The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Sankaracarya Part 29

This argumentation, we reply, is unsound again; for as the adherents of both doctrines admit that motion is not observed in the case of merely non-intelligent things such as chariots, &c., we infer that water and milk also move only because they are directed by intelligent powers.

Scriptural pa.s.sages, moreover (such as 'He who dwells in the water and within the water, who rules the water within,' B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 4; and, 'By the command of that Akshara, O Gargi, some rivers flow to the East,' &c., B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 9), declare that everything in this world which flows is directed by the Lord. Hence the instances of milk and water as belonging themselves to that cla.s.s of cases which prove our general principle[325] cannot be used to show that the latter is too wide.--Moreover, the cow, which is an intelligent being and loves her calf, makes her milk flow by her wish to do so, and the milk is in addition drawn forth by the sucking of the calf. Nor does water move either with absolute independence--for its flow depends on the declivity of the soil and similar circ.u.mstances--or independently of an intelligent principle, for we have shown that the latter is present in all cases.--If, finally, our opponent should point to Sutra II, 1, 24 as contradicting the present Sutra, we remark that there we have merely shown on the ground of ordinary experience that an effect may take place in itself independently of any external instrumental cause; a conclusion which does not contradict the doctrine, based on Scripture, that all effects depend on the Lord.

4. And because (the pradhana), on account of there existing nothing beyond it, stands in no relation; (it cannot be active.)

The three gu/n/as of the [email protected] when in a state of equipoise form the pradhana. Beyond the pradhana there exists no external principle which could either impel the pradhana to activity or restrain it from activity. The soul (purusha), as we know, is indifferent, neither moves to--nor restrains from--action. As therefore the pradhana stands in no relation, it is impossible to see why it should sometimes modify itself into the great principle (mahat) and sometimes not. The activity and non-activity (by turns) of the Lord, on the other hand, are not contrary to reason, on account of his omniscience and omnipotence, and his being connected with the power of illusion (maya).

5. Nor (can it be said that the pradhana modifies itself spontaneously) like gra.s.s, &c. (which turn into milk); for (milk) does not exist elsewhere (but in the female animal).

Let this be (the [email protected] resumes). Just as gra.s.s, herbs, water, &c.

independently of any other instrumental cause transform themselves, by their own nature, into milk; so, we a.s.sume, the pradhana also transforms itself into the great principle, and so on. And, if you ask how we know that gra.s.s transforms itself independently of any instrumental cause; we reply, 'Because no such cause is observed.' For if we did perceive some such cause, we certainly should apply it to gra.s.s, &c. according to our liking, and thereby produce milk. But as a matter of fact we do no such thing. Hence the transformation of gra.s.s and the like must be considered to be due to its own nature merely; and we may infer therefrom that the transformation of the pradhana is of the same kind.

To this we make the following reply.--The transformation of the pradhana might be ascribed to its own nature merely if we really could admit that gra.s.s modifies itself in the manner stated by you; but we are unable to admit that, since another instrumental cause is observed. How? 'Because it does not exist elsewhere.' For gra.s.s becomes milk only when it is eaten by a cow or some other female animal, not if it is left either uneaten or is eaten by a bull. If the transformation had no special cause, gra.s.s would become milk even on other conditions than that of entering a cow's body. Nor would the circ.u.mstance of men not being able to produce milk according to their liking prove that there is no instrumental cause; for while some effects can be produced by men, others result from divine action only[326]. The fact, however, is that men also are able, by applying a means in their power, to produce milk from gra.s.s and herbs; for when they wish to procure a more abundant supply of milk they feed the cow more plentifully and thus obtain more milk from her.--For these reasons the spontaneous modification of the pradhana cannot be proved from the instance of gra.s.s and the like.

6. Even if we admit (the [email protected] position refuted in what precedes, it is invalidated by other objections) on account of the absence of a purpose (on the part of the pradhana).

