Lord Milner's Work in South Africa Part 31

"That this committee views with the utmost disapproval the statement of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman at Plymouth, to the effect that no satisfactory settlement would be arrived at in South Africa so long as Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Milner retained their present offices, and, on the contrary, emphatically affirms that the retention in office of those statesmen is regarded by the South African loyalists as affording the best security for a settlement which will be permanent, just, and consistent with the honour of the empire and the best interests of South Africa, and, further, affirms that the whole tone of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's speech is most pernicious, and prejudicial to Imperial interests in South Africa, and shows him to be entirely out of sympathy with loyalist opinion in South Africa."

With this prompt and uncompromising rejoinder we may take leave of an attempt to remove a great and devoted servant of the empire, which is as discreditable to the intelligence as it is to the patriotism of those prominent members of the Liberal party who thus lent their co-operation to the Afrikander nationalists. In South Africa the issue was simple. While Boer and rebel combined in their efforts to rid themselves of the man who had thwarted their ambitions, the loyalists closed their ranks and stood firm in his support. It is to the far-off Homeland that we have to turn for the spectacle of a nation in which grat.i.tude to the man who upheld the flag gave place to sympathy for the enemy and the rebel; in which patriotism itself yielded to a greed of place wrapped up by sophistry in such decent terms as "humanity," "Liberal principles," and "conciliation."

[Sidenote: Finances of the new colonies.]

In the meantime Lord Milner had returned to Johannesburg. His "hard-begged" holiday had proved a change of occupation rather than a respite from work. Before he left England (August 10th), he had made known to the Home Government the actual condition of the infant administrations of the new colonies, and obtained a provision for their immediate wants. The Letters Patent const.i.tuting him Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony had been pa.s.sed under the Great Seal; and these and other instruments creating a system of Crown Colony Government, with Executive and Legislative Councils in both colonies, had been sent to him in readiness for use "whenever it might be thought expedient to bring them into operation."[298] And on August 6th the House of Commons had voted 6,500,000 as a grant in aid of the revenues of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony. Of this sum 1,000,000 was required for the purchase of fresh rolling-stock for the Imperial Military Railways, still placed under the direction of Sir Percy (then Colonel) Girouard, and 500,000 was a.s.signed to "relief and re-settlement," an item which included the purchase of land and other arrangements for the establishment of suitable British settlers on farms in both colonies.

The debate on the vote afforded a significant exhibition of the spirit of mingled pessimism and distrust in which the Liberal Opposition approached every aspect of the South African question. The idea of the Transvaal ever being able to repay this grant-in-aid out of the "hypothetical" development loan appeared ridiculous to Sir William Harcourt. "Why," asked the Liberal ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer, "was not the money required for the South African Constabulary put forward in a supplementary military vote, instead of being proposed in this form and, under the grant-in-aid, subject to future repayment by the Transvaal, in which n.o.body believed?"[299]

[Footnote 298: They were read and published by Lord Milner on June 21st, 1902.]

[Footnote 299: It is scarcely necessary to say that the entire cost of the Constabulary has been borne by the new colonies; or that every penny of this grant-in-aid was paid back out of the development loan raised in 1902-3.]

This temporary financial a.s.sistance was of the utmost importance. Just as in the Cape Colony Lord Milner had seen that the Boers and Afrikander nationalists were to be beaten at their own game of renewed invasion by enabling the loyalist population to defend the Colony, so in the new colonies he proposed to beat the guerilla leaders at their game of wanton and mischievous resistance by building up a new prosperity faster than they could destroy the old. The conditions under which he worked, and the state in which he found South Africa when he began to engage actively in the work of reconstruction, he has himself described. In a despatch, written from the "High Commissioner's Office, Johannesburg," on November 15th, 1901, not only has Lord Milner placed on record the actual position of affairs in the new colonies at this time, but he has sketched with masterly precision the nature of the economic and administrative problems that awaited solution. The progress towards pacification won by the mobile columns and the blockhouse system, the dominant influence of the railways as the agency of transport, the condition of the Concentration Camps, and the degree in which our responsibility for the non-combatant and surrendered Boers limited our capacity to restore our own people to their homes, the economic exhaustion of the country, the threatened danger of the scarcity of native labour, and the processes and problems of repatriation--all these subjects are touched as by a master of statecraft.

