The United States and Latin America Part 7

These were known as Peninsulars or Spanish immigrants. They were the official cla.s.s, the wealthy planters and slave-owners and the real rulers of Cuba. On the other hand there was a party composed of Creoles, or native Cubans, whose cry was "Cuba for the Cubans!" and who hoped to effect the complete separation of the island from Spain, either through their own efforts or through the a.s.sistance of the United States. Not infrequently in the same family, the father, born and brought up in the Peninsula, was an ardent loyalist, while the son, born in Cuba, was an insurgent at heart, if not actually enlisted in the ranks.

The Spanish revolution of September, 1868, was the signal for an uprising of the native or Creole party in the eastern part of the island. This movement was not at first ostensibly for independence, but for the revolution in Spain, the cries being "Hurrah for Prim!" "Hurrah for the Revolution!" Its real character was, however, apparent from the first and its supporters continued for a period of ten years, without regard to the numerous vicissitudes through which the Spanish government pa.s.sed--the provisional government, the regency, the elective monarchy, the republic, and the restored Bourbon dynasty--to wage a dogged, though desultory warfare against the const.i.tuted authorities of the island.

This struggle was almost coterminous with President Grant's administration of eight years.

At an early stage of the contest the Spanish authorities conceived it to be necessary to issue certain decrees which were contrary to public law and, in so far as they affected citizens of the United States, in violation of treaty obligations. On March 24, 1869, the captain-general issued a decree authorizing the capture on the high seas of vessels carrying men, arms, munitions, or effects in aid of the insurgents, and declaring that "all persons captured in such vessels without regard to their number will be immediately executed."[109] By another decree the estates of American citizens suspected of sympathy with the insurgents were confiscated.[110] Secretary Hamilton Fish protested against these decrees so far as they affected citizens of the United States, as they were in violation of the provisions of the treaty of 1795.

On July 7, 1869, the captain-general issued another decree closing certain ports, declaring voyages with arms, ammunition, or crew for the insurgents illegal, and directing cruisers on the high seas to bring into port all vessels found to be enemies. On July 16 Mr. Fish called the attention of the Spanish minister to this decree, saying that it a.s.sumed powers over the commerce of the United States that could be permitted only in time of war; that the United States would not yield the right to carry contraband of war in time of peace, and would not permit their vessels to be interfered with on the high seas except in time of war; that if Spain was at war she should give notice to the United States to that effect, and that a continuance of the decree or any attempt to enforce it would be regarded as a recognition by Spain of a state of war in Cuba. This declaration produced a prompt modification of the decree so far as it concerned the search of vessels on the high seas.

As our commercial interests at large, as well as the interests of individual citizens, were deeply affected by the condition of the island, President Grant determined at the beginning of his administration to offer to mediate between Spain and the insurgents.

General Daniel E. Sickles was appointed minister to Spain and his instructions, under date of June 29, 1869, directed him to offer to the cabinet at Madrid the good offices of the United States for the purpose of bringing to a close the civil war then ravaging the island and establis.h.i.+ng the independence of Cuba. Mr. Fish instructed General Sickles to explain to the Spanish government that he used the term civil war advisedly, not as implying any public recognition of belligerent rights, but a condition of affairs that might not justify withholding much longer those rights from the insurgents.[111] In reply Spain agreed to accept the good offices of the United States, but on conditions that were impracticable and unsatisfactory. At the same time the Spanish government allowed the purport of General Sickles's note tendering the good offices of the United States to get out, and it was accepted by the press as indicating the purpose of the United States to recognize the Cubans as belligerents if its offer of mediation were refused. No Spanish cabinet could possibly endure the odium of having made a concession to the Cubans under a threat from an outside power.

The Spanish government therefore requested the withdrawal of the American note.

After the rejection of the offer of mediation President Grant decided to recognize the Cuban insurgents and in August, 1869, while on his way from New York to New England on the Fall River boat he signed a proclamation of Cuban belligerency which he forwarded to Was.h.i.+ngton with a note to Secretary Fish, requesting him to sign, seal, and issue it.

