The Problem of China Part 9

By this Treaty, the Chinese recover everything in Shantung, except the private property of j.a.panese subjects, and certain restrictions as regards the railway. The railway was the great difficulty in the negotiations, since, so long as the j.a.panese could control that, they would have the province at their mercy. The Chinese offered to buy back the railway at once, having raised about half the money as a result of a patriotic movement among their merchants. This, however, the j.a.panese refused to agree to. What was finally done was that the Chinese were compelled to borrow the money from the j.a.panese Government to be repaid in fifteen years, with an option of repayment in five years. The railway was valued at 53,400,000 gold marks, plus the costs involved in repairs or improvements incurred by j.a.pan, less deterioration; and it was to be handed over to China within nine months of the signature of the treaty.

Until the purchase price, borrowed from j.a.pan, is repaid, the j.a.panese retain a certain degree of control over the railway: a j.a.panese traffic manager is to be appointed, and two accountants, one Chinese and the other j.a.panese, under the control of a Chinese President.

It is clear that, on paper, this gives the Chinese everything five years hence. Whether things will work out so depends upon whether, five years hence, any Power is prepared to force j.a.pan to keep her word. As both Mr. Hughes and Sir Arthur Balfour strongly urged the Chinese to agree to this compromise, it must be a.s.sumed that America and Great Britain have some responsibility for seeing that it is properly carried out. In that case, we may perhaps expect that in the end China will acquire complete control of the Shantung railway.

On the whole, it must be said that China did better at Was.h.i.+ngton than might have been expected. As regards the larger aspects of the new international situation arising out of the Conference, I shall deal with them in the next chapter. But in our present connection it is necessary to consider certain Far Eastern questions _not_ discussed at Was.h.i.+ngton, since the mere fact that they were not discussed gave them a new form.

The question of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia was not raised at Was.h.i.+ngton. It may therefore be a.s.sumed that j.a.pan's position there is secure until such time as the Chinese, or the Russians, or both together, are strong enough to challenge it. America, at any rate, will not raise the question unless friction occurs on some other issue. (See Appendix.)

The Siberian question also was not settled. Therefore j.a.pan's ambitions in Vladivostok and the Maritime Provinces will presumably remain unchecked except in so far as the Russians unaided are able to check them. There is a chronic state of semi-war between the j.a.panese and the Far Eastern Republic, and there seems no reason why it should end in any near future. The j.a.panese from time to time announce that they have decided to withdraw, but they simultaneously send fresh troops. A conference between them and the Chita Government has been taking place at Dairen, and from time to time announcements have appeared to the effect that an agreement has been reached or was about to be reached.

But on April 16th (1922) the j.a.panese broke up the Conference. _The Times_ of April 27th contains both the j.a.panese and the Russian official accounts of this break up. The j.a.panese statement is given in _The Times_ as follows:--

The j.a.panese Emba.s.sy communicates the text of a statement given out on April 20th by the j.a.panese Foreign Office on the Dairen Conference.

It begins by recalling that in response to the repeatedly expressed desire of the Chita Government, the j.a.panese Government decided to enter into negotiations. The first meeting took place on August 26th last year.

The j.a.panese demands included the non-enforcement of communistic principles in the Republic against j.a.panese, the prohibition of Bolshevist propaganda, the abolition of menacing military establishments, the adoption of the principle of the open door in Siberia, and the removal of industrial restrictions on foreigners. Desiring speedily to conclude an agreement, so that the withdrawal of troops might be carried out as soon as possible, j.a.pan met the wishes of Chita as far as practicable.

Though, from the outset, Chita pressed for a speedy settlement of the Nicolaievsk affair, j.a.pan eventually agreed to take up the Nicolaievsk affair immediately after the conclusion of the basis agreement. She further a.s.sured Chita that in settling the affair j.a.pan had no intention of violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia, and that the troops would be speedily withdrawn from Saghalin after the settlement of the affair, and that Chita'a wishes in regard to the transfer of property now in the custody of the j.a.panese authorities would be met.

