by the frontier tribes in defending their independence. Refusing to accept the official propaganda that the Government's armed actions were provided by the lawlessness and blood-thirstiness of the frontier tribesmen, they condemned the Government for its savage measures in putting down the tribal uprisings. They were quite caustic about the claim of the British Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, that the frontier wars were 'but the surf that marks the edge and the advance of the wave of civilization.' 'Philanthropy, it is said,' quipped Tilak's Mahratta on 17 October 1897, 'is the last resort of the scoundrel and the statesman. It is the straw at which they will catch when reason is exhausted and sophistry is exposed.'

The Indian leaders argued that the expansionist policy of the Government of India's frontiers, a product of Britain's world-wide imperialist policy, was the most important cause of the maintenance of a large standing army, the increase in Indian military expenditure, the deplorable financial position of the Government, and the consequent increase of taxation in India after 1815. The Indians advocated, instead, a policy of peace, the demand for which was made by C. Sankaran Nair, the Congress President, in 1897 in words that have a remarkably modern and familiar ring: 'Our true policy is a peaceful policy . . . With such capacity for internal development as our country possesses, with such crying need to carry out the reforms absolutely necessary for our well-being, we want a period of prolonged peace.'3 Three other major themes in the area of nationalist foreign policy emerged during the period 1880-1914. One was that of sympathy and support for people fighting for their independence and liberation. Thus, sentiments of solidarity with the people of Ireland, Russia, Turkey, Burma, Afghanistan, Egypt and Sudan, Ethiopia and other people of Africa were vigorously expressed and popularized through the Press. Foreign intervention in China during the I Ho-Tuan (Boxer) Uprising was vigorously opposed and the despatch of Indian troops to China condemned.

The second theme was that of Asia-consciousness. It was during their opposition to the Burma war in 1885 that consciousness of an Asian ident.i.ty emerged, perhaps for the first time. Some of the nationalist newspapers bemoaned the disappearance of an independent, fellow Asian country. The rise of modern j.a.pan as an industrial power after 1868 was hailed by Indians as proof of the fact that a backward Asian country could develop itself within Western control. But despite their admiration for j.a.pan, the nationalist newspapers criticized it for attacking China in 1895 and for partic.i.p.ating in the international suppression of the I Ho-Tuan Uprising. The imperialist effort to part.i.tion China was condemned because its success would lead to the disappearance of a major independent Asian power. The defeat of Czarist Russia by j.a.pan further exploded the myth of European solidarity and led to the resurgence of a pan-Asian feeling.

Indians also began to understand and expound the economic rationale, including the role of foreign capital exports, behind the resurgence of imperialism in the last quarter of the 19th century. Thus, commenting on the reasons behind the attack upon Burma, the Mahratta of 15 November 1885, edited at the time of Tilak and Agarkar, wrote: The truth was 'that England with its superfluous human energy and overflowing capital cannot but adhere to the principle of political conduct - might is right - for centuries to come in order to find food for her superfluous population and markets for her manufacturers.' Similarly, the Hindu of 23 September 1889 remarked: 'Where foreign capital has been sunk in a country, the administration of that country becomes at once the concern of the bond-holders.'

World War I broke out in June 1914. The Indian nationalist leaders, including Lokamanya Tilak, decided to support the war effort of the Government. Sentiments of loyalty to the empire and of the desire to defend it were loudly and widely expressed. But, as Jawaharlal Nehru has pointed out in his Autobiography: 'There was little sympathy with the British in spite of loud professions of loyalty. Moderate and Extremist alike learnt with satisfaction of German victories. There was no love for Germany, of course, only the desire to see our own rulers humbled.'4 The hope was that a grateful Britain would repay India's loyalty with economic and political concessions enabling India to take a long step towards self-government, that Britain would apply to India the principles of democracy for which she and the Allies were claiming to be fighting the War.

After the War, the nationalists further developed their foreign policy in the direction of opposition to political and economic imperialism and cooperation of all nations in the cause of world peace. As part of this policy, at its Delhi session in 1919, the Congress demanded India's representation at the Peace Conference through its elected representatives.

Indians also continued to voice their sympathy for the freedom fighters of other countries. The Irish and Egyptian people and the Government of Turkey were extended active support. At its Calcutta session in 1920, the Congress asked the people not to join the army to fight in West Asia. In May 1921, Gandhiji declared that the Indian people would oppose any attack on Afghanistan. The Congress branded the Mandate system of the League of Nations as a cover for imperialist greed. In 1921, the Congress congratulated the Burmese people on their struggle for freedom. Burma was at that time a part of India, but the Congress announced that free India favoured Burma's independence from India. Gandhiji wrote in this context in 1922: 'I have never been able to take pride in the fact that Burma has been made part of British India. It never was and never should be. The Burmese have a civilization of their own.'5 In 1924, the Congress asked the Indian settlers in Burma to demand no separate rights at the cost of the Burmese people.

In 1925, the Northern March of the Chinese Nationalist army began under Sun Yat-Sen's leaders.h.i.+p and the foreign powers got ready to intervene. The Congress immediately expressed a strong bond of sympathy with the Chinese people in their struggle for national unity and against the common enemy and protested against the dispatch of Indian troops to China. In 1925, Gandhiji described the use of Indian soldiers to shoot the innocent Chinese students as a 'humiliating and degrading spectacle.' 'It demonstrates also most forcibly that India is being kept under subjection, not merely for the exploitation of India herself, but that it enables Great Britain to exploit the great and ancient Chinese nation.'6 In January 1927, S. Srinavasa Iyengar moved an adjournment motion in the Central Legislative a.s.sembly to protest against Indian troops being used to suppress the Chinese people. The strong Indian feelings on the question were repeatedly expressed by the Congress during 1927 (including at its Madras session). The Madras Congress advised Indians not to go to China to fight or work against the Chinese people who were fellow fighters in the struggle against imperialism. It also asked for the withdrawal of Indian troops from Mesopotamia and Iran and all other foreign countries. In 1928, the Congress a.s.sured the people of Egypt, Syria, Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan of its full support in their national liberation struggles.

Sentiments of the solidarity of the Indian people with the colonial people and the awareness of India's role as the gendarme of British imperialism the world over were summed up by Dr. M.A. Ansari in his presidential address at the Congress session of 1927: 'The history of this philanthropic burglary on the part of Europe is written in blood and suffering from Congo to Canton . . . Once India is free the whole edifice (of imperialism) will collapse as she is the key-stone of the arch of Imperialism.'7 *

In 1926-27, Jawaharlal Nehru travelled to Europe and came into contact with left-wing European political workers and thinkers. This had an abiding impact on his political development, including in the field of foreign affairs. This was, of course, not the first time that major Indian political leaders had made an effort to establish links with, and get the support of, the anti-imperialist sections of British and European public opinion. Dadabhai Naoroji was a close friend of the socialist H.M. Hyndman. He attended the Hague session of the International Socialist Congress in August 1904 and after describing imperialism as a species of barbarism declared that the Indian people had lost all faith in British political parties and parliament and looked for cooperation only to the British working cla.s.s. Lajpat Rai also established close relations with American socialists during his stay in the US from 1914-18. In 1917, he opposed US partic.i.p.ation in the World War because of the War's imperialistic character. Gandhiji also developed close relations with outstanding European figures such as Tolstoy and Romain Rolland.

The highlight of Jawaharlal's European visit was his partic.i.p.ation as a representative of the Congress in the International Congress against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism held in Brussels in February 1927. The basic objective of the Conference was to bring together the colonial people of Africa, Asia and Latin America struggling against imperialism and the working people of the capitalist countries fighting against capitalism. Nehru was elected one of the honorary presidents of the Conference along with Albert Einstein, Romain Rolland, Madame Sun Yat-Sen and George Lansbury. In his speeches and statements at the Conferences, Nehru emphasized the close connection between colonialism and capitalism and the deep commitment of Indian nationalism to internationalism and to anti-colonial struggles the world over. A major point of departure from previous Indian approaches was his understanding of the significance of US imperialism as a result of his discussions with Latin American delegates. In this confidential report on the Conference to the Congress Working Committee, he wrote: 'Most of us, specially from Asia, were wholly ignorant of the problems of South America, and of how the rising imperialism of the United States, with its tremendous resources and its immunity from outside attack, is gradually taking a stranglehold of Central and South America. But we are not likely to remain ignorant much longer for the great problem of the near future will be American imperialism, even more than British imperialism.'8 The Brussels Conference decided to found the League Against Imperialism and for National Independence. Nehru was elected to the Executive Council of the League. The Congress also affiliated to the League as an a.s.sociated member. At its Calcutta session, the Congress declared that the Indian struggle was a part of the worldwide struggle against imperialism. It also decided to open a Foreign Department to develop contacts with other peoples and movements fighting against imperialism. Nor was this understanding confined to Nehru and other leftists. Gandhiji, for example, wrote to Nehru in September 1933: 'We must recognize that our nationalism must not be inconsistent with progressive internationalism . . . I can, therefore, go the whole length with you and say that "we should range ourselves with the progressive forces of the world." '9 *

A very active phase of nationalist foreign policy began in 1936. From then onwards, there was hardly an important event in the world to which the Congress and its leaders did not react. Fascism had already triumphed in Italy, Germany and j.a.pan and was raising its ugly head in other parts of the capitalist world. The Congress condemned it as the most extreme form of imperialism and racialism. It fully recognized that the future of India was closely interlinked with the coming struggle between Fascism and the forces of freedom, socialism and democracy. It extended full support to the people of Ethiopia, Spain, China and Czechoslovakia in their struggle against fascist aggression.

The nationalist approach to world problems was clearly enunciated by Jawaharlal Nehru, the chief Congress spokesperson on world affairs, in his presidential address to the Lucknow Congress in 1936. Nehru a.n.a.lysed the world situation in detail and focused on the Indian struggle in the context of the coming world struggle against Fascism. 'Our struggle was but part of a far wider struggle for freedom, and the forces that moved us were moving people all over the world into action . . . Capitalism, in its difficulties, took to fascism . . . what its imperialist counterpart had long been in the subject colonial countries. Fascism and imperialism thus-stood out as the two faces of the now decaying capitalism.' And again: 'Thus we see the world divided up into two vast groups today - the imperialist and fascist on one side, the socialist and nationalist on the other. Inevitably we take our stand with the progressive forces of the world which are ranged against fascism and imperialism.'10 Nehru went back to these themes again and again in the later years. 'The frontiers of our struggle lie not only in our own country but in Spain and China also,' he wrote in January 1939.11 Gandhiji, too, gave expression to strong anti-fascist feelings. He condemned Hitler for the genocide of the Jews and for 'propounding a new religion of exclusive and militant nationalism in the name of which any inhumanity becomes an act of humanity.' 'If there ever could be a justifiable war in the name of and for humanity,' he wrote, 'a war against Germany, to prevent the wanton persecution of a whole race, would be completely justified.'12 When Ethiopia was attacked by fascist Italy in early 1936, the Congress declared the Ethiopian people's struggle to be part of all exploited people's struggle for freedom. The Congress declared 9 May to be Ethiopia Day on which demonstrations and meetings were held all over India expressing sympathy and solidarity with the Ethiopians. On his way back from Europe, Jawaharlal refused to meet Mussolini, despite his repeated invitations, lest the meeting was used for fascist propaganda.

The Congress expressed strong support for Spanish Republicans engaged in a life and death struggle with fascist Franco in the Spanish Civil War. In his presidential address to the Faizpur Congress in December 1936, Nehru emphasized that the struggle going on in Spain was not merely between Republicans and Franco or even Fascism and democracy but between forces of progress and reaction throughout the world. 'In Spain today,' he declared, 'our battles are being fought and we watch this struggle not merely with the sympathy of friendly outsiders, but with the painful anxiety of those who are themselves involved in it.'13 In June 1938, he visited Spain accompanied by Krishna Menon, visited the battlefront and spent five days in Barcelona which was under constant bombardment. On 13 October 1938, Gandhiji sent a message to Juan Negrin, Prime Minister of Spain: 'My whole heart goes out to you in sympathy. May true freedom be the outcome of your agony.'14 In late 1938, Hitler began his diplomatic and political aggression against Czechoslovakia leading to its betrayal by Britain and France at Munich. The Congress Working Committee, meeting in Nehru's absence, pa.s.sed a resolution viewing 'with grave concern the unabashed attempt that is being made by Germany to deprive Czechoslovakia of its independence or to reduce it to impotence,' and sending its 'profound sympathy to the brave people of Czechoslovakia.'15 Gandhiji wrote in the Harijan: 'Let the Czechs know that the Working Committee wrung itself with pain while their doom was being decided.' Speaking for himself, Gandhiji wrote that the plight of the Czechs 'moved me to the point of physical and mental distress.'16 Nehru, then in Europe, refused to visit Germany as a state guest and went to Prague instead. He was angry with the British Government for encouraging Germany. In a letter to the Manchester Guardian he wrote: 'Recent developments in Czechoslovakia and the way the British Government, directly and through its mediators, had baulked and threatened the Czech Government at every turn has produced a feeling of nausea in me.'17 He was disgusted with the Munich Agreement and in an article in the National Herald of 5 October 1938, he described it as 'the rape of Czechoslovakia by Germany with England and France holding her forcibly down!'18 His interpretation of this betrayal of Czechoslovakia was that Britain and France wanted to isolate the Soviet Union and maintain Fascism in Europe as a counterpoise to it. At Tripuri, in early 1939, the Congress pa.s.sed a resolution dissociating itself 'entirely from the British foreign policy, which has consistently aided the fascist Powers and helped the destruction of the democratic countries.'

In 1937, j.a.pan launched an attack on China. The Congress pa.s.sed a resolution condemning j.a.pan and calling upon the Indian people to boycott j.a.panese goods as a mark of their sympathy with the Chinese people. At its Haripura session in early 1938, the Congress reiterated this call while condemning 'the aggression of a brutal imperialism in China and horrors and frightfulness that have accompanied it.' It warned that the invasion of China was 'fraught with the gravest consequences for the future of the world peace and of freedom in Asia.' As an expression of its solidarity with the Chinese people, 12 June was celebrated throughout India as China Day. The Congress also sent a medical mission, headed by Dr. M. Atal, to work with the Chinese armed forces. One of its members, Dr. Kotnis, was to lay down his life working with the Eighth Route Army under Mao Ze-Dong's command.

The complexity, the humanist approach, and anti-imperialist content of the Indian nationalist foreign policy were brought out in the approach to the problem of Palestine. While Arabs were fighting against British imperialism in Palestine, many of the Jews, hunted and killed in n.a.z.i Germany and discriminated against and oppressed all over Europe, were trying to carve out under Zionist leaders.h.i.+p a homeland in Palestine with British support. Indians sympathized with the persecuted Jews, victims of n.a.z.i genocide, but they criticized their efforts to deprive the Arabs of their due. They supported the Arabs and urged the Jews to reach an agreement with the Arabs directly. The Congress observed 27 September 1936 as Palestine Day. In October 1937, the Congress protested against the reign of terror in Palestine and the proposal to part.i.tion it and a.s.sured the Arabs of the solidarity of the Indian people. In September 1938, it again condemned the part.i.tion decision, urged the British to 'leave the Jews and Arabs to amicably settle the issues between them,' and appealed to the Jews 'not to take shelter behind British imperialism.' Gandhiji reiterated all these views in December 1938 in an important editorial in the Harijan on the plight of the Jews in Europe. 'My sympathies are all with the Jews,' he wrote. But it would also be 'wrong and inhuman to impose the Jews on the Arabs . . . It would be crime against humanity to reduce the proud Arabs.' Appealing to the Jews to reason with the Arabs and 'discard the help of the British bayonet,' he pointed out that 'as it is, they are co-sharers with the British in despoiling a people who have done no wrong to them.'19 Nehru gave expression to similar views on the Palestinian question from 1936 to 1939.

A major aspect of the nationalists' world outlook, especially of the youth, was the admiration and immense goodwill for the Soviet Union. Nearly all the major Indian political leaders of the time - for example, Lokamanya Tilak, Lajpat Rai, Bipin Chandra Pal - had reacted favourably to the Russian Revolution during 1917-18, seeing in it the success of an oppressed people. During the 1920s, the rising socialist and communist groups and young intellectuals were attracted by the Soviet Union, its egalitarianism, socialist idealism, anti-imperialism, and the Five Year Plan and were full of admiration for the socialist homeland. In November 1927, Jawaharlal and Motilal visited the Soviet Union. On his return, Jawaharlal wrote a series of articles for the Hindu which were also published in book form. His reaction was very positive and idealistic and was reflected in the lines he put on the t.i.tle page of the book: 'Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive, but to be young was very heaven.' In 1928 and after Nehru repeatedly praised the Soviet Union 'as the greatest opponent of imperialism,' this admiration for the Soviet Union was to deepen as he came more and more under the influence of Marxism. At Lucknow, in 1936, he said that though he was pained and disagreed with much that was happening in the Soviet Union, he looked upon 'that great and fascinating unfolding of a new order and a new civilization as the most promising feature of our dismal age.' In fact, 'if the future is full of hope it is largely because of Soviet Russia.'20 The ma.s.s trials and purges of Stalin's opponents in the 1930s repelled him, but he still retained his faith in the Soviet regime, especially as, in his view, it 'stood as the one real effective bulwark against fascism in Europe and Asia.'21 Other Congress leaders, for example, C.R. Das and Gandhiji were also friendly to the Soviet Union but were put off by what they believed to be the Communist emphasis on the role of violence. This was particularly true of Gandhiji. But he, too, gradually began to change his appraisal. In a discussion with students of Gujarat Vidyapith in late 1928, Gandhiji, on one hand, praised the Bolshevik ideal of the abolition of the inst.i.tution of private property and, on the other, condemned the Bolsheviks for accomplis.h.i.+ng it through violence. While predicting the downfall of the Bolshevik regime, he said: 'If it continued to base itself on violence, there is no questioning the fact that the Bolshevik ideal has behind it the purest sacrifice of countless men and women who have given up their all for its sake, and an ideal that is sanctified by the sacrifices of such master spirits as Lenin cannot go in vain; the n.o.ble example of their renunciation will be emblazoned for ever and quicken and purify the ideal as time pa.s.ses.'22 Goodwill, admiration and support for the Soviet Union were to acquire major proportions during the 1930s as the Communist Party, the Congress Socialist Party, the kisan sabhas, and trade unions developed and in their propaganda and agitation cited the Soviet Union as an example of what workers' and peasants' power could achieve.

War clouds had begun to gather again around the world since the late 1920s. The Congress had declared at its Madras session in 1927 that India could not be a party to an imperialist war and in no case should India be made to join a war without the consent of its people. This declaration was to become one of the foundations of nationalist foreign policy in the later years and was repeated time and again. The rise of Fascism and the threat it posed to peace, democracy and socialism and to the independence of nations transformed the situation to a certain extent. As pointed out earlier, the Indian national leaders.h.i.+p was firmly opposed to Fascism and the fascist drive towards war and conquest. At the same time, it was afraid that Britain would go to war, when it did, not in defence of peace and democracy but to protect its imperialist interests. Indian could not support an imperialist war. Moreover, imperialism itself was a major cause of war. Imperialism must disappear if the fascist threat was to be successfully met; and lasting peace could be established only if the domination and exploitation of one nation by another was ended. The character of the war in which Britain partic.i.p.ated would be determined by its att.i.tude towards India's freedom. For enslaved India could not fight for the freedom of others. India could, and would, actively support an anti-fascist war provided its independence was immediately recognized. On the other hand, the Congress repeatedly declared, during 1936-39, it would resist every effort to use Indian men, money and resources in a war to serve British imperialism. Summing up the nationalist position, Nehru wrote on 18 April 1939: 'For us in India our path is clear. It is one of complete opposition to the fascists; it is also one of opposition to imperialism. We are not going to line up under Chamberlainism; we are not going to throw our resources in defence of empire. But we would gladly offer those very resources for the defence of democracy, the democracy of a free India lined up with other free countries.'23 This position was reiterated by the Congress Working Committee meeting in the second week of August 1939, virtually on the eve of war. Because of this commitment to non-violence, Gandhiji had a basic difference with this approach. But he agreed to go along. The Congress position was to be sorely tested in the coming three years.