Mr. Fish disapproved of this step, and while he affixed the seal and signed the doc.u.ment, he did not issue it, but kept it in a safe place to await further developments. Grant's attention was diverted by Wall Street speculations in gold and the crisis that followed on "Black Friday." He failed to notice at the time that the secretary of state did not carry out his instructions, and later he thanked Mr. Fish for having saved him from a serious mistake.[112]

For some time the United States had been urging upon Spain the importance of abolis.h.i.+ng slavery in Cuba as a necessary condition to the complete pacification of the island. During the fall of 1869 Spain gave repeated a.s.surances to the United States of her readiness to effect emanc.i.p.ation in Cuba as soon as hostilities should cease, but the Spanish government could never be brought to enter into any definite engagement on the subject. In fact as regarded the slavery question the cabinet of Madrid found itself unable to choose between the horns of the dilemma. The United States and Great Britain were urging the immediate abolition of slavery, while the most influential upholders of Spanish rule in Porto Rico as well as in Cuba were the slaveholders themselves.

The insurgents on the other hand had abolished slavery by a decree of the a.s.sembly of February 26, 1869, promising indemnity to the owners in due time and providing for the enrolment of liberated slaves in the army.[113] On January 26, 1870, Mr. Fish wrote to General Sickles:

It becomes more apparent every day that this contest cannot terminate without the abolition of slavery. This government regards the government at Madrid as committed to that result.... You will, therefore, if it shall appear that the insurrection is regarded as suppressed, frankly state that this government, relying upon the a.s.surances so often given, will expect steps to be taken for the emanc.i.p.ation of the slaves in the Spanish colonies.

The British representative at Madrid, Mr. Layard, was instructed to second the suggestions of the United States minister in regard to the abolition of slavery in the Spanish colonies.

From the outbreak of the insurrection the Cuban patriots had the sympathy of the great ma.s.s of the American people, and that of the administration, although the latter was kept within the bounds of public law and treaty obligation, so as to avoid giving offense to Spain. The government did all that treaty obligations demanded of it to prevent the violation of the neutrality laws. Numbers of filibustering expeditions did, however, escape from American ports, and those that were arrested at the instance of the Spanish government through its representatives in this country usually escaped conviction in our courts for want of evidence.

In June, 1870, the question of granting belligerent rights to the Cubans was brought before Congress in the form of a joint resolution introduced into the House. Personally General Grant sympathized with the Cubans and was disposed to grant them the rights of belligerents, but his judgment was again overruled by the counsels of Mr. Fish. On June 13, during the heat of the debate on the question of belligerency, the President sent to Congress a message embodying the views of the executive. At Mr.

Fish's instance the message took the ground that the facts did not justify the recognition of a state of war, although Mr. Fish himself had made use of the term civil war in his instructions to General Sickles.

The Secretary had almost to force the President to sign this message, though General Grant was afterwards satisfied as to the wisdom of the measure.[114] The message said in part:

The question of belligerency is one of fact not to be decided by sympathies with or prejudices against either party. The relations between the parent state and the insurgents must amount, in fact, to war in the sense of international law. Fighting, though fierce and protracted, does not alone const.i.tute war; there must be military forces acting in accordance with the rules and customs of war--flags of truce, cartels, exchange of prisoners, etc.,--and to justify belligerency there must be, above all, a _de facto_ political organization of the insurgents sufficient in character and resources to const.i.tute it, if left to itself, a state among nations capable of discharging the duties of a state, and of meeting the just responsibilities it may incur as such toward other powers in the discharge of its international duties.

This message provoked a long and animated discussion in the House next day and sharp criticism on the part of the Cuban sympathizers of the President's conduct in thus "intruding himself into the House for the purpose of controlling their deliberations." The debate continued until June 16, when the resolution pa.s.sed the House by a vote of 80 to 68.[115] It was taken up by the Senate, discussed and amended, but finally lost.