[Sidenote: Improved situation.]

"Without being unduly optimistic," he writes, "it is impossible not to be struck by two great changes for the better in [the military situation] since the time when I first took up my residence in the Transvaal--just eight months ago. These are the now almost absolute safety and uninterrupted working of the railways and the complete pacification of certain central districts. As regards the railways, I cannot ill.u.s.trate the contrast better than by my own experiences. In the end of last year and the earlier months of this I had occasion to make several journeys between Capetown and Johannesburg or Pretoria, and between Johannesburg and Bloemfontein. Though most careful preparations were made and every precaution taken, I was frequently 'hung up' on these journeys because the line had been blown up--not, I think, with any reference to my movements, but in the ordinary course of affairs. Small bodies of the enemy were always hovering about, and a state of extreme vigilance, not to say anxiety, was observable almost everywhere along the line.

Since my return from England I have again traversed the country from East London to Bloemfontein and Johannesburg, and from Johannesburg to Durban and back, to say nothing of constant journeys between this place and Pretoria. On no single occasion has there been the slightest hitch or the least cause for alarm.

The trains have been absolutely up to time, and very good time.

They could not have been more regular in the most peaceful country. This personal experience, in itself unimportant, is typical of a general improvement. I may add, in confirmation of it, that during the last two months the mail train from Capetown to the north has only been late on one or two occasions, and then it was a matter of hours. Six months ago it was quite a common event for it to arrive a day, or a couple of days, late. I need not enlarge on the far-reaching importance of the improvement which these instances ill.u.s.trate. Not only have the derailments, often accompanied by deplorable loss of life, which were at one time so common, almost entirely ceased, but, owing to more regular running, and especially the resumption of night running, the carrying capacity of the railways has greatly increased.

Indeed, it is the inadequacy of the lines themselves to meet the enormous and ever-increasing extra requirements resulting from the war, and the shortness of rolling-stock, not any interference from the enemy, which causes us whatever difficulties--and they are still considerable--we now labour under in the matter of transport. When the large amount of additional rolling-stock ordered for the Imperial Military Railways last summer is received--and the first instalment will arrive very shortly--there will be a further great and progressive improvement in the conveyance of supplies and materials for the troops, the civil population of the towns, and the concentration camps.

[Sidenote: Contraction of area of war.]

"The advance made in clearing the country is equally marked. Six months ago the enemy were everywhere, outside the princ.i.p.al towns. It is true they held nothing, but they raided wherever they pleased, and, though mostly in small bodies, which made little or no attempt at resistance when seriously pressed, they almost invariably returned to their old haunts when the pressure was over. It looked as though the process might go on indefinitely. I had every opportunity of watching it, for during the first two months of my residence here it was in full swing in the immediate neighbourhood. There were half a dozen Boer strong-holds, or rather trysting-places, quite close to Pretoria and Johannesburg, and the country round was quite useless to us for any purpose but that of marching through it, while the enemy seemed to find no difficulty in subsisting there....

"To-day a large and important district of the Transvaal is now firmly held by us. But it must not be supposed that all the rest is held, or even roamed over, by the enemy. Wide districts of both the new colonies are virtually derelict, except, in some cases, for the native population. This is especially true of the northern part of the Transvaal, which has always been a native district, and where, excepting in Pietersburg and some other positions held by our troops, the natives are now almost the only inhabitants. Indeed, nothing is more characteristic of the latest stage of the war than the contraction of Boer resistance within certain wide but fairly well-defined districts, separated from one another by considerable s.p.a.ces. Instead of ranging indifferently over the whole of the two late Republics, the enemy show an increasing tendency to confine themselves to certain neighbourhoods, which have always been their chief, though till recently by no means their exclusive, centres of strength....

From time to time the commandos try to break out of these districts and to extend the scene of operations. But the failure of the latest of these raids--Botha's bold attempt to invade Natal--shows the disadvantages under which the Boers now labour in attempting to undertake distant expeditions.

