Doctrine Of The Will Part 6

2. We also perceive the senses in which G.o.d purposed the existence of moral good and evil, in the universe. He purposed the existence of the motives, in view of which He knew that a part of His subjects would render themselves holy, and a part would render themselves sinful. But when we contemplate all the holiness and consequent happiness which do exist, we then perceive the reason why G.o.d gave existence to these motives. The sin consequent, in the sense above explained, const.i.tutes no part of the reason for their existence, but was always, in the Divine Mind, a reason against their existence; which reason, however, was overpowered by infinitely more important reasons on the other side. The good which results from creation and providence is the great and exclusive object of creation and providence. The evil, G.o.d always regretted, and would have prevented, if possible, i. e. if compatible with the existence of the best possible system.

DEATH OF THE INCORRIGIBLE PREORDAINED BUT NOT WILLED.

3. We also perceive the perfect consistency of those Scriptures which represent G.o.d as, on the whole, _purposing_ the death of incorrigible transgressors, and yet as not _willing_ it, but as willing the opposite.

The purpose to destroy is based upon the foreseen incorrigibleness of the transgressor,--a purpose demanded by perfect wisdom and benevolence, in view of that foreseen incorrigibleness. The incorrigibleness itself, however, and the perdition consequent, are evils, the existence of which G.o.d never willed; but are the opposite of what he willed, are evils which a being of perfect wisdom and goodness never could, and never can will. It is with perfect consistency, therefore, that the Scriptures represent G.o.d, in view of incorrigibleness foreseen, as purposing the death of the transgressor, and at the same time, in view of the fact that such incorrigibleness is the opposite of what He wills the creature to do, as affirming, that He is not "willing that any should perish, but that all should come to a knowledge of the truth."

G.o.d NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF THE INCORRIGIBLE.

4. We see, also, how it is, that, while G.o.d does that, and eternally purposed to do that, in view of which he eternally knew that certain of his creatures would for ever destroy themselves, none but themselves are in fault for such destruction. The reasons are these:

(1.) G.o.d never did anything in view of which men ought to act thus, nor which did not lay them under obligations infinite, to act differently, and which was not best adapted to secure that end.

(2.) Their destruction const.i.tuted no part of the _object_ of G.o.d in creation and providence, the opposite of this being true.

(3.) The great object of G.o.d in creation and providence was and is, to produce the greatest possible amount of holiness and consequent happiness, and to prevent, in every possible way consistent with this end, the existence of sin, and consequently of misery.--Now if creatures perish under such an influence, they perish by their own fault.

SIN A MYSTERY.

5. I have a single remark to make upon those phenomena of the Will, in which evil is chosen instead of good, or sin instead of holiness. That all intelligent beings possess the power to make such a choice, is a fact affirmed by universal consciousness. But that any being, under any circ.u.mstances, should make such a choice, and that he should for ever refuse to return to the paths of virtue, notwithstanding his experience of the consequences of sin, is an abuse of human liberty, which must for ever remain an inexplicable mystery. When a being a.s.signs the real reason in view of which right is chosen, we are always satisfied with such reason. But we are never satisfied with the reason for the opposite course.

CONCLUSION FROM THE ABOVE.

One conclusion forces itself upon us, from that view of the Divine government which consists with the doctrine of Liberty. The aspect of that government which results from this view of the subject commends itself to the reason and conscience of the intelligent universe.

_Mysteries_ we do and must find in it; but _absurdities_ and _contradictions_, never. Under such a Government, no being is condemned for what he cannot avoid, nor rewarded for what he could but do. While

"G.o.d sits on no precarious throne, Nor borrows leave to be,"

the destiny of the creature turns upon his own deserts, his own choice of good or evil. The elucidation of the principles of such a government "commends itself to every man's conscience in the sight of G.o.d."

CHAPTER VIII.

OBLIGATION PREDICABLE ONLY OF THE WILL.

SECTION I.

THE Will, as I have already said, exists in a trinity with the Intelligence and Sensibility. In respect to the operations of the different departments of our mental being, I lay down the two following propositions:

1. Obligation, moral desert, &c., are directly predicable only of the action of the Will.

2. For the operations of the other faculties we are accountable so far forth only as the existence and character of such operations depend upon the Will. In other words, it is for voluntary acts and states only that we are accountable. This I argue because,

1. Obligation, as we have seen, consists only with Liberty. All the phenomena of the Intelligence and Sensibility, in the circ.u.mstances of their occurrence, are not free, but necessary. Accountability, therefore, cannot be predicated of such phenomena. We may be, and are, accountable for such phenomena, so far forth as their existence and character depend upon the Will: in other words, so far forth as they are voluntary, and not involuntary, states of mind.

2. The truth of the above proposition, and of that only, really corresponds with the universal conviction of the race. This conviction is expressed in two ways.

(1.) When blame is affirmed of the operations of the Intelligence or Sensibility, it is invariably thus affirmed: "You have no right to _entertain_ such thoughts or sentiments. You have no right _indulge_ such feeling's." In other words, praise or blame is never directly predicated of these operations themselves, but of the action of the Will relatively to them.

(2.) All men agree, that the moral character of all actions, of all states of mind whatever; depends upon _intention_. In no point is there a more universal harmony among moral philosophers than in respect to this. But intention is undeniably a phenomenon of the Will, and of that exclusively. We must therefore admit, that moral obligation is predicable of the Will only, or deny the fundamental convictions of the race.

3. The truth of the above propositions is intuitively evident, the moment the mind apprehends their real import. A man, as he steps out of a warm room, amid the external frosts of winter, feels an involuntary chill over his whole system. We might with the same propriety attribute blame to him for such feelings, as for any other feelings, thoughts, or perceptions which exist alike independent of his Will, and especially in opposition to its determinations.

4. If we suppose all the voluntary acts and states of a moral agent to be, and always to have been, in perfect conformity to moral rect.i.tude, it is impossible for us to impute moral guilt to him for any feelings or thoughts which may have risen in his mind independently of his Will. We can no more conceive him to have incurred ill desert, than we can conceive of the annihilation of s.p.a.ce. We may safely put it to the consciousness of every man whether this is not the case. This renders demonstrably evident the truth, that moral obligation is predicable only of the Will.

5. With the above perfectly harmonize the positive teachings of Inspiration. For example. "l.u.s.t, when it is _conceived_, bringeth forth sin." The involuntary feeling does not const.i.tute the sin, but the action of the Will in harmony with that feeling.

6. A single supposition will place this whole subject in a light perfectly conspicuous before the mind. We can readily conceive that the Will, or voluntary states of the mind, are in perfect harmony with the moral law, while the Sensibility, or involuntary states, are opposed to it. We can also with equal readiness make the opposite supposition, to wit, that the Sensibility, or involuntary states, are in harmony with the law, while the determinations of the Will are all opposed to it.

What shall we think of these two states? Let us suppose a case of no unfrequent occurrence, that the feelings, or involuntary state of the mind, are in perfect harmony with the law, while the action of this Will, or the voluntary states, are in determined opposition to the law, the individual being inflexibly determined to quench such feelings, and act in opposition to them. Is there any virtue at all in such a state of mind? Who would dare to say that there is? Is not the guilt of the individual aggravated in proportion to the depth and intensity of the feeling which he is endeavoring to suppress? Now if, as all will admit, there is no virtue at all, when the states of the Sensibility are in harmony with the law, and the determinations of the Will, or voluntary states of the mind, are opposed to it, how can there be guilt when the Will, or voluntary states, are in perfect harmony with the law, and the Sensibility or involuntary states, opposed to it? This renders it demonstrably evident that obligation and moral desert of praise or blame are predicable only of the Will, or voluntary states of mind.

7. We will make another supposition; one, if possible, still more to the point. The tiger, we well know, has received from his Maker, either directly or through the laws of natural generation sustained by the Most High, a ferocious nature. Why do we not blame the animal for this nature? The answer, perhaps, would be, that he is not a rational being, and is therefore not responsible for anything.

Let us suppose, then, that with this nature, G.o.d had a.s.sociated Intelligence and Free-Will, such as man possesses. Why should the animal now be held responsible for the bare existence of this nature, any more than in the first instance, when the effect, in both instances, exists, alike independent of his knowledge, choice, and agency? A greater absurdity than this never lay upon the brain of a Theologian, that the mere existence of rationality renders the subject properly responsible for what G.o.d himself produces in connection with that rationality, and produces wholly independent of the knowledge, choice, and agency of that subject.

Let us suppose, further, that the animal under consideration, as soon as he becomes aware of the existence and tendencies of this nature, holds all its impulses in perfect subjection to the law of love, and never suffers them, in a single instance, to induce a voluntary act contrary to that law. Is it in the power of the Intelligence to affirm guilt of that creature? Do we not necessarily affirm his virtue to be great in proportion to the strength of the propensity thus perfectly subjected to the Moral law? The above ill.u.s.tration renders two conclusions demonstrably evident:

1. For the mere _existence_ of any const.i.tutional propensity whatever, the creature is not and cannot be responsible.

2. When all the actions of the Will, or voluntary power, are in perfect harmony with the moral law, and all the propensities are held in full subjection to that law, the creature stands perfect and complete in the discharge of his duty to G.o.d and Man. For the involuntary and necessary actings of those propensities, he cannot be responsible.

