Doctrine Of The Will Part 7

All that influence, or voluntary acts, can do in such a case, is to develope the nature already in existence. They can do nothing to confirm the soul in its tendencies, one way or the other. What should we think of the proposition, that a certain tree had formed and confirmed the habit of bearing particular kinds of fruits, when it commenced bearing, with the necessity of bearing this kind only, and with the absolute impossibility of bearing any other? So the soul, according to this dogma, commences action with the absolute impossibility of any but sinful acts, and with the equal necessity of putting forth sinful ones.

Now, Necessity and Impossibility know and can know no degrees. How then can a mind, thus const.i.tuted, generate and confirm the habit of sinning?

What, on this supposition, is the meaning of the declaration, "How can ye, who are _accustomed_ to do evil, learn to do well?" All such declarations are without meaning, if this dogma is true.

4. If G.o.d imputes guilt to the creature, for the existence of the nature under consideration, he must have required the creature to prevent its existence. For it is a positive truth of reason and inspiration both, that as "sin is a transgression of the law;" that "where there is no law, there is no transgression;" and that "sin is not imputed where there is no law," that is, where nothing is required, no obligation does or can exist, and consequently no guilt is imputed. The existence of the nature under consideration, then, is not and cannot be sin to the creature, unless it is a transgression of the law; and it cannot be a transgression of the law, unless the law required the creature to prevent its existence, and prevent it when that existence was the exclusive result of G.o.d's agency, and when the creature could have no knowledge, choice, or agency, in respect to what G.o.d was to produce. Can we conceive of a greater absurdity than that? G.o.d is about to produce a certain nature by his own creative act, or by sustaining the laws of natural generation. He imputes infinite guilt to the creature for not preventing the result of that act, and inducing a result precisely opposite, and that in the absence of all knowledge of what was required of him, and of the possibility of any agency in respect to it. Is this a true exposition of the Government of G.o.d?

PRESENT IMPOSSIBILITIES REQUIRED.

III. The last dogma that I notice is the position, that the Moral law demands of us, as sinners, not what is now possible to us on the ground of natural powers and proffered grace, but what would be possible, had we never sinned. It is admitted by all, that we have not now a capacity for that degree of virtue which would be possible to us, had we always developed our moral powers in harmony with the Divine law. Still it is maintained, that this degree of virtue, notwithstanding our present total incapacity to exercise it, is demanded of us. For not rendering it, we are justly bound over to the wrath and curse of G.o.d. In reply, I remark:

1. That this dogma, which is professedly founded on the express teachings of Inspiration, has not even the shadow of a foundation in any direct or implied affirmation of the Bible. I may safely challenge the world to adduce a single pa.s.sage of Holy Writ, that either directly or indirectly a.s.serts any such thing.

2. This dogma is opposed not only to the _spirit_, but to the _letter_ of the _law_. The law, addressing men, enfeebled as their powers now are, in consequence of sin previously committed, requires them to love G.o.d with all their "mind and strength," that is, not with the power they would have possessed, had they never sinned, but with the power they now actually possess. On what authority does any Theologian affirm, when the law expressly makes one demand upon men, that it, in reality, makes another, and different demand? In such an a.s.sertion, is he not wise, not only _above_, but _against_ what is written?

3. This dogma is opposed to the express and positive teachings of Inspiration. The Scriptures expressly affirm, Rom. xiii. 8, that every one that exercises love, "hath fulfilled the law," hath done all that the law requires of him. This would not be true, did the law require a degree of love not now practicable to the creature. Again, in Deut. x.

12, it is positively affirmed, that G.o.d requires nothing of his creatures but to "love him with all the heart and with all the soul,"

that is, with all the powers they actually possess. This could not be true, if the dogma under consideration is true.

4. If we conceive an individual to yield a voluntary conformity to moral obligations of every kind, to the full extent of his present capacities, it is impossible for us to conceive that he is not now doing all that he really ought to do. No person would ever think of exhorting him to do more, nor of charging him with guilt for not doing it. We may properly blame him for the past, but as far as the present is concerned, he stands guiltless in the eye of reason and revelation both.

5. Let us suppose that an individual continues for fifty years in sin.

He is then truly converted, and immediately after dies. All admit that he enters heaven in a state of perfect holiness. Yet no one supposes that he now exercises, or has the capacity to exercise, as high a degree of holiness, as he would, had he spent those fifty years in obedience, instead of disobedience to G.o.d. This shows that even those who theoretically hold the dogma under consideration do not practically believe it themselves.

The conclusion to which our inquiries lead us is this: Holiness is a voluntary conformity to all perceivable obligation. Sin is a similar violation of such obligation. Nothing else is or can be holiness.

Nothing else is or can be sin.

CHAPTER IX.

THE STANDARD BY WHICH THE MORAL CHARACTER OF VOLUNTARY STATES OF MIND, OR ACTS OF WILL, SHOULD BE DETERMINED.

IN the remarks which I have to make in elucidation of this subject, I shall, on the authority of evidence already presented, take two positions for granted:

1. Moral obligation and moral desert are predicable only of acts of Will.

2. It is only of those acts of Will denominated _Intentions_, and of course ultimate intentions, that obligation, merit and demerit, are predicable.

In this last position, as I have already said, there is a universal agreement among moral philosophers. We may also safely a.s.sume the same as a first truth of the universal Intelligence. The child, the philosopher, the peasant, men of all cla.s.ses, ages, and conditions, agree in predicating obligation and moral desert of intention, and of ultimate intention only. By ultimate intention, I, of course, refer to those acts, choices, or determinations of the Will, to which all other mental determinations are subordinate, and by which they are controlled.

Thus, when an individual chooses, on the one hand, the Divine glory, and the highest good of universal being, as the end of his existence; or, on the other, his own personal gratification; and subordinates to one or the other of these acts of choice all the law of his being, here we find his ultimate intention. In this exclusively all mankind agree in finding the moral character of all mental acts and states.

Now an important question arises, By what _standard_ shall we judge of the moral character of intentions? Of course, they are to be placed in the light of the two great precepts of the Moral law by which we are required to love G.o.d with all our powers, and our neighbor as ourselves.

But two distinct and opposite explanations have been given of the above precepts, presenting entirely different standards of moral judgment.

According to one, the precept requiring us to love G.o.d with _all our heart and strength_, requires a certain degree of _intensity_ of intention and feeling. On no other condition, it is said, do we love G.o.d with _all_ the heart.

According to the other explanation, the precept requiring us to love G.o.d with _all_ the heart, &c., means, that we devote our entire powers and interests to the glory of G.o.d and the good of his creatures, with the sincere intention to employ these powers and interests for the accomplishment of these objects in the _best possible manner_. When all our powers are under the exclusive control of such an intention as this, we then, it is affirmed, love G.o.d according to the letter and spirit of the above precept, "with all our heart, and with all our strength."

SINCERITY, AND NOT INTENSITY, THE TRUE STANDARD.

My object now is to show, that this last is the right exposition, and presents the only true standard by which to judge of all moral acts and states of mind. This I argue from the following considerations.

1. If _intensity_ be fixed upon as the standard, no one can define it, so as to tell us what he means. The command requiring us to love with _all_ the heart, if understood as requiring a certain degree of intensity of intention, may mean the highest degree of tension of which our nature is susceptible. Or it may mean the highest possible degree, consistent with our existence in this body; or the highest degree consistent with the most perfect health; or some inconceivable indefinable degree, n.o.body knows what. It cannot include all, and may and must mean some one of the above-named dogmas. Yet no one would dare to tell us which. Has G.o.d given, or does our own reason give us, a standard of moral judgment of which no one can form a conception, or give us a definition?

2. No one could practically apply this standard, if he could define it, as a test of moral action. The reason is obvious. No one, but Omniscience, can possibly know what degree of tensity our nature is capable of; nor precisely what degree is compatible with life, or with the most perfect health. If intensity, then, is the standard by which we are required to determine definitely the character of moral actions, we are in reality required to fix definitely the value of an unknown quant.i.ty, to wit: moral action, by a standard of which we are, and of necessity must be, most profoundly ignorant. We are required to find the definite by means of the indefinite; the plain by means of the "palpable obscure." Has G.o.d, or our own reason, placed us in such a predicament as this, in respect to the most momentous of all questions, the determination of our true moral character and deserts?

3. While the standard under consideration is, and must be, unknown to us, it is perpetually varying, and never fixed. The degree of intensity of mental effort of which we are capable at one moment, differs from that which is possible to us at another. The same holds equally of that which is compatible with life and health. Can we believe that "the judge of all the earth" requires us to conform, and holds us responsible for not conforming to a standard located we cannot possibly know where, and which is always movable, and never for a moment remaining fixed?

4. The absurdity of attempting to act in conformity to this principle, in reference to particular duties, will show clearly that it cannot be the standard of moral obligations in any instance. Suppose an individual becomes convinced that it is his duty, that is, that G.o.d requires him to walk or travel a given distance, or for a time to compose himself for the purpose of sleeping. Now he must will with all his heart to perform the duty before him. What if he should judge himself bound to will to sleep, for example, and to will it with all possible intensity, or with as great an intensity as consists with his health? How long would it take him to compose himself to sleep in this manner? What if he should with all possible intensity will to walk? What if, when with all sincerity, he had intended to perform, in the best manner, the duty devolved upon him, he should inquire whether the intention possessed the requisite intensity? It would be just as rational to apply this standard in the instances under consideration, as in any other.

5. That _Sincerity_, and not intensity of intention, presents the true standard of moral judgment, is evident from the fact, that the former commends itself to every man's conscience as perfectly intelligible, of ready definition in itself, and of consequently ready application, in determining the character and moral desert of all moral actions. We can readily conceive what it is to yield all our powers and interests to the Will of G.o.d, and to do it with the sincere intention of employing them in the wisest and best manner for the accomplishment of the highest good. We can conceive, too, what it is to employ our powers and interests under the control of such an intention. We can also perceive with perfect distinctness our obligation to live and act under the supreme control of such an intention. If we are bound to yield to G.o.d at all, we are bound to yield our entire being to his supreme control. If we are bound to will and employ our powers and resources to produce any good at all, we are bound to will and aim to produce the highest good.

This principle also is equally applicable in, determining the character and deserts of all moral actions. Every honest mind can readily determine the fact, whether it is or is not acting under the supreme control of the intention under consideration. If we adopt this principle, as expressing the meaning of the command requiring us to love with _all_ the heart, perfect sunlight rests upon the Divine law. If we adopt any other standard, perfect midnight hangs over that law.

6. If we conceive a moral agent really to live and act in full harmony with the intention under consideration, it is impossible for us to conceive, or affirm, that he has not done his entire duty. What more ought a moral agent to intend than the highest good he can accomplish?

Should it be said, that he ought to intend this with a certain degree of intensity, the reply is, that Sincerity implies an intention to will and act, at all times, with that degree of intensity best adapted to the end to be accomplished. What more can properly or wisely be demanded? Is not this loving with all the heart?

7. On this principle, a much greater degree of intensity, and consequent energy of action, will be secured, than on the other principle. Nothing tends more effectually to palsy the energies of the mind, than the attempt always to act with the greatest intensity. It is precisely like the attempt of some orators, to speak, on all subjects alike, with the greatest possible pathos and sublimity. On the other hand, let an individual throw his whole being under the control of the grand principle of doing all the good he can, and his powers will energize with the greatest freedom, intensity, and effect. If, therefore, the standard of moral obligation and moral desert has been wisely fixed, Sincerity, and nothing else, is that standard.

8. I remark, once more, that Sincerity is the standard fixed in the Scriptures of truth. In Jer. iii. 16, the Jews are accused of not "turning to the Lord with _the whole heart_, but feignedly," that is, with insincerity. If they had turned sincerely, they would, according to this pa.s.sage, have done it with the _whole heart_. The whole heart, then, according to the express teachings of the Bible, is synonymous with Sincerity and Sincerity according to the above definition of the term. This is the true standard, according to revelation as well as reason. I have other arguments, equally conclusive as the above, to present, but these are sufficient. The importance of the subject, together with its decisive bearing upon the momentous question to be discussed in the next Chapter, is my apology for dwelling thus long upon it.

CHAPTER X.

INTUITIONS, OR MORAL ACTS, NEVER OF A MIXED CHARACTER; THAT IS, PARTLY RIGHT AND PARTLY WRONG.

WE are now prepared to consider the question, whether each moral act, or exercise, is not always of a character purely unmixed? In other words, whether every such act, or intention, is not always perfectly right or perfectly wrong I would here be understood to speak of single acts, or intuitions, in distinction from a series, which continues through some definite period, as an hour or a day. Such series of acts may, of course, be of a mixed character; that is, it may be made up of individual acts, some of which are right and some wrong. But the question is, can distinct, opposite, and contradictory elements, such as sin and holiness, right and wrong, selfishness and benevolence, enter into one and the same act No one will pretend that an individual is virtuous at all, unless he _intends_ obedience to the moral law. The question is, can an individual intend to obey and to disobey the law, in one and the same act? On this question I remark,

1. That the principle established in the last Chapter really settles the question. No one, to my knowledge, pretends, that, as far as sincerity is concerned, the same moral act can be of a mixed character. Very few, if any, will be guilty of the folly of maintaining, that an individual can sincerely intend to obey and to disobey the law at one and the same time. When such act is contemplated in this point of light, it is almost universally admitted that it cannot be of a mixed character. But then another test is applied--that of intensity. It is conceivable, at least, it is said, that the intention might possess a higher degree of intensity than it does possess. It is, therefore, p.r.o.nounced defective.

On the same supposition, every moral act in existence might be p.r.o.nounced defective. For we can, at least, conceive, that it might possess a higher degree of intensity. It has been abundantly established in the last Chapter, however, that there is no such test of moral actions as this, a test authorized either by reason or revelation.

Sincerity is the only standard by which to determine the character and deserts of all moral acts and states. In the light of this standard, it is intuitively evident, that no one act can combine such contradictory and opposite elements as sin and holiness, right and wrong, an intention to obey and to disobey the moral law.

2. The opinions and reasonings of distinguished philosophers and theologians on the subject may be adduced in confirmation of the doctrine under consideration. Let it be borne in mind, that if the same act embraces such contradictory and opposite elements as sin and holiness, it must be, in reality, opposed to itself, one element const.i.tuting the act, being in harmony with the law, and in opposition to the other element which is opposed to the law.

Now the remark of Edwards upon this subject demands our special attention. "It is absurd," he says, "to suppose the same individual Will to oppose itself in its present act; or the present choice to be opposite to and resisting present choice; as absurd as it is to talk of two contrary motions in the same moving body at the same time." Does not the common sense of the race affirm the truth of this statement Sin and holiness cannot enter into the same act, unless it embraces a serious intention to obey and not to obey the moral law at the same time. Is not this, in the language of Edwards, as "absurd as it is to talk of two contrary motions in the same moving body at the same time."

Equally conclusive is the argument of Kant upon the same subject. Having shown that mankind are divided into two cla.s.ses, the morally good and the morally evil; that the distinguis.h.i.+ng characteristic of the former is, that they have adopted the Moral law as their maxim, that is, that it is their serious intention to comply with all the claims of the law; and of the latter, that they have not adopted the law as their maxim; he adds, "The sentiment of mankind is, therefore, never indifferent relatively to the law, and he never can be neither good nor evil." Then follows the paragraph to which special attention is invited. "In like manner, mankind cannot be, in some points of character, morally good, while he is, at the same time, in others evil; for, is he in any point good, then the moral law is his maxim (that is, it is his serious intention to obey the law in the length and breadth of its claims); but is he likewise, at the same time, in some points bad, then quoad [as to]

these, the Moral law is not his maxim, (that is, in these particulars, it is his intention not to obey the law). But since the law is one and universal, and as it commands in one act of life, so in all, then the maxim referring to it would be, at the same time universal and particular, which is a contradiction;" (that is, it would be his intention to obey the law universally, and at the same time, not to obey it in certain particulars, one of the most palpable contradictions conceivable.) To my mind the above argument has all the force of demonstration. Let it be borne in mind, that no man is morally good at all, unless it is his intention to obey the Moral law universally. This being his intention, the law has no higher claims upon him. Its full demands are, and must be, met in that intention. For what can the law require more, than that the voluntary powers shall be in full harmony with its demands, which is always true, when there is a sincere intention to obey the law universally. Now, with this intention, there can be nothing in the individual morally evil; unless there is, at the same time, an intention not to obey the law in certain particulars; that is, not to obey it universally. A mixed moral act, or intention, therefore, is possible, only on this condition, that it shall embrace these two contradictory elements--a serious determination to obey the law universally, and a determination equally decisive, at the same time, to disobey it in certain particulars; that is, not to obey it universally. I leave it with the advocates of the doctrine of Mixed Moral Action to dispose of this difficulty as they can.

3. If we could conceive of a moral act of a mixed character, the Moral law could not recognize it as holy at all. It presents but one scale by which to determine the character of moral acts, the command requiring us to love with all the heart. It knows such acts only as conformed, or not conformed, to this command. The mixed action, if it could exist, would, in the light of the Moral law, be placed among the not-conformed, just as much as those which are exclusively sinful. The Moral law does not present two scales, according to one of which actions are cla.s.sed as conformed or not-conformed, and according to the other, as partly conformed and partly not-conformed. Such a scale as this last is unknown in the circle of revealed truth. The Moral law presents us but one scale. Those acts which are in full conformity to its demands, it puts down as holy. Those not thus conformed, it puts down as sinful; as holy or sinful is the only light in which actions stand according to the law.

4. Mixed actions, if they could exist, are as positively prohibited by the law, and must therefore be placed under the category of total disobedience, just as much as those which are in themselves entirely sinful. While the law requires us to love with _all_ the heart, it positively prohibits everything short of this. The individual, therefore, who puts forth an act of a mixed character, puts forth an act as totally and positively prohibited as the man who puts forth a totally sinful one. Both alike must be placed under the category of total disobedience. A father requires his two sons to go to the distance of ten rods, and positively prohibits their stopping short of the distance required. One determines to go nine rods, and there to stop. The other determines not to move at all. One has put forth an act of total disobedience just as much as the other. So of all moral acts which stop short of loving with all the heart.

5. A moral act of a mixed character cannot possibly proceed from that regard to moral obligation which is an essential condition of the existence of any degree of virtue at all. Virtue, in no degree, can exist, except from a sacred regard to moral obligation. The individual who thus regards moral obligation in one degree, will regard it equally in all degrees. The individual, therefore, who, from such regard, yields to the claims of the law at all, will and must conform to the full measure of its demands. He cannot be in voluntary opposition to any one demand of that law. A mixed moral act, then, cannot possibly proceed from that regard to moral obligation which is the essential condition of holiness in any degree. This leads me to remark,

6. That a moral act of a mixed character, if it could exist, could arise from none other than the most purely selfish and wicked intention conceivable. Three positions, we will suppose, are before the mind--a state of perfect conformity to the law, a state of total disobedience, and a third state combining the elements of obedience and disobedience.

By a voluntary act of moral election, an individual places himself in the last state, in distinction from each of the others. What must have been his intention in so doing? He cannot have acted from a regard to moral rect.i.tude. In that case, he would have elected the state of total obedience. His intention must have been to secure, at the same time, the reward of holiness and the "pleasures of sin"--a most selfish and wicked state surely. The supposition of a moral act, that is, intention combining the elements of holiness and sin--is as great an absurdity as the supposition, that a circle has become a square, without losing any of its properties as a circle.