The 11th Division of the troops in Siberia was originally to be relieved during April, but if the Dairen Conference had progressed satisfactorily, the troops, instead of being relieved, would have been sent home. j.a.pan therefore intimated to Chita that should the basis agreement be concluded within a reasonable period these troops would be immediately withdrawn, and proposed the signature of the agreement by the middle of April, so that the preparations for the relief of the said division might be dispensed with. Thereupon Chita not only proposed the immediate despatch of Chita troops to Vladivostok without waiting for the withdrawal of the j.a.panese troops, but urged that j.a.pan should fix a tine-limit for the complete withdrawal of all her troops.

j.a.pan informed Chita that the withdrawal would be carried out within a short period after the conclusion of the detailed arrangements, giving a definite period as desired, and at the same time she proposed the signing of the agreement drawn up by j.a.pan.

Whereas j.a.pan thus throughout the negotiations maintained a sincere and conciliatory att.i.tude, the Chita delegates entirely ignored the spirit in which she offered concessions and brought up one demand after another, thereby trying to gain time. Not only did they refuse to entertain the j.a.panese proposals, but declared that they would drop the negotiations and return to Chita immediately. The only conclusion from this att.i.tude of the Chita Government is that they lacked a sincere effort to bring the negotiations to fruition, and the j.a.panese Government instructed its delegates to quit Dairen.

The Russian official account is given by _The Times_ immediately below the above. It is as follows:--

On April 16th the j.a.panese broke up the Dairen Conference with the Far Eastern Republic. The Far Eastern Delegation left Dairen.

Agreement was reached between the j.a.panese and Russian Delegations on March 30th on all points of the general treaty, but when the question of military evacuation was reached the j.a.panese Delegation proposed a formula permitting continued j.a.panese intervention.

Between March 30th and April 15th the j.a.panese dragged on the negotiations _re_ military convention, reproaching the Far Eastern delegates for mistrusting the j.a.panese Government. The Russian Delegation declared that the general treaty would be signed only upon obtaining precise written guarantees of j.a.panese military evacuation.

On April 15th the j.a.panese Delegation presented an ultimatum demanding a reply from the Far Eastern representatives in half an hour as to whether they were willing to sign a general agreement with new j.a.panese conditions forbidding an increase in the Far Eastern Navy and retaining a j.a.panese military mission on Far Eastern territory. _Re_ evacuation, the j.a.panese presented a Note promising evacuation if "not prevented by unforeseen circ.u.mstances." The Russian Delegation rejected this ultimatum.

On April 16th the j.a.panese declared the Dairen Conference broken up. The j.a.panese delegates left for Tokyo, and j.a.panese troops remain in the zone established by the agreement of March 29th.

Readers will believe one or other of these official statements according to their prejudices, while those who wish to think themselves impartial will a.s.sume that the truth lies somewhere between the two. For my part, I believe the Russian statement. But even from the j.a.panese communique it is evident that what wrecked the Conference was j.a.panese unwillingness to evacuate Vladivostok and the Maritime Province; all that they were willing to give was a vague promise to evacuate some day, which would have had no more value than Mr. Gladstone's promise to evacuate Egypt.

It will be observed that the Conference went well for Chita until the Senate had ratified the Was.h.i.+ngton treaties. After that, the j.a.panese felt that they had a free hand in all Far Eastern matters not dealt with at Was.h.i.+ngton. The practical effect of the Was.h.i.+ngton decisions will naturally be to make the j.a.panese seek compensation, at the expense of the Far Eastern Republic, for what they have had to surrender in China.

This result was to be expected, and was presumably foreseen by the a.s.sembled peacemakers.[85]

It will be seen that the j.a.panese policy involves hostility to Russia.

This is no doubt one reason for the friends.h.i.+p between j.a.pan and France.

Another reason is that both are the champions of nationalistic capitalism, as against the international capitalism aimed at by Messrs.

Morgan and Mr. Lloyd George, because France and j.a.pan look to their armaments as the chief source of their income, while England and America look rather to their commerce and industry. It would be interesting to compute how much coal and iron France and j.a.pan have acquired in recent years by means of their armies. England and America already possessed coal and iron; hence their different policy. An uninvited delegation from the Far Eastern Republic at Was.h.i.+ngton produced doc.u.ments tending to show that France and j.a.pan came there as secret allies. Although the authenticity of the doc.u.ments was denied, most people, apparently, believed them to be genuine. In any case, it is to be expected that France and j.a.pan will stand together, now that the Anglo-j.a.panese Alliance has come to an end and the Anglo-French Entente has become anything but cordial. Thus it is to be feared that Was.h.i.+ngton and Genoa have sown the seeds of future wars--unless, by some miracle, the "civilized" nations should grow weary of suicide.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 84: See _e.g._ chap. viii. of Millard's _Democracy and the Eastern Question._]

[Footnote 85: I ought perhaps to confess that I have a bias in favour of the Far Eastern Republic, owing to my friends.h.i.+p for their diplomatic mission which was in Peking while I was there. I never met a more high-minded set of men in any country. And although they were communists, and knew the views that I had expressed on Russia, they showed me great kindness. I do not think, however, that these courtesies have affected my view of the dispute between Chita and Tokyo.]

CHAPTER X

PRESENT FORCES AND TENDENCIES IN THE FAR EAST

The Far Eastern situation is so complex that it is very difficult to guess what will be the ultimate outcome of the Was.h.i.+ngton Conference, and still more difficult to know what outcome we ought to desire. I will endeavour to set forth the various factors each in turn, not simplifying the issues, but rather aiming at producing a certain hesitancy which I regard as desirable in dealing with China. I shall consider successively the interests and desires of America, j.a.pan, Russia and China, with an attempt, in each case, to gauge what parts of these various interests and desires are compatible with the welfare of mankind as a whole.[86]

I begin with America, as the leading spirit in the Conference and the dominant Power in the world. American public opinion is in favour of peace, and at the same time profoundly persuaded that America is wise and virtuous while all other Powers are foolish and wicked. The pessimistic half of this opinion I do not desire to dispute, but the optimistic half is more open to question. Apart from peace, American public opinion believes in commerce and industry, Protestant morality, athletics, hygiene, and hypocrisy, which may be taken as the main ingredients of American and English Kultur. Every American I met in the Far East, with one exception, was a missionary for American Kultur, whether nominally connected with Christian Missions or not. I ought to explain that when I speak of hypocrisy I do not mean the conscious hypocrisy practised by j.a.panese diplomats in their dealings with Western Powers, but that deeper, unconscious kind which forms the chief strength of the Anglo-Saxons. Everybody knows Labouchere's comment on Mr.

Gladstone, that like other politicians he always had a card up his sleeve, but, unlike the others, he thought the Lord had put it there.

This att.i.tude, which has been characteristic of England, has been somewhat chastened among ourselves by the satire of men like Bernard Shaw; but in America it is still just as prevalent and self-confident as it was with us fifty years ago. There is much justification for such an att.i.tude. Gladstonian England was more of a moral force than the England of the present day; and America is more of a moral force at this moment than any other Power (except Russia). But the development from Gladstone's moral fervour to the cynical imperialism of his successors is one which we can now see to be inevitable; and a similar development is bound to take place in the United States. Therefore, when we wish to estimate the desirability of extending the influence of the United States, we have to take account of this almost certain future loss of idealism.

Nor is idealism in itself always an unmixed blessing to its victims. It is apt to be incompatible with tolerance, with the practice of live-and-let-live, which alone can make the world endurable for its less pugnacious and energetic inhabitants. It is difficult for art or the contemplative outlook to exist in an atmosphere of bustling practical philanthropy, as difficult as it would be to write a book in the middle of a spring cleaning. The ideals which inspire a spring-cleaning are useful and valuable in their place, but when they are not enriched by any others they are apt to produce a rather bleak and uncomfortable sort of world.

All this may seem, at first sight, somewhat remote from the Was.h.i.+ngton Conference, but it is essential if we are to take a just view of the friction between America and j.a.pan. I wish to admit at once that, hitherto, America has been the best friend of China, and j.a.pan the worst enemy. It is also true that America is doing more than any other Power to promote peace in the world, while j.a.pan would probably favour war if there were a good prospect of victory. On these grounds, I am glad to see our Government making friends with America and abandoning the militaristic Anglo-j.a.panese Alliance. But I do not wish this to be done in a spirit of hostility to j.a.pan, or in a blind reliance upon the future good intentions of America. I shall therefore try to state j.a.pan's case, although, _for the present_, I think it weaker than America's.

It should be observed, in the first place, that the present American policy, both in regard to China and in regard to naval armaments, while clearly good for the world, is quite as clearly in line with American interests. To take the naval question first: America, with a navy equal to our own, will be quite strong enough to make our Admiralty understand that it is out of the question to go to war with America, so that America will have as much control of the seas as there is any point in having.[87] The Americans are adamant about the j.a.panese Navy, but very pliant about French submarines, which only threaten us. Control of the seas being secured, limitation of naval armaments merely decreases the cost, and is an equal gain to all parties, involving no sacrifice of American interests. To take next the question of China: American ambitions in China are economic, and require only that the whole country should be open to the commerce and industry of the United States. The policy of spheres of influence is obviously less advantageous, to so rich and economically strong a country as America, than the policy of the universal Open Door. We cannot therefore regard America's liberal policy as regards China and naval armaments as any reason for expecting a liberal policy when it goes against self-interest.

In fact, there is evidence that when American interests or prejudices are involved liberal and humanitarian principles have no weight whatever. I will cite two instances: Panama tolls, and Russian trade. In the matter of the Panama ca.n.a.l, America is bound by treaty not to discriminate against our s.h.i.+pping; nevertheless a Bill has been pa.s.sed by a two-thirds majority of the House of Representatives, making a discrimination in favour of American s.h.i.+pping. Even if the President ultimately vetoes it, its present position shows that at least two-thirds of the House of Representatives share Bethmann-Hollweg's view of treaty obligations. And as for trade with Russia, England led the way, while American hostility to the Bolsheviks remained implacable, and to this day Gompers, in the name of American labour, thunders against "shaking hands with murder." It cannot therefore be said that America is _always_ honourable or humanitarian or liberal. The evidence is that America adopts these virtues when they suit national or rather financial interests, but fails to perceive their applicability in other cases.

I could of course have given many other instances, but I content myself with one, because it especially concerns China. I quote from an American weekly, The _Freeman_ (November 23, 1921, p. 244):--

On November 1st, the Chinese Government failed to meet an obligation of $5,600,000, due and payable to a large banking-house in Chicago. The State Department had facilitated the negotiation of this loan in the first instance; and now, in fulfilment of the promise of Governmental support in an emergency, an official cablegram was launched upon Peking, with intimations that continued defalcation might have a most serious effect upon the financial and political rating of the Chinese Republic. In the meantime, the American bankers of the new international consortium had offered to advance to the Chinese Government an amount which would cover the loan in default, together with other obligations already in arrears, and still others which will fall due on December 1st; and this proposal had also received the full and energetic support of the Department of State. That is to say, American financiers and politicians were at one and the same time the heroes and villains of the piece; having co-operated in the creation of a dangerous situation, they came forward handsomely in the hour of trial with an offer to save China from themselves as it were, if the Chinese Government would only enter into relations with the consortium, and thus prepare the way for the eventual establishment of an American financial protectorate.

It should be added that the Peking Government, after repeated negotiations, had decided not to accept loans from the consortium on the terms on which they were offered. In my opinion, there were very adequate grounds for this decision. As the same article in the _Freeman_ concludes:--

If this plan is put through, it will make the bankers of the consortium the virtual owners of China; and among these bankers, those of the United States are the only ones who are prepared to take full advantage of the situation.

There is some reason to think that, at the beginning of the Was.h.i.+ngton Conference, an attempt was made by the consortium banks, with the connivance of the British but not of the American Government, to establish, by means of the Conference, some measure of international control over China. In the _j.a.pan Weekly Chronicle_ for November 17, 1921 (p. 725), in a telegram headed "International Control of China," I find it reported that America is thought to be seeking to establish international control, and that Mr. Wellington Koo told the _Philadelphia Public Ledger_: "We suspect the motives which led to the suggestion and we thoroughly doubt its feasibility. China will bitterly oppose any Conference plan to offer China international aid." He adds: "International control will not do. China must be given time and opportunity to find herself. The world should not misinterpret or exaggerate the meaning of the convulsion which China is now pa.s.sing through." These are wise words, with which every true friend of China must agree. In the same issue of the _j.a.pan Weekly Chronicle_--which, by the way, I consider the best weekly paper in the world--I find the following (p. 728):--

Mr. Lennox Simpson [Putnam Weale] is quoted as saying: "The international bankers have a scheme for the international control of China. Mr. Lamont, representing the consortium, offered a sixteen-million-dollar loan to China, which the Chinese Government refused to accept because Mr. Lamont insisted that the Hukuang bonds, German issue, which had been acquired by the Morgan Company, should be paid out of it." Mr. Lamont, on hearing this charge, made an emphatic denial, saying: "Simpson's statement is unqualifiedly false. When this man Simpson talks about resisting the control of the international banks he is fantastic. We don't want control. We are anxious that the Conference result in such a solution as will furnish full opportunity to China to fulfil her own destiny."

Sagacious people will be inclined to conclude that so much anger must be due to being touched on the raw, and that Mr. Lamont, if he had had nothing to conceal, would not have spoken of a distinguished writer and one of China's best friends as "this man Simpson."

I do not pretend that the evidence against the consortium is conclusive, and I have not s.p.a.ce here to set it all forth. But to any European radical Mr. Lamont's statement that the consortium does not want control reads like a contradiction in terms. Those who wish to lend to a Government which is on the verge of bankruptcy, must aim at control, for, even if there were not the incident of the Chicago Bank, it would be impossible to believe that Messrs. Morgan are so purely philanthropic as not to care whether they get any interest on their money or not, although emissaries of the consortium in China have spoken as though this were the case, thereby greatly increasing the suspicions of the Chinese.

In the _New Republic_ for November 30, 1921, there is an article by Mr.

Brailsford ent.i.tled "A New Technique of Peace," which I fear is prophetic even if not wholly applicable at the moment when it was written. I expect to see, if the Americans are successful in the Far East, China compelled to be orderly so as to afford a field for foreign commerce and industry; a government which the West will consider good subst.i.tuted for the present go-as-you-please anarchy; a gradually increasing flow of wealth from China to the investing countries, the chief of which is America; the development of a sweated proletariat; the spread of Christianity; the subst.i.tution of the American civilization for the Chinese; the destruction of traditional beauty, except for such _objets d'art_ as millionaires may think it worth while to buy; the gradual awakening of China to her exploitation by the foreigner; and one day, fifty or a hundred years hence, the ma.s.sacre of every white man throughout the Celestial Empire at a signal from some vast secret society. All this is probably inevitable, human nature being what it is.

It will be done in order that rich men may grow richer, but we shall be told that it is done in order that China may have "good" government. The definition of the word "good" is difficult, but the definition of "good government" is as easy as A.B.C.: it is government that yields fat dividends to capitalists.

The Chinese are gentle, urbane, seeking only justice and freedom. They have a civilization superior to ours in all that makes for human happiness. They have a vigorous movement of young reformers, who, if they are allowed a little time, will revivify China and produce something immeasurably better than the worn-out grinding mechanism that we call civilization. When Young China has done its work, Americans will be able to make money by trading with China, without destroying the soul of the country. China needs a period of anarchy in order to work out her salvation; all great nations need such a period, from time to time. When America went through such a period, in 1861-5, England thought of intervening to insist on "good government," but fortunately abstained.

Now-a-days, in China, all the Powers want to intervene. Americans recognize this in the case of the wicked Old World, but are smitten with blindness when it comes to their own consortium. All I ask of them is that they should admit that they are as other men, and cease to thank G.o.d that they are not as this publican.

So much by way of criticism by America; we come now to the defence of j.a.pan.

j.a.pan's relations with the Powers are not of her own seeking; all that j.a.pan asked of the world was to be let alone. This, however, did not suit the white nations, among whom America led the way. It was a United States squadron under Commodore Perry that first made j.a.pan aware of Western aggressiveness. Very soon it became evident that there were only two ways of dealing with the white man, either to submit to him, or to fight him with his own weapons. j.a.pan adopted the latter course, and developed a modern army trained by the Germans, a modern navy modelled on the British, modern machinery derived from America, and modern morals copied from the whole lot. Everybody except the British was horrified, and called the j.a.panese "yellow monkeys." However, they began to be respected when they defeated Russia, and after they had captured Tsing-tao and half-enslaved China they were admitted to equality with the other Great Powers at Versailles. The consideration shown to them by the West is due to their armaments alone; none of their other good qualities would have saved them from being regarded as "n.i.g.g.e.rs."