Even if we, accommodating ourselves to your (the [email protected]'s) belief, should admit what has been disproved in the preceding Sutra, viz. that the pradhana is spontaneously active, still your opinion would lie open to an objection 'on account of the absence of a purpose.' For if the spontaneous activity of the pradhana has, as you say, no reference to anything else, it will have no reference not only to any aiding principle, but also to any purpose or motive, and consequently your doctrine that the pradhana is active in order to effect the purpose of man will become untenable. If you reply that the pradhana does not indeed regard any aiding principle, but does regard a purpose, we remark that in that case we must distinguish between the different possible purposes, viz. either enjoyment (on the part of the soul), or final release, or both. If enjoyment, what enjoyment, we ask, can belong to the soul which is naturally incapable of any accretion (of pleasure or pain)[327]? Moreover, there would in that case be no opportunity for release[328].--If release, then the activity of the pradhana would be purposeless, as even antecedently to it the soul is in the state of release; moreover, there would then be no occasion for the perception of sounds, &c.[329]--If both, then, on account of the infinite number of the objects of pradhana to be enjoyed (by the soul)[330], there would be no opportunity for final release. Nor can the satisfaction of a desire be considered as the purpose of the activity of the pradhana; for neither the non-intelligent pradhana nor the essentially pure soul can feel any desire.--If, finally, you should a.s.sume the pradhana to be active, because otherwise the power of sight (belonging to the soul on account of its intelligent nature) and the creative power (belonging to the pradhana) would be purposeless; it would follow that, as the creative power of the pradhana does not cease at any time any more than the soul's power of sight does, the apparent world would never come to an end, so that no final release of the soul could take place[331].--It is, therefore, impossible to maintain that the pradhana enters on its activity for the purposes of the soul.

7. And if you say (that the soul may move the pradhana) as the (lame) man (moves the blind one) or as the magnet (moves the iron); thus also (the difficulty is not overcome).

Well then--the [email protected] resumes, endeavouring to defend his position by parallel instances--let us say that, as some lame man devoid of the power of motion, but possessing the power of sight, having mounted the back of a blind man who is able to move but not to see, makes the latter move; or as the magnet not moving itself, moves the iron, so the soul moves the pradhana.--Thus also, we reply, you do not free your doctrine from all shortcomings; for this your new position involves an abandonment of your old position, according to which the pradhana is moving of itself, and the (indifferent, inactive) soul possesses no moving power. And how should the indifferent soul move the pradhana? A man, although lame, may make a blind man move by means of words and the like; but the soul which is devoid of action and qualities cannot possibly put forth any moving energy. Nor can it be said that it moves the pradhana by its mere proximity as the magnet moves the iron; for from the permanency of proximity (of soul and pradhana) a permanency of motion would follow. The proximity of the magnet, on the other hand (to the iron), is not permanent, but depends on a certain activity and the adjustment of the magnet in a certain position; hence the (lame) man and the magnet do not supply really parallel instances.--The pradhana then being non-intelligent and the soul indifferent, and there being no third principle to connect them, there can be no connexion of the two. If we attempted to establish a connexion on the ground of capability (of being seen on the part of the pradhana, of seeing on the part of the soul), the permanency of such capability would imply the impossibility of final release.--Moreover, here as well as before (in the preceding Sutra) the different alternatives connected with the absence of purpose (on the pradhana's part) have to be considered[332].--The highest Self, on the other hand (which is the cause of the world, according to the Vedantins), is characterised by non-activity inherent in its own nature, and, at the same time, by moving power inherent in Maya and is thus superior (to the soul of the [email protected]).

8. And, again, (the pradhana cannot be active) because the relation of princ.i.p.al (and subordinate matter) is impossible (between the three gu/n/as).

For the following reason also activity on the part of the pradhana is not possible.--The condition of the pradhana consists in the three gu/n/as, viz. goodness, pa.s.sion, and darkness, abiding in themselves in a state of equipoise without standing to one another in the relation of mutual superiority or inferiority. In that state the gu/n/as cannot possibly enter into the relation of mutual subserviency because thereby they would forfeit their essential characteristic, viz. absolute independence. And as there exists no extraneous principle to stir up the gu/n/as, the production of the great principle and the other effects--which would acquire for its operative cause a non-balanced state of the gu/n/as--is impossible.