The conclusion of an agreement on February 12, 1871, for the submission to a mixed commission of claims of American citizens arising in Cuba,[116] took away all our pressing grievances against Spain and for more than two years our diplomatic relations were on a comparatively friendly basis. Good feeling between the two countries was further promoted by the proclamation of the Spanish republic in 1873 and by the prompt action of General Sickles in extending to it the recognition of the United States. After striving in vain for more than two years to reconcile and unite the contending factions of Spain, King Amadeus on February 11, 1873, abdicated the royal authority and returned to the nation the powers with which he had been intrusted. The Cortes at once proclaimed a republic. General Sickles had on January 30 telegraphed to Was.h.i.+ngton for instructions in case the republicans should succeed in their efforts. On the day after the abdication, he received directions to recognize the republican government when it was fully established and in possession of the power of the nation. Three days later, in the uniform of a major-general of the United States army he was given an audience by the president of the a.s.sembly and formally recognized the republic.

On March 6, Congress by joint resolution, in behalf of the American people, tendered its congratulations to the people of Spain. It seemed at last as if our relations with Spain were on a good footing. General Sickles urged upon the new republican government the abolition of slavery and the concession of self-government to Cuba.

But such cordial relations did not long continue. On October 31, 1873, the steamer _Virginius_, sailing under American colors and carrying a United States registry, was captured on the high seas by the _Tornado_, a Spanish war vessel, and on the afternoon of the first of November taken into the port of Santiago de Cuba. The men and supplies she bore were bound for the insurgents, but the capture did not occur in Cuban waters. General Burriel, the commandant of the city, summoned a court-martial, and in spite of the protests of the American consul, condemned to death at the first sitting four of the pa.s.sengers, General W. A. C. Ryan, an Irish patriot and three Cubans. They were shot on the morning of November 4. On the 7th twelve other pa.s.sengers were executed and on the 8th, Captain Fry and his entire crew, numbering thirty-six, making the total number of executions fifty-three. As soon as news of the capture reached Madrid, General Sickles called upon President Castelar and represented to him the difficulties that might arise in case the s.h.i.+p had been taken on the high seas bearing United States colors. Upon General Sickles's suggestion the President of the Spanish republic at once telegraphed to the captain-general to await orders before taking any steps in regard to the captured vessel and crew.

In accordance with instructions from Mr. Fish, General Sickles on November 14 protested by note against the executions as brutal and barbarous and stated that ample reparation would be demanded. The next day he received from the minister of state an ill-tempered reply, rejecting the protest as inadmissible when neither the cabinet at Was.h.i.+ngton nor that of Madrid had sufficient data upon which to ground a complaint. On the day this reply was received General Sickles, following out telegraphic instructions from Was.h.i.+ngton, made a formal demand by note for the restoration of the _Virginius_, the surrender of the survivors, a salute to the United States flag, and the punishment of the guilty officials. In case of a refusal of satisfactory reparation within twelve days, General Sickles was instructed by his government, at the expiration of that period, to close the legation and leave Madrid.

The formal reply to General Sickles's demand for reparation was received November 18. The Spanish government declared that it would make no reparation until satisfied that an offense had been committed against the flag of the United States, and that when so convinced through her own sources of information or by the showing of the United States, due reparation would be made.

The representations made at Was.h.i.+ngton by the Spanish minister were of a much more satisfactory character than those made to General Sickles at Madrid. Mr. Fish, therefore, instructed General Sickles to remain at his post until the 26th, and if no accommodation were reached by that time he could demand his pa.s.sports. By the time this dispatch reached Madrid General Sickles had already asked for his pa.s.sports, but had not received the reply of the Spanish government. On the 26th he received a note from the Spanish minister asking for a postponement to December 25 and promising that if by that time Spain could not show that she had the right on her side--i.e., that the _Virginius_ was not ent.i.tled to sail under the United States flag--she would comply with the demands of the United States. General Sickles replied that he could not accept such a proposal, but that he would inform his government of it and take the responsibility of deferring his departure.

