The United States and Latin America Part 10

[133] Senate Doc. No. 62, Fifty-Fifth Cong., Third Sess.

[134] Report of the Military Governor of Cuba, 8 vols., 1901.

[135] U. S. Statues at Large, Vol. x.x.xI, p. 897.

[136] Doc.u.mentary History of the Inauguration of the Cuban Government, in Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1902, Appendix A.

[137] Doc.u.mentary History of the Inauguration of the Cuban Government, in Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1902, Appendix B.

[138] Senate Docs. Nos. 405 and 679, Fifty-Seventh Cong., First Sess.

[139] Secretary Taft's report on the Cuban situation was sent to Congress December 17, 1906.

CHAPTER IV

THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE PANAMA Ca.n.a.l

The cutting of the isthmus between North and South America was the dream of navigators and engineers from the time when the first discoverers ascertained that nature had neglected to provide a pa.s.sage. Yet the new continent which so unexpectedly blocked the way of Columbus in his search for the Indies opposed for centuries an insurmountable barrier to the commerce of the East and the West. The piercing of the isthmus always seemed a perfectly feasible undertaking, but the difficulties in the way proved greater than at first sight appeared. There were (1) the physical or engineering problems to be solved, and (2) the diplomatic complications regarding the control of the ca.n.a.l in peace and its use in war. The weakness of the Spanish-American states, whose territories embraced the available routes, and their recognized inability either to construct or protect a ca.n.a.l made what might otherwise have been merely a question of domestic economy one of grave international import. In this respect, as in others, the problem presented the same features as the Suez ca.n.a.l. To meet these difficulties three plans were successively developed during the nineteenth century: (1) a ca.n.a.l constructed by a private corporation under international control, (2) a ca.n.a.l constructed by a private corporation under the exclusive control of the United States, and (3) a ca.n.a.l constructed, owned, operated, and controlled by the United States as a government enterprise. The Clayton-Bulwer treaty provided for the construction of a ca.n.a.l in accordance with the first plan; several unsuccessful attempts were made to raise the necessary capital under the second plan; while the third plan was the one under which the gigantic task was actually accomplished.

The comparative merits of the Nicaragua and Panama routes long divided the opinion of experts. American engineers generally favored that through Nicaragua. The length of the Nicaragua route, from Greytown on the Atlantic to Brito on the Pacific by way of the San Juan river and through Lake Nicaragua, is about 170 miles. The elevation of the lake above the sea is about 110 feet. Its western sh.o.r.e is only twelve miles from the Pacific, with an intervening divide 154 feet above the sea.

From the southeast corner of the lake flows the San Juan river, 120 miles to the Atlantic, with an average fall of about 10 inches to the mile. The serious objections to this route are: (1) the lack of harbors at the terminals, Brito being a mere indentation on the coast, rendering the construction of immense breakwaters necessary, while at Greytown the San Juan broadens out into a delta that would require extensive dredging; and (2) the enormous rainfall at Greytown, exceeding that known anywhere else on the western continent--nearly 25 feet.

The Panama route from Colon on the Atlantic to Panama on the Pacific is about 50 miles in length, with a natural elevation nearly double that of Nicaragua. There are natural harbors at each end which are capacious and able to accommodate the heaviest s.h.i.+pping. The Panama Railroad, built along the line of the proposed ca.n.a.l, in 1850-55, gave this route an additional advantage. There were, however, certain disadvantages: (1) the unhealthfulness of the vicinity, rendering labor scarce and inefficient; (2) the heavy rainfall, 10 to 12 feet at Colon; and (3) the treacherous character of the geologic structure, due to its volcanic origin, through which the cut had to be made. The impossibility of making even approximate estimates of the cost of the work in such a deadly climate and through such an uncertain geologic formation was one of the greatest difficulties to be overcome. The De Lesseps plan provided for an open cut throughout at the sea-level, at an estimated cost of $170,000,000. The work was begun in 1884 and prosecuted until 1888, when the gigantic scheme collapsed, after the company had expended about $300,000,000 and accomplished less than one-third of the work.

Great as the engineering problems of the various ca.n.a.l schemes have been shown to be, the importance to the world's commerce of the object in view would, in all probability, have led to their solution and to the construction of a ca.n.a.l long before the United States undertook the Panama enterprise, had it not been for difficulties of an altogether different character, complications arising out of the question as to the status of the ca.n.a.l in international law. The diplomatic difficulties in the case of an interoceanic ca.n.a.l are very great. It cannot be regarded as a natural strait, like the Dardanelles, the Danish Belts, or the Straits of Magellan, which were for a long time held under exclusive jurisdiction, but are now free to all nations. Nor, on the other hand, could an isthmian ca.n.a.l be compared to the Kiel ca.n.a.l, which is within the territory of Germany, and which, although open to commerce, was specially designed to meet the needs of the German navy. Such ca.n.a.ls as this are built by the capital of the country through which they pa.s.s, and are protected and controlled by its government.