9. And although another inference be made, (the objections remain in force) on account of the (pradhana) being devoid of the power of intelligence.

But--the [email protected] resumes--we draw another inference, so as to leave no room for the objection just stated. We do not acknowledge the gu/n/as to be characterised by absolute irrelativity and unchangeableness, since there is no proof for such an a.s.sumption. We rather infer the characteristics of the gu/n/as from those of their effects, presuming that their nature must be such as to render the production of the effects possible. Now the gu/n/as are admitted to be of an unsteady nature; hence the gu/n/as themselves are able to enter into the relation of mutual inequality, even while they are in a state of equipoise.

Even in that case, we reply, the objections stated above which were founded on the impossibility of an orderly arrangement of the world, &c., remain in force on account of the pradhana being devoid of the power of intelligence. And if (to escape those objections) the [email protected] should infer (from the orderly arrangement of the world, &c.), that the primal cause is intelligent, he would cease to be an antagonist, since the doctrine that there is one intelligent cause of this multiform world would be nothing else but the Vedantic doctrine of Brahman.--Moreover, if the gu/n/as were capable of entering into the relation of mutual inequality even while in the state of equipoise, one of two things would happen; they would either not be in the condition of inequality on account of the absence of an operative cause; or else, if they were in that condition, they would always remain in it; the absence of an operative cause being a non-changing circ.u.mstance. And thus the doctrine would again be open to the objection stated before[333].

10. And moreover (the [email protected] doctrine) is objectionable on account of its contradictions.

The doctrine of the [email protected], moreover, is full of contradictions.

Sometimes they enumerate seven senses, sometimes eleven[334]. In some places they teach that the subtle elements of material things proceed from the great principle, in other places again that they proceed from self-consciousness. Sometimes they speak of three internal organs, sometimes of one only[335]. That their doctrine, moreover, contradicts /S/ruti, which teaches that the Lord is the cause of the world, and Sm/ri/ti, based on /S/ruti, is well known.--For these reasons also the [email protected] system is objectionable.

Here the [email protected] again brings a countercharge--The system of the Vedantins also, he says, must be declared to be objectionable; for it does not admit that that which suffers and that which causes suffering[336] are different cla.s.ses of things (and thereby renders futile the well-established distinction of causes of suffering and suffering beings). For those who admit the one Brahman to be the Self of everything and the cause of the whole world, have to admit also that the two attributes of being that which causes suffering and that which suffers belong to the one supreme Self (not to different cla.s.ses of beings). If, then, these two attributes belong to one and the same Self, it never can divest itself of them, and thus Scripture, which teaches perfect knowledge for the purpose of the cessation of all suffering, loses all its meaning. For--to adduce a parallel case--a lamp as long as it subsists as such is never divested of the two qualities of giving heat and light. And if the Vedantin should adduce the case of water with its waves, ripples, foam, &c.[337], we remark that there also the waves, &c. const.i.tute attributes of the water which remain permanently, although they by turns manifest themselves, and again enter into the state of non-manifestation; hence the water is never really dest.i.tute of waves, not any more than the lamp is ever dest.i.tute of heat and light.--That that which causes suffering, and that which suffers const.i.tute different cla.s.ses of things is, moreover, well known from ordinary experience. For (to consider the matter from a more general point of view) the person desiring and the thing desired[338] are understood to be separate existences. If the object of desire were not essentially different and separate from the person desiring, the state of being desirous could not be ascribed to the latter, because the object with reference to which alone he can be called desiring would already essentially be established in him (belong to him). The latter state of things exists in the case of a lamp and its light, for instance. Light essentially belongs to the lamp, and hence the latter never can stand in want of light; for want or desire can exist only if the thing wanted or desired is not yet obtained.

