The Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha Part 27

[Footnote 236: The whole (as the jar) resides by intimate relation in its parts (as the jar's two halves). But the eternal substances, ether, time, the soul, mind, and the atoms of earth, water, fire, and air, do not thus reside in anything, although, of course, the category _visesha_ does reside in them by intimate relation. The word "substances" excludes _tantutva_, and "existing in intimate relation"

excludes ether, &c.]

[Footnote 237: Intermediate between infinite and infinitesimal, all eternal substances being the one or the other.]

[Footnote 238: The _viruddha-hetu_ is that which is never found where the major term is.]

[Footnote 239: This and much more of the whole discussion is taken from the Kusumanjali, v. 2, and I extract my note on the pa.s.sage there. "The older Naiyayikas maintained that the argument 'the mountain has fire because it has blue smoke,' involved the fallacy of vyapyatvasiddhi, because the alleged middle term was unnecessarily restricted (see Siddhanta Muktav. p. 77). The moderns, however, more wisely consider it as a harmless error, and they would rather meet the objection by a.s.serting that there is no proof to establish the validity of the a.s.sumed middle term."]

[Footnote 240: For the _upadhi_ cf. pp. 7, 8.]

[Footnote 241: As in the former case it would be clear that it is a subject for separate discussion; and in the latter you would be liable to the fault of _asrayasiddhi_, a "baseless inference," since your subject (or minor term), being itself non-existent, cannot be the locus or subject of a negation (cf. Kusumanjali, iii. 2). "Just as that subject from which a given attribute is excluded cannot be unreal, so neither can an unreal thing be the subject of a negation."]

[Footnote 242: If G.o.d is known, then His existence must be granted; if He is not known, how can we argue about Him? I read lines 15, 16, in p. 120 of the Calcutta edition, _vikalpaparahatatvat_, and then begin the next clause with _syad etat_. The printed text, _vikalpaparahata?

syat tad etat_, seems unintelligible.]

[Footnote 243: The aggregate of the various subtile bodies const.i.tutes Hira?yagarbha, or the supreme soul viewed in His relation to the world as creator, while the aggregate of the gross bodies similarly const.i.tutes his gross body (viraj).]

[Footnote 244: The usual reading is _tasthur_ for _tasthe_.]

[Footnote 245: For these divisions of the _anyonyasraya_ fallacy, see _Nyayasutra v?itti_, i. 39 (p. 33).]

[Footnote 246: For _tivra_ cf. _Yoga sutras_, i. 21, 22.]

CHAPTER XII.

THE JAIMINI-DARSANA.

An objector may here ask, "Are you not continually repeating that merit (_dharma_) comes from the practice of duty (_dharma_), but how is duty to be defined or proved?" Listen attentively to my answer. A reply to this question has been given in the older[247] Mima?sa by the holy sage Jaimini. Now the Mima?sa consists of twelve books.[248] In the first book is discussed the authoritativeness of those collections of words which are severally meant by the terms injunction (_vidhi_), "explanatory pa.s.sage" (_arthavada_), hymn (_mantra_), tradition (_sm?iti_), and "name." In the second, certain subsidiary discussions [as _e.g._, on _apurva_] relating to the difference of various rites, refutation of (erroneously alleged) proofs, and difference of performance [as in "constant" and "voluntary" offerings]. In the third, _Sruti_, "sign" or "sense of the pa.s.sage" (_li?ga_), "context"

