The Problem of China Part 7

"It would be interesting to know whether a refusal to allow China to build a railway on her own territory is or is not an impairment of Chinese sovereignty and whether such a railway as that proposed was not a measure for the 'development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria.'

"It is doubtful if even the Russo-j.a.panese war created as much feeling in China as did the Fa-ku-men incident. j.a.pan's action was of such flagrant dishonesty and such a cynical repudiation of her promises and pledges that her credit received a blow from which it has never since recovered. The abject failure of the British Government to support its subjects' treaty rights was almost as much an eye-opener to the world as the protest from Tokio....

"The methods which had proved so successful in stopping the Fa-ku-men railway were equally successful in forcing the abandonment of other projected railways. Among these were the Chin-chou-Aigun line and the important Antung-Mukden line.[60] The same alleged secret protocol was used equally brutally and successfully for the acquisition of the Newchw.a.n.g line, and partic.i.p.ation in 1909, and eventual acquisition in 1914, of the Chan-Chun-Kirin lines. Subsequently by an agreement with Russia the sixth article of the Russo-Chinese Agreement of 1896 was construed to mean 'the absolute and exclusive rights of administration within the railway zone.'"

j.a.pan's spheres of influence have been subsequently extended to cover the whole of Manchuria and the whole of Shantung--though the latter has been nominally renounced at Was.h.i.+ngton. By such methods as the above, or by loans to impecunious Chinese authorities, the j.a.panese have acquired vast railway monopolies wherever their influence has penetrated, and have used the railways as a means of acquiring all real power in the provinces through which they run.

After the Russo-j.a.panese war, Russia and j.a.pan became firm friends, and agreed to bring pressure on China jointly in any matter affecting Manchuria. Their friends.h.i.+p lasted until the Bolshevik revolution.

Russia had entered into extensive obligations to support j.a.pan's claims at the Peace Conference, which of course the Bolsheviks repudiated.

Hence the implacable hostility of j.a.pan to Soviet Russia, leading to the support of innumerable White filibusters in the territory of the Far Eastern Republic, and to friends.h.i.+p with France in all international questions. As soon as there began to be in China a revolutionary party aiming at the overthrow of the Manchus, the j.a.panese supported it. They have continuously supported either or both sides in Chinese dissensions, as they judged most useful for prolonging civil war and weakening China politically. Before the revolution of 1911, Sun Yat Sen was several times in j.a.pan, and there is evidence that as early as 1900 he was obtaining financial support from some j.a.panese.[61] When the revolution actually broke out, j.a.pan endeavoured to support the Manchus, but was prevented from doing so effectively by the other Legations. It seems that the policy of j.a.pan at that time, as later, was to prevent the union of North and South, and to confine the revolution to the South.

Moreover, reverence for monarchy made j.a.pan unwilling to see the Emperor of China dispossessed and his whole country turned into a Republic, though it would have been agreeable to see him weakened by the loss of some southern provinces. Mr. Pooley gives a good account of the actions of j.a.pan during the Chinese Revolution, of which the following quotation gives the gist[62]:--

It [the Genro] commenced with a statement from Prince Katsura on December 18th [1911], that the time for intervention had arrived, with the usual rider "for the sake of the peace of the Far East."

This was followed by a private instruction to M. Ijuin, j.a.panese Minister in Peking, whereunder the latter on December 23rd categorically informed Yuan-s.h.i.+-kai that under no circ.u.mstances would j.a.pan recognize a republican form of government in China.... In connection with the peace conference held at Shanghai, Mr. Matsui (now j.a.panese Amba.s.sador to France), a trusted Councillor of the Foreign Office, was dispatched to Peking to back M. Ijuin in the negotiations to uphold the dynasty. Simultaneously, Mr. Denison, Legal Adviser to the j.a.panese Foreign Office, was sent to Shanghai to negotiate with the rebel leaders. Mr. Matsui's mission was to bargain for j.a.panese support of the Manchus against the rebels, Manchuria against the throne; Mr. Denison's mission was to bargain for j.a.panese support of the rebels against the throne, recognition by Peking of the Southern Republic against virtually a j.a.panese protectorate of that Republic and exclusive railway and mining concessions within its borders. The rebels absolutely refused Mr.

Denison's offer, and sent the proposed terms to the Russian Minister at Peking, through whom they eventually saw the light of day. Needless to say the j.a.panese authorities strenuously denied their authenticity.

The British Legation, however, supported Yuan s.h.i.+-k'ai, against both the Manchus and Sun Yat Sen; and it was the British policy which won the day. Yuan s.h.i.+-k'ai became President, and remained so until 1915. He was strongly anti-j.a.panese, and had, on that ground, been opposed as strongly as j.a.pan dared. His success was therefore a blow to the influence of j.a.pan in China. If the Western Powers had remained free to make themselves felt in the Far East, the course of events would doubtless have been much less favourable to the j.a.panese; but the war came, and the j.a.panese saw their chance. How they used it must be told in a separate chapter.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 56: Quoted by A.M. Pooley, _j.a.pan's Foreign Policy_, Allen & Unwin, 1920, p. 18.]

[Footnote 57: Op. cit. p. 16 n.]

[Footnote 58: Pooley, op. cit. p. 17.]

[Footnote 59: A.M. Pooley, _j.a.pan's Foreign Policies_, pp. 48-51.]

[Footnote 60: This line was subsequently built by the j.a.panese.]

[Footnote 61: Pooley, op. cit., pp. 67-8.]

[Footnote 62: Page 66.]

CHAPTER VIII

j.a.pAN AND CHINA DURING THE WAR

The most urgent problem in China's relations with foreign powers is j.a.panese aggression. Originally j.a.pan was less powerful than China, but after 1868 the j.a.panese rapidly learnt from us whatever we had to teach in the way of skilful homicide, and in 1894 they resolved to test their new armaments upon China, just as Bismarck tested his on Denmark. The Chinese Government preserved its traditional haughtiness, and appears to have been quite unaware of the defeat in store for it. The question at issue was Korea, over which both Powers claimed suzerainty. At that time there would have been no reason for an impartial neutral to take one side rather than the other. The j.a.panese were quickly and completely victorious, but were obliged to fight Russia before obtaining secure possession of Korea. The war with Russia (1904-5) was fought chiefly in Manchuria, which the Russians had gained as a reward for befriending China. Port Arthur and Southern Manchuria up to Mukden were acquired by the j.a.panese as a result of the Russo-j.a.panese war; the rest of Manchuria came under j.a.panese control as a result of Russia's collapse after the Great War.

The nominal sovereignty in Manchuria is still Chinese; the Chinese have the civil administration, an army, and the appointment of the Viceroy.

But the j.a.panese also have troops in Manchuria; they have the railways, the industrial enterprises, and the complete economic and military control. The Chinese Viceroy could not remain in power a week if he were displeasing to the j.a.panese, which, however, he takes care not to be.

(See Note A.) The same situation was being brought about in Shantung.

Shantung brings us to what j.a.pan did in the Great War. In 1914, China could easily have been induced to join the Allies and to set to work to turn the Germans out of Kiao-Chow, but this did not suit the j.a.panese, who undertook the work themselves and insisted upon the Chinese remaining neutral (until 1917). Having captured Tsing-tau, they presented to the Chinese the famous Twenty-One Demands, which gave the Chinese Question its modern form. These demands, as originally presented in January 1915, consisted of five groups. The first dealt with Shantung, demanding that China should agree in advance to whatever terms j.a.pan might ultimately make with Germany as regarded this Chinese province, that the j.a.panese should have the right to construct certain specified railways, and that certain ports (unspecified) should be opened to trade; also that no privileges in Shantung should be granted to any Power other than j.a.pan. The second group concerns South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and demands what is in effect a protectorate, with control of railways, complete economic freedom for j.a.panese enterprise, and exclusion of all other foreign industrial enterprise. The third group gives j.a.pan a monopoly of the mines and iron and steel works in a certain region of the Yangtze,[63] where we claim a sphere of influence. The fourth group consists of a single demand, that China shall not cede any harbour, bay or island to any Power except j.a.pan. The fifth group, which was the most serious, demanded that j.a.panese political, financial, and military advisers should be employed by the Chinese Government; that the police in important places should be administered by Chinese and j.a.panese jointly, and should be largely j.a.panese in _personnel_; that China should purchase from j.a.pan at least 50 per cent. of her munitions, or obtain them from a Sino-j.a.panese a.r.s.enal to be established in China, controlled by j.a.panese experts and employing j.a.panese material; that j.a.pan should have the right to construct certain railways in and near the Yangtze valley; that j.a.pan should have industrial priority in f.u.kien (opposite Formosa); and finally that the j.a.panese should have the right of missionary propaganda in China, to spread the knowledge of their admirable ethics.

These demands involved, as is obvious, a complete loss of Chinese independence, the closing of important areas to the commerce and industry of Europe and America, and a special attack upon the British position in the Yangtze. We, however, were so busy with the war that we had no time to think of keeping ourselves alive. Although the demands const.i.tuted a grave menace to our trade, although the Far East was in an uproar about them, although America took drastic diplomatic action against them, Mr. Lloyd George never heard of them until they were explained to him by the Chinese Delegation at Versailles.[64] He had no time to find out what j.a.pan wanted, but had time to conclude a secret agreement with j.a.pan in February 1917, promising that whatever j.a.pan wanted in Shantung we would support at the Peace Conference.[65] By the terms of the Anglo-j.a.panese Alliance, j.a.pan was bound to communicate the Twenty-one Demands to the British Government. In fact, j.a.pan communicated the first four groups, but not the fifth and worst, thus definitely breaking the treaty;[66] but this also, one must suppose, Mr.

Lloyd George only discovered by chance when he got to Versailles.

China negotiated with j.a.pan about the Twenty-one Demands, and secured certain modifications, but was finally compelled to yield by an ultimatum. There was a modification as regards the Hanyehping mines on the Yangtze, presumably to please us; and the specially obnoxious fifth group was altered into an exchange of studiously vague Notes.[67] In this form, the demands were accepted by China on May 9, 1915. The United States immediately notified j.a.pan that they could not recognize the agreement. At that time America was still neutral, and was therefore still able to do something to further the objects for which we were supposed to be fighting, such as protection of the weaker nations. In 1917, however, after America had entered the war for self-determination, it became necessary to placate j.a.pan, and in November of that year the Is.h.i.+-Lansing Agreement was concluded, by which "the Government of the United States recognizes that j.a.pan has special interests in China, particularly for the parts to which her possessions are contiguous." The rest of the agreement (which is long) consists of empty verbiage.[68]

I come now to the events leading up to China's entry into the war.[69]

In this matter, the lead was taken by America so far as severing diplomatic relations was concerned, but pa.s.sed to j.a.pan as regards the declaration of war. It will be remembered that, when America broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, President Wilson called upon all neutrals to do likewise. Dr. Paul S. Reinsch, United States Minister in Peking, proceeded to act with vigour in accordance with this policy. He induced China first, on February 9, 1917, to send a Note of expostulation to Germany on the subject of the submarine campaign; then, on March 14th, to break off diplomatic relations. The further step of declaring war was not taken until August 14th. The intrigues connected with these events deserve some study.

In view of the fact that the j.a.panese were among the Allies, the Chinese had not any strong tendency to take sides against Germany. The English, French and Russians had always desired the partic.i.p.ation of China (for reasons which I shall explain presently), and there appears to have been some suggestion, in the early days of the war, that China should partic.i.p.ate in return for our recognizing Yuan s.h.i.+-k'ai as Emperor.

These suggestions, however, fell through owing to the opposition of j.a.pan, based partly on hostility to Yuan s.h.i.+-k'ai, partly on the fear that China would be protected by the Allies if she became a belligerent.

When, in November 1915, the British, French and Russian Amba.s.sadors in Tokyo requested j.a.pan to join in urging China to join the Allies, Viscount Is.h.i.+ said that "j.a.pan considered developments in China as of paramount interest to her, and she must keep a firm hand there. j.a.pan could not regard with equanimity the organization of an efficient Chinese army such as would be required for her active partic.i.p.ation in the war, nor could j.a.pan fail to regard with uneasiness a liberation of the economic activities of 400,000,000 people."[70] Accordingly the proposal lapsed. It must be understood that throughout the war the j.a.panese were in a position to blackmail the Allies, because their sympathies were with Germany, they believed Germany would win, and they filled their newspapers with scurrilous attacks on the British, accusing them of cowardice and military incompetence.[71]

But when America severed diplomatic relations with Germany, the situation for China was changed. America was not bound to subservience to j.a.pan, as we were; America was not one of the Allies; and America had always been China's best friend. Accordingly, the Chinese were willing to take the advice of America, and proceeded to sever diplomatic relations with Germany in March 1917. Dr. Reinsch was careful to make no _promises_ to the Chinese, but of course he held out hopes. The American Government, at that time, could honestly hold out hopes, because it was ignorant of the secret treaties and agreements by which the Allies were bound. The Allies, however, can offer no such excuse for having urged China to take the further step of declaring war. Russia, France, and Great Britain had all sold China's rights to secure the continued support of j.a.pan.

In May 1916, the j.a.panese represented to the Russians that Germany was inviting j.a.pan to make a separate peace. In July 1916, Russia and j.a.pan concluded a secret treaty, subsequently published by the Bolsheviks.

This treaty const.i.tuted a separate alliance, binding each to come to the a.s.sistance of the other in any war, and recognizing that "the vital interests of one and the other of them require the safeguarding of China from the political domination of any third Power whatsoever, having hostile designs against Russia or j.a.pan." The last article provided that "the present agreement must remain profoundly secret except to both of the High Contracting Parties."[72] That is to say, the treaty was not communicated to the other Allies, or even to Great Britain, in spite of Article 3 of the Anglo-j.a.panese Alliance, which provides that "The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into a separate agreement with another Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this Agreement,"

one of which objects was the preservation of equal opportunity for all Powers in China and of the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire.

On February 16, 1917, at the very time when America was urging China to sever diplomatic relations with Germany, we concluded an agreement with j.a.pan containing the following words:--

His Britannic Majesty's Government accedes with pleasure to the request of the j.a.panese Government, for an a.s.surance that they will support j.a.pan's claims in regard to the disposal of Germany's rights in Shantung and possessions in the islands north of the equator on the occasion of the Peace Conference; it being understood that the j.a.panese Government will, in the eventual peace settlement, treat in the same spirit Great Britain's claims to the German islands south of the equator.

The French att.i.tude about Shantung, at the same time, is indicated by Notes which pa.s.sed between France and j.a.pan at Tokyo.[73] On February 19th, Baron Motono sent a communication to the French and Russian Amba.s.sadors stating, among other things, that "the Imperial j.a.panese Government proposes to demand from Germany at the time of the peace negotiations, the surrender of the territorial rights and special interests Germany possessed before the war in Shantung and the islands belonging to her situated north of the equator in the Pacific Ocean."

The French Amba.s.sador, on March 2nd, replied as follows:--

The Government of the French Republic is disposed to give the j.a.panese Government its accord in regulating at the time of the Peace Negotiations questions vital to j.a.pan concerning Shantung and the German islands on the Pacific north of the equator. It also agrees to support the demands of the Imperial j.a.panese Government for the surrender of the rights Germany possessed before the war in this Chinese province and these islands.

M. Briand demands on the other hand that j.a.pan give its support to obtain from China the breaking of its diplomatic relations with Germany, and that it give this act desirable significance.

The consequences in China should be the following:

First, handing pa.s.sports to the German diplomatic agents and consuls;

Second, the obligation of all under German jurisdiction to leave Chinese territory;

Third, the internment of German s.h.i.+ps in Chinese ports and the ultimate requisition of these s.h.i.+ps in order to place them at the disposition of the Allies, following the example of Italy and Portugal;

Fourth, requisition of German commercial houses, established in China; forfeiting the rights of Germany in the concessions she possesses in certain ports of China.

The Russian reply to Baron Motono's Note to the French and Russian Amba.s.sadors, dated March 5, 1917, was as follows:--

In reply to the Note of the j.a.panese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under the date of February 19th last, the Russian Emba.s.sy is charged with giving the j.a.panese Government the a.s.surance that it can entirely count on the support of the Imperial Government of Russia with regard to its desiderata concerning the eventual surrender to j.a.pan of the rights belonging to Germany in Shantung and of the German Islands, occupied by the j.a.panese forces, in the Pacific Ocean to the north of the Equator.[74]

It will be observed that, unlike England and France, Russia demands no _quid pro quo_, doubtless owing to the secret treaty concluded in the previous year.

After these agreements, j.a.pan saw no further objection to China's partic.i.p.ation in the war. The chief inducement held out to China was the hope of recovering Shantung; but as there was now no danger of this hope being realized, j.a.pan was willing that America, in more or less honest ignorance, should unofficially use this hope for the persuasion of the Chinese. It is true that j.a.pan had reason to fear America until the last days of the Peace Conference, but this fear was considerably diminished by the conclusion of the Lansing-Is.h.i.+ Agreement in November 1917.

Meanwhile j.a.pan had discovered that the question of China's entry into the war could be used to increase internal strife in China, which has been one of the aims of j.a.panese policy ever since the beginning of the revolutionary movement.[75] If the Chinese had not been interfered with at this time, there was some prospect of their succeeding in establis.h.i.+ng a stable democratic government. Yuan was dead, and his successor in the Presidency, Li Yuan Hung, was a genuine const.i.tutionalist. He rea.s.sembled the Parliament which Yuan had dismissed, and the work of drafting a permanent const.i.tution was resumed. The President was opposed to severing diplomatic relations, and, of course, still more to declaring war. The Prime Minister, Tuan Chih-jui, a militarist, was strongly in favour of war. He and his Cabinet persuaded a considerable majority of both Houses of the Chinese Parliament to side with them on the question of severing diplomatic relations, and the President, as in duty bound, gave way on this issue.