(And just as there could be no desiring person, if the object of desire and the desiring person were not essentially separate), so the object of desire also would cease to be an object for the desiring person, and would be an object for itself only. As a matter of fact, however, this is not the case; for the two ideas (and terms), 'object of desire' and 'desiring person,' imply a relation (are correlative), and a relation exists in two things, not in one only. Hence the desiring person and the object of desire are separate.--The same holds good with regard to what is not desired (object of aversion; anartha) and the non-desiring person (anarthin).

An object of desire is whatever is of advantage to the desiring person, an object of aversion whatever is of disadvantage; with both one person enters into relation by turns. On account of the comparative paucity of the objects of desire, and the comparative mult.i.tude of the objects of aversion, both may be comprised under the general term, 'object of aversion.' Now, these objects of aversion we mean when we use the term 'causes of suffering,' while by the term 'sufferer' we understand the soul which, being one, enters into successive relations with both (i.e.

the objects of desire and the objects of aversion). If, then, the causes of suffering and the sufferer const.i.tute one Self (as the Vedanta teaches), it follows that final release is impossible.--But if, on the other hand, the two are a.s.sumed to const.i.tute separate cla.s.ses, the possibility of release is not excluded, since the cause of the connexion of the two (viz. wrong knowledge) may be removed.

All this reasoning--we, the Vedantins, reply--is futile, because on account of the unity of the Self the relation, whose two terms are the causes of suffering, and the sufferer cannot exist (in the Self).--Our doctrine would be liable to your objection if that which causes suffering and that which suffers did, while belonging to one and the same Self, stand to each other in the relation of object and subject.

But they do not stand in that relation just because they are one. If fire, although it possesses different attributes, such as heat and light, and is capable of change, does neither burn nor illumine itself since it is one only; how can the one unchangeable Brahman enter with reference to itself into the relation of cause of suffering and sufferer?--Where then, it may be asked, does the relation discussed (which after all cannot be denied altogether) exist?--That, we reply, is not difficult to see[339]. The living body which is the object of the action of burning is the sufferer; the sun, for instance, is a cause of suffering (burning).--But, the opponent rejoins, burning is a pain, and as such can affect an intelligent being only, not the non-intelligent body; for if it were an affection of the mere body, it would, on the destruction of the body, cease of itself, so that it would be needless to seek for means to make it cease.--But it is likewise not observed, we reply, that a mere intelligent being dest.i.tute of a body is burned and suffers pain.--Nor would you (the [email protected]) also a.s.sume that the affection called burning belongs to a mere intelligent being. Nor can you admit[340] a real connexion of the soul and the body, because through such a connexion impurity and similar imperfections would attach to the soul[341]. Nor can suffering itself be said to suffer. And how then, we ask, can you explain the relation existing between a sufferer and the causes of suffering? If (as a last refuge) you should maintain that the sattva-gu/n/a is that which suffers, and the gu/n/a called pa.s.sion that which causes suffering, we again object, because the intelligent principle (the soul) cannot be really connected with these two[342]. And if you should say that the soul suffers as it were because it leans towards[343] the sattva-gu/n/a, we point out that the employment of the phrase, 'as it were,' shows that the soul does not really suffer.

If it is understood that its suffering is not real, we do not object to the phrase 'as it were[344].' For the amphisbena also does not become venomous because it is 'a serpent as it were' ('like a serpent'), nor does the serpent lose its venom because it is 'like an amphisbena.' You must therefore admit that the relation of causes of suffering and of sufferers is not real, but the effect of Nescience. And if you admit, that, then my (the Vedantic) doctrine also is free from objections[345].

But perhaps you (the [email protected]) will say that, after all, suffering (on the part of the soul) is real[346]. In that case, however, the impossibility of release is all the more undeniable[347], especially as the cause of suffering (viz. the pradhana) is admitted to be eternal.--And if (to get out of this difficulty) you maintain that, although the potentialities of suffering (on the part of the soul) and of causing suffering (on the part of the pradhana) are eternal, yet suffering, in order to become actual, requires the conjunction of the two--which conjunction in its turn depends on a special reason, viz. the non-discrimination of the pradhana by the soul--and that hence, when that reason no longer exists, the conjunction of the two comes to an absolute termination, whereby the absolute release of the soul becomes possible; we are again unable to accept your explanation, because that on which the non-discrimination depends, viz. the gu/n/a, called Darkness, is acknowledged by you to be eternal.

