The Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha Part 8

4. "The seventh is required when all three characters are to be employed simultaneously."

_Syat_, "may be," is here an indeclinable particle in the form of a part of a verb, used to convey the idea of indeterminateness; as it has been said--

"This particle _syat_ is in the form of a verb, but, from its being connected with the sense, it denotes indeterminateness in sentences, and has a qualifying effect on the implied meaning."

If, again, the word _syat_ denoted determinateness, then it would be needless in the phrase, "may be, it is;" but since it really denotes indeterminateness, "may be, it is," means "it is somehow;" _syat_, "may be," conveys the meaning of "somehow," _katha?chit_; and so it is not really useless. As one has said--

"The doctrine of the _syad-vada_ arises from our everywhere rejecting the idea of the absolute;[95] it depends on the _sapta-bha?gi-naya_, and it lays down the distinction between what is to be avoided and to be accepted."

If a thing absolutely exists, it exists altogether, always, everywhere, and with everybody, and no one at any time or place would ever make an effort to obtain or avoid it, as it would be absurd to treat what is already present as an object to be obtained or avoided.

But if it be relative (or indefinite), the wise will concede that at certain times and in certain places any one may seek or avoid it.

Moreover, suppose that the question to be asked is this: "Is _being_ or _non-being_ the real nature of the thing?" The real nature of the thing cannot be _being_, for then you could not properly use the phrase, "It is a pot" (_gha?osti_), as the two words "is" and "pot"

would be tautological; nor ought you to say, "It is not a pot," as the words thus used would imply a direct contradiction; and the same argument is to be used in other questions.[96] As it has been declared--

"It must not be said 'It is a pot,' since the word 'pot'

implies 'is;'

"Nor may you say 'it is not a pot,' for existence and non-existence are mutually exclusive," &c.

The whole is thus to be summed up. Four cla.s.ses of our opponents severally hold the doctrine of existence, non-existence, existence and non-existence successively, and the doctrine that everything is inexplicable (_anirvachaniyata_);[97] three other cla.s.ses hold one or other of the three first theories combined with the fourth.[98] Now, when they meet us with the scornful questions, "Does the thing exist?"

&c., we have an answer always possible, "It exists in a certain way,"

&c., and our opponents are all abashed to silence, and victory accrues to the holder of the _Syad-vada_, which ascertains the entire meaning of all things. Thus said the teacher in the _Syadvada-manjari_--

"A thing of an entirely indeterminate nature is the object only of the omniscient; a thing partly determined is held to be the true object of scientific investigation.[99] When our reasonings based on one point proceed in the revealed way, it is called the revealed _Syad-vada_, which ascertains the entire meaning of all things."

"All other systems are full of jealousy from their mutual propositions and counter-propositions; it is only the doctrine of the Arhat which with no partiality equally favours all sects."

The Jaina doctrine has thus been summed up by Jinadatta-suri--

"The hindrances belonging to vigour, enjoyment, sensual pleasure, giving and receiving,--sleep, fear, ignorance, aversion, laughter, liking, disliking, love, hatred, want of indifference, desire, sorrow, deceit, these are the eighteen 'faults' (_dosha_) according to our system.[100] The divine Jina is our Guru, who declares the true knowledge of the _tattwas_. The path[101] of emanc.i.p.ation consists of knowledge, intuition, and conduct. There are two means of proof (_prama?a_) in the _Syad-vada_ doctrine,--sense-perception and inference. All consists of the eternal and the non-eternal; there are nine or seven _tattwas_. The _jiva_, the _ajiva_, merit and demerit, _asrava_, _sa?vara_, _bandha_, _nirjara_, _mukti_,--we will now explain each. _Jiva_ is defined as intelligence; _ajiva_ is all other than it; merit means bodies which arise from good actions, demerit the opposite; _asrava_ is the bondage of actions,[102] _nirjara_ is the unloosing thereof; _moksha_ arises from the destruction of the eight forms of _karman_ or "action". But by some teachers "merit" is included in _sa?vara_,[103] and "demerit" in _asrava_.

"Of the soul which has attained the four infinite things[104] and is hidden from the world, and whose eight actions are abolished, absolute liberation is declared by Jina. The Swetambaras are the destroyers of all defilement, they live by alms,[105] they pluck out their hair, they practise patience, they avoid all a.s.sociation, and are called the Jaina _Sadhus_. The Digambaras pluck out their hair, they carry peac.o.c.ks' tails in their hands, they drink from their hands, and they eat upright in the giver's house,--these are the second cla.s.s of the Jaina ?is.h.i.+s.

"A woman attains not the highest knowledge, she enters not Mukti,--so say the Digambaras; but there is a great division on this point between them and the Swetambaras."[106]

E. B. C.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 40: _Vivasanas_, "without garments."]

[Footnote 41: "The Buddhists are also called _Muktakachchhas_, alluding to a peculiarity of dress, apparently a habit of wearing the hem of the lower garment untucked."--_Colebrooke._]

[Footnote 42: In p. 26, line 3, read _Syad-vadinam_.]

[Footnote 43: I propose to read in p. 26, line 5, _infra_, _grahyasya_ for _agrahyasya_.]

[Footnote 44: As these terms necessarily relate to the perceiver.]

[Footnote 45: I correct the reading _tasyagraha?a?_ to _tasya graha?a?_ (_tasya_ being _ja?ataya?_).]

[Footnote 46: _I.e._, if you say that the _avayava_ may be not seen though the _avayavin_ is seen, then I may say that the post is the _avayavin_, and the unperceived three worlds its _avayava_!]

[Footnote 47: I read _arhatsvarupam arhachchandra_ in p. 27, line 3, _infra_.]

[Footnote 48: The following pa.s.sage occurs in some part of k.u.marila's writings in an argument against the Jainas. It is curious that in the Sa?kara-digvijaya, chap. lv., it is mentioned that k.u.marila had a little relenting towards the Jainas at the end of his life. He repented of having so cruelly persecuted them, and acknowledged that there was some truth in their teaching. _Jainagurumukhat kaschid vidyaleso jata?._]

[Footnote 49: k.u.marila tries to prove that no such being can exist, as his existence is not established by any one of the five recognised proofs,--the sixth, _abhava_, being negative, is, of course, not applicable. I understand the last sloka as showing the inapplicability of "presumption" or _artha-patti_. A Jaina would say, "If the Arhat were not omniscient, his words would not be true and authoritative, but we see that they are, therefore he is omniscient." He answers by retorting that the same argument might be used of Buddha by a Buddhist; and as the Jaina himself would disallow it in that case, it cannot be convincing in his own.]

[Footnote 50: In p. 29, line 2, read _tatsadbhavavedakasya_ for _tatsadbhavadekasya_.]

[Footnote 51: In p. 29, line 9, for _nikhilarthajnanat notpatty_, I propose to read _nikhilarthajnanotpatty_.]

[Footnote 52: _Janya_ is included in _Karya_ and equally disputed.]

[Footnote 53: Thus "I am possessed of a body" (_aham Sariri_), "my hand," &c., are all sentences in which a predicate involving the notion of parts is applied to the soul "I."]

[Footnote 54: Reasoning in a circle. I suppose the &c. includes the _Anavasthadosha_ or reasoning _ad infinitum_. He accepts the supposed fault, and holds that it is actually borne out in a case before everybody's eyes.]

[Footnote 55: In p. 31, line 5, _infra_, read _tattvarthe_ for _tattvartham_.]

[Footnote 56: I read in p. 32, line 9, _Samyagdarsanadi_ for _asamyagdarsanadi_; but the old text may mean "caused by the abolition of hindrances produced by the qualities, wrong intuition," &c.]

[Footnote 57: Cf. the five _yamas_ in the _Yoga-sutras_, ii. 30.

Hemachandra (_Abhidh_ 81) calls them _yamas_.]

[Footnote 58: I read _kamanam_ for _kama?am_ in p. 33, line 7 (2 3 3 = 18).]

[Footnote 59: For _abhasha?a_, see Hemach. 16.]

[Footnote 60: I propose in p. 33, line 17, _rasayanajnanasraddhavachara?ani_ for _rasaya?ajnana?

sraddhanavara?ani_. For _avachara?a_, see _Susruta_, vol. ii. p. 157, &c. If _anavara?a_ be the true reading, I suppose it must mean "the absence of obstructions."]

[Footnote 61: This is a hard pa.s.sage, but some light is thrown on it by the scholiast to Hemachandra, _Abhidh_. 79.]

[Footnote 62: Or this may mean "by the influence of _upasamakshaya_ or _kshayopasama_, it appears characterised by one or the other."]

[Footnote 63: I read in p. 34, line 7, _kalushadyakare?a_ for _kalushanyakare?a_. The _upasamakshaya_ and _kshayopasama_ seem to correspond to the _aupasamika_ and _kshayika_ states about to be described.]

[Footnote 64: _Strychnos potatorum._]

[Footnote 65: Just as in the Sankhya philosophy, the soul is not really bound though it seems to itself to be so.]

[Footnote 66: A valid non-perception is when an object is not seen, and yet all the usual concurrent causes of vision are present, such as the eye, light, &c.]

[Footnote 67: I read in p. 35, line 5, _'st.i.ti_ for _sthiti_.]

[Footnote 68: Hence the term here used for "category"--_astikaya_.]