Grace, Actual and Habitual Part 9

Pa.s.saglia(478) has worked out the Patristic argument in detail, quoting no less than two hundred authorities.

a) We must limit ourselves to a few specimen citations. St. Ambrose declares that G.o.d wills to save all men. "He willed all to be His own whom He established and created. O man, do not flee and hide thyself! He wants even those who flee, and does not will that those in hiding should perish."(479) St. Gregory of n.a.z.ianzus holds G.o.d's _voluntas salvifica_ to be co-extensive in scope with original sin and the atonement. "The law, the prophets, and the sufferings of Christ," he says, "by which we were redeemed, are common property and admit of no exception: but as all [men]

are partic.i.p.ators in the same Adam, deceived by the serpent and subject to death in consequence of sin, so by the heavenly Adam all are restored to salvation and by the wood of ignominy recalled to the wood of life, from which we had fallen."(480) St. Prosper concludes that, since all men are in duty bound to pray for their fellowmen, G.o.d must needs be willing to save all without exception. "We must sincerely believe," he says, "that G.o.d wills all men to be saved, since the Apostle solicitously prescribes supplication to be made for all."(481) The question why so many perish, Prosper answers as follows: "[G.o.d] wills all to be saved and to come to the knowledge of truth, ... so that those who are saved, are saved because He wills them to be saved, while those who perish, perish because they deserve to perish."(482) In his _Responsiones ad Capitula Obiectionum Vincentianarum_ the same writer energetically defends St. Augustine against the accusation that his teaching on predestination is incompatible with the orthodox doctrine of the universality of G.o.d's saving will.(483)

) St. Augustine aroused suspicion in the camp of the Semipelagians by his general teaching on predestination and more particularly by his interpretation of 1 Tim. II, 4. The great Bishop of Hippo interprets this Pauline text in no less than four different ways. In his treatise _De Spiritu et Litera_ he describes the divine _voluntas salvifica_ as strictly universal in the physical sense.(484) In his _Enchiridion_ he restricts it to the predestined.(485) In his _Contra Iulianum_ he says: "No one is saved unless G.o.d so wills."(486) In his work _De Correptione et Gratia_: "G.o.d wills all men to be saved, because He makes us to will this, just as He sent the spirit of His Son [into our hearts], crying: Abba, Father, that is, making us to cry, Abba, Father."(487) How did St.

Augustine come to interpret this simple text in so many different ways?

Some think he chose this method to overwhelm the Pelagians and Semipelagians with Scriptural proofs. But this polemical motive can hardly have induced him to becloud an obvious text and invent interpretations which never occurred to any other ecclesiastical writer before or after his time. The conundrum can only be solved by the a.s.sumption that Augustine believed in a plurality of literal senses in the Bible and held that over and above (or notwithstanding) the _sensus obvius_ every exegete is free to read as much truth into any given pa.s.sage as possible, and that such interpretation lay within the scope of the inspiration of the Holy Ghost quite as much as the _sensus obvius_. In his _Confessions_(488) he actually argues in favor of a _pluralitas sensuum_. He was keen enough to perceive, however, that if a Scriptural text is interpreted in different ways, the several constructions put upon it must not be contradictory. As he was undoubtedly aware of the distinction between _voluntas antecedens_ and _consequens_,(489) his different interpretations of 1 Tim. II, 4 can be reconciled by a.s.suming that he conceived G.o.d's _voluntas salvifica_ as _antecedens_ in so far as it is universal, and as _consequens_ in so far as it is particular. St. Thomas solves the difficulty in a similar manner: "The words of the Apostle, 'G.o.d will have all men to be saved, etc.,' can be understood in three ways: First, by a restricted application, in which case they would mean, as Augustine says, 'G.o.d wills all men to be saved that are saved, not because there is no man whom he does not wish to be saved, but because there is no man saved whose salvation He does not will.' Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every cla.s.s of individuals, not of every individual of each cla.s.s; in which case they mean that 'G.o.d wills some men of every cla.s.s and condition to be saved, males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of every condition.' Thirdly, according to the Damascene, they are understood of the antecedent will of G.o.d, not of the consequent will. The distinction must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent or consequent; but to the things willed. To understand which we must consider that everything, so far as it is good, is willed by G.o.d. A thing taken in its strict sense, and considered absolutely, may be good or evil, and yet when some additional circ.u.mstance is taken into account, by a consequent consideration may be changed into its contrary.