And as[348] there is no fixed rule for the (successive) rising and sinking of the influence of the particular gu/n/as, there is also no fixed rule for the termination of the cause which effects the conjunction of soul and pradhana (i.e. non-discrimination); hence the disjunction of the two is uncertain, and so the [email protected] cannot escape the reproach of absence of final release resulting from their doctrine.

To the Vedantin, on the other hand, the idea of final release being impossible cannot occur in his dreams even; for the Self he acknowledges to be one only, and one thing cannot enter into the relation of subject and object, and Scripture, moreover, declares that the plurality of effects originates from speech only. For the phenomenal world, on the other hand, we may admit the relation of sufferer and suffering just as it is observed, and need neither object to it nor refute it.

Herewith we have refuted the doctrine which holds the pradhana to be the cause of the world. We have now to dispose of the atomic theory.

We begin by refuting an objection raised by the atomists against the upholders of Brahman.--The Vai/s/es.h.i.+kas argue as follows: The qualities which inhere in the substance const.i.tuting the cause originate qualities of the same kind in the substance const.i.tuting the effect; we see, for instance, that from white threads white cloth is produced, but do not observe what is contrary (viz. white threads resulting in a piece of cloth of a different colour). Hence, if the intelligent Brahman is a.s.sumed as the cause of the world, we should expect to find intelligence inherent in the effect also, viz. the world. But this is not the case, and consequently the intelligent Brahman cannot be the cause of the world.--This reasoning the Sutrakara shows to be fallacious, on the ground of the system of the Vai/s/es.h.i.+kas themselves.

II. Or (the world may originate from Brahman) as the great and the long originate from the short and the atomic.

The system of the Vai/s/es.h.i.+kas is the following:--The atoms which possess, according to their special kind[349], the qualities of colour, &c., and which are of spherical form[350], subsist during a certain period[351] without producing any effects[352]. After that, the unseen principle (ad/ri/sh/ta/), &c.[353], acting as operative causes and conjunction const.i.tuting the non-inherent cause[354], they produce the entire aggregate of effected things, beginning with binary atomic compounds. At the same time the qualities of the causes (i.e. of the simple atoms) produce corresponding qualities in the effects. Thus, when two atoms produce a binary atomic compound, the special qualities belonging to the simple atoms, such as white colour, &c., produce a corresponding white colour in the binary compound. One special quality, however, of the simple atoms, viz. atomic sphericity, does not produce corresponding sphericity in the binary compound; for the forms of extension belonging to the latter are said to be minuteness (a/n/utva) and shortness. And, again, when two binary compounds combining produce a quaternary atomic compound, the qualities, such as whiteness, &c., inherent in the binary compounds produce corresponding qualities in the quaternary compounds; with the exception, however, of the two qualities of minuteness and shortness. For it is admitted that the forms of extension belonging to quaternary compounds are not minuteness and shortness, but bigness (mahattva) and length. The same happens[355] when many simple atoms or many binary compounds or a simple atom and a binary compound combine to produce new effects.

Well, then, we say, just as from spherical atoms binary compounds are produced, which are minute and short, and ternary compounds which are big and long, but not anything spherical; or as from binary compounds, which are minute and short, ternary compounds, &c., are produced which are big and long, not minute and short; so this non-intelligent world may spring from the intelligent Brahman. This is a doctrine to which you--the Vai/s/es.h.i.+ka--cannot, on your own principles, object.

Here the Vai/s/es.h.i.+ka will perhaps come forward with the following argumentation[356]. As effected substances, such as binary compounds and so on, are engrossed by forms of extension contrary to that of the causal substances, the forms of extension belonging to the latter, viz.

sphericity and so on, cannot produce similar qualities in the effects.