"The contraction of the theatre of war is doubtless due to the increased difficulty which the enemy have in obtaining horses and supplies, but, above all, to the great reduction in their numbers.... To wear out the resistance of the Boers still in the field--not more than one-eighth, I think, of the total number of burghers who have, first and last, been engaged in the war[300]--may take a considerable time yet, and will almost certainly involve further losses. I will not attempt to forecast either the time or the cost. What seems evident is that the concentration of the Boers, and the subst.i.tution of several fairly well-defined small campaigns for that sort of running fight all over the country which preceded them, is on the whole an advantage to us, and tends to bring the end of the struggle within a more measurable distance. Our great object, it seems to me, should be to keep the Boers within the areas of their main strength, even if such concentration makes the commandos individually more dangerous and involves more desperate fighting, and meanwhile to push on with might and main the settlement of those parts of the country out of which they have been driven. No doubt this is a difficult, and must be a gradual, process. The full extent of the difficulty will appear from the sequel. But it is the point to which the main efforts, of the civil authorities at any rate, should be continually directed.

[Footnote 300: An under-estimate. One-fourth, or one-fifth, would have been nearer the mark. See note, p. 454.]

[Sidenote: The return to the Rand.]

"If the latest phase of the military situation is maintained, _i.e._, if we are able to prevent the Boers from breaking back into the cleared areas, or from injuring the railway lines, I can see no reason why the work of settlement should not proceed at a greatly quickened pace in the immediate future. The most urgent point is to bring back the exiled Uitlanders to the Rand, always provided that they are able to find employment when they arrive there. But the basis of any general revival of industrial and commercial activity on the Rand is the resumption of mining operations. So far it has only been found possible to proceed very slowly in this respect. The full capacity of the Rand is about 6,000 stamps. The first step was taken in April last, when the Commander-in-Chief agreed to allow the Chamber of Mines to open three mines with 50 stamps each. Up till now permission has been granted for the working of 600 stamps, but only 450 have actually been started. This is slow work, but even this beginning, modest as it is, has made an immense difference in the aspect of Johannesburg since first I came here in March last.

"The number of people allowed to return from time to time, for other than mining employments, is in proportion to the number of stamps re-started. This, no doubt, is a wise principle, for business generally can only expand _pari pa.s.su_ with the resumption of mining. Up to the present something like 10,000 people have been allowed to come up, the vast majority of them being refugees, though there is a small new element of civil servants and civilians in the employ of the military. a.s.suming that from 8,000 to 9,000 are refugees, this would represent about one-sixth of the total number of well-accredited Uitlanders registered in the books of the 'Central Registration Committee.'

"The best that can be said on the th.o.r.n.y subject of the return of the refugees, is that latterly the rate of return has been steadily increasing. Last month the military authorities allowed us to grant 400 ordinary permits (this number is over and above permits given to officials or persons specially required for particular services to the Army or the Government). This month the number has been raised to 800. I need hardly say that the selection of 800 people out of something like fifty times that number is an onerous and ungrateful task. South Africa simply rings with complaints as to favouritism in the distribution of permits. As a matter of fact, whatever mistakes have been made, there has been no favouritism. I do not mean to say that a certain number of people--not a large number--have not slipped through or been smuggled up under false pretences. But the great bulk of the permits have been allotted by the Central Registration Committee, a large, capable, and most representative body of the citizens of this town and neighbourhood. And they have been allotted on well-defined principles, and with great impartiality.... I am satisfied that no body of officials, even if our officials were not already over-worked in other directions, could have done the business so well.

[Sidenote: Labour and transport.]

"There can, I think, be little doubt that the present rate of return can be maintained, and I am not without hope that it may in a short time be considerably increased. But this depends entirely, for the reasons already given, on the question whether the resumption of mining operations can be quickened. The obstacles to such a quickening are two-fold: first, want of native labour; secondly, want of trucks to bring up not only the increased supplies which a larger population necessitates, but also, and this is even a more serious matter, to bring up the material required for their work. The latter, I need hardly say, is a very heavy item, not only in the case of the mines, but in the case of all those other industries, building, for instance, which only need a chance in order to burst into extreme activity in this place. For the Rand requires just now an increase of everything--dwelling-houses, offices, roads, sewers, lighting, water-supply, etc., etc. Capital would be readily forthcoming for every kind of construction, and many skilled workmen are waiting at the coast. But it is no use bringing up workmen to live in the dearest place in the world unless they have the materials to work with. The most necessary materials, however, are bulky, and the carrying capacity of the railways, greatly improved as it is, gives no promise of an early importation of quant.i.ties of bulky material, if the other and more urgent demands upon our means of transport are to be satisfied.

