The Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha Part 23

"Fixing the internal organ upon that, seeing the whole universe manifested, made of pure intelligence,

"The aspirant even in this life attains to the absolute, his bondage to works annulled."

A Vedic text also declares: That is Rasa (mercury), having obtained this he becomes beat.i.tude.

Thus, then, it has been shown that mercury alone is the means of pa.s.sing beyond the burden of transmigratory pains. And conformably we have a verse which sets forth the ident.i.ty between mercury and the supreme self--

"May that mercury, which is the very self, preserve us from dejection and from the terrors of metempsychosis,

"Which is naturally to be applied again and again by those that aspire to liberation from the enveloping illusion,

"Which perfected endures, which plays not again when the soul awakes,

"Which, when it arises, pains no other soul, which s.h.i.+nes forth by itself from itself."

A. E. G.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 153: Cf. Marco Polo's account of the Indian yogis in Colonel Yule's edit. vol. ii. p. 300. _Parada-pana_ is one of the practices of the Siddhopasakas in the Sa?kara-digvijaya, -- 49, to obviate _apam?ityu_, _akalam?ityu_, &c.]

CHAPTER X.

THE VAISEs.h.i.+KA OR AULuKYA DARSANA.[154]

Whoso wishes to escape the reality of pain, which is established by the consciousness of every soul through its being felt to be essentially contrary to every rational being, and wishes therefore to know the means of such escape,--learns that the knowledge of the Supreme Being is the true means thereof, from the authority of such pa.s.sages as these (_Svetasvatara Upan_. vi. 20)--

"When men shall roll up the sky as a piece of leather,

"Then shall there be an end of pain without the knowledge of Siva."

Now the knowledge of the Supreme is to be gained by hearing (_srava?a_), thought (_manana_), and reflection (_bhavana_), as it has been said--

"By scripture, by inference, and by the force of repeated meditation,--

"By these three methods producing knowledge, he gains the highest union (_yoga_)."

Here thought depends on inference, and inference depends on the knowledge of the _vyapti_ (or universal proposition), and the knowledge of the _vyapti_ follows the right understanding of the categories,--hence the saint Ka?ada[155] establishes the six categories in his tenfold treatise, commencing with the words, "Now, therefore, we shall explain duty."

In the first book, consisting of two daily lessons, he describes all the categories which are capable of intimate relation. In the first _ahnika_ he defines those which possess "genus" (_jati_), in the second "genus" (or "generality") itself and "particularity." In the similarly divided second book he discusses "substance," giving in the first _ahnika_ the characteristics of the five elements, and in the second he establishes the existence of s.p.a.ce and time. In the third book he defines the soul and the internal sense, the former in the first _ahnika_, the latter in the second. In the fourth book he discusses the body and its adjuncts, the latter in the first _ahnika_, and the former in the second. In the fifth book he investigates action; in the first _ahnika_ he considers action as connected with the body, in the second as belonging to the mind. In the sixth book he examines merit and demerit as revealed in Sruti; in the first _ahnika_ he discusses the merit of giving, receiving gifts, &c., in the second the duties of the four periods of religious life. In the seventh book he discusses quality and intimate relation; in the first _ahnika_ he considers the qualities independent of thought, in the second those qualities which are related to it, and also intimate relation. In the eighth book he examines "indeterminate" and "determinate" perception, and means of proof. In the ninth book he discusses the characteristics of intellect. In the tenth book he establishes the different kinds of inference.[156]

The method of this system is said to be threefold, "enunciation,"

"definition," and "investigation."[157] "But," it may be objected, "ought we not to include 'division,' and so make the method fourfold, not threefold?" We demur to this, because "division" is really included in a particular kind of enunciation. Thus when we declare that substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, and intimate relation are the only six positive categories,--this is an example of enunciation. If you ask "What is the reason for this definite order of the categories?" we answer as follows:--Since "substance" is the chief, as being the substratum of all the categories, we enounce this first; next "quality," since it resides in its generic character in all substances [though different substances have different qualities]; then "action," as it agrees with "substance" and "quality" in possessing "generality;"[158] then "generality," as residing in these three; then "particularity,"

inasmuch as it possesses "intimate relation;"[159] lastly, "intimate relation" itself; such is the principle of arrangement.