It is no part of my object to prove that men have not derived from their progenitors, propensities which impel and induce them to sin; but that, for the mere _existence_ of these propensities, together with their necessary involuntary action, they are not guilty.

SEC. II. DOGMAS IN THEOLOGY.

Certain dogmas in Theology connected with the subject above ill.u.s.trated here claim our attention.

MEN NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SIN OF THEIR PROGENITORS.

I. The first that I notice is the position, that creatures are now held responsible, even as "deserving G.o.d's wrath and curse, not only in this life, but in that which is to come," not merely for their own voluntary acts of disobedience, nor for their involuntary exercises, but for the act of a progenitor, performed when they had no existence. If G.o.d holds creatures responsible for such an act, we may safely affirm that it is absolutely impossible for them to conceive of the justice of such a principle; and that G.o.d has so const.i.tuted them, as to render it impossible for them to form such a conception. Can a being who is not a _moral_ agent sin? Is not _existence_ necessary to moral agency? How then can creatures "sin _in_ and _through_ another" six thousand years before their own existence commenced? We cannot conceive of creatures as guilty for the involuntary and necessary exercises of their own minds.

How can we conceive of them as guilty for the act of another being,--an act of which they had, and could have, no knowledge, choice, or agency whatever? How can intelligent beings hold such a dogma, and hold it as a revelation from Him who has declared with an oath, that the "son shall not bear the iniquity of the father," but that "every man shall die for his own sins?"

CONSt.i.tUTIONAL ILL-DESERT.

II. The next dogma deserving attention is the position, that mankind derive from our first progenitor a corrupt nature, which renders obedience to the commands of G.o.d impossible, and disobedience necessary, and that for the mere _existence_ of this nature, men "deserve G.o.d's wrath and curse, not only in this world, but in that which is to come."

If the above dogma is true, it is demonstrably evident, that this corrupt nature comes into existence without the knowledge, choice, or agency of the creature, who, for its existence, is p.r.o.nounced deserving of, and "bound over to the wrath of G.o.d." Equally evident is it, that this corrupt nature exists as the result of the direct agency of G.o.d. He proclaims himself the Maker of "every soul of man." As its Maker, He must have imparted to that soul the const.i.tution or nature which it actually possesses. It does not help the matter at all, to say, that this nature is derived from our progenitor: for the laws of generation, by which this corrupt nature is derived from that progenitor, are sustained and continued by G.o.d himself. It is a truth of reason as well as of revelation, that, even in respect to plants, derived "by ordinary generation" from the seed of those previously existing, it is G.o.d who "giveth them a body as it hath pleased him, and to every seed its own body." If this is true of plants, much more must it be so of the soul of man.

If, then, the above dogma is true, man, in the first place, is held as deserving of eternal punishment for that which exists wholly independent of his knowledge, choice, or agency, in any sense, direct or indirect.

He is also held responsible for the result, not of his own agency, but for that which results from the agency of G.o.d. On this dogma, I remark,

1. It is impossible for the Intelligence to affirm, or even to conceive it to be true, that a creature deserves eternal punishment for that which exists wholly independent of his knowledge, choice, or agency; for that which results, not from his own agency, but from that of another.

The Intelligence can no more affirm the truth of such propositions, than it can conceive of an event without a cause.

2. This dogma is opposed to the intuitive convictions of the race.

Present the proposition to any mind, that, under the Divine government, the creature is held responsible for his own voluntary acts and states of minds only, and such a principle "commends itself to every man's conscience in the sight of G.o.d." Present the dogma, on the other hand, that for a nature which renders actual obedience impossible, a nature which exists as the exclusive result of the agency of G.o.d himself, independently of the knowledge, choice, or agency of the creature, such creature is justly "bound over to the wrath of G.o.d, and curse of the law, and so made subject to death, with all miseries, spiritual, temporal, and eternal," and there is not a conscience in the universe which will not reprobate with perfect horror such a principle. The intuitive convictions of the race are irreconcilably opposed to it.

3. If mankind, as this dogma affirms, have a nature from which voluntary acts of a given character necessarily result, to talk of real _growth_ or _confirmation_ in holiness or sin, is to use words without meaning.