The world, on the other hand, is not engrossed by any quality contrary to intelligence owing to which the intelligence inherent in the cause should not be able to originate a new intelligence in the effect. For non-intelligence is not a quality contrary to intelligence, but merely its negation. As thus the case of sphericity is not an exactly parallel one, intelligence may very well produce an effect similar to itself.

This argumentation, we rejoin, is not sound. Just as the qualities of sphericity and so on, although existing in the cause, do not produce corresponding effects, so it is with intelligence also; so that the two cases are parallel so far. Nor can the circ.u.mstance of the effects being engrossed by a different form of extension be alleged as the reason of sphericity, &c. not originating qualities similar to themselves; for the power of originating effects belongs to sphericity, &c. before another form of extension begins to exist. For it is admitted that the substance produced remains for a moment devoid of qualities, and that thereupon only (i.e. after that moment) its qualities begin to exist. Nor, again, can it be said that sphericity, &c. concentrate their activity on originating other forms of extension[357], and therefore do not originate forms of extension belonging to the same cla.s.s as their own; for it is admitted that the origin of other forms is due to other causes; as the Sutras of Ka/n/abhuj (Ka/n/ada) themselves declare (Vai/s/. Sut. VII, 1, 9, 'Bigness is produced from plurality inherent in the causes, from bigness of the cause and from a kind of acc.u.mulation;'

VII, 1, 10, 'The contrary of this (the big) is the minute;' VII, 1, 17, 'Thereby length and shortness are explained[358]').--Nor, again, can it be said that plurality, &c. inherent in the cause originate (like effects) in consequence of some peculiar proximity (in which they are supposed to stand to the effected substance), while sphericity, &c. (not standing in a like proximity) do not; for when a new substance or a new quality is originated, all the qualities of the cause stand in the same relation of inherence to their abode (i.e. the causal substance in which they inhere). For these reasons the fact of sphericity, &c. not originating like effects can be explained from the essential nature of sphericity, &c. only, and the same may therefore be maintained with regard to intelligence[359].

Moreover, from that observed fact also, that from conjunction (sa/m/yoga) there originate substances, &c. belonging to a cla.s.s different (from that to which conjunction itself belongs), it follows that the doctrine of effects belonging to the same cla.s.s as the causes from which they spring is too wide. If you remark against this last argument that, as we have to do at present with a substance (viz.

Brahman), it is inappropriate to instance a quality (viz. conjunction) as a parallel case; we point out that at present we only wish to explain the origination of effects belonging to a different cla.s.s in general.

Nor is there any reason for the restriction that substances only are to be adduced as examples for substances, and qualities only for qualities.

Your own Sutrakara adduces a quality as furnis.h.i.+ng a parallel case for a substance (Vai/s/. Sut. IV, 2, 2, 'On account of the conjunction of things perceptible and things imperceptible being imperceptible the body is not composed of five elements'). Just as the conjunction which inheres in the perceptible earth and the imperceptible ether is not perceptible, the body also, if it had for its inherent cause the five elements which are part of them perceptible, part of them imperceptible, would itself be imperceptible; but, as a matter of fact, it is perceptible; hence it is not composed of the five elements. Here conjunction is a quality and the body a substance.--The origin of effects different in nature (from the cause) has, moreover, been already treated of under II, 1; 6.--Well then, this being so, the matter has been settled there already (why then is it again discussed here?)-Because, we reply, there we argued against the [email protected], and at present we have to do with the Vai/s/es.h.i.+ka.--But, already once, before (II, 1, 3) a line of argument equally applicable to a second case was simply declared to extend to the latter also; (why then do you not simply state now that the arguments used to defeat the [email protected] are equally valid against the Vai/s/es.h.i.+ka?)--Because here, we reply, at the beginning of the examination of the Vai/s/es.h.i.+ka system we prefer to discuss the point with arguments specially adapted to the doctrine of the Vai/s/es.h.i.+kas.

12. In both cases also (in the cases of the ad/ri/sh/t/a inhering either in the atoms or the soul) action (of the atoms) is not (possible); hence absence of that (viz. creation and pralaya).