Meanwhile the Spanish minister at Was.h.i.+ngton had proposed arbitration, but Mr. Fish declined to submit to arbitration the question of an indignity to the United States flag. The minister then asked for a delay, but Mr. Fish told him that delay was impossible in view of the approaching meeting of Congress. Unless settled beforehand the question would have to be referred to Congress. This firm stand brought the Spanish minister to time and on November 27 a proposition was submitted and accepted by Mr. Fish, by the terms of which Spain stipulated to restore the vessel forthwith, to surrender the survivors of her pa.s.sengers and crew, and on the 25th of December to salute the flag of the United States. If, however, before that date Spain should prove to the satisfaction of the United States that the _Virginius_ was not ent.i.tled to carry the flag of the United States, the salute should be dispensed with, but in such case the United States would expect a disclaimer of intent of indignity to its flag.

The Spanish envoy submitted to the state department a large number of doc.u.ments and depositions to show that the _Virginius_ had no right to sail under the United States flag. These were referred to the attorney-general, and on December 17 he gave his opinion that the evidence was conclusive that the _Virginius_, although registered in New York on September 26, 1870, in the name of one Patterson, who made oath as required by law that he was the owner, was in fact the property of certain Cubans and was controlled by them. In conclusion the attorney-general said:

Spain, no doubt, has a right to capture a vessel, with an American register, and carrying the American flag, found in her own waters a.s.sisting, or endeavoring to a.s.sist, the insurrection in Cuba, but she has no right to capture such a vessel on the high seas upon an apprehension that, in violation of the neutrality or navigation laws of the United States, she was on her way to a.s.sist said rebellion. Spain may defend her territory and people from the hostile attacks of what is, or appears to be, an American vessel; but she has no jurisdiction whatever over the question as to whether or not such vessel is on the high seas in violation of any law of the United States. Spain cannot rightfully raise that question as to the _Virginius_, but the United States may, and, as I understand the protocol, they have agreed to do it, and, governed by that agreement and without admitting that Spain would otherwise have any interest in the question, I decide that the _Virginius_, at the time of her capture, was without right, and improperly carrying the American flag.[117]

This decision was communicated to the Spanish authorities and, according to the agreement, the salute to the United States flag was dispensed with, and on January 3, 1874, the Spanish minister, on behalf of his government, expressed a disclaimer of an intent of indignity to the flag of the United States. Spain later paid indemnities to Great Britain and the United States for the families of those who had been executed.

Meanwhile General Sickles offered his resignation by cable in consequence of certain reports that his conduct had been disapproved.

Mr. Fish replied that such reports were unauthorized, that no dissatisfaction had been expressed or intimated and that it was deemed important that he remain at his post. Ten days later, General Sickles requested that the telegram tendering his resignation and the reply be published. Mr. Fish declined to do so, as the resignation was hypothetical. On December 20, General Sickles again tendered his resignation and it was accepted.

After the settlement of the _Virginius_ affair the government of the United States addressed itself once more to the task of forcing a settlement of the Cuban question in general. In his instructions to Mr.

Cus.h.i.+ng, who succeeded General Sickles, Secretary Fish expressed the policy of the administration at considerable length. After reviewing the main facts of the insurrection which had then lasted more than five years, with little or no change in the military situation, and after referring to the rejection by Spain of the offers of mediation made by the United States at an early day of the trouble, he said:

In these circ.u.mstances, the question what decision the United States shall take is a serious and difficult one, not to be determined without careful consideration of its complex elements of domestic and foreign policy, but the determination of which may at any moment be forced upon us by occurrences either in Spain or in Cuba.

Withal the President cannot but regard independence, and emanc.i.p.ation, of course, as the only certain, and even the necessary, solution of the question of Cuba. And, in his mind, all incidental questions are quite subordinate to those, the larger objects of the United States in this respect.