No one of the republics to the south of us, through whose territory it was proposed to build a ca.n.a.l, could raise the capital for its construction or insure its protection when completed. No company chartered by one of these governments could have raised the necessary capital without some further guarantee. Hence it was that all companies organized for this purpose had to secure their charters from some more powerful nation, such as the United States or France, and their concessions from one of the Central American states. This rendered necessary a treaty between the state granting the concession or right to construct a ca.n.a.l through its territory and the state chartering the company. The claims of other states to equality of treatment in the use of such a ca.n.a.l const.i.tuted another element that had to be considered.

With the establishment of the independence of the Spanish-American republics the question of the construction of a s.h.i.+p ca.n.a.l across the isthmus became a matter of general interest, and it was one of the proposed subjects of discussion at the Congress of American Republics summoned by Bolivar to meet at Panama in 1826. In the instructions to the United States commissioners to that congress, Mr. Clay authorized them to enter into the consideration of that subject, suggesting that the best routes would likely be found in the territory of Mexico or of the Central Republic. As to the diplomatic status of the ca.n.a.l, he said:

If the work should ever be executed so as to admit of the pa.s.sage of sea vessels from ocean to ocean, the benefits of it ought not to be exclusively appropriated to any one nation, but should be extended to all parts of the globe upon the payment of a just compensation or reasonable tolls.[140]

In 1835, and again in 1839, the United States Senate pa.s.sed resolutions authorizing the President to enter into negotiations with other nations, particularly Central America and New Granada, for the purpose of protecting by treaty either individuals or companies who might undertake to open communication between the two oceans, and of insuring "the free and equal navigation of the ca.n.a.l by all nations." Presidents Jackson and Van Buren both commissioned agents with a view to carrying out these resolutions, but without success.

While a prisoner at Ham in 1845, Prince Louis Napoleon Bonaparte secured from the government of Nicaragua a concession granting him power to organize a company for the construction of a waterway to be known as "Le Ca.n.a.le Napoleon de Nicaragua." After his escape from Ham, he published in London a pamphlet ent.i.tled "The Ca.n.a.l of Nicaragua, or a Project for the Junction of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans by means of a Ca.n.a.l."[141]

Although the United States government was a party to endless negotiations in regard to an inter-oceanic ca.n.a.l, there were only three treaties of any practical importance prior to the close of the nineteenth century, by which it acquired rights and a.s.sumed obligations on that account.[142] These were (1) the treaty with New Granada (Colombia) of 1846; (2) the Clayton-Bulwer treaty with England of 1850; and (3) the treaty with Nicaragua of 1867. We shall proceed to examine these in detail.

The treaty with New Granada was signed at Bogota, December 12, 1846, and ratified by both governments in 1848. It did not differ materially from the general draft of treaties, except in the thirty-fifth article, which was of a special character and related to the Isthmus of Panama. By this article "the government of New Granada guarantees to the government of the United States that the right-of-way or transit across the Isthmus of Panama, upon any modes of communication that now exist or that may be hereafter constructed, shall be open and free to the government and citizens of the United States," for the transportation of all articles of lawful commerce upon the same terms enjoyed by the citizens of New Granada.

And in order to secure to themselves the tranquil and constant enjoyment of these advantages, and for the favors they have acquired by the 4th, 5th, and 6th articles of this treaty, the United States guarantee positively and efficaciously to New Granada, by the present stipulation, the perfect neutrality of the before-mentioned isthmus, with the view that the free transit from the one to the other sea may not be interrupted or embarra.s.sed in any future time while this treaty exists; and, in consequence, the United States also guarantee, in the same manner, the rights of sovereignty and property which New Granada has and possesses over the said territory.[143]

This treaty was to remain in force for twenty years, and then, if neither party gave notice of intended termination, it was to continue in force, terminable by either party at twelve months' notice. This treaty was in full force when the Panama revolution of 1903 took place. Under the protection of this treaty the Panama Railroad Company, composed mainly of citizens of the United States, secured a charter from New Granada, and between 1850 and 1855 constructed a railroad across the isthmus along the line of the proposed Panama ca.n.a.l. In consequence of the riot at Panama in 1856, efforts were made by the United States to modify this treaty so as to give the United States greater control and power to protect the means of transit, but without success.[144] Other attempts to modify it in 1868 and 1870 likewise failed.[145]

In 1862 the Granadian government, through its representative at Was.h.i.+ngton, notified the United States that a revolutionary chief, who was then trying to subvert the Granadian confederation, had sent an armed force to occupy the Isthmus of Panama, and the government of Granada called upon the United States to enforce its guarantee.