The Sutrakara now proceeds to refute the doctrine of atoms being the cause of the world.--This doctrine arises in the following manner. We see that all ordinary substances which consist of parts as, for instance, pieces of cloth originate from the substances connected with them by the relation of inherence, as for instance threads, conjunction co-operating (with the parts to form the whole). We thence draw the general conclusion that whatever consists of parts has originated from those substances with which it is connected by the relation of inherence, conjunction cooperating. That thing now at which the distinction of whole and parts stops and which marks the limit of division into minuter parts is the atom.--This whole world, with its mountains, oceans, and so on, is composed of parts; because it is composed of parts it has a beginning and an end[360]; an effect may not be a.s.sumed without a cause; therefore the atoms are the cause of the world. Such is Ka/n/ada's doctrine.--As we observe four elementary substances consisting of parts, viz. earth, water, fire, and air (wind), we have to a.s.sume four different kinds of atoms. These atoms marking the limit of subdivision into minuter parts cannot be divided themselves; hence when the elements are destroyed they can be divided down to atoms only; this state of atomic division of the elements const.i.tutes the pralaya (the periodical destruction of the world). After that when the time for creation comes, motion (karman) springs up in the aerial atoms.

This motion which is due to the unseen principle[361] joins the atom in which it resides to another atom; thus binary compounds, &c. are produced, and finally the element of air. In a like manner are produced fire, water, earth, the body with its organs. Thus the whole world originates from atoms. From the qualities inhering in the atoms the qualities belonging to the binary compounds are produced, just as the qualities of the cloth result from the qualities of the threads.--Such, in short, is the teaching of the followers of Ka/n/ada.

This doctrine we controvert in the following manner.--It must be admitted that the atoms when they are in a state of isolation require action (motion) to bring about their conjunction; for we observe that the conjunction of threads and the like is effected by action. Action again, which is itself an effect, requires some operative cause by which it is brought about; for unless some such cause exists, no original motion can take place in the atoms. If, then, some operative cause is a.s.sumed, we may, in the first place, a.s.sume some cause a.n.a.logous to seen causes, such as endeavour or impact. But in that case original motion could not occur at all in the atoms, since causes of that kind are, at the time, impossible. For in the pralaya state endeavour, which is a quality of the soul, cannot take place because no body exists then. For the quality of the soul called endeavour originates when the soul is connected with the internal organ which abides in the body. The same reason precludes the a.s.sumption of other seen causes such as impact and the like. For they all are possible only after the creation of the world has taken place, and cannot therefore be the causes of the original action (by which the world is produced).--If, in the second place, the unseen principle is a.s.sumed as the cause of the original motion of the atoms, we ask: Is this unseen principle to be considered as inhering in the soul or in the atom? In both cases it cannot be the cause of motion in the atoms, because it is non-intelligent. For, as we have shown above in our examination of the system, a non-intelligent thing which is not directed by an intelligent principle cannot of itself either act or be the cause of action, and the soul cannot be the guiding principle of the ad/ri/sh/t/a because at the time of pralaya its intelligence has not yet arisen[362]. If, on the other hand, the unseen principle is supposed to inhere in the soul, it cannot be the cause of motion in the atoms, because there exists no connexion of it with the latter. If you say that the soul in which the unseen principle inheres is connected with the atoms, then there would result, from the continuity of connexion[363], continuity of action, as there is no other restricting principle.--Hence, there being no definite cause of action, original action cannot take place in the atoms; there being no action, conjunction of the atoms which depends on action cannot take place; there being no conjunction, all the effects depending on it, viz. the formation of binary atomic compounds, &c., cannot originate.

How, moreover, is the conjunction of one atom with another to be imagined? Is it to be total interpenetration of the two or partial conjunction? If the former, then no increase of bulk could take place, and consequently atomic size only would exist; moreover, it would be contrary to what is observed, as we see that conjunction takes place between substances having parts (prade/s/a). If the latter, it would follow that the atoms are composed of parts.--Let then the atoms be imagined to consist of parts.--If so, imagined things being unreal, the conjunction also of the atoms would be unreal and thus could not be the non-inherent cause of real things. And without non-inherent causes effected substances such as binary compounds, &c. could not originate.

