Lord Milner's Work in South Africa Part 34

"In order to secure complete pacification, disarmament is necessary. Re-armament should not be allowed until both the new colonies are considered fit for self-government, and even then the carrying of arms and the issuing of ammunition should be contingent on the taking of the oath of allegiance."

[Sidenote: The native question.]

On the subject of the treatment of the natives in the new colonies, the remarks of the Natal ministers are weighty and pertinent.

"For a long while," they wrote, "the natives cannot be given political rights. The grant of such rights would have the effect of alienating the sympathy of English and Dutch alike, and would materially prejudice the good government of the new colonies, and be provocative of racial bitterness. In the meantime the natives should be taught habits of steady industry.

"Officers appointed over the natives should be acquainted with their language and customs.

"The a.s.sumption in England that colonists are unjust and brutal to the natives has worked great harm, and both Dutch and English have suffered from its influence.

"A native policy out of sympathy with colonial views is likely, owing to the past history of South Africa, to arouse so strong a feeling that even the just rights of natives would be disregarded. It is essential, in the interests of the natives themselves, generally, that the Home Government should work in accord with colonial sentiments as a whole, and the great influence of a colonial minister in sympathy with colonists will secure far more reforms than will any attempt to over-rule local feeling."[325]

[Footnote 325: Cd. 1,163.]

As one of certain immediately practicable steps in the direction of South African unity, the Natal Ministry advocated "reciprocity" in the learned professions and the Civil Services of the several colonies. To effect this purpose they recommended that uniform tests of professional qualifications should be adopted throughout South Africa, and that public officers should be allowed to proceed from the civil service of one colony to that of another, their separate periods of service counting as continuous "for pension and other purposes." They also put forward a claim for the incorporation of certain districts of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony into Natal. The justice of this claim, in so far as it referred to a portion of Zululand wrongfully annexed by the Transvaal Boers, was recognised by the Imperial Government, and the district in question was transferred to Natal on the termination of the war.

As High Commissioner, Lord Milner was bound to prevent the grant of any terms to the Boers inconsistent with the future maintenance of British supremacy in South Africa, now re-established at so great a cost. As the representative man of the British in South Africa, he was no less bound to see that the terms of surrender contained no concessions to the separatist aspirations of the Boer people calculated to form an obstacle to the future administrative union of the South African colonies. With this two-fold responsibility laid upon him, it is not surprising that his view both of what might be conceded safely to the Boer leaders, and of how it might be conceded, was somewhat different from that of the Commander-in-Chief. That the Boers themselves were conscious of being likely to get more favourable terms from Lord Kitchener than from the High Commissioner, is apparent from the anxiety which they displayed to deal exclusively with the former. In this object, however, they were entirely unsuccessful, since the Home Government indicated from the first their desire that Lord Milner should be present at the meetings for negotiation; and in the end the terms of surrender were drafted by him with the a.s.sistance of Sir Richard Solomon, the legal adviser to the Transvaal Administration.

[Sidenote: The peace negotiations.]

The actual circ.u.mstances in which the Vereeniging negotiations originated were these. Early in the year 1902, when, as we have seen, the ultimate success of the military operations directed by Lord Kitchener was a.s.sured, the Netherlands Government communicated their readiness to mediate between the British Government and the Governments of the South African Republic and the Orange Free State, with a view to the termination of hostilities. To this offer the British Government replied that, while they were sincerely desirous of terminating the war, the only persons whom they could recognise as competent to negotiate for peace were the leaders of the Boer forces in the field. Lord Kitchener was directed, however, to forward a copy of the correspondence between the British and Netherlands Governments to the Boer leaders. In acknowledging this communication Mr. Schalk Burger, as acting President of the South African Republic, informed Lord Kitchener that he was prepared to treat for peace, but that before doing so he wished to see President Steyn. He, therefore, asked for a safe-conduct through the British lines and back to effect this purpose. On March 13th, 1902, the Home Government authorised Lord Kitchener to grant this request, if "he and Lord Milner agreed in thinking it desirable." As the result of the consultation between Schalk Burger and Steyn, a conference of the Free State and Transvaal leaders was held at Klerksdorp, at which it was decided, on April 10th, to request the British Commander-in-Chief to receive representatives of the Boers personally, "time and place to be appointed by him, in order to lay before him direct peace proposals."

The approval of the Home Government having been obtained, President Steyn, Mr. Schalk Burger, and Generals Botha, De Wet, and De la Rey met Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner on April 12th, at Pretoria. The proposals which the Boer representatives then put forward were wholly inadmissible. Nevertheless, Lord Kitchener telegraphed them to London with the remark:

"I have a.s.sured [the Boer representatives] that His Majesty's Government will not accept any proposals which would maintain the independence of the Republics, as this would do, and that they must expect a refusal."

[Sidenote: Independence refused.]

On the day following the British Government replied that they could not

"entertain any proposals which were based upon the former independence of the Republics, which had been formally annexed to the British Crown."