Simultaneously the same information was received from the United States consul at Panama, and the President instructed the United States naval commander at that port to protect at all hazards and at whatever cost the safety of the railroad transit across the isthmus.

The Granadian government, however, was not satisfied with this action, and urged the United States to land a body of troops at Panama, suggesting that it consist of 300 cavalry. Under the circ.u.mstances, President Lincoln hesitated to take such action without consulting Great Britain and France, and Mr. Seward instructed our representatives at London and Paris to seek an understanding with those governments in regard to the matter. He declared:

This government has no interest in the matter different from that of other maritime powers. It is willing to interpose its aid in execution of its treaty and for the benefit of all nations. But if it should do so it would incur some hazard of becoming involved in the revolutionary strife which is going on in that country. It would also incur danger of misapprehension of its object by other maritime powers if it should act without previous consultation with them.[146]

In a conference between Mr. Adams and Lord John Russell, the latter declared that he did not consider that the contingency had arisen which called for intervention; that so far as he could learn, no attempt had been made to obstruct the free transit across the isthmus. The French government took substantially the same view.[147] In questions of a similar nature that arose later, the attorney-general of the United States expressed the opinion that the guarantee by the United States of Granadian sovereignty and property in the territory of the isthmus was only against foreign governments, and did not authorize the United States to take sides with one or the other party in the intestine troubles of that nation.

In April, 1885, the Colombian government, which was embarra.s.sed by civil war, called upon the United States for the fulfillment of the treaty of 1846, to secure the neutrality and sovereignty of the isthmus. President Cleveland at once sent a body of troops to the isthmus with instructions to confine their action to preventing the transit and its accessories from being interrupted or embarra.s.sed. As soon as peace was reestablished, the troops of the United States were withdrawn.[148]

Four years after the signature of the above treaty with Colombia, and two years after its ratification by the Senate, the United States and Great Britain executed what is popularly known as the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. It is of great importance to understand clearly the circ.u.mstances under which this treaty was negotiated.

For very obvious reasons, the Isthmus of Panama was for many years the objective point of all ca.n.a.l schemes, but as the engineering difficulties of this route began to be fully appreciated, attention was directed more and more to that through Nicaragua. The occupation by Great Britain, under the a.s.sumption of a protectorate, of the territory about the mouth of the San Juan river, which belonged to Nicaragua and Costa Rica, and in which the Atlantic terminus of the ca.n.a.l would fall, was a source of no little uneasiness and perplexity to the United States. In June, 1849, Mr. Hise, charge d'affaires of the United States in Central America, negotiated without the authorization or knowledge of his government, a treaty with Nicaragua which gave the United States exclusive rights in the construction of a ca.n.a.l through the territory of that state.[149] This treaty was not submitted to the Senate, but was made use of in the negotiations that were opened shortly thereafter with Great Britain for the purpose of ousting her from her position of control over the mouth of the San Juan. A few months later, September 28, 1849, Mr. Squier signed with Honduras a treaty which ceded Tiger Island, in the Bay of Fonseca, to the United States, thus giving us a naval station on the Pacific side of the isthmus. This treaty, like that negotiated by Mr. Hise, was unauthorized and never submitted to the Senate.[150] Both treaties were used, however, in bringing England to the signature of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. This activity in treaty-making was occasioned by the acquisition of California and the rush to the gold fields by way of the isthmus.

During the period that elapsed between Mr. Bancroft's withdrawal from London and Mr. Lawrence's arrival as the representative of the United States, Mr. Clayton instructed Mr. Rives, who was on his way to Paris, to stop in London and hold a conference with Lord Palmerston on the Central American question. At this date the United States was striving simply for equal rights in any waterway that might be opened through the isthmus and not for any exclusive rights. Mr. Rives declared to Lord Palmerston "that citizens of the United States had entered into a contract with the state of Nicaragua to open, on certain conditions, a communication between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans by the river San Juan and the Nicaragua lake; that the government of the United States, after the most careful investigation of the subject, had come undoubtedly to the conclusion that upon both legal and historical grounds the state of Nicaragua was the true territorial sovereign of the river San Juan as well as of the Nicaragua lake, and that it was, therefore, bound to give its countenance and support, by all proper and reasonable means, to rights lawfully derived by their citizens under a grant from that sovereign." He further said:

That the United States would not, if they could, obtain any exclusive right or privilege in a great highway, which naturally belonged to all mankind, for they well knew that the possession of any such privilege would expose them to inevitable jealousies and probable controversies which would make it infinitely more costly than advantageous; that while they aimed at no exclusive privilege for themselves, they could never consent to see so important a communication fall under the exclusive control of any other great commercial power; that we were far from imputing to Her Britannic Majesty's government any views of that kind, but Mosquito possession at the mouth of the San Juan could be considered in no other light than British possession, and his lords.h.i.+p would readily comprehend that such a state of things, so long as it was continued, must necessarily give rise to dissatisfaction and distrust on the part of other commercial powers.[151]

The negotiations thus opened by Mr. Rives were continued by Mr. Lawrence upon his arrival in England, but were shortly thereafter transferred to Was.h.i.+ngton, where Mr. Clayton succeeded in arranging with Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer the terms of a convention which was signed April 19, 1850.

The intention of the two governments, as declared in the preamble, was to set forth "their views and intentions with reference to any means of communication by s.h.i.+p ca.n.a.l which may be constructed between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans by the way of the river San Juan de Nicaragua, and either or both of the lakes of Nicaragua or Managua, to any port or place on the Pacific ocean."

By the first article Great Britain and the United States bound themselves never to obtain or maintain any exclusive control over the said s.h.i.+p ca.n.a.l; never to erect or maintain any fortifications commanding the same or in the vicinity thereof, or to colonize or exercise dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito coast, or any part of Central America; and never to make use of any alliance, connection or influence with any of these states to obtain any unequal advantages in regard to commerce or navigation through the said ca.n.a.l.

The second article provided for the neutralization of the ca.n.a.l in the event of war between the contracting parties. The third guaranteed protection for the persons and property of the parties legally undertaking the construction of the ca.n.a.l. The fourth related to gaining the consent of the states whose territory the ca.n.a.l should traverse. The fifth article provided for the neutralization and protection of the ca.n.a.l so long as it was managed without discrimination against either of the contracting parties, and stipulated that neither of them would withdraw its protection without giving the other six months' notice. In the sixth article the contracting parties promised to invite every state with which they were on terms of friendly intercourse to accede to this convention. In the seventh article the contracting parties agreed to lend their support and encouragement to the first company offering to construct the ca.n.a.l in accordance with the spirit and intention of this convention. The eighth article was of special importance. It declared that "the governments of the United States and Great Britain having not only desired, in entering into this convention, to accomplish a particular object, but also to establish a general principle, they hereby agree to extend their protection, by treaty stipulations, to any other practicable communication, whether by ca.n.a.l or railway, across the isthmus which connects North and South America, and especially to the interoceanic communications, should the same prove practicable, whether by ca.n.a.l or railway, which are now proposed to be established by the way of Tehuantepec or Panama."[152]

Such are the main stipulations of the celebrated Clayton-Bulwer treaty, which remained in force until 1901, and which during that period probably called forth more discussion than any treaty which the United States had ever signed.

In after years a large number of people on this side of the Atlantic, forgetting the object and aim of the treaty and the circ.u.mstances under which it was negotiated, thought that the United States conceded too much and violated the principle of the Monroe Doctrine in giving England a position and interest in America which she did not before possess.

This opinion was held by some prominent statesmen at the time the treaty was negotiated, notably by Buchanan, who poured forth severe criticism and ridicule upon it. While it was before the Senate for ratification, he wrote to a friend:

If Sir Henry Bulwer can succeed in having the two first provisions of this treaty ratified by the Senate, he will deserve a British peerage. The consideration for our concessions is the relinquishment of the claim to the protectorate of the Mosquito sh.o.r.e--so absurd and unfounded that it has been ridiculed even by the London _Times_. Truly Sir Henry has brought this claim to a good market when he found a purchaser in Mr. Clayton. The treaty altogether reverses the Monroe Doctrine, and establishes it against ourselves rather than European governments.[153]

Let us see what the interests of the two signatory powers were at that time in Central America. The United States had recently acquired California by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and the rapid development of the Pacific states made the ca.n.a.l a question of greater importance to the United States than ever before. The great transcontinental railroads, which some fifteen years later established direct overland communication with the Pacific states, were then hardly thought of.