It requires to be borne in mind that, in so far as we may contribute to the solution of these questions, this government is not actuated by any selfish or interested motive. The President does not meditate or desire the annexation of Cuba to the United States, but its elevation into an independent republic of freemen, in harmony with ourselves and with the other republics of America.[118]

For some months Mr. Cus.h.i.+ng was occupied with the settlement of the indemnities in the _Virginius_ case. After nearly two years had elapsed since the instructions above quoted, the Grant administration determined, in view of the unchanged condition of the Cuban struggle, to bring matters to an issue and to force, if need be, the hand of the Spanish government. On November 5, 1875, Mr. Fish addressed a long letter of instruction to Mr. Cus.h.i.+ng. After reviewing the course of the insurrection, the interests of the United States affected thereby, the numerous claims arising therefrom, many of them still unsettled, the persistent refusal of Spain to redress these grievances and the general neglect on her part of treaty obligations, he concluded:

In the absence of any prospect of a termination of the war, or of any change in the manner in which it has been conducted on either side, he (the President) feels that the time is at hand when it may be the duty of other governments to intervene, solely with a view to bringing to an end a disastrous and destructive conflict, and of restoring peace in the island of Cuba. No government is more deeply interested in the order and peaceful administration of this island than is that of the United States, and none has suffered as the United States from the condition which has obtained there during the past six or seven years. He will, therefore, feel it his duty at an early day to submit the subject in this light, and accompanied by an expression of the views above presented, for the consideration of Congress.

Mr. Cus.h.i.+ng was instructed to read this note to the Spanish minister of state. At the same time a copy was sent to General Robert C. Schenck, United States minister at London, with instructions to read the same to Lord Derby, and to suggest to him that it would be agreeable to the United States if the British government would support by its influence the position a.s.sumed by the Grant administration. In the course of a few days copies of this note were sent to our representatives at Paris, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Lisbon, and St. Petersburg, with instructions to communicate its purport orally, or by reading the note, to the governments to which they were accredited and to ask their intervention with Spain in the interests of terminating the state of affairs existing in Cuba.

As the result of Mr. Cus.h.i.+ng's friendly representations and in view of the President's message discountenancing recognition of either independence or belligerency, the Spanish minister, Mr. Calderon, received the communication of November 5 threatening intervention, in good part, and expressed his intention of answering it after he should have had time to consider it carefully.

The reply of Great Britain was given to General Schenck in an interview with Lord Derby on January 25, 1876. It was in substance that he was convinced that Spain would not listen to mediation, and that the British government was not prepared to bring pressure to bear upon her in case she refused; that the Spanish government hoped to finish the Carlist war in the spring and would then be in a position to put forth its whole military strength for the reduction of Cuba; in conclusion, therefore, Lord Derby thought "that if nothing were contemplated beyond an amicable interposition, having peace for its object, the time was ill-chosen and the move premature." The answers of the other powers were unsatisfactory or evasive, none of them being willing to bring pressure to bear upon the government of young Alfonso, while the Carlist war was on his hands.

The answer of Spain was finally given in the form of a note dated February 3, 1876, addressed to the representatives of Spain in other countries, including the United States, communicated to Mr. Cus.h.i.+ng February 19. This answer, written by Mr. Calderon was in good temper. He stated that the insurrection was supported and carried on largely by negroes, mulattoes, Chinese, deserters, and adventurers; that they carried on a guerrilla warfare from their mountain retreats, that Spain had sufficient forces in the island to defeat them in the field; that the triumph of Spain would soon be followed by the total abolition of slavery and the introduction of administrative reforms. The number of vessels of war and troops in Cuba was enumerated to show that Spain was putting forth a reasonable effort to bring the rebellion to a close, and statistics were quoted to show that the trade between Cuba and the United States, as well as the general trade of the island, had actually increased largely since the outbreak of the insurrection. Finally he declared that while individual foreigners had suffered, Spain had done justice to all claims presented.

In conversation with Mr. Cus.h.i.+ng, Mr. Calderon intimated that Spain, although she would resist to the uttermost armed intervention, might be willing under certain circ.u.mstances to accept the mediation of the United States in Cuba, and he invited a frank statement of what the United States would advise or wish Spain to do with regard to Cuba. In reply to this suggestion, Mr. Fish, after disclaiming on the part of the United States all intention of annexing Cuba, stated the following points as the wish of his government:

(1) The mutual and reciprocal observance of treaty obligations, and a full, friendly, and liberal understanding and interpretation of all doubtful treaty provisions, wherever doubt or question might exist.