"As regards native labour for the mines, the greater development of which is a condition of all other industrial development, the difficulty is that, while natives can be found in abundance to do surface work, the number of those who are willing to go underground is limited. There are only certain tribes among whom underground workers can be found in any great numbers, and these reside mostly in Portuguese territory. As you are aware, difficulties have arisen about the introduction of Portuguese natives, and the matter is at present the subject of negotiations between the Governor-General of Mozambique and myself. Having regard to the friendly att.i.tude of the Governor-General, I have every hope that this difficulty may soon be overcome. But even then we shall not be able to count on any great immediate influx of labourers from Portuguese territory....

[Sidenote: The concentration camps.]

"The delay in obtaining native labour would be more serious if it were not for the existence of that other and still greater obstacle to the rapid revival of industry here which I have already dwelt on, namely, the difficulty of transport. And this latter difficulty is immensely aggravated at the present time by the constantly increasing requirements of the concentration camps. Not only has the number of people in these camps increased, with overwhelming rapidity, to an extent never contemplated when they were first started, but the extreme state of dest.i.tution in which many of the people arrived, and the deplorable amount of sickness which has all along existed among them, create a demand for a great deal more than mere primary necessities, such as food and shelter, if the condition of the camps is to be anything like what we should wish to see it. The amount of mortality in these camps, especially amongst very young children, as you are well aware, has been deplorable. I do not, indeed, agree with those who think--or a.s.sert--that the mortality among the Boers would have been less, if thousands of women and children had been allowed to live on isolated farms in a devastated country, or to roam about on the trail of the commandos. Indeed, I feel confident that it would have been far greater. The best proof of this is the deplorable state of starvation and sickness in which great numbers of people arrived at the camps, and which rendered them easy victims to the attack of epidemic diseases. At the same time it is evident that the ravages of disease would have been less if our means of transport had allowed us to provide them on their first arrival, not only with tents, rations, and necessary medicines (all of which were, as a matter of fact, supplied with great prompt.i.tude), but with the hundred and one appliances and comforts which are so essential for the recovery of the weakly and the sick, and the prevention of the spread of disease. I do not mean to say that it was only want of material, due to the insuperable difficulties of transport (especially at the time when the camps were first started, and when railways were subject to continual interruptions) from which the camps suffered. Equally serious was the want of personnel; of the necessary number of doctors, nurses, matrons, superintendents, etc., who were simply not to be found in South Africa, severely taxed as it had already been to find men and women of sufficient training and experience to look after the other victims of the war. Still, the want of material has been a serious item; and it is evidently a want which, as the carrying capacity of the railways increases, we must do our best to supply. The Ladies' Commission, of whose devoted labours in visiting and inspecting the camps it is impossible to speak too highly (they have been of inestimable service to the Government), have handed in a considerable list of requirements, which have been, and are being, supplied as fast as possible. But evidently these requirements enter into compet.i.tion, and most serious compet.i.tion, with the supply of food and materials necessary for the revival even of our central industry, not to say of industrial and agricultural activity elsewhere in the new colonies, of which, under the circ.u.mstances, it is, for the moment, unfortunately impossible to think.

"To decide between the competing demands upon the still very limited amount of truckage available for civil purposes, after the paramount requirements of the army have been satisfied, is indeed a most difficult and delicate task. Whether we have done all for the best, it is not for me to say. That any amount of conscientious thought and labour has been devoted, on all hands, to grappling with the problem, I can confidently a.s.sert. And I am equally confident that whatever has been done, and whatever may yet be done, the amount of hards.h.i.+p must have been and must still be very great. It would be amusing, if amus.e.m.e.nt were possible in the presence of so much sadness and suffering, to put side by side the absolutely contradictory criticisms, all equally vehement, to which our action is subjected. On the one hand is the outcry against the cruelty and heartlessness manifested in not making better provision for the people in the concentration camps: on the other, the equally loud outcry against our injustice in leaving the British refugees in idleness and poverty at the coast, in order to keep the people in the concentration camps supplied with every luxury and comfort. I have even frequently heard the expression that we are 'spoiling' the people in the Boer camps. We are, alas, not in a position to spoil anybody, however much we might desire to do so....

"The pressing questions connected with the return of the refugees and the maintenance of the Boers at present in the concentration camps are, it is evident, only the first of a series of problems of the most complicated character, which have to be solved before the country can resume its normal life....

[Sidenote: Re-settlement problems.]

"Even if the war were to come to an end to-morrow, it would not be possible to let the people in the concentration camps go back at once to their former homes. They would only starve there. The country is, for the most part, a desert, and, before it can be generally re-occupied, a great deal will have to be done in the way of re-stocking, provision of seed, and also probably, in the absence of draught animals, for the importation of steam ploughs.

"Then there are the arrangements to be made for the return of the prisoners of war. Evidently these will have to wait till the whole of the British refugees are brought back. The latter not only have the strongest claim, but they will be immediately wanted when order is restored, and will have, as soon as the railway can bring up the necessary material, abundance of work, whereas it may take some time before the country is fit to receive the prisoners. Nevertheless, though the return of the prisoners may still be far distant, there are certain measures which have to be taken even now, in order that we may be able to deal with the matter when the time comes.

"Altogether, the number and complexity of the tasks, embraced under the general term 're-settlement,' which are either already upon us or will come upon us as the country gradually quiets down, are sufficient to daunt the most stout-hearted. And yet the tone of hopefulness among the British population who have so far returned to the new colonies is very marked, especially in the Transvaal. It is not incompatible with many grievances, and with much grumbling at the Administration. But that was only to be expected, and is of very small importance as long as people are prepared to tackle the big work of reconstruction in front of them in a vigorous and sanguine spirit. Nor is this hopefulness, in my opinion, at all ill-founded, however gloomy may be the immediate outlook.

"Terrible as have been the ravages of war and the destruction of agricultural capital, a destruction which is now pretty well complete, the great fact remains that the Transvaal possesses an amount of mineral wealth, virtually unaffected by the war, which will ensure the prosperity of South Africa for the next fifty years; and other resources, both industrial and agricultural, which, properly developed, should make it a rich country, humanly speaking, for ever. Economically, all that is required is that a very small proportion of the superabundant but exhaustible riches of the mines should be devoted to developing the vast permanent sources of wealth which the country possesses, and which will maintain a European population twenty times as large as the present, when all the gold has been dug out. No doubt it is not economic measures alone which will ensure that result. A social change is also necessary, viz., the introduction of fresh blood, of a body of enterprising European settlers, especially on the land, to reinforce the Boer population, who have been far too few, and far too easy-going, to do even the remotest justice to the vast natural capabilities of the soil, on which, for the most part, they have done little more than squat. But then the introduction of the right type of agricultural settlers, though it will not come about of itself, would not seem to be a task beyond the powers of statesmans.h.i.+p to grapple with.

[Sidenote: The land settlement report.]

"This despatch has dealt so largely with questions of immediate urgency, that I have left myself no time to refer to the work which is being quietly done in both the new colonies to build up the framework of the new Administration. I can hardly claim for myself that I have been able to give to that work anything more than the most general supervision, as my time is more than fully occupied in dealing with matters of present urgency. But, thanks to the great energy displayed by the princ.i.p.al officers of the Administration--by Major Goold-Adams and Mr. Wilson at Bloemfontein, by Mr. Fiddes, Sir Richard Solomon, and Mr. Duncan, at Pretoria, and by Sir G.o.dfrey Lagden and Mr. Wybergh here--a really surprising amount of ground has been covered. Despite all the difficulties and discouragements of the present time, the machinery of the Government is getting rapidly into working order, and, as soon as normal conditions are restored, the new colonies will find themselves provided with an Administration capable of dealing with the needs of a great and progressive community, and with efficient and trustworthy courts of law. A number of fundamental laws are being worked out, and will shortly be submitted for your approval. In the Orange River Colony they do not involve any great change of system, but, in the Transvaal, some most important reforms are at once necessary, while an immense amount of useless rubbish, which enc.u.mbered the Statute Book and made it the despair of jurists, has already been repealed."[301]

[Footnote 301: Cd. 903.]

