The Works of George Berkeley Part 16

(M307) Bodies exist without the mind, i.e. are not the mind, but distinct from it. This I allow, the mind being altogether different therefrom(193).

(M308) Certainly we should not see motion if there was no diversity of colours.

(M309) Motion is an abstract idea, i.e. there is no such idea that can be conceived by itself.

(M310) Contradictions cannot be both true. Men are obliged to answer objections drawn from consequences. Introd.

(M311) The Will and Volition are words not used by the vulgar. The learned are bantered by their meaning abstract ideas.

Speculative Math, as if a man was all day making hard knots on purpose to unty them again.

Tho' it might have been otherwise, yet it is convenient the same thing wch is M.V. should be also M.T., or very near it.

(M312) I must not give the soul or mind the scholastique name "pure act,"

but rather pure spirit, or active being.

(M313) I must not say the Will or Understanding are all one, but that they are both abstract ideas, i.e. none at all-they not being even _ratione_ different from the Spirit, _qua_ faculties, or active.

(M314) Dangerous to make idea & thing terms convertible(194). That were the way to prove spirits are nothing.

(M315) Qu. whether _veritas_ stands not for an abstract idea?

(M316) 'Tis plain the moderns must by their own principles own there are no bodies, i.e. no sort of bodies without the mind, i.e. unperceived.

(M317) Qu. whether the Will can be the object of prescience or any knowledge?

(M318) If there were only one ball in the world, it could not be moved.

There could be no variety of appearance.

According to the doctrine of infinite divisibility, there must be some smell of a rose, v. g. at an infinite distance from it.

(M319) Extension, tho' it exist only in the mind, yet is no property of the mind. The mind can exist without it, tho' it cannot without the mind.

But in Book II. I shall at large shew the difference there is betwixt the Soul and Body or extended being.

(M320) 'Tis an absurd question wch Locke puts, whether man be free to will?

Mem. To enquire into the reason of the rule for determining questions in Algebra.

It has already been observed by others that names are nowhere of more necessary use than in numbering.

(M321) I will grant you that extension, colour, &c. may be said to be without the mind in a double respect, i.e. as independent of our will, and as distinct from the mind.

(M322) Certainly it is not impossible but a man may arrive at the knowledge of all real truth as well without as with signs, had he a memory and imagination most strong and capacious. Therefore reasoning & science doth not altogether depend upon words or names(195).

(M323) I think not that things fall out of necessity. The connexion of no two ideas is necessary; 'tis all the result of freedom, i.e. 'tis all voluntary(196).

(M324) If a man with his eyes shut imagines to himself the sun & firmament, you will not say _he_ or _his mind_ is the sun, or is extended, tho' neither sun or firmament be without mind.

(M325) 'Tis strange to find philosophers doubting & disputing whether they have ideas of spiritual things or no. Surely 'tis easy to know. Vid. De Vries(197), _De Ideis Innatis_, p. 64.

(M326) De Vries will have it that we know the mind agrees with things not by idea but sense or conscientia. So will Malbranch. This a vain distinction.

August 28th, 1708. The Adventure of the [s.h.i.+rt?].

It were to be wished that persons of the greatest birth, honour, & fortune, would take that care of themselves, by education, industry, literature, & a love of virtue, to surpa.s.s all other men in knowledge & all other qualifications necessary for great actions, as far as they do in quality & t.i.tles; that princes out of them might always chose men fit for all employments and high trusts. Clov. B. 7.

One eternity greater than another of the same kind.

In what sense eternity may be limited.

(M327) Whether succession of ideas in the Divine intellect?

(M328) Time is the train of ideas succeeding each other.

Duration not distinguish'd from existence.

Succession explain'd by before, between, after, & numbering.

Why time in pain longer than time in pleasure?

Duration infinitely divisible, time not so.

(M329) The same t? ??? not common to all intelligences.

Time thought infinitely divisible on account of its measure.

Extension not infinitely divisible in one sense.

Revolutions immediately measure train of ideas, mediately duration.

(M330) Time a sensation; therefore onely in ye mind.

Eternity is onely a train of innumerable ideas. Hence the immortality of ye soul easily conceiv'd, or rather the immortality of the person, that of ye soul not being necessary for ought we can see.

Swiftness of ideas compar'd with yt of motions shews the wisdom of G.o.d.

Wt if succession of ideas were swifter, wt if slower?

(M331) Fall of Adam, use of idolatry, use of Epicurism & Hobbism, dispute about divisibility of matter, &c. expounded by material substances.

Extension a sensation, therefore not without the mind.