Thus, that men should live is good; and that men should be killed is evil, absolutely considered. If in a particular case it happens that a man is a murderer or dangerous to society, to kill him becomes good, to let him live an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge that antecedently he wills all men to live, but consequently he wills the murderer to be hanged. In the same way G.o.d antecedently wills all men to be saved, but consequently wills some to be d.a.m.ned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we will simply what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in a qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in themselves they exist under particular qualifications.

Hence we will a thing simply in as much as we will it when all particular circ.u.mstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he would will him to live, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear that whatever G.o.d simply wills takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place."(490)

*Thesis III: The lot of unbaptized infants, though difficult to reconcile with the universality of G.o.d's saving will, furnishes no argument against it.*

Proof. The most difficult problem concerning the divine _voluntas salvifica_-a real _crux theologorum_-is the fate of unbaptized children.

The Church has never uttered a dogmatic definition on this head, and theologians hold widely divergent opinions.

Bellarmine teaches that infants who die without being baptized, are excluded from the divine _voluntas salvifica_, because, while the non-reception of Baptism is the proximate reason of their d.a.m.nation, its ultimate reason must be the will of G.o.d.

a) This rather incautious a.s.sertion needs to be carefully restricted. It is an article of faith that G.o.d has inst.i.tuted the sacrament of Baptism as the ordinary means of salvation for all men. On the other hand, it is certain that He expects parents, priests, and relatives, as his representatives, to provide conscientiously for its proper and timely administration. Sinful negligence on the part of these responsible agents cannot, therefore, be charged to Divine Providence, but must be laid at the door of those human agents who fail to do their duty. In exceptional cases infants can be saved even by means of the so-called Baptism of blood (_baptismus sanguinis_), _i.e._ death for Christ's sake. On the whole it may be said that G.o.d has, in principle, provided for the salvation of little children by the inst.i.tution of infant Baptism.

b) But there are many cases in which either invincible ignorance or the order of nature precludes the administration of Baptism. The well-meant opinion of some theologians(491) that the responsibility in all such cases lies not with G.o.d, but with men, lacks probability. Does G.o.d, then, really will the d.a.m.nation of these innocents? Some modern writers hold that the physical order of nature is responsible for the misfortune of so many innocent infants; but this hypothesis contributes nothing towards clearing up the awful mystery.(492) For G.o.d is the author of the natural as well as of the supernatural order. To say that He is obliged to remove existing obstacles by means of a miracle would disparage His ordinary providence.(493) Klee's a.s.sumption that dying children become conscious long enough to enable them to receive the Baptism of desire (_baptismus flaminis_), is scarcely compatible with the definition of the Council of Florence that "the souls of those who die in actual mortal sin, or only in original sin, forthwith descend to h.e.l.l."(494) A still more unsatisfactory supposition is that the prayer of Christian parents acts like a baptism of desire and saves their children from h.e.l.l. This theory, espoused by Cardinal Cajetan, was rejected by the Fathers of Trent,(495) and Pope Pius V ordered it to be expunged from the Roman edition of Cajetan's works.(496)

A way out of the difficulty is suggested by Gutberlet and others, who, holding with St. Thomas that infants that die without Baptism will enjoy a kind of natural beat.i.tude, think it possible that G.o.d, in view of their sufferings, may mercifully cleanse them from original sin and thereby place them in a state of innocence.(497) This theory is based on the a.s.sumption that the ultimate fate of unbaptized children is deprivation of the beatific vision of G.o.d and therefore a state of real d.a.m.nation (_poena d.a.m.ni, infernum_), and that the remission of original sin has for its object merely to enable these unfortunate infants to enjoy a perfect natural beat.i.tude, which they could not otherwise attain. It is reasonable to argue that, as these infants are deprived of celestial happiness through no guilt of their own, the Creator can hardly deny them some sort of natural beat.i.tude, to which their very nature seems to ent.i.tle them.

"h.e.l.l" for them probably consists in being deprived of the beatific vision of G.o.d, which is a supernatural grace and as such lies outside the sphere of those prerogatives to which human nature has a claim by the fact of creation. This theory would seem to establish at least some manner of salvation for the infants in question, and consequently, to vindicate the divine _voluntas salvifica_ in the same measure. Needless to say, it can claim no more than probability, and we find ourselves constrained to admit, at the conclusion of our survey, that there is no sure and perfect solution of the difficulty, and theologians therefore do well to confess their ignorance.(498)

c) The difficulty of which we have spoken does not, of course, in any way impair the certainty of the dogma. The Scriptural pa.s.sages cited above(499) clearly prove that G.o.d wills to save all men without exception.

In basing the universality of G.o.d's mercy on His omnipotence, His universal dominion, and His love of souls, the Book of Wisdom(500) evidently implies that the unbaptized infants partic.i.p.ate in that mercy in all three of these respects. How indeed could Divine Omnipotence exert itself more effectively than by conferring grace on those who are inevitably and without any fault of their own deprived of Baptism? Who would deny that little children, as creatures, are subject to G.o.d's universal dominion in precisely the same manner as adults? Again, if G.o.d loves the souls of men, must He not also love the souls of infants?

1 Tim. II, 4(501) applies primarily to adults, because strictly speaking only adults can "come to the knowledge of the truth." But St. Paul employs certain middle terms which undoubtedly comprise children as well. Thus, if all men have but "one G.o.d," this G.o.d must be the G.o.d of infants no less than of adults, and His mercy and goodness must include them also. And if Jesus Christ as G.o.d-man is the "one mediator of G.o.d and men," He must also have a.s.sumed the human nature of children, in order to redeem them from original sin. Again, if Christ "gave himself a redemption for all," it is impossible to a.s.sume that millions of infants should be directly excluded from the benefits of the atonement.(502)

Article 2. G.o.d's Will To Give Sufficient Grace To All Adult Human Beings In Particular

In relation to adults, G.o.d manifests His saving will by the bestowal of sufficient grace upon all.(503) The bestowal of sufficient grace being evidently an effluence of the universal _voluntas salvifica_, the granting of such grace to all who have attained the use of reason furnishes another proof for the universality of grace.

G.o.d gives all men sufficient graces. But He is not obliged to give to each _efficacious_ graces, because all that is required to enable man to reach his supernatural destiny is cooperation with sufficient grace, especially with the _gratia prima vocans_, which is the beginning of all salutary operation.

To prove that G.o.d gives sufficient grace to all adult human beings without exception, we must show that He gives sufficient grace (1) to the just, (2) to the sinner, and (3) to the heathen. This we shall do in three distinct theses.

*Thesis I: G.o.d gives to all just men sufficient grace to keep His commandments.*

This is _de fide_.

Proof. The Tridentine Council teaches: "If any one saith that the commandments of G.o.d are, even for one that is justified and const.i.tuted in grace, impossible to keep; let him be anathema."(504)

A contrary proposition in the writings of Jansenius(505) was censured by Pope Innocent the Tenth as "foolhardy, impious, blasphemous, and heretical."

The Church does not a.s.sert that G.o.d gives to the just sufficient grace at all times. She merely declares that sufficient grace is at their disposal whenever they are called upon to obey the law (_urgente praecepto_). Nor need G.o.d always bestow a _gratia proxime sufficiens_; in many instances the grace of prayer (_gratia remote sufficiens_) fully serves the purpose.(506)

This dogma is clearly contained in Holy Scripture. We shall quote the most important texts.

a) 1 John V, 3 sq.: "For this is the charity of G.o.d, that we keep his commandments, and his commandments are not heavy. For whatsoever is born of G.o.d, overcometh the world."(507) According to this text the "charity of G.o.d" manifests itself in "keeping his commandments" and "overcoming the world." This is declared to be an easy task. Our Lord Himself says: "My yoke is sweet and my burden light."(508) Hence it must be possible to keep His commandments, and therefore G.o.d does not withhold the absolutely necessary graces from the just.

St. Paul consoles the Corinthians by telling them that G.o.d will not suffer them to be tempted beyond their strength, but will help them to a happy issue, provided they faithfully cooperate with His grace. 1 Cor. X, 13: "G.o.d is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able, but will make also with temptation issue, that you may be able to bear it."(509) As it is impossible even for the just to overcome grievous temptations without supernatural aid,(510) and as G.o.d Himself tells us that we are able to overcome them, it is a necessary inference that He bestows sufficient grace. The context hardly leaves a doubt that St. Paul has in mind the just, for a few lines further up he says: "Therefore he that thinketh himself to stand, let him take heed lest he fall."(511) But there is no exegetical objection to applying the text to all the faithful without exception.(512)

b) This dogma is clearly set forth in the writings of the Fathers. Some of them, it is true, when combating the Pelagians and Semipelagians, defended the proposition that "grace is not given to all men,"(513) but they meant _efficacious_ grace.

a) A typical representative of this group of ecclesiastical writers is the anonymous author of the work _De Vocatione Omnium Gentium_,(514) whom Pope Gelasius praised as "_probatus Ecclesiae magister_." This fifth-century writer, who was highly esteemed by his contemporaries, discusses the question whether and in what sense all men are called, and why some are not saved. He begins by drawing a distinction between G.o.d's general and His special providence.(515) "It so pleased G.o.d," he says, "to give His efficacious grace to many, and to withhold His sufficient grace from none, in order that it might appear from both [actions] that what is conferred upon a portion is not denied to the entire race."(516)

) The Jansenists appealed in favor of their teaching to such Patristic pa.s.sages as the following: "After the withdrawal of the divine a.s.sistance he [St. Peter] was unable to stand;"(517) and: "He had undertaken more than he was able to do."(518) But the two Fathers from whose writings these pa.s.sages are taken (SS. Chrysostom and Augustine) speak, as the context evinces, of the withdrawal of efficacious and proximately sufficient grace in punishment of Peter's presumption. Had St. Peter followed our Lord's advice(519) and prayed instead of relying on his own strength, he would not have fallen. That this was the mind of St.

Augustine clearly appears from the following sentence in his work _De Unitate Ecclesiae_: "Who shall doubt that Judas, had he willed, would not have betrayed Christ, and that Peter, had he willed, would not have thrice denied his Master?"(520)

c) The theological argument for our thesis may be formulated as follows: Since the state of grace confers a claim to supernatural happiness, it must also confer a claim to those graces which are necessary to attain it.

To a.s.sert that G.o.d denies the just sufficient grace to observe His commandments, to avoid mortal sin, and to persevere in the state of grace, would be to gainsay His solemn promise to His adopted children: "This is the will of my Father that sent me: that every one who seeth the Son and believeth in him, may have life everlasting, and I will raise him up in the last day."(521) Consequently, G.o.d owes it to His own fidelity to bestow sufficient graces upon the just.

Again, according to the plain teaching of Revelation, the just are obliged, under pain of sin, to observe the commandments of G.o.d and the precepts of His Church.(522) But this is impossible without the aid of grace. Consequently, G.o.d grants at least sufficient grace to his servants, for _ad impossibile nemo tenetur_.(523)

*Thesis II: In regard to Christians guilty of mortal sin we must hold: (1) that ordinary sinners always receive sufficient grace to avoid mortal sin and do penance; (2) that G.o.d never entirely withdraws His grace even from the obdurate.*

The first part of this thesis embodies a theological conclusion; the second states the common teaching of Catholic theologians.

1. _Proof of the First Part._ The distinction here drawn between "ordinary" and "obdurate" sinners has its basis in revelation and is clearly demanded by the different degrees of certainty attaching to the two parts of our thesis.

An "ordinary" sinner is a Christian who has lost sanctifying grace by a grievous sin. An "obdurate" sinner is one who, by repeatedly and maliciously transgressing the laws of G.o.d, has dulled his intellect and hardened his will against salutary inspirations. A man may be an habitual sinner (_consuetudinarius_) and a backslider, without being obdurate, or, which comes to the same, impenitent. Weakness is not malice, though sinful habits often beget impenitence, which is one of the sins against the Holy Ghost and the most formidable obstacle in the way of conversion.

With regard to ordinary sinners, our thesis a.s.serts that they always receive sufficient grace to avoid mortal sin and do penance.

a) Experience teaches that a man falls deeper and deeper if he does not hasten to do penance after committing a mortal sin. But this is not the fault of Almighty G.o.d, who never withholds His grace; it is wholly the fault of the sinner who fails to cooperate with the proffered supernatural a.s.sistance.

a) A sufficient Scriptural argument for this part of our thesis is contained in the texts cited in support of Thesis I. If it is true that G.o.d suffers no one to be tempted beyond his strength,(524) this must surely apply to Christians who have had the misfortune of committing mortal sin. St. John says that the commandments of G.o.d "are not heavy" and that faith is "the victory which overcometh the world."(525) Faith in Christ remains in the Christian, even though he be guilty of mortal sin, and consequently if he wills, he is able, by the aid of sufficient grace, to overcome the "world," _i.e._ the temptations arising from concupiscence,(526) and thus to cease committing mortal sins.

) As for the teaching of Tradition, St. Augustine lays down two theological principles which apply to saint and sinner alike.

"G.o.d does not enjoin impossibilities," he says, "but in His injunctions counsels you both to do what you can for yourself, and to ask His aid in what you cannot do."(527) It follows that the sinner always receives at least the grace of prayer, which Augustine therefore calls _gratia initialis sive parva_, and of which he says that its right use ensures the _gratia magna_.

The second principle is this: "_c.u.m lege coniuncta est gratia, qua lex observari possit._" That is, every divine law, by special ordinance, carries with it the grace by which it may be observed. In other words, the laws of G.o.d can always be obeyed because the lawgiver never fails to grant sufficient grace to keep them.(528)

b) That the sinner always receives sufficient grace to be converted, follows from the Scriptural injunction of conversion. If conversion to G.o.d is a duty, and to comply with this duty is impossible without the aid of grace,(529) the divine command obviously implies the bestowal of sufficient grace.

That conversion is a duty follows from such Scriptural texts as these: "As I live, saith the Lord G.o.d, I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live. Turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways!"(530) "The Lord delayeth not his promise, as some imagine, but dealeth patiently for your sake, not willing that any should perish, but that all should return to penance."(531)

This teaching is faithfully echoed by Tradition.

2. _Proof of the Second Part._ Obduracy is a serious obstacle to conversion because the obdurate sinner has confirmed his will in malice(532) and by systematic resistance diminished the influence of grace. The question here is whether or not G.o.d in such cases eventually withdraws His grace altogether.

Some rigorists hold that He does so, with the purpose of sparing the sinner greater tortures in h.e.l.l.(533) Though this a.s.sertion cannot be said to contravene the dogma of the universality of G.o.d's salvific will, (its defenders do not deny that He faithfully does His share to save these unfortunate reprobates), we prefer to adopt the _sententia __ communis_, that G.o.d grants even the most obdurate sinner-at least now and then, _e.g._ during a mission or on the occasion of some terrible catastrophe-sufficient grace to be converted. The theological reasons for this opinion, which we hold to be the true one, coincide in their last a.n.a.lysis with those set forth in the first part of our thesis.

a) Sacred Scripture, in speaking of the duty of repentance, makes no distinction between ordinary and obdurate sinners. On the contrary, the Book of Wisdom points to one of the most wicked and impenitent of nations, the Canaanites, as a s.h.i.+ning object of divine mercy and patience.(534) According to St. Paul, G.o.d calls especially upon hardened and impenitent sinners to do penance. Rom. II, 4 sq.: "Or despisest thou the riches of his goodness, and patience, and long suffering? Knowest thou not that the benignity of G.o.d leadeth thee to penance? But according to thy hardness and impenitent heart, thou treasurest up to thyself wrath, against the day of wrath, and revelation of the just judgment of G.o.d, who will render to every man according to his works."(535)