Upon learning this reply President Steyn and his colleagues took up the position that they were not competent to surrender the independence of their country, since only the "people," meaning thereby the burghers still in the field, could do this. They asked, therefore, for an armistice to enable them to consult the burghers.

This request was refused on the ground that no basis of agreement had, as yet, been reached. The Boer representatives then asked that the British Government should state the "terms which they were prepared to grant, subsequent to a relinquishment of independence"; while they on their side undertook to refer these terms to the people, "without any expression of approval or disapproval." In answer to this proposal Lord Kitchener was authorised to refer the Boer representatives to the offer made by him to General Botha at Middelburg twelve months before.

"We have received," telegraphed the Secretary for War on April 16th, "with considerable surprise the message from the Boer leaders contained in your telegram of 14th April.

"The meeting was arranged at their request, and they must have been aware of our repeated declarations that we could not entertain any proposals based on the renewed independence of the two South African States. We were, therefore, ent.i.tled to a.s.sume that the Boer representatives had relinquished the idea of independence, and would propose terms of surrender for the forces still in the field.

"They now state that they are const.i.tutionally incompetent to discuss terms which do not include a restoration of independence, but request us to inform them what conditions would be granted if, after submitting the matter to their followers, they were to relinquish the demand for independence.

"This does not seem to us to be a satisfactory method of proceeding, or one best adapted to secure, at the earliest moment, a cessation of the hostilities which have involved the loss of so much life and treasure.

"We are, however, as we have been from the first, anxious to spare the effusion of further blood, and to hasten the restoration of peace and prosperity to the countries afflicted by the war; and you and Lord Milner are therefore authorised to refer the Boer leaders to the offer made by you to General Botha more than twelve months ago,[326] and to inform them that, although the subsequent great reduction in the strength of the forces opposed to us, and the additional sacrifice thrown upon us by the refusal of that offer would justify us in imposing far more onerous terms, we are still prepared, in the hope of a permanent peace and reconciliation, to accept a general surrender on the lines of that offer, but with such modifications in detail as may be agreed upon mutually.

"You are also authorised to discuss such modifications with them, and to submit the result for our approval.

"Communicate this to the High Commissioner."[327]

[Footnote 326: For these, the "Middelburg" or "Botha" terms, see above, p. 471, and forward; p. 568, note 2.]

[Footnote 327: Cd. 1,096.]

[Sidenote: Consulting the Burghers.]

Upon learning the contents of this telegram, the Boer representatives put forward the request that their "deputation" in Europe, Mr. Abraham Fischer, Mr. Cornelius Wessels, and Mr. Wolmarans,[328] might be allowed to return to South Africa to take part in the negotiations, and again asked for an armistice while the return of the deputation and the subsequent meetings of the burghers were taking place. Both these requests were refused on military grounds; but Lord Kitchener was willing to grant facilities to the Boer leaders to consult the burghers, and arrangements were made in the course of the next two days (April 17th-19th) for representatives of the Boer commandos in the field--exclusive of those in the Cape Colony--to be elected, and meet at Vereeniging, a small town on the Vaal near the border of the two colonies, on May 13th or 15th. During the month that followed, every possible a.s.sistance was rendered by the Commander-in-Chief to the Boer leaders with the object of enabling them to carry out these arrangements. Safe-conducts, under flags of truce, and pa.s.ses for their officers and messengers, were freely granted; and the localities chosen for the commando a.s.semblies, the places and dates of which had been notified to Lord Kitchener before the Boer representatives left Pretoria, were "scrupulously avoided" by the British troops. In spite, however, of the restrictions imposed upon the activity of the forces under his command, Lord Kitchener was able to report, on June 1st, that "good progress" had been made in the work of the campaign up to the actual cessation of hostilities.[329]

[Footnote 328: This deputation was despatched in March, 1900, to "win the sympathy of the nations," in De Wet's words.]

[Footnote 329: Cd. 986.]

The sixty Boer representatives--two for each commando--thus a.s.sembled at Vereeniging appointed, on May 18th, a special commission to treat for peace. The commissioners, who included Commandant-Generals Louis Botha and Christian De Wet, Generals Hertzog, De la Rey and s.m.u.ts, and President Steyn, Acting President Schalk Burger, and other civilians,[330] proceeded at once to Pretoria, where, on May 19th, they met Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner in conference, and put forward the following three proposals as a basis of negotiation:

[Footnote 330: A full list of the names is to be found in the Draft Terms of Surrender at p. 564.]

[Sidenote: The terms drafted.]

"(1) We are prepared to surrender our independence as regards foreign relations. (2) We wish to retain self-government under British supervision. (3) We are prepared to surrender a part of our territory."

What then happened can be told in the words of Lord Kitchener's telegram to the Secretary for War:

"Lord Milner and I refused to accept these terms as a basis for negotiation, as they differ essentially from the principles laid down by His Majesty's Government. After a long discussion, nothing was decided, and it was determined to meet in the afternoon. The Commission met again at 4 p.m., when Lord Milner proposed a form of doc.u.ment that might be submitted to the burghers for a 'Yes' or 'No' vote. There was a good deal of objection to this, but it was agreed finally that Lord Milner should meet s.m.u.ts and Hertzog with a view of drafting, as far as possible, an acceptable doc.u.ment on the Botha lines.[331] They will meet to-morrow for that purpose. Lord Milner stipulated for the a.s.sistance of Sir Richard Solomon in the preparation of the draft doc.u.ment."[332]

[Footnote 331: These were the "Middelburg terms" of a year ago. See note 2, p. 568.]

[Footnote 332: Cd. 1,096.]

The "long discussion" of May 19th, to which Lord Kitchener refers, is to be found in the minutes of the conferences held at Pretoria between May 19th and 28th. It affords an exhibition of gross disingenuousness on the part of the Boer commissioners. Almost in the same breath they allege that their proposal is "not necessarily in contradiction to"[333] the Middelburg terms; admit that there is a "fundamental difference" between the two proposals, but ask that their own may be accepted, nevertheless, as the basis of negotiation;[334] and finally maintain that, as it is "nearly equivalent"[335] to the Middelburg terms, they need not "insist so much" upon it.[336] To all this Lord Milner has but one answer: "It is impossible for us to take your proposal into consideration."

[Footnote 333: s.m.u.ts.]

[Footnote 334: Hertzog.]

[Footnote 335: De Wet.]

[Footnote 336: Botha.]

[Sidenote: Payment of Boer war debts.]

On May 21st the doc.u.ment drafted by Lord Milner and Sir R. Solomon in consultation with Mr. s.m.u.ts (General and ex-State Attorney of the Transvaal) and Mr. Hertzog (General and late Judge of the Free State High Court) on the preceding day, was read at a plenary meeting of the negotiators. In the main the doc.u.ment was accepted with little demur; but a long discussion arose on the question of the degree in which the the British Government would recognise the debts incurred by military and civil officers of the late Republics in the course of the war. The Boers desired that all Government notes and all receipts given by their officers for goods, whether commandeered or not, should be recognised to be part of the liabilities of the Republican Governments for which the new Government was to become responsible. Lord Milner, on the other hand, expressed the opinion that such a demand was very unreasonable. The British Government would take over, with the a.s.sets of the Republican Governments, all liabilities existing at the time when the war broke out, but it could not be expected to pay for expenses actually incurred by the Boer leaders in carrying on a war against itself, which was, in its later stages, at any rate, utterly indefensible. The British people, he said--

"would much prefer to pay a large sum at the conclusion of hostilities with the object of bettering the condition of the people who have been fighting against them, than to pay a much smaller sum to meet the costs incurred by the Republics during the war."

As, however, the principle of the recognition of these notes and receipts had been conceded in the Middelburg terms, he was willing, with Lord Kitchener's concurrence, to refer the matter to the Home Government, although he disapproved of the clause in question in the Middelburg terms.

This point was thus left to be settled by the Home Government, and the clause which they drafted to deal with it was that which ultimately became Article X. of the Terms of Surrender. That clause represented a compromise between the desire of the Boer leaders to have a definite sum allotted for the payment of debts contracted by them in the course of the war, and Lord Milner's desire to ignore these debts but to make a free grant for the relief of the Boer people. The British Government followed Lord Milner in making such a free grant--3,000,000--and in rejecting the claim of the Boer leaders that this sum should be devoted to the payment of the promissory notes and receipts issued by them but it nevertheless allowed such notes and receipts to be submitted "as evidence of war losses" to the commissioners who were to be appointed to distribute the 3,000,000 grant.

The minutes of these discussions reveal very clearly the difference in the respective att.i.tudes of the High Commissioner and the Commander-in-Chief. Lord Kitchener was the humane and successful general, anxious to bring the miseries of the war to an end, and anxious, too, to close a campaign which, in spite of its difficult and arduous character, had afforded little or no opportunity of reaping military honours commensurate to the skill and endurance of the army or the sacrifices of the nation. Lord Milner was the far-sighted statesman, responsible for the future well-being of British South Africa, and, above all, the jealous trustee of the rights and interests of the empire. At this meeting, when the draft terms are being discussed before they are telegraphed to London, Lord Milner is exceedingly careful to point out to the Boer commissioners that the actual text of the doc.u.ment, as expressed in English, when once accepted, must be regarded as the sole record of the terms of surrender. After reading the proposed draft, he says: "If we come to an agreement, it will be the _English_ doc.u.ment which will be wired to England, on which His Majesty's Government will decide, and which will be signed." To Mr. s.m.u.ts' suggestion that it is not necessary to place a "formal clause" in the draft agreement, if the British Government is prepared to meet the Boer commissioners in a particular matter, he replies: