Dio's Rome Volume VI Part 14

[Frag. LIV]

1. -- Peace both creates wealth and preserves it, but war both expends it and destroys it. [Footnote: The first eight sections of this fragment seem to be taken from speeches of Romans in the senate-house. Nos. 1 and 2 are apparently the words of an unknown individual discouraging the eagerness for war; Nos. 3 and 4 may be spoken by Lentulus, urging war; and Nos. 5 to 8 may contain the opposing arguments of Fabius.](Mai, p.

188.)

2. --Every human being is so const.i.tuted as to desire to lord it over such as yield, and to employ the turn of Fortune's scale against voluntary slaves. (Mai, ib.)

3. But do you who know the facts and have experienced them, think that propriety and humaneness are sufficient for your safety? And do you regard listlessly all the wrongs they have committed against us by stealth or deceit or violence? Are you not stimulated, are you not for paying them back or for defending yourselves? Then again, you have never reflected that such behavior is in place for you toward one another, but toward the Carthaginians is cowardly and base. Our citizens we must treat in a gentle and politic fas.h.i.+on; if one be preserved unexpectedly, he is of our possessions: but harsh treatment is for the enemy. We shall save ourselves not by our defeats as a result of sparing them, but by our victories that will come from abasing them. (Mai, p.188.)

4. --War both preserves men's own possessions and wins the property of others, whereas peace destroys not only what has been bestowed by war but itself in addition. (Mai, pp.188 and 541.)

[Frag. LIV]

5. --It is base to proceed to action ere arguments about the matter have been heard: for in such a case, if successful, you will be thought to have enjoyed good fortune rather than to have employed good counsel, and if worsted, to have taken your resolution without forethought, at a time when there was no profit in it. And yet who does not know this,--that to heap up reproaches and to accuse people that have once warred against us is very easy--any man can do it--whereas, to say what is advantageous for the State, not in anger over other men's deeds, but with a view to the State's benefit, is really the duty of the advising cla.s.s? Do not irritate us, Lentulus, nor persuade us to begin war until you show us that it shall be really for our advantage. Reflect particularly (though there are other considerations) that speaking here about deeds of war is not the same sort of thing as their actual performance. (Mai, p.189.)

6. Men are often set on their feet by disasters, and many who use them wisely fare better than those who are completely fortunate and for that very reason wanton. Somehow ill luck seems to hold no inconsiderable portion of benefit, because it does not permit men to lose their senses or indulge in extreme wantonness. For naturally it is most advisable to set one's face steadfastly toward all the best things, and to make not possibility, but calculation, the measure of desire. And if a man be not able to prefer what is more excellent, it will still pay him to behave, even unwillingly, with moderation so as to regard in the light of happiness even the failure to be fortunate in all cases. (Mai, p.542.)

7. It is imperative to be on one's guard against any similar experience again,--that being the only benefit that can come from disasters.

Repeated good fortune occasionally ruins those who unthinkingly base their hopes upon it, believing they are sure of another victory, whereas failures compel every one as a result of his past trouble to provide for the future carefully beforehand. (Mai, pp.189 and 542.)

8. --For securing the favor of the G.o.ds or a good reputation among men it is no small thing to escape the appearance of creating war, and seem to be compelled to defend the existing population. (Mai, p.189.)

9. After speeches of this character on both sides they determined to prepare for fighting: they would not vote that way however, but determined to send envoys to Carthage and denounce Hannibal; then, if the Carthaginians refrained from approving his exploits, they would arbitrate the matter, or if all responsibility were laid on his shoulders, they would demand his extradition; if he were given up, well; otherwise they would declare war. (Mai, p.190. Zonaras, 8, 22.)

10. --When the Carthaginians made no definite answer to the envoys and instead behaved contemptuously toward them, Marcus [Footnote: According to Livy (XXI, 18, 1) his name was _Quintus_. Willems suggests emending to Maximus here.] Fabius thrust his hands beneath his toga and holding them with palms upward said: "Here I bring to you, Carthaginians, both war and peace: do you choose unequivocally whichever of them you wish."

Upon their replying to this challenge even then that they chose neither but would readily accept either that the Romans left with them, he declared war upon them. (Mai, p.190. Zonaras, 8, 22.)

[Frag. LV]

--The Romans invited the Narbonenses to an alliance. But the latter declared that they had never suffered any harm from the Carthaginians or received any favor from the Romans that they should war against the one or defend the other, and were quite angry with them, charging that the Romans had often treated their kinsmen outrageously. (Mai, p.190.)

[Frag. LVI]

1. --From such an expectation, Dio says, already acquired from that source, the Romans and Carthaginians had reached a state in which they had formed the most different judgments regarding the administration of the war. For hopefulness, in that it leads all men to cheerfulness, renders them also more active and confident, possessed of a faith that they will be victorious; lack of hope casts them into dejection and despair, and deprives of strength even the naturally stout-hearted.

(Mai, p.191.)

2. Just as matters at a great distance and quite unknown are accustomed to disturb many men, so now they struck no little fear to the hearts of the Spaniards. [Footnote: This refers to the Spaniards' refusing, at the start, to undertake a campaign. Cp. Livy, XXI, 23.] For the majority of the mult.i.tude that makes a campaign not for any reason of its own but ranking as an allied force is a strong force just so long as it has the hopes of obtaining some benefit without danger. But when the men reach the vicinity of the conflict, they are frightened out of their hopes of gain and lose their faith in promises. And the most of them have gotten it into their heads that they are by all means going to be successful in any case; consequently, even if they should meet with some reverse, they esteem it lightly in comparison with the hopes which have been offsetting it. (Mai, p.191. Cp. Zonaras, 8, 23.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 218 (_a.u._ 536)] 3. When the preparations failed to be sufficient in any respect for the size of Hannibal's army, and some one on this account suggested to him that the soldiers be fed on the flesh of their opponents, he did not take the idea amiss, but said he feared that some day through lack of bodies of that kind they might turn to eating one another. (Mai, p.191. Cp. Zonaras, 8, 23.)

4. --Hannibal before beginning operations called together the soldiers and brought in the captives whom he had taken by the way: he enquired of the latter whether they wished to undergo imprisonment in fetters and to endure a grievous slavery or to fight in single combat one with another on condition that the victors should be released. When they chose the second alternative, he set them to fighting. And at the end of the conflict he said: "Now is it not shameful, fellow-soldiers, that these men who have been captured by us are so disposed toward bravery as to be eager to die in place of becoming slaves, whereas we shrink from incurring a little toil and danger for the purpose of not being subservient to others,--yes, and ruling them besides?" (Mai, p.192.

Zonaras, 8, 23.)

5. All the sufferings that we have endured when occasionally defeated by the enemy we will inflict upon them, if we are victorious. Be well a.s.sured that by conquering we shall obtain all the benefits that I mention, but if conquered we shall not even have a safe means of escape.

The victor straightway finds everything friendly, even if possibly it hates him, and to the vanquished no one even of his own household pays any longer heed. (Mai, pp. 543 and 192.)

6. --To have once failed in an enterprise against some foes puts them forever out of countenance, and is a preventative of any future courage.

(Mai, p. 192.)

7. For the whole Gallic race is naturally more or less eccentric and cowardly and faithless. Just as they are readily emboldened in the face of hopes, so (only more readily) when frightened do they fall into a panic. The fact that they were no more faithful to the Carthaginians will teach the rest of mankind a lesson never to dare to invade Italy.

(Mai, p. 192. Cp. Zonaras, 8, 24.)

8. --Many portents, [Footnote: Cp. Livy XXI, 62, and XXII, I, 8-20.] some of which had actually occurred and others which were the product of idle talk, became the subject of conversation. For when persons get seriously frightened and those [lacuna] are in reality proven to have occurred to them, oftentimes others are imagined. And if once any of the former phenomena is believed, heedlessly at once the rest [lacuna]

Accordingly, the sacrifices were offered and all the other ceremonies were accomplished which men are in the habit of performing for the cure of their temporary terror and for escape from expected ruin. Yet the race of men is wont to trust such agencies, hoping in the line of improvement, and so now, even if because of the greatness of the danger awaited they thought that the harshest fate would fall upon them, still they kept hoping that they would not be defeated. (Mai, p. 192.)

9. -- The Romans proclaimed Fabius dictator, satisfied if they could themselves survive, and neither despatched any aid to the allies nor [lacuna] but learning that Hannibal had turned aside from Campania, they made sure of the former's safety through fear that they might change sides either willingly or under compulsion. (Mai, p. 193. Zonaras, 8, 25.)

10. -- Fabius continued to besiege him from a safe distance instead of in dangerous proximity; he would not venture to make a trial of men skilled in the art of war, and made the safety of the soldiers a matter of great circ.u.mspection because of the scarcity of the citizens, deeming it no disaster to fail of destroying the forces of the enemy but a great one to lose any of his troops. The Carthaginians, he believed, by means of their enormous mult.i.tude would encounter danger again even if once defeated, but if the smallest part of his own army met with failure he calculated that he should find himself in every extremity of evil; this would not be due to the number of the dead on any such occasion but to the previous setbacks endured. He was in the habit of saying that men with powers undiminished could often suffer without hurt the most dreadful losses, but those who were already exhausted might be harmed by the slightest reverses. Once, when his son advised him to run the risk and be done with it and said something about his not losing more than a hundred men, the above consideration led him to refuse a.s.sent, and he further inquired of the young man whether he would like to be one of the hundred men. (Mai, pp. 193 and 544. Zonaras, 8, 26.)

11. -- The Carthaginians, far from sending voluntarily any support to Hannibal, were rather disposed to make sport of him, because whereas he was continually writing of his splendid progress and his many successes he still asked money and soldiers of them. They said his requests did not agree with his successes: victors ought to find their existing army sufficient and to send money home instead of demanding additional funds from them. (Mai, p. 194. Zonaras, 8, 26.)

12. I am under accusation, not because I dash headlong into battles nor because I risk dangers in my office as general, purposing by losing many soldiers and killing many enemies to be named dictator and celebrate a triumph, but because I am slow and because I delay and because I always exercise extreme foresight for your preservation. (Mai, p.542.)

13. Is it not really absurd for us to be zealous for success in enterprises outside and far off before the city itself is really set upon a firm foundation? Is it not absolutely outrageous to be eager to conquer the enemy before we set our own affairs well in order? (Mai, p.

543.)

14 -- Hannibal either as a favor to Fabius, on the ground that he was an advantage to them or perhaps to create a prejudice against him, did not ravage any of his possessions. Accordingly, when an exchange of captives was made between the Romans and Carthaginians with the proviso that any number in excess on either side should be ransomed, and as the Romans were unwilling to ransom their men with money from the public treasury, Fabius sold the farms and paid their ransom. Therefore they did not depose him but they gave equal power to his master of the horse, so that both held their commands on a like footing. Fabius harbored no wrath against either the citizens or Rufus: he excused them for an act prompted by human nature and was for contenting himself if in any way they might survive. He desired the preservation and victory of the commonwealth rather than an individual reputation, and continued to believe that excellence depends not on decrees but on each man's spirit, and that a man is better or worse not as a result of any ordinance but as a result of his own wisdom or ignorance.

Rufus, however, who had not shown the right spirit in the first place was now more than ever puffed up and could not contain himself because he had obtained through his insubordination the further prize of equal authority with the dictator. And so he kept asking for the right to hold sole sway a day at a time, or for several days alternately. But Fabius, in the fear that he might work some harm if he should get possession of the undivided power, would not consent to either plan of his, but divided the army in such a way that they each, like the consuls, had a separate force. And immediately Rufus encamped apart, in order that he might give a practical ill.u.s.tration of the fact that he held sway in his own right and not subject to the dictator. (Valesius, p. 597. Zonaras, 8, 26.)

15. -- It is customary for men who are ruled to concur in opinion easily.

Especially often do they join forces when the object is to slander men of good reputation, for the reason that it is their nature to help in augmenting any power just come to light but to bring low what has already obtained preeminence. And though one can not immediately measure one's self with men who surpa.s.s one through ampler resources, growth in an unexpected quarter brings hope of a like good fortune to others that dwell in obscurity. [Footnote: This may come from a speech of M.

Terentius Varro in favor of equalizing the powers of dictator and of master-of-horse.](Mai, p. 194.) 16. -- Rufus, who obtained equal authority with the dictator, after a defeat by the Carthaginians altered his att.i.tude (for disasters chasten somehow those who are not completely fools) and voluntarily gave up his leaders.h.i.+p. And for this all praised him loudly. He was not held worthy of censure because he had failed to recognize at first what was fitting, but was commended for not hesitating to change his mind. They deemed it an act of good fortune for a man to choose right at the start a proper course of conduct, but they thoroughly approved the course of one, who, having learned from practical experience the better way, was not ashamed to face squarely about. From this episode, too, it was clearly shown how much one man differs from another and true excellence from the reputation therefor.

What had been taken from Fabius by jealousy and prejudice of the citizens, he received back with good-will and even at the request of his colleague. (Mai, p. 194. Zonaras, 8, 26.) 17. -- The same man when about to retire from office sent for the consuls, surrendered his army to them, and advised them in addition very fully regarding all the details of what must be done. The safety of the city stood higher in his estimation than a reputation for being the only successful commander, and expecting that if they followed their own bent they would probably meet with failure, but if they heeded his counsel they would meet with a favorable outcome, he preferred to look to the second contingency for praise. And the consuls were not unduly bold but acted on the suggestion of Fabius, deeming it better not to accomplish any important result than to be ruined; hence they remained where they were throughout the entire period of their command. (Mai, p. 195. Zonaras, 8, 26.)

18. For the Iapygians and Apulians dwell around the Ionic Gulf. Of the Apulians the tribes according to Dio are the Peuketii Pediculi, Daunii, Tarentini. There is also Cannae, the "plain of Diomed," near Daunian Apulia. Messapia was called also Iapygia, later Salentia, and then Calabria. Argyrippa, a Diomedian city, was renamed Arpi by the Apulians. (Isaac Tzetzes on Lycophron, 603 and 852. Cp. Zonaras, 9, 1.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 216 (_a.u._ 538)] 19. Later he was arrayed against the Romans at Cannae, when the Roman generals were Paulus and Terentius. Now Cannae is a level district of Argyrippa, where Diomed founded the city Argyrippa, that is to say "Argos the Horse-City" in the tongue of the Greeks. And this plain comes to belong later to the Daunii (of the Iapygians), then to the Salantii, and now to those that all call by the name Calauri. It is also the boundary between the Calauri and Longibardi, where the great war burst upon them. (Tzetzes, Hist., 1, 757-767. Cp. Zonaras, 9, 1.)

20. -- With regard to divination and astronomy Dio says: "I, however, can not form any opinion either about these events or about others that are foretold by divination. For what does foreshowing avail, if a thing shall certainly come to pa.s.s, and if there could be no averting of it either by human devices or by divine providence? Accordingly, let each man look at these matters in what way he pleases." (Mai, p. 195. Cp.

Zonaras, 9, 1.)

21. -- The commanders were Paulus and Terentius, men not of similar temperament, but differing alike in family and in character. The former was a patrician, possessed of the graces of education, and esteemed safety before haste, being restrained partly, it might be said, as a result of the censure he had received for his former conduct in office.

Hence he was not inclined to audacity, but was considering how he might keep from getting into trouble again rather than how he might achieve success by some desperate venture. Terentius, however, had been brought up among the rabble, was practiced in vulgar bravado, and so displayed lack of prudence in nearly all respects; for instance, he promised himself general direction of the war, kept constantly annoying the patricians, and thought that he alone should have the leaders.h.i.+p in view of the quiet behavior of his colleague. Now they both reached the camp at a most opportune time: Hannibal had no longer any provender; Spain was in turmoil; the affection of the allies was being alienated from him: and if they had waited for even the briefest possible period, they would have conquered without trouble. As matters went, however, the heedlessness of Terentius and the submissiveness of Paulus, who always desired the proper course but a.s.sented to his colleague in most points--so sure is gentleness to be overcome by audacity,--compa.s.sed their defeat. (Mai, p. 196. Zonaras, 9, 1.)

22. -- In the melee of the war not even the boldest possessed a hope so buoyant as to rise above the fear that arose from its uncertainty. The surer they felt of conquering the more did they tremble for fear they might in some way come to grief. Those who are ignorant of a matter by reason of their very lack of perception are not awaiting anything terrible, but the boldness derived from calculation [lacuna] (Six pages are lacking.) (Mai, p. 196.)

23. At the time when burst this frightful war, a terrific earthquake occurred, so that mountains were cleft asunder and showers of great stones poured down from heaven. But they, fighting vigorously, perceived none of these things. At last so great a mult.i.tude of Roman warriors fell that Hannibal, the general, in sending to Sicily the finger-rings of the generals and the other men of repute filled many bushel and peck measures--so great a mult.i.tude that the n.o.ble, foremost Roman women ran lamenting to the temples in Rome and with the hairs of their heads cleansed the statues there;--and later had intercourse with both slaves and barbarians (because the Roman land had been utterly impoverished of men), to the end that their race might not be every whit extirpated.

Rome at that time, after the utter loss of all her citizens, stood inglorious through many day-coursing cycles. Her old men sitting at her outer gates bewailed the disaster most grievous to be borne and asked ever and anon the pa.s.sers-by whether any one perchance were left alive.

(Tzetzes, Hist. 1, 767-785. (Cp. Fragm. LVI, 19, which precedes this.) Cp. Zonaras, 9, 1.)

24. -- Scipio, on learning that some of the Romans were prepared to abandon Rome, and indeed all Italy, because they felt it was destined to fall into the hands of the Carthaginians, yet found a way to restrain them. Sword in hand he sprang suddenly into the room where they were conferring, and after himself swearing to take all proper measures both of word and act he made them also devote themselves by oath to utter destruction, should they fail to keep their pledges to him. Later these men reached a harmonious decision and wrote to the consul that they were safe enough. He, however, did not at once write or despatch a messenger to Rome; on reaching Ca.n.u.sium he set in order affairs at that place, sent to the regions in proximity garrisons sufficient for immediate needs, and repulsed a cavalry attack upon the city. Altogether, he displayed neither dejection nor terror, but with an unbending spirit, as if no serious evil had befallen them, he both planned and executed all measures of immediate benefit. (Valesius, p. 598. Zonaras, 9, 2.)

25. Hannibal took possession of the Nucerini under an agreement that each man should leave the city carrying one change of clothing. As soon, however, as he was master of the situation he shut the senators into bath-houses and suffocated them, and in the case of the others, although he had granted them permission to go away where they pleased, he cut down many of them even on the road. Still, this course was of no profit to him, for the rest became afraid that they might suffer a similar fate, and so would not come to terms with him and resisted as long as they could hold out. (Valesius, p. 598. Zonaras, 9, 2.)

26. -- Marcellus showed great bravery, moderation, and justice. His demands on his subjects were not all rigorous or harsh, nor was he careful to see that they also should do what was needful. Those of them who committed any errors he pardoned humanely and, furthermore, was not angry if they failed to be like him. (Valesius, p. 601.)

27. -- When many citizens of Nola were dreading the men captured at Cannae and later released by Hannibal, because they thought that such persons favored the invader's cause, and when they were even desirous of putting them to death, he opposed it. Furthermore, he concealed from this time on the suspicion that he felt toward them, and treated them in such a way that they chose his side by preference, and became extremely useful both to their native land and to the Romans. (Valesius, p. 601. Cp.

Zonaras, 9, 2.)