31.

The Rise and Growth of Communalism

Before we discuss the growth of communalism in modern India, it is perhaps useful to define the term and point to certain basic fallacies regarding it. Communalism is basically an ideology with which we have lived so long that it appears to be a simple, easily understood notion. But this is, perhaps not so.

Communalism or communal ideology consists of three basic elements or stages, one following the other. First, it is the belief that people who follow the same religion have common secular interests, that is, common political, economic, social and cultural interests. This is the first bedrock of communal ideology. From this arises the notion of socio-political communities based on religion. It is these religion-based communities, and not cla.s.ses, nationalities, linguistic-cultural groups, nations or such politico-territorial units as provinces or states, that are seen as the fundamental units of Indian society. The Indian people, it is believed, can act socially and politically and protect their collective or corporate or non-individual interests only as members of these religion-based communities. These different communities are alleged to have their own leaders. Those who talk of being national, regional, or cla.s.s leaders are merely masquerading; beneath the mask they are only leaders of their own communities. The best they can do is to unite as communal leaders and then serve the wider category of the nation or country.

The second element of communal ideology rests on the notion that in a multi-religious society like India, the secular interests, that is the social, cultural, economic and political interests, of the followers of one religion are dissimilar and divergent from the interests of the followers of another religion.

The third stage of communalism is reached when the interests of the followers of different religions or of different 'communities' are seen to be mutually incompatible, antagonistic and hostile. Thus, the communalist a.s.serts this stage that Hindus and Muslims cannot have common secular interests, that their secular interests are bound to be opposed to each other.

Communalism is, therefore, basically and above all an ideology on which communal politics is based. Communal violence is a conjunctural consequence of communal ideology. Similarly, Hindu, Muslim, Sikh or Christian communalisms are not very different from each other; they belong to a single species; they are varieties of the same communal ideology.

Communal ideology in a person, party or movement starts with the first stage. Many nationalists fell prey to it or thought within its digits even while rejecting the two other elements of communalism, that is, the notion of the mutual divergence or hostility of the interests of different religion-based communities. These were the persons who saw themselves as Nationalist Hindus, Nationalist Muslims, Nationalist Sikhs, etc., and not as simple nationalists.

The second stage of communalism may be described as liberal communalism or, in the words of some, moderate communalism. The liberal communalist was basically a believer in and pract.i.tioner of communal politics; but he still upheld certain liberal, democratic, humanist and nationalist values. Even while holding that India consisted of distinct religion-based communities, with their own separate and special interests which sometimes came into conflict with each other, he continued to believe and profess publicly that these different communal interests could be gradually accommodated and brought into harmony within the overall, developing national interests, and India built as a nation. Most of the communalists before 1937 - the Hindu Mahasabha, the Muslim League, the Ali Brothers after 1925, M.A. Jinnah, Madan Mohan Malaviya, Lajpat Rai, and N.C. Kelkar after 1922 - functioned within a liberal communal framework.

Extreme communalism, or communalism functioning broadly within a fascist syndrome, formed the third or last stage of communalism. Extreme communalism was based on fear and hatred, and had a tendency to use violence of language, deed or behaviour, the language of war and enmity against political opponents. It was at this stage that the communalists declared that Muslims, 'Muslim culture' and Islam and Hindus, 'Hindu culture,' and Hinduism were in danger of being suppressed and exterminated. It was also at this stage that both the Muslim and Hindu communalists put forward the theory that Muslims and Hindus const.i.tuted separate nations whose mutual antagonism was permanent and irresolvable. The Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha after 1937 and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) increasingly veered towards extreme or fascistic communalism.

Though the three stages of communalism were different from one another, they also interacted and provided a certain continuum. Its first element or stage fed liberal and extreme communalism and made it difficult to carry on a struggle against them. Similarly, the liberal communalist found it difficult to prevent the ideological transition to extreme communalism.

We may take note of several other connected aspects. While a communalist talked of, or believed in, defending his 'community's' interests, in real life no such interests existed outside the field of religion. The economic and political interests of Hindus, Muslims, and others were the same. In that sense they did not even const.i.tute separate communities. As Hindus or Muslims they did not have a separate political-economic life or interests on an all-India or even regional basis. They were divided from fellow Hindus or Muslims by region, language, culture, cla.s.s, caste, social status, social practices, food and dress habits, etc., and united on these aspects with followers of other religions. An upper cla.s.s Muslim had far more in common, even culturally, with an upper cla.s.s Hindu than with a lower cla.s.s Muslim. Similarly, a Punjabi Hindu stood closer culturally to a Punjabi Muslim than to a Bengali Hindu; and, of course, the same was true of a Bengali Muslim in relation to a Bengali Hindu and a Punjabi Muslim. The unreal communal division, thus, obscured the real division of the Indian people into linguistic-cultural regions and social cla.s.ses as well as their real, emerging and growing unity into a nation.

If communal interests did not exist, then communalism was not a partial or one-sided or sectional view of the social reality; it was its wrong or unscientific view. It has been suggested, on occasions, that a communalist, being narrow-minded, looks after his own community's interests. But if no such interests existed, then he could not be serving his 'community's' or co-religionists' interests either. He could not be the 'representative' of his 'community.' In the name of serving his community's interests, he served knowingly or unknowingly some other interests. He, therefore, either deceived others or unconsciously deceived himself. Thus, communal a.s.sumptions, communal logic and communal answers were wrong. What the communalist projected as problems were not the real problems, and what the communalist said was the answer was not the real answer.

Sometimes, communalism is seen as something that has survived from the past, as something that the medieval period has bequeathed to the present or at least as having roots in the medieval period. But while communalism uses, and is based on, many elements of ancient and medieval ideologies, basically it is a modern technology and political trend that expresses the social urges and serves the political needs of modern social groups, cla.s.ses and forces. Its social roots as also its social, political and economic objectives lie very much in the modern period of Indian history. It was brought into existence and sustained by contemporary socio-economic structure.

Communalism emerged as a consequence of the emergence of modern politics which marked a sharp break with the politics of the ancient or medieval or pre-1857 periods. Communalism, as also other modern views such as nationalism and socialism, could emerge as politics and as ideology only after politics based on the people, politics of popular partic.i.p.ation and mobilization, politics based on the creation and mobilization of public opinion had come into existence. In pre-modern politics, people were either ignored in upper-cla.s.s based politics or were compelled to rebel outside the political system and, in case of success, their leaders incorporated into the old ruling cla.s.ses. This was recognized by many perceptive Indians. Jawaharlal Nehru, for example, noted in 1936: 'One must never forget that communalism in India is a latter-day phenomenon which has grown up before our eyes.'1 Nor was there anything unique about communalism in the Indian context. It was not an inevitable or inherent product of India's peculiar historical and social development. It was the result of conditions which have in other societies produced similar phenomena and ideologies such as Fascism, anti-Semitism, racism, Catholic-Protestant conflict in Northern Ireland, or Christian-Muslim conflict in Lebanon.

The communal consciousness arose as a result of the transformation of Indian society under the impact of colonialism and the need to struggle against it. The growing economic, political and administrative unification of regions and the country, the process of making India into a nation, the developing contradiction between colonialism and the Indian people and the formation of modern social cla.s.ses and strata called for new ways of seeing one's common interests. They made it necessary to have wider links and loyalties among the people and to form new ident.i.ties. This also followed from the birth of new politics during the last half of the 19th century. The new politics was based on the politicization and mobilization of an ever increasing number of the Indian people.

The process of grasping the new, emerging political reality and social relations and the adoption of new uniting principles, new social and political ident.i.ties with the aid of new ideas and concepts was bound to be a difficult and gradual process. The process required the spread of modern ideas of nationalism, cultural-linguistic development and cla.s.s struggle. But wherever their growth was slow and partial, people inevitably used the old, familiar pre-modern categories of self-ident.i.ty such as caste, locality, region, race, religion, sect and occupation to grasp the new reality, to make wider connections and to evolve new ident.i.ties and ideologies. Similar developments have occurred all over the world in similar circ.u.mstances. But often such old, inadequate and false ideas and ident.i.ties gradually give way to the new, historically necessary ideas and ident.i.ties of nation, nationality and cla.s.s. This also occurred on a large scale in India, but not uniformly among all the Indian people. In particular, religious consciousness was transformed into communal consciousness in some parts of the country and among some sections of the people. This was because there were some factors in the Indian situation which favoured its growth; it served the needs of certain sections of society and certain social and political forces. The question is why did communalism succeed in growing during the 20th century? What aspects of the Indian situation favoured this process? Which social cla.s.ses and political forces did it serve? Why did it become such a pervasive part of Indian reality? Though it was not inherent or inevitable in the situation, it was not a mere conspiracy of power-hungry politicians and crafty administrators either. It had socio-economic and political roots. There was a social situation which was funneling it and without which it could not have survived for long.

Above all, communalism was one of the by-products of the colonial character of Indian economy, of colonial underdevelopment, of the incapacity of colonialism to develop the Indian economy. The resulting economic stagnation and its impact on the lives of the Indian people, especially the middle cla.s.ses, produced conditions which were conducive to division and antagonism within Indian society as also to its radical transformation.

Throughout the 20th century, in the absence of modern industrial development and the development of education, health and other social and cultural services, unemployment was an acute problem in India, especially for the educated middle and lower middle cla.s.ses who could not fall back on land and whose socio-economic conditions suffered constant deterioration. These economic opportunities declined further during the Great Depression after 1928 when large scale unemployment prevailed.