In spite of the disturbed condition of the country, two independent inquiries, each of which was concerned with matters of cardinal importance to the future of South Africa, were concluded before the second year of the war had run its course. From the report addressed to Mr. Chamberlain by the Land Settlement Commission, of which Mr.

Arnold-Forster was chairman, and from that presented to Lord Milner by Sir William (then Mr.) Willc.o.c.ks[302] on Irrigation in South Africa, there emerged three significant conclusions. Racial fusion, or the ultimate solution of the nationality difficulty, was to be found in the establishment of British settlers upon the land, living side by side with the Dutch farmers and identified with them by common pursuits and interests; the possibility alike of the successful introduction of these settlers and of the development of the hitherto neglected agricultural resources of South Africa depended upon the enlargement and improvement of the cultivable area by irrigation; and the only existing source of wealth capable of providing the material agencies for the realisation of these objects was the Wit.w.a.tersrand gold industry. British agricultural settlers for the political, irrigation for the physical regeneration of South Africa--this was the essence of these two Reports.

[Footnote 302: Managing Director of the Daira Sania Company; of the Indian and Egyptian Irrigation Services.]

"We desire to express our firm conviction," wrote the Land Settlement Commissioners,[303] "that a well-considered scheme of settlement in South Africa by men of British origin is of the most vital importance to the future prosperity of British South Africa. We find among those who wish to see British rule in South Africa maintained and its influence for good extended, but one opinion upon this subject. There even seems reason to fear lest the vast expenditure of blood and treasure which has marked the war should be absolutely wasted, unless some strenuous effort be made to establish in the country, at the close of the war, a thoroughly British population large enough to make a recurrence of division and disorder impossible."

[Footnote 303: Cd. 626.]

[Sidenote: The irrigation report.]

Apart from its mineral development, Sir William Willc.o.c.ks points out,[304] South Africa has remained "strangely stationary. Fifty years ago it was a pastoral country importing cereals and dairy produce, and even hay from foreign countries. It is the same to-day. Half a century ago it needed a farm of 5,000 acres to keep a family in decent comfort; to-day it needs the same farm of 5,000 acres to keep a single family in comfort." West of the great Drakenberg range it is an arid, or semi-arid, region. The reason is not so much that the rainfall is deficient, as that the rain comes at the wrong time, and is wasted.

What is wanted is water-storage, with irrigation works to spread the water upon the land when it is needed by the farmer. Nothing short of the agency of the State will serve to bring about this physical revolution; for bad legislation must be annulled, and a great intercolonial system of water-husbandry, comparable to those of India and Egypt, must be created. Hitherto agriculture, in spite of the latent possibilities of the country, has scarcely been "attempted"; for, with the exception of the extreme south-western corner of the Cape Colony, the "conquered territory" of the Orange River Colony, and the high veld of the Transvaal, the agricultural development of South Africa "depends entirely on irrigation."

[Footnote 304: Cd. 1,163.]

But, great as was the claim of agriculture, the claim of the gold industry was at once more immediate and more imperative.

"Valuable as water may be for agricultural purposes," Sir William Willc.o.c.ks wrote, "it is a thousand times more valuable for gold-was.h.i.+ng at the Rand mines."

And again:

"The prosperity and well-being of every interest, not only in the Transvaal, but in South Africa generally, will depend on the prosperity of the Rand, certainly for the next fifty years.

Though my life has been spent in the execution of irrigation projects and the furtherance of agricultural prosperity, I feel that, under the special conditions prevailing in South Africa, the suggestion of any course other than the obvious one of first putting the Rand mines on a sound footing as far as their water supply is concerned, would have const.i.tuted me a bigot. Ten acres of irrigable land in the Mooi or Klip river valleys, with Johannesburg in the full tide of prosperity, will yield as good a rent as forty acres with Johannesburg in decay."

And the prosperity of the mines is not only essential in the present: it is to be the instrument for the development of the permanent resources of the Transvaal: