The Works of George Berkeley Part 17

(M332) In the immaterial hypothesis, the wall is white, fire hot, &c.

Primary ideas prov'd not to exist in matter; after the same manner yt secondary ones are prov'd not to exist therein.

Demonstrations of the infinite divisibility of extension suppose length without breadth, or invisible length, wch is absurd.

(M333) World wthout thought is _nec quid_, _nec quantum_, _nec quale_, &c.

(M334) 'Tis wondrous to contemplate ye World empty'd of all intelligences.

Nothing properly but Persons, i.e. conscious things, do exist. All other things are not so much existences as manners of ye existence of persons(198).

Qu. about the soul, or rather person, whether it be not compleatly known?

Infinite divisibility of extension does suppose the external existence of extension; but the later is false, ergo ye former also.

Qu. Blind man made to see, would he know motion at 1st sight?

Motion, figure, and extension perceivable by sight are different from those ideas perceived by touch wch goe by the same name.

Diagonal incommensurable wth ye side. Quaere how this can be in my doctrine?

(M335) Qu. how to reconcile Newton's 2 sorts of motion with my doctrine?

Terminations of surfaces & lines not imaginable _per se_.

Molyneux's blind man would not know the sphere or cube to be bodies or extended at first sight(199).

Extension so far from being incompatible wth, yt 'tis impossible it should exist without thought.

(M336) Extension itself or anything extended cannot think-these being meer ideas or sensations, whose essence we thoroughly know.

No extension but surface perceivable by sight.

(M337) Wn we imagine 2 bowls v. g. moving in vacuo, 'tis only conceiving a person affected with these sensations.

(M338) Extension to exist in a thoughtless thing [or rather in a thing void of perception-thought seeming to imply action], is a contradiction.

Qu. if visible motion be proportional to tangible motion?

(M339) In some dreams succession of ideas swifter than at other times.

(M340) If a piece of matter have extension, that must be determined to a particular bigness & figure, but &c.

Nothing wthout corresponds to our primary ideas but powers. Hence a direct & brief demonstration of an active powerfull Being, distinct from us, on whom we depend.

The name of colours actually given to tangible qualities, by the relation of ye story of the German Count.

Qu. How came visible & tangible qualities by the same name in all languages?

Qu. Whether Being might not be the substance of the soul, or (otherwise thus) whether Being, added to ye faculties, compleat the real essence and adequate definition of the soul?

(M341) Qu. Whether, on the supposition of external bodies, it be possible for us to know that any body is absolutely at rest, since that supposing ideas much slower than at present, bodies now apparently moving wd then be apparently at rest?

(M342) Qu. What can be like a sensation but a sensation?

Qu. Did ever any man see any other things besides his own ideas, that he should compare them to these, and make these like unto them?

(M343) The age of a fly, for ought that we know, may be as long as yt of a man(200).

Visible distance heterogeneous from tangible distance demonstrated 3 several ways:-

1st. If a tangible inch be equal or in any other reason to a visible inch, thence it will follow yt unequals are equals, wch is absurd: for at what distance would the visible inch be placed to make it equal to the tangible inch?

2d. One made to see that had not yet seen his own limbs, or any thing he touched, upon sight of a foot length would know it to be a foot length, if tangible foot & visible foot were the same idea-sed falsum id, ergo et hoc.

3dly. From Molyneux's problem, wch otherwise is falsely solv'd by Locke and him(201).

(M344) Nothing but ideas perceivable(202).

A man cannot compare 2 things together without perceiving them each. Ergo, he cannot say anything wch is not an idea is like or unlike an idea.

Bodies &c. do exist even wn not perceived-they being powers in the active being(203).

Succession a simple idea, [succession is an abstract, i.e. an inconceivable idea,] Locke says(204).

Visible extension is [proportional to tangible extension, also is]

encreated & diminish'd by parts. Hence taken for the same.

If extension be without the mind in bodies. Qu. whether tangible or visible, or both?

Mathematical propositions about extension & motion true in a double sense.

Extension thought peculiarly inert, because not accompany'd wth pleasure & pain: hence thought to exist in matter; as also for that it was conceiv'd common to 2 senses, [as also the constant perception of 'em].