England's interest in the ca.n.a.l, on the other hand, was rather a prospective one, but farsighted as usual, she had provided for future contingencies by occupying several years before, under the guise of a protectorate over the Mosquito Indians, Greytown at the mouth of the San Juan river, the Atlantic terminus of the ca.n.a.l. In addition to the Mosquito coast, England at this time held the Bay Islands and Belize, or British Honduras. The United States, it is true, had never recognized the claims of Great Britain to dominion over the Mosquito coast. These claims, which dated back to the eighteenth century, when British wood-cutters in search of mahogany, and smugglers entered the territory occupied by the Mosquito Indians and established cordial relations with them, had been abandoned by the treaty of 1786 with Spain, but were revived in 1841, when a s.h.i.+p of war was sent to San Juan del Norte to announce the protection of England over the lands of the Mosquito king and to raise the Mosquito flag.[154] In 1848 the English and Indians drove the Nicaraguans out of the town and changed the name to Greytown.

The United States uniformly denied the rights of the Mosquito king to sovereignty over the district, and consequently the pretensions of the inhabitants of Greytown to political organization or power derived in any way from the Mosquitos. In his instructions to Mr. Hise soon after the occupation of Greytown, Secretary Buchanan said:

The object of Great Britain in this seizure is evident from the policy which she has uniformly pursued throughout her history, of seizing upon every available commercial point in the world whenever circ.u.mstances have placed it in her power. Her purpose probably is to obtain control of the route for a railroad or ca.n.a.l between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans by way of Lake Nicaragua.... The government of the United States has not yet determined what course it will pursue in regard to the encroachment of the British government.... The independence as well as the interests of the nations on this continent require that they should maintain an American system of policy entirely distinct from that which prevails in Europe. To suffer any interference on the part of the European governments with the domestic concerns of the American republics, and to permit them to establish new colonies upon this continent, would be to jeopard their independence and ruin their interests. These truths ought everywhere throughout this continent to be impressed upon the public mind; but what can the United States do to resist such European interference whilst the Spanish-American republics continue to weaken themselves by civil divisions and civil war, and deprive themselves of doing anything for their own protection.

Whatever the rights of the case, Great Britain was in actual possession of the Atlantic terminus of the proposed ca.n.a.l, and the United States was not prepared forcibly to oust her, even if such a course had been deemed advisable. The United States had no rights in the case at this time by treaty with Nicaragua or otherwise, none of the statesmen of that day having been broad enough in their views or bold enough to consider the territory of Nicaragua as "a part of the coast-line of the United States." All that could be opposed to England's _de facto_ possession was the Monroe Doctrine, and England held that her claim antedated the declaration of that principle of American diplomacy. Mr.

Clayton cannot, therefore, be justly charged with a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, for the effect of the treaty was to leave England weaker territorially on this continent than she was before.

The Clayton-Bulwer treaty left open several minor questions that required adjustment before the ca.n.a.l enterprise could be pushed forward with success. Chief among these were the dispute between Nicaragua and Costa Rica in regard to their boundary line and the controversy between Great Britain and Nicaragua in regard to the territory claimed by the Mosquito Indians. In April, 1852, Mr. Webster and Sir John Crampton agreed upon a basis for the settlement of Central American affairs, and drew up and signed a proposal to be submitted to Nicaragua and Costa Rica.[155] This proposed basis for a treaty was rejected by Nicaragua, which left the questions involved in the same unsettled position.

A much more serious obstacle to the accomplishment of the objects of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty than the failure of the above proposal arose from the wide divergence of opinion between the British and American governments in regard to its interpretation. The discussion involved two princ.i.p.al points: (1) Whether the abnegatory clauses of the first article were merely prospective in character and directed against future acquisitions in Central America, or whether they required Great Britain to abandon her protectorate over the Mosquito coast at once; and (2) whether the Bay Islands came within the purview of the treaty. It was expressly stipulated that Belize or British Honduras was not included in Central America and therefore not affected by the treaty one way or the other. A declaration to this effect was filed at the state department by the British minister, Sir Henry Bulwer. In reply, Mr. Clayton, after conference with the chairman of the Senate committee on foreign relations, acknowledged that British Honduras did not come within the scope of the treaty, but at the same time carefully refrained from affirming or denying the British t.i.tle to that settlement or its alleged dependencies.[156] This left open the question as to whether the Bay Islands were dependencies of Belize or of the Republic of Honduras.

Shortly after the failure of the Crampton-Webster proposals, Great Britain took advantage of the uncertainty that existed in regard to the status of the Bay Islands and by a formal proclamation, issued July 17, 1852, converted her settlements on those islands into "The Colony of the Bay Islands." When the United States government expressed its surprise at this proceeding, the British government replied that the Bay Islands were dependencies of Her Majesty's settlement at Belize and therefore, by explicit agreement, not within the scope of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.[157]