In this social situation, the nationalist and other popular movements worked for the long-term solution to the people's problems by fighting for the overthrow of colonialism and radical social transformation. In fact, the middle cla.s.ses formed the backbone both of the militant national movement from 1905 to 1947 and the left-wing parties and groups since the 1920s. Unfortunately there were some who lacked a wider social vision and political understanding and looked to their narrow immediate interests and short-term solutions to their personal or sectional problems such as communal, caste, or provincial reservation in jobs or in munic.i.p.al committees, legislatures, and so on.

Because of economic stagnation, there was intense compet.i.tion among individuals for government jobs, in professions like law and medicine, and in business for customers and markets. In an attempt to get a larger share of existing economic opportunities, middle cla.s.s individuals freely used all the means at their disposal - educational qualifications, personal merit as also nepotism, bribery, and so on. At the same time, to give their struggle a wider base, they also used other group ident.i.ties such as caste, province and religion to enhance their capacity to compete. Thus, some individuals from the middle cla.s.ses could, and did, benefit, in the short run, from communalism, especially in the field of government employment. This gave a certain aura of validity to communal politics. The communalist could impose his interpretation of reality on middle cla.s.s individuals because it did have a basis, however partial, perverted and short-term, in the social existence and social experience of the middle cla.s.ses.

Gradually, the spread of education to well-off peasants and small landlords extended the boundaries of the job-seeking middle cla.s.s to the rural areas. The newly educated rural youth could not be sustained by land whether as landlords or peasants, especially as agriculture was totally stagnant because of the colonial impact. They flocked on the towns and cities for opening in government jobs and professions and tried to save themselves by fighting for jobs through the system of communal reservations and nominations. This development gradually widened the social base of communalism to cover the rural upper strata of peasants and landlords.

Thus, the crisis of the colonial economy constantly generated two opposing sets of ideologies and political tendencies among the middle cla.s.ses. When anti-imperialist revolution and social change appeared on the agenda, the middle cla.s.ses enthusiastically joined the national and other popular movements. They then readily advocated the cause and demands of the entire society from the capitalists to the peasants and workers. Individual ambitions were then sunk in the wider social vision. But when prospects of revolutionary change receded, when the anti-imperialist struggle entered a more pa.s.sive phase, many belonging to the middle cla.s.ses s.h.i.+fted to short-term solutions of their personal problems, to politics based on communalism and other similar ideologies. Thus with the same social causation, large sections of the middle cla.s.ses in several parts of the country constantly oscillated between anti-imperialism and communalism or communal-type politics. But there was a crucial different in the two cases. In the first case, their own social interests merged with the interests of general social development and their politics formed a part of the broader anti-imperialist struggle. In the second case, they functioned as a narrow and selfish interest group, accepted the socio-political status quo and objectively served colonialism.

To sum up this aspect: communalism was deeply rooted in and was an expression of the interests and aspirations of the middle cla.s.ses in a social situation in which opportunities for them were grossly inadequate. The communal question was, therefore a middle cla.s.s question par excellence. The main appeal of communalism and its main social base also lay among the middle cla.s.ses. It is, however, important to remember that a large number of middle cla.s.s individuals remained, on the whole free of communalism even in the 1930s and 1940s. This was, in particular, true of most of the intellectuals, whether Hindu, Muslim or Sikh. In fact, the typical Indian intellectual of the 1930s tended to be both secular and broadly left-wing.

There was another aspect of the colonial economy that favoured communal politics. In the absence of openings in industry, commerce, education and other social services, and the cultural and entertainment fields, the Government service was the main avenue of employment for the middle cla.s.ses. Much of the employment for teachers, doctors and engineers was also under government control. As late as 1951, while 1.2 million persons were covered by the Factory Acts, 3.3 millions got employment in government service. And communal politics could be used to put pressure on the Government to reserve and allocate its jobs as also seats in professional colleges on communal and caste lines. Consequently, communal politics till 1937 was organized around government jobs, educational concessions, and the like as also political positions - seats in legislative councils, munic.i.p.al bodies, etc. - which enabled control over these and other economic opportunities. It may also be noted that though the communalists spoke in the name of their 'communities,' the reservations, guarantees and other 'rights' they demanded were virtually confined to these two aspects. They did not take up any issues which were of interest to the ma.s.ses.