(2) Peace, order, and good government in Cuba, which involved prompt and effective measures to restore peace, and the establishment of a government suited to the spirit and necessities of the age.

(3) Gradual but effectual emanc.i.p.ation of slaves.

(4) Improvement of commercial facilities and the removal of the obstructions then existing in the way of trade and commerce.

In reply to these suggestions Mr. Calderon handed Mr. Cus.h.i.+ng a note, dated April 16, 1876, in which he represented that his majesty's government was in full accord with Mr. Fish's suggestions.

This a.s.surance on the part of the Spanish government completely thwarted Mr. Fish's plans, and, together with Lord Derby's reply, put all further attempts at intervention out of the question.

The substance of Mr. Fish's note threatening intervention appeared unofficially in the press of Europe and America in December, 1875, and attracted such general attention that in January the House asked for the correspondence. In reply Mr. Fish submitted to the President for transmission the note of November 5, together with a few carefully chosen extracts from the correspondence between himself and Mr.

Cus.h.i.+ng,[119] but nothing was given that might indicate that the United States had appealed to the powers of Europe to countenance intervention.

As rumors to this effect had, however, appeared in the press, the House called the next day for whatever correspondence had taken place with foreign powers in regard to Cuba. Mr. Fish replied that "no correspondence has taken place during the past year with any European government, other than Spain, in regard to the island of Cuba," but that the note of November 5 had been orally communicated to several European governments by reading the same.[120] This was putting a very strict and a very unusual construction upon the term "correspondence," to say the least. The dispatches, notes, and telegrams that pa.s.s between a government and its representatives abroad are the generally recognized means of communicating with foreign powers, and are always spoken of as the correspondence with those powers. The whole affair reveals a curious lack of candor and of courage on the part of Mr. Fish. He was trying to s.h.i.+eld either the administration or himself, and did not wish the American public to know that he had reversed the time-honored policy of the state department by appealing to the powers of Europe to intervene in what had been uniformly treated, from the days of John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay, as a purely American question.

This correspondence was suppressed for twenty years. On March 24, 1896, the Senate called for "copies of all dispatches, notes, and telegrams in the department of state, from and after the note from Secretary Fish to Mr. Cus.h.i.+ng of November 5, 1875, and including that note, until the pacification of Cuba in 1878, which relate to mediation or intervention by the United States in the affairs of that island, together with all correspondence with foreign governments relating to the same topic." On April 15 President Cleveland transmitted the "correspondence" called for, which forms a doc.u.ment of 137 pages.[121]

The Cuban struggle continued for two years longer. In October, 1877, several leaders surrendered to the Spanish authorities and undertook the task of bringing over the few remaining ones. Some of these paid for their efforts with their lives, being taken and condemned by court-martial by order of the commander of the Cuban forces. Finally, in February, 1878, the terms of pacification were made known. They embraced representation in the Spanish Cortes, oblivion of the past in respect of political offenses committed since the year 1868, and the freedom of slaves in the insurgent ranks.[122] In practice, however, the Cuban deputies were never truly representative, but were men of Spanish birth designated usually by the captain-general. By gradual emanc.i.p.ation slavery ceased to exist in the island in 1885. The powers of the captain-general, the most objectionable feature of Spanish rule, continued uncurtailed.

In February, 1895, the final insurrection against Spanish rule in Cuba began, and soon developed the same features as the "Ten Years' War." The policy of Maximo Gomez, the insurrectionary chief, was to fight no pitched battles but to keep up incessant skirmishes, to destroy sugar plantations and every other source of revenue with the end in view of either exhausting Spain or forcing the intervention of the United States. With the opening of the second year of the struggle, General Weyler arrived in Havana as governor and captain-general, and immediately inaugurated his famous "Reconcentration" policy. The inhabitants of the island were directed by proclamation to a.s.semble within a week in the towns occupied by Spanish troops under penalty, if they refused, of being treated as rebels. The majority of those who obeyed the proclamation were women and children who, as a result of being cooped up in crowded villages under miserable sanitary conditions and without adequate food, died by the thousands.[123] In the province of Havana alone 52,000 perished.