(_vakya_), &c., and their respective weight when in apparent opposition to one another, the ceremonies called _pratipatti-karma?i_, things mentioned incidentally (_anarabhyadhita_), things accessory to several main objects, as _prayajas_, &c., and the duties of the sacrificer. In the fourth, the influence on other rites of the princ.i.p.al and subordinate rites, the fruit caused by the _juhu_ being made of the _butea frondosa_, &c., and the dice-playing, &c., which form subordinate parts of the _rajasuya_ sacrifice. In the fifth, the relative order of different pa.s.sages of _Sruti_, &c., the order of different parts of a sacrifice [as the seventeen animals at the _vaj.a.peya_], the multiplication and non-multiplication of rites, and the respective force of the words of _Sruti_, order of mention, &c., in determining the order of performance. In the sixth, the persons qualified to offer sacrifices, their obligations, the subst.i.tutes for enjoined materials, supplies for lost or injured offerings, expiatory rites, the _sattra_ offerings, things proper to be given, and the different sacrificial fires. In the seventh, transference of the ceremonies of one sacrifice to another by direct command in the Vaidic text, and then as inferred by "name" or "sign." In the eighth, transference by virtue of the clearly expressed or obscurely expressed "sign," or by the predominant "sign," and cases where no transference takes place. In the ninth, the beginning of the discussion on the adaptation of hymns when quoted in a new connection (_uha_), the adaptation of _samans_ and _mantras_, and collateral questions connected therewith. In the tenth, the discussion of occasions where the non-performance of the primary rite involves the "preclusion" and non-performance of the dependent rites, and of occasions where rites are precluded because other rites produce their special result, discussions connected with the _graha_ offerings, certain _samans_, and various other things, and a discussion on the different kinds of negation. In the eleventh, the incidental mention and subsequently the fuller discussion of _tantra_[249] [where several acts are combined into one], and _avapa_ [or the performing an act more than once]. In the twelfth, a discussion on _prasa?ga_ [where the rite is performed for one chief purpose, but with an incidental further reference], _tantra_, c.u.mulation of concurrent rites (_samuchchaya_) and option.

Now the first topic which introduces the discussions of the Purva-Mima?sa arises from the aphorism, "Now therefore a desire to know duty [is to be entertained by thee"]. Now the learned describe a "topic" as consisting of five members, and these are (_a._) the subject, (_b._) the doubt, (_c._) the _prima facie_ argument, (_d._) the demonstrated conclusion, and (_e._) the connection (_sa?gati_).

The topic is discussed according to the doctrines held by the great teachers of the system. Thus the "subject" to be discussed is the sentence, "The Veda is to be read." Now the "doubt" which arises is whether the study of Jaimini's _sastra_ concerning duty, beginning with the aphorism, "Duty is a thing which is to be recognised by an instigatory pa.s.sage," and ending with "and from seeing it in the _anvaharya_," is to be commenced or not. The _prima facie_ argument is that it is not to be commenced, whether the injunction to read the Veda be held to have a visible and present or an invisible and future fruit. (_a._) If you say that this injunction must have a visible fruit, and this can be no other[250] than the knowledge of the meaning of what is read, we must next ask you whether this said reading is enjoined as something which otherwise would not have been thought of, or whether as something which otherwise would have been optional, as we see in the rule for sh.e.l.ling rice.[251] It cannot be the former, for the reading of the Veda is a means of knowing the sense thereof from its very nature as reading, just as in the parallel instance of reading the Mahabharata; and we see by this argument that it would present itself as an obvious means quite independently of the injunction. Well, then, let it be the latter alternative; just as the baked flour cake called _puro?asa_ is made only of rice prepared by being unhusked in a mortar, when, but for the injunction, it might have been unhusked by the finger-nails. There, however, the new moon and full moon sacrifices only produce their unseen effect, which is the princ.i.p.al _apurva_, by means of the various minor effects or subordinate _apurvas_, produced by the various subordinate parts of the whole ceremony; and consequently the minor _apurva_ of the unhusking is the reason there for the restricting injunction. But in the case which we are discussing, there is no such reason for any such restriction, as the rites can be equally well performed by gaining the knowledge of the Veda's meaning by reading a written book, or by studying under an authorised teacher. Hence we conclude that there is no injunction to study the Purva Mima?sa as a means of knowing the sense of the Veda. (_b._) "What, then, becomes of the Vedic injunction, 'The Veda is to be read'?" Well, you must be content with the fact that the injunction will have heaven as its [future] fruit, although it merely enjoins the making oneself master of the literal words of the Vedic text [without any care to understand the meaning which they may convey], since heaven, though not expressly mentioned, is to be a.s.sumed as the fruit, according to the a.n.a.logy of the Visvajit offering. Just as Jaimini, in his aphorism (iv. 3, 15), "Let that fruit be heaven, since it equally applies to all," establishes that those who are not expressly mentioned are still qualified to offer the Visvajit sacrifice, and infers by argument that its characteristic fruit is heaven, so let us a.s.sume it to be in the present case also. As it has been said--

"Since the visible fruit would be equally obtained without the injunction, this cannot be its sole object; we must rather suppose heaven to be the fruit from the injunction's significance, after the a.n.a.logy of the Visvajit, &c."

Thus, too, we shall keep the Sm?iti rule from being violated: "Having read the Veda, let him bathe." For this rule clearly implies that no long interval is to take place between reading the Veda and the student's return to his home; while, according to your opinion, after he had read the Veda, he would still have to remain in his preceptor's house to read the Mima?sa discussions, and thus the idea of no interval between would be contradicted. Therefore for these three reasons, (_a._) that the study of Mima?sa is not enjoined, (_b._) that heaven can be obtained by the simple reading of the text, and (_c._) that the rule for the student's return to his home is thus fulfilled, we maintain that the study of the Mima?sa discussions on duty is not to be commenced.

The "authoritative conclusion" (_siddhanta_), however, is as follows:--

We grant that it cannot be a case of _vidhi_, for it might have been adopted on other grounds; but not even Indra with his thunderbolt could make us lose our hold of the other alternative that it is a case of _niyama_. In the sentence, "The Veda is to be read," the affix _tavya_ expresses an enforcing power in the word,[252] which is to be rendered visible by a corresponding action in man, bringing a certain effect into existence; and this enforcing power seeks some corresponding end which is connected with the man's creative effort.

Now it cannot be the act itself of reading, as suggested by the whole word _adhyetavya_, which it thus seeks as an end; for this act of reading, thus expressed by the word, could never be regarded as an end, since it is a laborious operation of the voice and mind, consisting in the articulate utterance of the portion read. Nor could the portion read, as suggested by the whole sentence, be regarded as the end. For the ma.s.s of words called "Veda," which is what we really mean by the words "portion read," being eternal and omnipresent, could never fulfil the conditions of the four "fruits of action,"

production, &c.[253] Therefore the only true end which remains to us is the knowledge of the meaning, as obtained by carrying out the sense of the words of the injunction. According to the old rule, "He has the right who has the want, the power, and the wit," those who are aiming to understand certain things, as the new and full moon sacrifices, use their daily reading to learn the truth about them. And the injunction for reading, since it virtually excludes the reading of written books, &c. [from the well-known technical sense of the word "read" when used in this connection], conveys the idea that the reading the Veda enjoined has a consecrated character [as taught by a duly authorised teacher]. Therefore, as the princ.i.p.al _apurva_, produced by the great new and full moon sacrifices, necessitates and establishes the subordinate _apurvas_ produced by the inferior sacrificial acts, as unhusking the rice, &c., so the ma.s.s of _apurva_ produced by all the sacrifices necessitates and establishes a previous _apurva_ produced by the restricting injunction (_niyama_), which prescribes reading the Veda as the means to know how to perform these sacrifices. If you hesitate to concede that a _niyama_ could have this future influence called _apurva_, the same doubt might equally invalidate the efficacy of a _vidhi_ [as the two stand on the same level as to their enjoining power]. Nor is the supposition a valid one that heaven is the fruit, according to the a.n.a.logy of the _Visvajit_ offering, since, if there is a present and visible fruit in the form of a knowledge of the meaning of the sacred text, it is improper to suppose any other future and unseen fruit. Thus it has been said--

"Where a seen fruit is obtained, you must not suppose an unseen one; but if a _vidhi_ has the restricting meaning of a _niyama_, it does not thereby become meaningless."

But an objector may say, "Although a man who reads the simple text of the Veda may not attain to a knowledge of its meaning, still, as he who reads the Veda with its _a?gas_, grammar, &c., may attain to this knowledge, the study of Mima?sa will be useless." But this is not true: for even though he may attain to a simple knowledge of the literal meaning, all deeper investigation must depend on this kind of discussion. For instance, when it is said, "He offers anointed gravel," neither grammar nor _nigama_[254] nor _nirukta_ will determine the true meaning that it is to be anointed with ghee and not with oil, &c.; it is only by a Mima?sa discussion that the true meaning is unravelled from the rest of the pa.s.sage, "Verily, ghee is brightness."[255] It is therefore established that the study of Mima?sa is enjoined. Nor need it be supposed that this contradicts the pa.s.sage of Sm?iti, "Having read the Veda, let him bathe," which implies that he should now leave his teacher's house, and prohibits any further delay; as the words do not necessarily imply that the return to the paternal roof is to follow immediately on his having read the Veda, but only that it is to follow it at some time, and that both actions are to be done by the same person, just as we see in the common phrase, "Having bathed, he eats." Therefore from the purport of the injunction we conclude that the study of the Purva Mima?sa Sastra, consisting of a thousand "topics,"[256] is to be commenced. This topic is connected with the main subject of the Sastra as being a subsidiary digression, as it is said, "They call that a subsidiary digression which helps to establish the main subject."[257]

I now proceed to give a sketch of the discussion of the same "topic"

in accordance with the teaching of the Guru Prabhakara.

In the Sm?iti rule,[258] "Let him admit as a pupil the Brahman lad when eight years old (by investing him with the sacred cord), let him instruct him," the object of the direction appears to be the pupil's instruction.

Now a direction must have reference to somebody to be directed; and if you ask who is here to be directed, I reply, "He who desires to be a teacher,"

since, by Pa?ini's rule (i. 3, 36), the root _ni_ is used in the _atmanepada_ when honour, &c., are implied, _i.e._, here the duty which a teacher performs to his pupils. He who is to be directed as to admitting a pupil is the same person who is to be directed as to teaching him, since both are the object of one and the same command. Hence the inspired sage Manu has said (ii. 140), "The Brahman who girds his pupil with the sacrificial cord and then instructs him in the Veda, with its subsidiary _a?gas_ and mystic doctrines, they call a spiritual teacher (_acharya_)."

Now the teaching which is the function of the teacher cannot be fulfilled without the learning which is the function of the pupil, and therefore the very injunction to teach implies and establishes a corresponding obligation to learn, since the influencer's efforts fail without those of one to be influenced. If you object that this view does not make reading the Veda the object of definite injunction, I reply, What matters it to us if it is not? For even if there is no reason for us to admit a separate injunction for reading the Veda, it will still remain perpetually enjoined as a duty, because the pa.s.sage which mentions it is a perpetual _anuvada_ or "supplementary repet.i.tion."[259] Therefore the former _prima facie_ argument and its answer, which were given before under the idea that there was a definite injunction to read the Veda, must now be discussed in another way to suit this new view.

Now the _prima facie_ argument was that the study of Mima?sa, not being authoritatively enjoined, is not to be commenced; the "conclusion" was that it is to be commenced as being thus authoritatively enjoined.

Now the upholders of the former or _prima facie_ view argue as follows:--"We put to the advocates of the conclusion the following dilemma: Does the injunction to teach imply that the pupil is to understand the meaning of what is read, or does it only refer to the bare reading? It cannot be the former, for obviously the act of teaching cannot depend for its fulfilment on the pupil's understanding what is taught [as this will depend on his ability as a recipient]; and the latter will not help you, as, if the bare reading is sufficient, the Mima?sa discussions in question will have no subject or use. For their proper subject is a point in the Veda, which is doubted about from having been only looked at in a rough and impromptu way; now if there is no need of understanding the meaning at all, why should we talk of doubts and still more of any hope of ascertaining the true meaning by means of laborious discussion? And therefore in accordance with the well-known principle, 'That which is a thing of use and not a matter of doubt is an object of attainment to an intelligent man, as, for instance, a jar which is in broad light and in contact with the external and internal senses,' as there is in the present case no such thing as a subject to exercise it upon, or a useful end to be attained by it, we maintain that the study of Mima?sa is not to be commenced."

We grant, in reply, that the injunction to teach does not imply a corresponding necessity that the student must understand the meaning; still when a man has read the Veda with its subsidiary _a?gas_, and has comprehended the general connection of the words with their respective meanings, this will imply an understanding of the meaning of the Veda, just as it would in any ordinary human compositions. "But may we not say that, just as in the case of the mother who said to her son, 'Eat poison,' the meaning literally expressed by the words was not what she wished to convey, since she really intended to forbid his eating anything at all in such and such a house; so if the literal meaning of the Veda does not express its real purport, the old objection will recur with full force that the study of Mima?sa will have neither subject nor end [as there will be no use in understanding the literal meaning, since, as in the mother's case, it may only lead astray, and so common sense must be the ultimate judge"]. We reply, that your supposed ill.u.s.tration and the case in question are not really parallel. In the supposed ill.u.s.tration the primary meaning of the words would be obviously precluded, because a direction to eat poison would be inconceivable in the mouth of an authoritative and trustworthy speaker like a mother, and you would know at once that this could not be what she wished to say; but in the case of the Veda, which is underived from any personal author, why should not the literal meaning be the one actually intended? And it is just the doubts that arise, as they occasionally will do, in reference to this intended meaning, which will be the proper "subject" of Mima?sa discussion; and the settlement of these doubts will be its proper "end." Therefore, whenever the true meaning of the Veda is not obtained[260] by that reading which is virtually prescribed by the authoritative injunction to a Brahman to teach, it will be a proper subject for systematic discussion; and hence we hold that the study of Mima?sa _is_ enjoined, and should be commenced.

"Well,[261] be it so" [say the followers of the Nyaya], "but how can the Vedas be said to be underived from any personal author, when there is no evidence to establish this? Would you maintain that they have no personal author because, although there is an unbroken line of tradition, there is no remembrance of any author, just as is the case with the soul"?[262] This argument is weak, because the alleged characteristics [unbroken tradition, &c.] are not proved; for those who hold the human origin of the Vedas maintain that the line of tradition was interrupted at the time of the dissolution of the universe. And, again, what is meant by this a.s.sertion that the author is not remembered? Is it (1.) that no author is believed, or (2.) that no author is remembered? The first alternative cannot be accepted, since we hold that G.o.d is proved to have been the author. Nor can the second, because it cannot stand the test of the following dilemma, viz., is it meant (_a._) that no author of the Veda is remembered by some one person, or (_b._) by any person whatever? The former supposition breaks down, as it would prove too much, since it would apply to such an isolated stanza as "He who is religious and has overcome pride and anger," &c.[263] And the latter supposition is inadmissible, since it would be impossible for any person who was not omniscient to know that no author of the Veda was recollected by any person whatever. Moreover, there is actual proof that the Veda had a personal author, for we argue as follows:--The sentences of the Veda must have originated from a personal author, since they have the character of sentences like those of Kalidasa and other writers. And, again, the sentences of the Veda have been composed by a competent person, since, while they possess authority, they have, at the same time, the character of sentences, like those of Manu and other sages.

But [ask the Mima?sakas] may it not be a.s.sumed that "all study of the Veda was preceded by an earlier study of it by the pupil's preceptor, since the study of the Veda must always have had one common character which was the same in former times as now;" and therefore this uninterrupted succession has force to prove the eternity of the Veda?

This reasoning, however [the Naiyayikas answer], cannot rise to the height of proof, for it has no more validity than such obviously illusory reasoning, as "All study of the Mahabharata was preceded by an earlier study of it by the pupil's preceptor, since it is the study of the Mahabharata, which must have been the same in former times as now." But [the Mima?sakas will ask whether there is not a difference between these two cases, since] the Sm?iti declares that [Vish?u incarnate as] Vyasa was the author of the Mahabharata, in accordance with the line, "Who else than the lotus-eyed Vish?u could be the maker of the Mahabharata?" [while nothing of this sort is recorded in any Sm?iti in regard to the Veda]. This argument, however, is pithless, since those words of the Purushasukta (Rig V., x. 90), "From him sprang the ?ich and Saman verses; from him sprang the Metres; from him the Yajus arose;" prove that the Veda had a maker.

Further [proceed the Naiyayikas] we hold that sound is non-eternal[264] because it has genus, and is also perceptible to the external organs of beings such as ourselves, just as a jar is.[265]

"But," you may object, "is not this argument refuted by the proof arising from the fact that we recognise the letter _g_ (for example) as the same we have heard before?" This objection, however, is extremely weak, for the recognition in question is powerless to refute our argument, since it has reference only to ident.i.ty of _species_, as in the case of a man whose hair has been cut and has grown again, or of a jasmine which has blossomed afresh. "But [asks the Mima?saka] how can the Veda have been uttered by the incorporeal Paramesvara, who has no palate or other organs of speech, and therefore cannot have p.r.o.nounced the letters?" "This objection [answers the Naiyayika] is not happy, because, though Paramesvara is by nature incorporeal, he can yet a.s.sume a body in sport, in order to show kindness to his wors.h.i.+ppers. Consequently the arguments in favour of the doctrine that the Veda had no personal author are inconclusive."

I shall now [says the Mima?saka] clear up the whole question. What is meant by this _paurusheyatva_ ["derivation from a personal author"]

which it is sought to prove? Is it (1.) mere procession (_utpannatva_) from a person, like the procession of the Veda from persons such as ourselves, when we daily utter it? or (2.) is it the arrangement--with a view to its manifestation--of knowledge acquired by other modes of proof, as in the case of treatises composed by persons like ourselves?

If the first meaning be intended, there will be no dispute between us.[266] If the second sense be meant, I ask whether it is established (_a._) by inference,[267] or (_b._) by supernatural testimony? (_a._) The former alternative cannot be correct, because your argument would equally apply to the sentences in dramas such as the Malatimadhava [which, of course, being a work of fiction, has no authoritative character]. If you qualify your argument by inserting the saving clause, "while they possess authority,"[268] [as supra, p. 188, line 21], even this explanation will fail to satisfy a philosopher. For the sentences of the Veda are universally defined to be sentences which prove things that are not provable by other evidence. But if you could establish that these Vedic sentences only prove what is provable by other evidence, this definition would be at once contradicted, just as if a man were to say that his mother was a barren woman. And even if we granted that Paramesvara might a.s.sume a body in sport, in order to show kindness to his wors.h.i.+ppers, it would not at all follow that he would perceive things beyond the reach of the senses, from the want of any means of apprehending objects removed from him in place, in time, and in nature.[269] Nor is it to be a.s.sumed that his eyes and other senses alone would have the power of producing such knowledge, for we can only draw upon our imagination in accordance with our past experience. This has been declared by the Guru [Prabhakara] when he refutes the supposition of an omniscient author--

"Wherever we do find the power of an organ intensified,[270]

it is done without its going beyond its own proper objects; thus it may appear in the power of seeing the very distant or the very minute, but not in the ear's becoming cognisant of form."

Hence (_b._) we also maintain that your position cannot be established by any supposed supernatural testimony [as that quoted above from the Rig-Veda, "from him sprang the ?ich and Saman verses"]. For the rule of Pa?ini (iv. 3, 101) will still remain inviolate, that the grammatical affixes with which such names as Ka?haka, Kalapa, and Taittiriya are formed, impart to those derivatives the sense of "uttered by" Ka?ha, Kalapin, &c., though we maintain that these names have reference [not to those parts of the Veda as first composed by these sages, but] to the fact that these sages inst.i.tuted certain schools of traditional study. And in the same way we hold [in reference to this verse from the Rig-Veda] that it only refers to the inst.i.tution of certain schools of traditional study of these Vedas.

Nor will any supposed inference establish the non-eternity of sound, because [as we said before] it is opposed to the evidence of our consciousness, [since we certainly recognise the letter now heard as the one heard before]. Nor is it reasonable to reply that, although the letters are not the same, they seem to be so on account of their ident.i.ty of species. For here we ask our opponents a question--Is this idea that "the apparent sameness arises from ident.i.ty of species" put forward from a wish to preclude entirely any idea of the letters being the same, or only [from an imagined fear of error] because experience shows that the recognition will sometimes be erroneous [as in the cases of the hair and jasmine mentioned above]? (_a._) If it arises from the latter reason, we Mima?sakas, who hold that the Veda is its own evidence, have said in reference to this timid imagination--

"He who foolishly imagines that something as yet unknown to him will come hereafter to stop his present conclusion, will go to utter ruin in every transaction of life, his mind a ma.s.s of doubts."

(_b._) "But [the Naiyayikas will ask] does not this recognition of _g_ and other letters [as the same which we heard before] refer to the species which exists the same in each, and not to the several individual letters, since, in fact, we perceive that they are different as uttered by different persons, otherwise we could not make such distinctions as we do when we say 'Somasarman is reading'?" This objection, however, has as little brilliancy as its predecessors, for as there is no proof of any distinction between the individual _g_'s, there is no proof that we ought to a.s.sume any such thing as a species _g_; and we maintain that, just as to the man who does not understand [the Naiyayika doctrine of] the species _g_, the one species [in the Naiyayika view] will by the influence of distinction of place, magnitude, form, and individual sounds, appear as if it were variously modified as itself distinct in place, as small, as great, as long, as short; so to the man who does not understand our [Mima?saka doctrine of] one individual _g_, the one _g_ (in our view) will by the diversity of "manifesters,"[271] appear to him a.s.sociated with their respective peculiarities; and as contrary characters are in this way ascribed [to the letter _g_], there is a fallacious appearance of distinction [between different _g_'s]. But does this ascription of contrary characters, which is thus regarded as creating a difference [between the _g_'s], result (1.) from the nature of the thing, or (2.) from our imagination? There is no proof of the former alternative; for, if it were true, as an inherent difference would have to be admitted between different _g_'s, we should have to say, "Chaitra has uttered ten _g's_," and not "Chaitra has uttered the same _g_ ten times." On the latter supposition, there is no proof of any inherent distinction between _g_'s, for inherent oneness is not destroyed by a difference of external disguises. Thus we must not conceive, from the apparent distinction caused by such external disguises as jars, &c., that there is any inherent distinction, as of parts, in the one indivisible ether. The current use of the rejected phrase [_i.e._, "different" as applied to the _g_'s] is really caused by the _noise_, which in each case is different. This has been said by the great teacher--

"The object which the Naiyayikas seek by supposing a species is, in fact, gained from the letter itself; and the object which they aim at by supposing an individuality in letters, is attained from audible noises;[272] so that the a.s.sumption of species is useless."

And again--

"Since in regard to sounds such an irresistible instinct of recognition is always awake within us, it precludes by its superior evidence all the inferences to prove sound's non-eternity."

This at once refutes the argument given in the [Naiyayika] treatise by Vagiswara, ent.i.tled _Mana-manohara_, "sound is non-eternal from the fact of its being a special quality belonging to an organ of sense[273] (_sc._ the ear), just as colour is to the eye."

We can also refute it in the following ways: (_a._) If we follow the [Sa?khya and Vedanta] view that sound is a substance, it is evidently overthrown[274] [as in that case sound cannot be a quality]; (_b._) if we take it as referring to the _noise_, not the _sound_, we have no dispute, as it only establishes what we ourselves allow; and (_c._) the inference is overthrown by the "limiting condition" [_upadhi_] of _asrava?atva_, or "the not causing audition."[275] So Udayana tries at great length to establish that, although ether, the site of sound, is imperceptible, the non-existence of that which abides in this site is perceptible; and he then brings forward as an evidence for the non-eternity of sound, that sense perception which causes the use of such common expressions as "The tumult is stopped," "The sound has arisen."[276] But he is sufficiently answered[277] by our old reply [in p. 193], that the fallacious appearance of distinction arises from contrary characters being erroneously ascribed, just as, in the story, the demon Tala went away [as well as Betala] when the offering of blood was given to the latter.[278] And as for the objection raised by the author of the _Nyayabhusha?a_,[279] that, if sound were eternal, the conclusion must follow that it would be either always perceptible or always imperceptible, this also is obviated by our allowing that we only perceive that sound which is manifested by our articulate noise.[280] And as for the (Naiyayika) argument against the existence[281] of such a constant relation as this which is supposed between the manifested "sound" and the manifesting "noise," since they both come simultaneously in contact with the sense of hearing, this is invalid, as it will indisputably apply with equal force in the case of the soul.[282]