At another plane, communalism often distorted or misinterpreted social tension and cla.s.s conflict between the exploiters and the exploited belonging to different religions as communal conflict. While the discontent and clash of interests was real and was due to non-religious or non-communal factors, because of backward political consciousness it found a distorted expression in communal conflict. As C.G. Shah has put it: 'Under the pressure of communal propaganda, the ma.s.ses are unable to locate the real causes of their exploitation, oppression, and suffering and imagine a fict.i.tious communal source of their origin.'2 What made such communal (and later casteist) distortion possible was a specific feature of Indian social development - in several parts of the country the religious distinction coincided with social, and cla.s.s distinctions. Here most often the exploiting sections - landlords, merchants and moneylenders, - were upper caste Hindus while the poor and exploited were Muslims or lower caste Hindus. Consequently, propaganda by the Muslim communalists that Hindus were exploiting Muslims or by the Hindu communalists that Muslims were threatening Hindu property or economic interests could succeed even while wholly incorrect. Thus, for example, the struggle between tenant and landlord in East Bengal and Malabar and the peasant-debtor and the merchant-moneylender in Punjab could be portrayed by the communalists as a struggle between Muslims and Hindus. Similarly, the landlord-moneylender oppression was represented as the oppression of Muslims by Hindus, and the attack by the rural poor on the rural rich as an attack by Muslims on Hindus. For example, one aspect of the growth of communalism in Punjab was the effort of the big Muslim landlords to protect their economic and social position by using communalism to turn the anger of their Muslim tenants against Hindu traders and moneylenders, and the use of communalism by the latter to protect their threatened cla.s.s interests by raising the cry of Hindu interests in danger. In reality, the struggle of the peasants for their emanc.i.p.ation was inevitable. The question was what type of ideological-political content it would acquire. Both the communalists and the colonial administrators stressed the communal as against the cla.s.s aspects of agrarian exploitation and oppression. Thus, they held that the Muslim peasants and debtors were being exploited not as peasants and debtors but because they were Muslims.

In many cases, a communal form is given to the social conflict not by the partic.i.p.ants but by the observer, the official, the journalist, the politician, and, finally, the historian, all of whom provide a post-facto communal explanation for the conflict because of their own conscious or unconscious outlook. It is also important to note that agrarian conflicts did not a.s.sume a communal colour until the 20th century and the rise of communalism and that too not in most cases. In the Pabna agrarian riots of 1873, both Hindu and Muslim tenants fought zamindars together. Similarly, as brought out in earlier chapters, most of the agrarian struggles after 1919 stayed clear of communal channels. The peasants and workers and the radical intelligentsia succeeded in creating powerful secular peasants' and workers' movements and organizations which became important const.i.tuents of the anti-imperialist struggle.

It is important to note in this context that Hindu zamindars in Bengal had acquired control over land not because they were Hindus but as a result of the historical process of the spread of Islamic religion in Bengal among the lower castes and cla.s.ses. Hindu zamindars and businessmen acquired economic dominance over landed capital in Bengal at the beginning of the 18th century during the rule of Murs.h.i.+d Quli Khan, religiously the most devout of Aurangzeb's officials and followers. Under his rule, more than seventy-five per cent of the zamindars and most of the taluqdars were Hindus. The Permanent Settlement of 1793 further strengthened the trend by eliminating on a large scale both the old Hindu and Muslim zamindar families and replacing them with new men of commerce who were Hindus. Similarly, the predominance of Hindus among bankers, traders and moneylenders in northern India dated to the medieval period. The dominance these strata acquired over rural society under British rule was the result not of their being Hindu but of the important economic role they acquired in the colonial system of exploitation. In other words, colonial history guaranteed the growth and economic domination of merchant-moneylenders; medieval history had guaranteed that they would be mostly Hindus.

Communalism represented, at another level, a struggle between two upper cla.s.ses or strata for power, privileges and economic gains. Belonging to different religions (or castes) these cla.s.ses or strata used communalism to mobilize the popular support of their co-religionists in their mutual struggles. This was, for example, the case in Western Punjab where the Muslim landlords opposed the Hindu moneylenders and in East Bengal where the Muslim jotedars (small landlords) opposed the Hindu zamindars.

Above all, communalism developed as a weapon of economically and politically reactionary social cla.s.ses and political forces - and semi-feudal landlords and ex-bureaucrats (whom Dr. K.M. Ashraf has called the jagirdari cla.s.ses)3 merchants and moneylenders and the colonial state. Communal leaders and parties were, in general, allied with these cla.s.ses and forces. The social, economic and political vested interests deliberately encouraged or unconsciously adopted communalism because of its capacity to distort and divert popular struggles, to prevent the ma.s.ses from understanding the socio-economic and political forces responsible for their social condition, to prevent unity on national and cla.s.s lines, and to turn them away from their real national and socio-economic interests and issues and ma.s.s movements around them. Communalism also enabled the upper cla.s.ses and the colonial rulers to unite with sections of the middle cla.s.ses and to utilize the latter's politics to serve their own ends.

British rule and its policy of Divide and Rule bore special responsibility for the growth of communalism in modern India, though it is also true that it could succeed only because of internal social and political conditions. The fact was that the state, with its immense power, could promote either national integration or all kinds of divisive forces. The colonial state chose the latter course. It used communalism to counter and weaken the growing national movement and the welding of the Indian people into a nation. Communalism was presented by the colonial rulers as the problem of the defence of minorities. Hindu-Muslim disunity - and the need to protect the minorities from domination and suppression by the majority - was increasingly offered as the main justification for the maintenance of British rule, especially as theories of civilizing mission, white man's burden, welfare of the ruled, etc., got increasingly discredited.

Communalism was, of course, not the o