And just as at the time of the first creation motion of the atoms leading to their conjunction could not take place, there being no cause of such motion; thus at the time of a general pralaya also no action could take place leading to their separation, since for that occurrence also no definite seen cause could be alleged. Nor could the unseen principle be adduced as the cause, since its purport is to effect enjoyment (of reward and punishment on the part of the soul), not to bring about the pralaya. There being then no possibility of action to effect either the conjunction or the separation of the atoms, neither conjunction nor separation would actually take place, and hence neither creation nor pralaya of the world.--For these reasons the doctrine of the atoms being the cause of the world must be rejected.

13. And because in consequence of samavaya being admitted a regressus in infinitum results from parity of reasoning.

You (the Vai/s/es.h.i.+ka) admit that a binary compound which originates from two atoms, while absolutely different from them, is connected with them by the relation of inherence; but on that a.s.sumption the doctrine of the atoms being the general cause cannot be established, 'because parity involves here a retrogressus ad infinitum.' For just as a binary compound which is absolutely different from the two const.i.tuent atoms is connected with them by means of the relation of inherence (samavaya), so the relation of inherence itself being absolutely different from the two things which it connects, requires another relation of inherence to connect it with them, there being absolute difference in both cases. For this second relation of inherence again, a third relation of inherence would have to be a.s.sumed and so on ad infinitum.--But--the Vai/s/es.h.i.+ka is supposed to reply--we are conscious of the so-called samavaya relation as eternally connected with the things between which it exists, not as either non-connected with them or as depending on another connexion; we are therefore not obliged to a.s.sume another connexion, and again another, and so on, and thus to allow ourselves to be driven into a regressus in infinitum.--Your defence is unavailing, we reply, for it would involve the admission that conjunction (sa/m/yoga) also as being eternally connected with the things which it joins does, like samavaya, not require another connexion[364]. If you say that conjunction does require another connexion because it is a different thing[365] we reply that then samavaya also requires another connexion because it is likewise a different thing. Nor can you say that conjunction does require another connexion because it is a quality (gu/n/a), and samavaya does not because it is not a quality; for (in spite of this difference) the reason for another connexion being required is the same in both cases[366], and not that which is technically called 'quality' is the cause (of another connexion being required)[367].--For these reasons those who acknowledge samavaya to be a separate existence are driven into a regressus in infinitum, in consequence of which, the impossibility of one term involving the impossibility of the entire series, not even the origination of a binary compound from two atoms can be accounted for.--For this reason also the atomic doctrine is inadmissible.

14. And on account of the permanent existence (of activity or non-activity).

Moreover, the atoms would have to be a.s.sumed as either essentially active (moving) or essentially non-active, or both or neither; there being no fifth alternative. But none of the four alternatives stated is possible. If they were essentially active, their activity would be permanent so that no pralaya could take place. If they were essentially non-active, their non-activity would be permanent, and no creation could take place. Their being both is impossible because self-contradictory.

If they were neither, their activity and non-activity would have to depend on an operative cause, and then the operative causes such as the ad/ri/sh/t/a being in permanent proximity to the atoms, permanent activity would result; or else the ad/ri/sh/t/a and so on not being taken as operative causes, the consequence would be permanent non-activity on the part of the atoms.--For this reason also the atomic doctrine is untenable.

15. And on account of the atoms having colour, &c., the reverse (of the Vai/s/es.h.i.+ka tenet would take place); as thus it is observed.

Let us suppose, the Vai/s/es.h.i.+kas say, all substances composed of parts to be disintegrated into their parts; a limit will finally be reached beyond which the process of disintegration cannot be continued. What const.i.tutes that limit are the atoms, which are eternal (permanent), belong to four different cla.s.ses, possess the qualities of colour, &c., and are the originating principles of this whole material world with its colour, form, and other qualities.