If you ask, "Why do you say that there are only six categories since 'non-existence' is also one?" we answer: Because we wish to speak of the six as positive categories, _i.e._, as being the objects of conceptions which do not involve a negative idea. "Still," the objector may retort, "how do you establish this definite number 'only six'? for either horn of the alternative fails. For, we ask, is the thing to be thus excluded already thoroughly ascertained or not? If it is thoroughly ascertained, why do you exclude it? and still more so, if it is not thoroughly ascertained? What sensible man, pray, spends his strength in denying that a mouse has horns? Thus your definite number 'only six' fails as being inapplicable." This, however, we cannot admit; if darkness, &c., are allowed to form certainly a seventh category (as "non-existence"), we thus (by our definite number) deny it to be one of the six _positive_ categories,--and if others attempt to include "capacity," "number," &c., which we allow to be certainly positive existences, we thus deny that they make a _seventh_ category. But enough of this long discussion.

Substantiality, &c. (_dravyatvadi_), _i.e._, the genera of substance, quality, and action, are the definition of the triad substance, quality, and action respectively. The genus of substance (_dravyatva_) is that which, while it alike exists with intimate relation in the (eternal) sky and the (transitory) lotus, is itself eternal,[160] and does not exist with intimate relation in smell.[161]

The genus of quality (_gu?atva_) is that which is immediately subordinate to the genus existence, and exists with intimate relation in whatever is not an intimate or mediate cause.[162] The genus of action (_karmatva_) is that which is immediately subordinate to the genus existence, and is not found with intimate relation in anything eternal.[163] Generality (or genus, _samanya_) is that which is found in many things with intimate relation, and can never be the counter-ent.i.ty to emergent non-existence.[164] Particularity[165]

(_visesha_) exists with intimate relation, but it is dest.i.tute of generality, which stops mutual non-existence.[166] Intimate relation (_samavaya_) is that connection which itself has not intimate relation.[167] Such are the definitions of the six categories.

Substance is ninefold,--earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, s.p.a.ce, soul, and mind. The genera of earth, &c. (_p?ithivitva_), are the definitions of the first four. The genus of earth is that generality which is immediately subordinate to substance, and resides in the same subject with colour produced by baking.[168]

The genus of water is that generality which is found with intimate relation in water, being also found in intimate relation in river and sea. The genus of fire is that generality which is found with intimate relation in fire, being also found with intimate relation in the moon and gold. The genus of air is that which is immediately subordinate to substance, and is found with intimate relation in the organ of the skin.[169]

As ether, s.p.a.ce, and time, from their being single, cannot be subordinate genera, their several names stand respectively for their technical appellations. Ether is the abode of particularity, and is found in the same subject with the non-eternal (_janya_) special quality which is not produced by contact.[170]

Time is that which, being a pervading substance, is the abode of the mediate cause[171] of that idea of remoteness (_paratva_) which is not found with intimate relation in s.p.a.ce;[172] while s.p.a.ce is that pervading substance which possesses no special qualities and yet is not time.[173] The general terms _atmatva_ and _manastva_ are the respective definitions of soul (_atman_) and mind (_manas_). The general idea of soul is that which is subordinate to substance, being also found with intimate relation in that which is without form[174]

(_amurtta_). The general idea of mind is that which is subordinate to substance, being also found existing with intimate relation in an atom, but [unlike other atoms] not the intimate cause of any substance. There are twenty-four qualities; seventeen are mentioned directly in Ka?ada's Sutras (i. 1, 6), "colour, taste, smell, touch, number, quant.i.ty, severalty, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, intelligence, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and effort;" and, besides these, seven others are understood in the word "_and_," viz., gravity, fluidity, viscidity, faculty, merit, demerit, and sound. Their respective genera (_rupatva_, &c.) are their several definitions. The cla.s.s or genus of "colour" is that which is subordinate to quality and exists with intimate relation in blue. In the same way may be formed the definitions of the rest.

"Action" is fivefold, according to the distinction of throwing upwards, throwing downwards, contracting, expanding, and going: revolution, evacuating, &c., being included under "going." The genus of throwing upwards, &c., will be their respective definitions. The genus of throwing upwards is a subordinate genus to action; it exists with intimate relation, and is to be known as the mediate cause of conjunction with a higher place. In the same manner are to be made the definitions of throwing downwards, &c. Generality (or genus) is twofold, extensive and non-extensive; existence is extensive as found with intimate connection in substance and quality, or in quality and action; substance, &c., are non-extensive. The definition of generality has been given before. Particularity and intimate relation cannot be divided,--in the former case in consequence of the infinite number of separate particularities, in the latter from intimate relation being but one; their definitions have been given before.

There is a popular proverb--

"Duality, change produced by baking, and disjunction produced by disjunction,--he whose mind vacillates not in these three is the true Vaises.h.i.+ka;" and therefore we will now show the manner of the production of duality, &c.

There is here first the contact of the organ of sense with the object; thence there arises the knowledge of the genus unity; then the distinguis.h.i.+ng perception _apekshabuddhi_ [by which we apprehend "this is one," "this is one," &c.]; then the production of duality, _dvitva_ (in the object);[175] then the knowledge of the abstract genus of duality (_dvitvatva_); then the knowledge of the quality duality as it exists in the two things; then imagination[176] (_sa?skara_).[177]

But it may here be asked what is the proof of duality, &c., being thus produced from _apekshabuddhi_? The great doctor (Udayana) maintained that _apekshabuddhi_ must be the producer of duality, &c., because duality is never found separated from it, while, at the same time, we cannot hold _apekshabuddhi_ as the cause only of its being known [and therefore it follows that it must be the cause of its being produced[178]], just as contact is with regard to sound. We, however, maintain the same opinion by a different argument; duality, &c., cannot be held to be made known (_jnapya_) by that non-eternal apprehension whose object is two or more individual unities (_i.e._, _apekshabuddhi_), because these are qualities which reside in a plurality of subjects [and not in any one individual[179]] just as "severalty" does [and, therefore, as _apekshabuddhi_ is not their _jnapaka_, it must be their _janaka_].

Next we will describe the order of the successive destructions. From _apekshabuddhi_ arises, simultaneously with the production of duality (_dvitva_), the destruction of the knowledge of the genus of unity; next from the knowledge of the genus of duality (_dvitvatva_) arises, simultaneously with the knowledge of the quality duality, the destruction of _apekshabuddhi_; next from the destruction of _apekshabuddhi_ arises, simultaneously with the knowledge of the two substances, the destruction of the duality; next from the knowledge of the two substances arises, simultaneously with the production of imagination (_sa?skara_), the destruction of the knowledge of the quality; and next from imagination arises the destruction of the knowledge of the substances.

The evidence for the destruction of one kind of knowledge by another, and for the destruction of another knowledge by imagination, is to be found in the following argument; these knowledges themselves which are the subjects of the discussion _are_ successively destroyed by the rise of others produced from them, because knowledge, like sound, is a special quality of an all-pervading substance, and of momentary duration.[180] I may briefly add, that when you have the knowledge of the genus of unity simultaneously with an action in one of the two things themselves, producing that separation which is the opposite to the conjunction that produced the whole, in that case you have the subsequent destruction of duality produced by the destruction of its abiding-place (the two things); but where you have this separate action taking place simultaneously with the rise of _apekshabuddhi_, there you have the destruction of duality produced by the united influence of both.[181]

_Apekshabuddhi_ is to be considered as that operation of the mind which is the counter-ent.i.ty to that emergent non-existence (_i.e._, destruction) which itself causes a subsequent destruction.[182]

