Twenty Years of Congress Volume I Part 44

THE REPUBLICS OF AMERICA.

It needs no argument to show that the central element of the stability of this system of American republics was the strength of the Federal Union, its growth into a harmonious nationality, and its ability to prevent anywhere on the two continents the armed intervention of foreign Powers for the purpose of political domination. This strength was known and this resolution publicly declared, and it is safe to affirm that before 1861 or after 1865 not one nor all of the European Powers would have willingly challenged this policy. But the moment the strength of the Union seemed weakened, the moment that the leading Republic of this system found itself hampered and embarra.s.sed by internal dissensions, all Europe --that Europe which upon the threatening of a Belgian fortress, or the invasion of a Swiss canton, or the loss of the key to a church in Jerusalem, would have written protocols, summoned conferences, and mustered armies--quietly acquiesced in as wanton, wicked, and foolish an aggression as ever Imperial folly devised. The same monarch who appealed with confidence to Heaven when he declared war to prevent a Hohenzollern from ascending the throne of Spain, appealed to the same Heaven with equal confidence and equal success when he declared war to force a Hapsburg upon the throne of Mexico.

The success of the establishment of a Foreign Empire in Mexico would have been fatal to all that the United States cherished, to all that it hoped peacefully to achieve. The scheme of invasion rested on the a.s.sumption of the dissolution of the Union and its division into two hostile governments; but aside from that possibility, it threatened the United States upon the most vital questions. It was at war with all our inst.i.tutions and our habits of political life, for it would have introduced into a great country on this continent, capable of unlimited development, that curious and mischievous form of government, that perplexing mixture of absolutism and democracy,--imperial power supported by universal suffrage,-- which seems certain to produce aggression abroad and corruption at home, and which must have injuriously influenced the political growth of the Spanish-American Republics. Firmly seated in Mexico, it would have spread through Central America to the Isthmus, controlling all ca.n.a.l communications between the two oceans which were the boundaries of the Union, while its growth upon the Pacific Coast would have been in direct rivalry with the natural and increasing power of the United States. Commanding the Gulf of Mexico it would have controlled the whole commerce of the West- Indian islands and radically changed their future. Bound by dynastic connection, checked and directed by European influence, it could not have developed a national policy in harmony with neighboring States, but its existence and its necessary efforts at expansion would have made it not only a constant menace to American Republics but a source of endless war and confusion between the great Powers of the world. The policy signally failed. But surely European statesmen, without miraculous foresight, might have antic.i.p.ated that its success would have been more dangerous than its defeat, and that the conservative strength of the Union might be even to them an influence of good and not of evil.

FORMER VIEWS OF LORD PALMERSTON.

In 1859 Lord Palmerston wrote to Lord John Russell: "It is plain that France aims through Spain at getting fortified points on each side of the Gut of Gibraltar which in the event of war between Spain and France on the one hand and England on the other would by a cross fire render that strait very difficult and dangerous to pa.s.s and thus virtually shut us out of the Mediterranean. . . .

The French Minister of War or of marine said the other day that Algeria never would be safe till France possessed a port on the Atlantic coast of Africa. Against whom would such a port make Algeria safe? Evidently only against England, and how could such a port help France against England? Only by tending to shut us out of the Mediterranean." Later in the same year writing to the same colleague, he says, "Till lately I had strong confidence in the fair intentions of Napoleon towards England, but of late I have begun to feel great distrust and to suspect that his formerly declared intention of avenging Waterloo has only lain dormant and has not died away. He seems to have thought that he ought to lay his foundation by beating with our aid or with our concurrence or our neutrality, first Russia, then Austria, and by dealing with them generously to make them his friends in any subsequent quarrel with us. . . . Next he has been a.s.siduously laboring to increase his naval means, evidently for offensive as well as for defensive purposes, and latterly great pains have been taken to raise throughout France and especially among the army and navy, hatred of England and a disparaging feeling of our military and naval means."

Is it not strange that, even with such apprehensions, the destruction of the Union was so welcome in England that it blinded the eyes of her statesmen and her people? They should surely have seen that the establishment of a Latin empire under the protection of France, in the heart of the Spanish-American Republics, would open a field far more dangerous to British interests than a combination for a French port in Africa, and that in pursuing his policy the wily Emperor was providing a throne for an Austrian archduke as a compensation for the loss of Lombardy. There was a time when Lord Palmerston himself held broader and juster views of what ought to be the relations between England and the United States. In 1848 he suggested to Lord John Russell a policy which looked to a complete unification of the interests of the two countries: "If as I hope,"

said His Lords.h.i.+p, "we shall succeed in altering our Navigation Laws, and if as a consequence Great Britain and the United States shall place their commercial marines upon a footing of mutual equality with the exception of the coasting-trade and some other special matters, might not such an arrangement afford us a good opportunity for endeavoring to carry in some degree into execution the wish which Mr. Fox entertained in 1783, when he wished to subst.i.tute close alliance in the place of sovereignty and dependence as the connecting link between the United States and Great Britain?

A treaty for mutual defense would no longer be applicable to the condition of the two countries as independent Powers, but might they not with mutual advantage conclude a treaty containing something like the following conditions:--

"1. That in all cases of difference which may hereafter unfortunately arise between the contracting parties, they will in the first place have recourse to the mediation of some friendly Power, and that hostilities shall not begin between them until every endeavor to settle their difference by such means shall have proved fruitless.

"2. That if either of the two should at any time be at war with any other Power, no subject or citizen of the other contracting party shall be allowed to take out letters of marque from such Power under pain of being treated and dealt with as a pirate.

"3. That in such case of war between either of the two parties and a third Power, no subject or citizen of the other contracting party shall be allowed to enter into the service naval or military of such third Power.

"4. That in such case of war as aforesaid, neither of the contracting parties shall afford a.s.sistance to the enemies of the other by sea or by land, unless war should break out between the two contracting parties themselves after the failure of all endeavors to settle their differences in the manner specified in Article 1."

At the time Lord Palmerston expressed these opinions, we had just closed the Mexican war, with vast acquisition of territory and with a display of military power on distant fields of conquest which surprised European statesmen. Our maritime interests were almost equal to those of the United Kingdom, our prosperity was great, the prestige of the Nation was growing. In the thirteen intervening years between that date and the outbreak of the Southern Rebellion we had grown enormously in wealth, our Pacific possessions had shown an extraordinary production of precious metals, our population had increased more than ten millions. If an alliance with the United States was desirable for England in 1848, it was far more desirable in 1861, and Lord Palmerston being Prime Minister in the latter year, his power to propose and promote it was far greater.

Is there any reason that will satisfactorily account for His Lords.h.i.+p's abandonment of this ideal relation of friends.h.i.+p between the two countries except that he saw a speedier way of adding to the power of England by conniving at the destruction of the Union?

His change from the policy which he painted in 1848 to that which he acted in 1861 cannot be satisfactorily explained upon any other hypothesis than that he could not resist the temptation to cripple and humiliate the Great Republic.

FIXED POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.

This brief history of the spirit rather than the events which characterized the foreign relations of the United States during the civil war, has been undertaken with no desire to revive the feelings of burning indignation which they provoked, or to prolong the discussion of the angry questions to which they gave rise.

The relations of nations are not and should not be governed by sentiment. The interest and ambition of states, like those of men, will disturb the moral sense and incline to one side or the other the strict balance of impartial justice. New days bring new issues and old pa.s.sions are unsafe counselors. Twenty years have gone by. England has paid the cost of her mistakes. The Republic of Mexico has seen the fame and the fortunes of the Emperors who sought her conquest sink suddenly--as into the pits which they themselves had digged for their victims--and the Republic of the United States has come out of her long and bitter struggle, so strong that never again will she afford the temptation or the opportunity for unfriendly governments to strike at her National life. Let the past be the past, but let it be the past with all the instruction and the warning of its experience.

The future safety of these continents rests upon the strength and the maintenance of the Union, for had dissolution been possible, events have shown with what small regard the interests or the honor of either of the belligerents would have been treated. It has been taught to the smaller republics that if this strength be shattered they will be the spoil of foreign arms and the dependent provinces again of foreign monarchs. When this contest was over, the day of immaturity had pa.s.sed and the United States stood before the world a great and permanent Power. That Power can afford to bury all resentments. Tranquil at home, developing its inexhaustible resources with a rapidity and success unknown in history, bound in sincere friends.h.i.+p, and beyond the possibility of a hostile rivalry, with the other republics of the continents, standing midway between Asia and Europe, a Power on the Pacific as well as on the Atlantic, with no temptation to intermeddle in the questions which disturb the Old World, the Republic of the United States desires to live in amicable relation with all peoples, demanding only the abstinence of foreign intervention in the development of that policy which her political creed, her territorial extent, and the close and cordial neighborhood of kindred governments have made the essential rule of her National life.

[NOTE.--In the foregoing chapter the term "piratical" is used without qualification in referring to the Southern cruisers, because it is the word used in the quotations made. It undoubtedly represented the feeling of the country at that time, but in an impartial discussion of the events of the war the word cannot be used with propriety. Our own Courts have found themselves unable to sustain such a conclusion. Looking to the future it is better to rest our objections to the mode of maritime warfare adopted by the Confederacy upon a sound and enduring principle; viz., that the recognition of ocean belligerency, when the belligerent cannot give to his lawful exercise of maritime warfare the guaranty of a prize jurisdiction, is a violation of any just or reasonable system of international law. The Confederacy had the plea of necessity for its course, but the jurisdiction of England for aiding and abetting the practice has not yet been presented.]

[NOTE.--Her Britannic Majesty's princ.i.p.al ministers of State in 1861-2,--at the time of the correspondence touching the _Trent_ affair, referred to in the preceding chapter,--were as follows:--

_Premier_--Lord Palmerston.

_Lord High Chancellor_--Lord Westbury.

_Lord President of the Council_--Earl Granville.

_Lord Privy Seal_--The Duke of Argyll.

_Secretary for Foreign Affairs_--Lord John Russell.

_Secretary for the Colonies_--The Duke of Newcastle.

_Secretary for the Home Department_--Sir George Gray.

_Secretary of State for War_--Sir G. C. Lewis.

_Secretary of State for India_--Sir Charles Wood.

_Chancellor of the Exchequer_--Rt. Honorable W. E. Gladstone.

_Secretary for Ireland_--Rt. Honorable Edward Cardwell.

_Postmaster-General_--Lord Stanley of Alderney.

_President Board of Trade_--Rt. Honorable Charles Pelham Villiers.

The same Ministry, with unimportant changes, continued in power throughout the whole period of the Rebellion in the United States.]

ADDENDUM.

The Tenth chapter of this volume having been given to the press in advance of formal publication, many inquiries have been received in regard to the text of Judge Black's opinion of November 20, 1860, referred to on pp. 231, 232. The opinion was submitted to the President by Judge Black as Attorney-General. So much of the opinion as includes the points which are specially controverted and criticized is here given--about one-half of the entire doc.u.ment.

It is as follows:--

. . . "I come now to the point in your letter which is probably of the greatest practical importance. By the Act of 1807 you may employ such parts of the land and naval forces as you may judge necessary for the purpose of causing the laws to be duly executed, in all cases where it is lawful to use the militia for the same purpose. By the Act of 1795 the militia may be called forth 'whenever the laws of the United States shall be opposed, or the execution thereof obstructed, in any State by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of Judicial proceedings, or by the power vested in the marshals.' This imposes upon the President the sole responsibility of deciding whether the exigency has arisen which requires the use of military force, and in proportion to the magnitude of that responsibility will be the care not to overstep the limits of his legal and just authority.

"The laws referred to in the Act of 1795 are manifestly those which are administered by the judges, and executed by the ministerial officers of the courts for the punishment of crime against the United States, for the protection of rights claimed under the Federal Const.i.tution and laws, and for the enforcement of such obligations as come within the cognizance of the Federal Judiciary.

To compel obedience to these laws, the courts have authority to punish all who obstruct their regular administration, and the marshals and their deputies have the same powers as sheriffs and their deputies in the several States in executing the laws of the States. These are the ordinary means provided for the execution of the laws; and the whole spirit of our system is opposed to the employment of any other, except in cases of extreme necessity arising out of great and unusual combinations against them. Their agency must continue to be used until their incapacity to cope with the power opposed to them shall be plainly demonstrated. It is only upon clear evidence to that effect that a military force can be called into the field. Even then its operations must be purely defensive. It can suppress only such combinations as are found directly opposing the laws and obstructing the execution thereof.

It can do no more than what might and ought to be done by a civil posse, if a civil posse could be raised large enough to meet the same opposition. On such occasions, especially, the military power must be kept in strict subordination to the civil authority, since it is only in aid of the latter that the former can act at all.

"But what if the feeling in any State against the United States should become so universal that the Federal officers themselves (including judges, district attorneys, and marshals) would be reached by the same influences, and resign their places? Of course, the first step would be to appoint others in their stead, if others could be got to serve. But in such an event, it is more than probable that great difficulty would be found in filling the offices.

We can easily conceive how it might become altogether impossible.

We are therefore obliged to consider what can be done in case we have no courts to issue judicial process, and no ministerial officers to execute it. In that event troops would certainly be out of place, and their use wholly illegal. If they are sent to aid the courts and marshals, there must be courts and marshals to be aided.

Without the exercise of those functions which belong exclusively to the civil service, the laws cannot be executed in any event, no matter what may be the physical strength which the Government has at its command. Under such circ.u.mstances, to send a military force into any State, with orders to act against the people, would be simply making war upon them.

"The existing laws put and keep the Federal Government strictly on the defensive. You can use force only to repel an a.s.sault on the public property and aid the Courts in the performance of their duty. If the means given you to collect the revenue and execute the other laws be insufficient for that purpose, Congress may extend and make them more effectual to those ends.

"If one of the States should declare her independence, your action cannot depend upon the righteousness of the cause upon which such declaration is based. Whether the retirement of the State from the Union be the exercise of a right reserved in the Const.i.tution, or a revolutionary movement, it is certain that you have not in either case the authority to recognize her independence or to absolve her from her Federal obligations. Congress, or the other States in Convention a.s.sembled, must take such measures as may be necessary and proper. In such an event, I see no course for you but to go straight onward in the path you have hitherto trodden-- that is, execute the laws to the extent of the defensive means placed in your hands, and act generally upon the a.s.sumption that the present const.i.tutional relations between the States and the Federal Government continue to exist, until a new code of things shall be established either by law or force.

"Whether Congress has the const.i.tutional right to make war against one or more States, and require the Executive of the Federal Government to carry it on by means of force to be drawn from the other States, is a question for Congress itself to consider. It must be admitted that no such power is expressly given; nor are there any words in the Const.i.tution which imply it. Among the powers enumerated in Article 1, Section 8, is that 'to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and to make rules concerning captures on land and water.' This certainly means nothing more than the power to commence and carry on hostilities against the foreign enemies of the nation. Another clause in the same section gives Congress the power 'to provide for calling forth the militia,'

and to use them within the limits of the State. But this power is so restricted by the words which immediately follow that it can be exercised only for one of the following purposes: 1. To execute the laws of the Union; that is, to aid the Federal officers in the performance of their regular duties. 2. To suppress insurrection against the State; but this is confined by Article 4, Section 4, to cases in which the State herself shall apply for a.s.sistance against her own people. 3. To repel the invasion of a State by enemies who come from abroad to a.s.sail her in her own territory. All these provisions are made to protect the States, not to authorize an attack by one part of the country upon another; to preserve the peace, and not to plunge them into civil war. Our forefathers do not seem to have thought that war was calculated 'to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.'

There was undoubtedly a strong and universal conviction among the men who framed and ratified the Const.i.tution, that military force would not only be useless, but pernicious, as a means of holding the States together.

"If it be true that war cannot be declared, nor a system of general hostilities carried on by the Central Government against a State, then it seems to follow that an attempt to do so would be _ipso facto_ an expulsion of such State from the Union. Being treated as an alien and an enemy, she would be compelled to act accordingly.

And if Congress shall break up the present Union by unconst.i.tutionally putting strife and enmity and armed hostility between different sections of the country, instead of the domestic tranquility which the Const.i.tution was meant to insure, will not all the States be absolved from their Federal obligations? Is any portion of the people bound to contribute their money or their blood to carry on a contest like that?

"The right of the General Government to preserve itself in its whole const.i.tutional vigor by repelling a direct and positive aggression upon its property or its officers cannot be denied.

But this is a totally different thing from an offensive war to punish the people for the political misdeeds of their State Government, or to enforce an acknowledgment that the Government of the United States is supreme. The States are colleagues of one another, and if some of them shall conquer the rest, and hold them as subjugated provinces, it would totally destroy the whole theory upon which they are now connected.

"If this view of the subject be correct, as I think it is, then the Union must utterly perish at the moment when Congress shall arm one part of the people against another for any purpose beyond that of merely protecting the General Government in the exercise of its proper const.i.tutional functions.

"I am, very respectfully, yours, etc.,

"J. S. BLACK."

ERRATUM.

In Chapter VIII., there is some inaccuracy in regard to the number of killed in the John Brown raid at Harper's Ferry. According to the official report of Colonel Robert E. Lee, U.S.A., who commanded the military force that relieved Harper's Ferry, the insurgents numbered in all nineteen men,--fourteen white, five colored. Of the white men, ten were killed; two, John Brown and Aaron C. Stevens, were badly wounded; Edwin Coppee, unhurt, was taken prisoner; John E. Cooke escaped. Of the colored men, two were killed, two taken prisoner, one unaccounted for.

THE APPENDICES.