Next we will inquire in how many moments, commencing with the destruction of the compound of two atoms (the _dvya?uka_), another compound of two atoms is produced, having colour, &c. In the course of this investigation the mode of production will be explained. First, the compound of two atoms is gradually destroyed by the series of steps commencing with the contact of fire;[183] secondly, from the conjunction of fire arises the destruction of the qualities black, &c., in the single atom; thirdly, from another conjunction of fire arises the production of red, &c., in the atom; fourthly, from conjunction with a soul possessing merit arises an action[184] in the atom for the production of a substance; fifthly, by that action is produced a separation of that atom from its former place; sixthly, there is produced thereby the destruction of its conjunction with that former place; seventhly, is produced the conjunction with another atom; eighthly, from these two atoms arises the compound of two atoms; ninthly, from the qualities, &c., of the causes (_i.e._, the atoms) are produced colour, &c., the qualities of the effect (_i.e._, the _dvya?uka_). Such is the order of the series of nine moments. The other two series,[185] that of the ten and that of the eleven moments, are omitted for fear of prolixity. Such is the mode of production, if we hold (with the Vaises.h.i.+kas) that the baking process takes place in the atoms of the jar.[186] The Naiyayikas, however, maintain that the baking process takes place in the jar.

"Disjunction produced by disjunction" is twofold,--that produced by the disjunction of the intimate [or material] causes only, and that produced by the disjunction of the intimate cause and the non-cause [_i.e._, the place]. We will first describe the former kind.

It is a fixed rule that when the action of breaking arises in the [material] cause which is inseparably connected with the effect [_i.e._, in one of the two halves of the pot], and produces a disjunction from the other half, there is not produced at that time a disjunction from the place or point of s.p.a.ce occupied by the pot; and, again, when there is a disjunction from that point of s.p.a.ce occupied by the pot, the disjunction from the other half is not contemporary with it, but has already taken place. For just as we never see smoke without its cause, fire, so we never see that effect of the breaking in the pot which we call the disjunction from the point of s.p.a.ce,[187]

without there having previously been the origination of that disjunction of the halves which stops the conjunction whereby the pot was brought into being. Therefore the action of breaking in the parts produces the disjunction of one part from another, but not the disjunction from the point of s.p.a.ce; next, this disjunction of one part from another produces the destruction of that conjunction which had brought the pot into existence; and thence arises the destruction of the pot, according to the principle, _cessante causa cessat effectus_. The pot being thus destroyed, that disjunction, which resides in both the halves (which are the material or intimate causes of the pot) during the time that is marked by the destruction of the pot or perhaps having reference only to one independent half, initiates, in the case of that half where the breaking began, a disjunction from the point of s.p.a.ce which had been connected with the pot; but not in the case of the other half, as there is no cause to produce it.[188]

But the second kind is as follows:--As action which arises in the hand, and causes a disjunction from that with which it was in contact, initiates a disjunction[189] from the points of s.p.a.ce in which the original conjunction took place; and this is "the disjunction of the intimate cause and the non-cause." When the action in the hand produces an effect in relation to any points of s.p.a.ce, it initiates also in the same direction a disjunction of the intimate effect and the non-effect; thus the disjunction of the body [the intimate effect]

and the points of s.p.a.ce arises from the disjunction of the hand and the points of s.p.a.ce [the hand being an intimate or material cause of the body, but the points of s.p.a.ce being not a cause]. This second disjunction is not produced by the action of the body, because the body is supposed to be at the time inactive; nor is it produced by the action of the hand, because it is impossible that an action residing in some other place [as the hand] should produce the effect of disjunction [in the body]. Therefore we conclude by exhaustion that we must accept the view--that it is the disjunction of the intimate cause and the non-cause[190] which causes the second disjunction of the body and the points of s.p.a.ce.

But an opponent may here object that "what you formerly stated (p.

147) as to existence being denied of darkness, &c., is surely unreasonable; for, in fact, there are no less than four different opinions maintained on this point,--thus (_a._) the Bha??a Mima?sakas and the Vedantins hold that darkness is a substance; (_b._) Sridhara acharya[191] holds that the colour of dark blue is imposed [and thus darkness will be a quality]; (_c._) some of the Prabhakara Mima?sakas hold that it is the absence of the cognition of light; (_d._) the Naiyayikas, &c., hold that it is the absence of light." In reply, we a.s.sert that as for the first alleged opinion (_a._) it is quite out of the question, as it is consistent with neither of the two possible alternatives; for if darkness is a substance, it must either be one of the nine well-known substances, earth, &c.,[192] or some different one. But it cannot be any one of the nine, since, under whichever one you would place it, all the qualities of that substance should certainly be found in it; nor can you, on the other hand, a.s.sert that it is some substance different from these nine, since, being in itself dest.i.tute of qualities, it cannot properly be a substance at all [the very definition of substance being "that which is the substratum of qualities"], and therefore, of course, it cannot be a different substance from the nine. But you may ask, "How can you say that darkness is dest.i.tute of qualities, when it is perceived as possessed of the dark blue of the tamala blossom?" We reply, that this is merely an error, as when men say that the [colourless] sky is blue. But enough of this onslaught on ancient sages.[193] (_b._) Hence it follows that darkness cannot have its colour imposed upon it, since you cannot have an imposition of colour without supposing some substratum to receive it;[194] and again, we cannot conceive the eye as capable of imposing a colour when deprived of the concurrent cause, the external light. Nor can we accept that it is an impression independent of the eye [_i.e._, produced by the internal sense, mind], because the concurrence of the eye is not a superfluous but an indispensable condition to its being produced. Nor can you maintain that "absence or non-existence (_abhava_[195]) is incapable of being expressed by affirmative tense affixes [and, therefore, as we _do_ use such phrases as _tenebrae oriuntur_, darkness cannot be a mere non-existence"]; because your a.s.sertion is too broad, as it would include such cases of non-existence as a mundane collapse, destruction, inattention,[196] &c. [and yet we all know that men do speak of any of these things as past, present, or future, and yet all are cases of _abhava_]. (_c._) Hence darkness cannot be the absence of the cognition of light, since, by the well-known rule that that organ which perceives a certain object can also perceive its absence, it would follow that darkness would be perceived by the mind [since it is the mind which perceives cognitions].[197] Hence we conclude that the fourth or remaining opinion must be the true one, viz., that darkness is only the absence of light. And it need not be objected that it is very difficult to account for the attribution to non-existence of the qualities of existence, for we all see that the quality happiness _is_ attributed to the absence of pain, and the idea of separation is connected with the absence of conjunction. And you need not a.s.sert that "this absence of light must be the object of a cognition produced by the eye in dependence on light, since it is the absence of an object possessing colour,[198] as we see in the case of a jar's absence," because by the very rule on which you rely, viz., that that on which the eye depends to perceive an object, it must also depend on to perceive that object's absence, it follows that as there is no dependence of the eye on light to perceive light, it need not depend thereon to perceive this light's absence. Nor need our opponent retort that "the cognition of darkness [as the absence of light] necessitates the cognition of the place where the absence resides [and _this_ will require light]," as such an a.s.sertion is quite untenable, for we cannot admit that in order to have a conception of absence it is necessary to have a conception of the place where the absence resides, else we could not have the perception of the cessation of sound, as is implied in such an expression as "the tumult has ceased."[199] Hence, having all these difficulties in his mind, the venerable Ka?ada uttered his aphorism [as an _ipse dixit_ to settle the question]: "_Dravya-gu?a-karma-nish-patti-vaidharmyad abhavas tamas_" (_Vais.

Sut._ v. 2, 19), "Darkness is really non-existence, since it is dissimilar to the production of substances, qualities, or actions."

The same thing has been also established by the argument that darkness is perceived by the eye[200] [without light, whereas all substances, if perceptible at all, require the presence of light as well as of the eye to be visible].

Non-existence (_abhava_) is considered to be the seventh category, as established by negative proofs. It may be concisely defined as that which, itself not having intimate relation, is _not_ intimate relation;[201] and this is twofold, "relative non-existence"[202] and "reciprocal non-existence."

The former is again divided into "antecedent," "emergent," and "absolute." "Antecedent" is that non-existence which, though without any beginning, is not everlasting; "emergent" is that which, though having a beginning, is everlasting; "absolute" is that non-existence which abides in its own counter-ent.i.ty;[203] "reciprocal non-existence" is that which, being different from "absolute," has yet no defined limit [_i.e._, no _terminus ad quem_ nor _terminus a quo_, as "antecedent" and "emergent" have].