The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Sankaracarya Part 30

This fundamental a.s.sumption of the Vai/s/es.h.i.+kas we declare to be groundless because from the circ.u.mstance of the atoms having colour and other qualities there would follow the contrary of atomic minuteness and permanency, i.e. it would follow that, compared to the ultimate cause, they are gross and non-permanent. For ordinary experience teaches that whatever things possess colour and other qualities are, compared to their cause, gross and non-permanent. A piece of cloth, for instance, is gross compared to the threads of which it consists, and non permanent; and the threads again are non-permanent and gross compared to the filaments of which they are made up. Therefore the atoms also which the Vai/s/es.h.i.+kas admit to have colour, &c. must have causes compared to which they are gross and non-permanent. Hence that reason also which Ka/n/ada gives for the permanence of the atoms (IV, 1, 1, 'that which exists without having a cause is permanent') does not apply at all to the atoms because, as we have shown just now, the atoms are to be considered as having a cause.--The second reason also which Ka/n/ada brings forward for the permanency of the atoms, viz. in IV, 1, 4, 'the special negation implied in the term non-eternal would not be possible[368]' (if there did not exist something eternal, viz. the atoms), does not necessarily prove the permanency of the atoms; for supposing that there exists not any permanent thing, the formation of a negative compound such as 'non-eternal' is impossible. Nor does the existence of the word 'non-permanent' absolutely presuppose the permanency of atoms; for there exists (as we Vedantins maintain) another permanent ultimate Cause, viz. Brahman. Nor can the existence of anything be established merely on the ground of a word commonly being used in that sense, since there is room for common use only if word and matter are well-established by some other means of right knowledge.--The third reason also given in the Vai/s/. Sutras (IV, 1, 5) for the permanency of the atoms ('and Nescience') is unavailing. For if we explain that Sutra to mean 'the non-perception of those actually existing causes whose effects are seen is Nescience,' it would follow that the binary atomic compounds also are permanent[369]. And if we tried to escape from that difficulty by including (in the explanation of the Sutra as given above) the qualification 'there being absence of (originating) substances,' then nothing else but the absence of a cause would furnish the reason for the permanency of the atoms, and as that reason had already been mentioned before (in IV, 1, 1) the Sutra IV, 1, 5 would be a useless restatement.--Well, then (the Vai/s/es.h.i.+ka might say), let us understand by 'Nescience' (in the Sutra) the impossibility of conceiving a third reason of the destruction (of effects), in addition to the division of the causal substance into its parts, and the destruction of the causal substance; which impossibility involves the permanency of the atoms[370].--There is no necessity, we reply, for a.s.suming that a thing when peris.h.i.+ng must perish on account of either of those two reasons. That a.s.sumption would indeed have to be made if it were generally admitted that a new substance is produced only by the conjunction of several causal substances. But if it is admitted that a causal substance may originate a new substance by pa.s.sing over into a qualified state after having previously existed free from qualifications, in its pure generality, it follows that the effected substance may be destroyed by its solidity being dissolved, just as the hardness of ghee is dissolved by the action of fire[371].--Thus there would result, from the circ.u.mstance of the atoms having colour, &c., the opposite of what the Vai/s/es.h.i.+kas mean. For this reason also the atomic doctrine cannot be maintained.

16. And as there are difficulties in both cases.

Earth has the qualities of smell, taste, colour, and touch, and is gross; water has colour, taste, and touch, and is fine; fire has colour and touch, and is finer yet; air is finest of all, and has the quality of touch only. The question now arises whether the atoms const.i.tuting the four elements are to be a.s.sumed to possess the same greater or smaller number of qualities as the respective elements.--Either a.s.sumption leads to unacceptable consequences. For if we a.s.sume that some kinds of atoms have more numerous qualities, it follows that their solid size (murti) will be increased thereby, and that implies their being atoms no longer. That an increase of qualities cannot take place without a simultaneous increase of size we infer from our observations concerning effected material bodies.--If, on the other hand, we a.s.sume, in order to save the equality of atoms of all kinds, that there is no difference in the number of their qualities, we must either suppose that they have all one quality only; but in that case we should not perceive touch in fire nor colour and touch in water, nor taste, colour, and touch in earth, since the qualities of the effects have for their antecedents the qualities of the causes. Or else we must suppose all atoms to have all the four qualities; but in that case we should necessarily perceive what we actually do not perceive, viz. smell in water, smell and taste in fire, smell, taste, and colour in air.--Hence on this account also the atomic doctrine shows itself to be unacceptable.

17. And as the (atomic theory) is not accepted (by any authoritative persons) it is to be disregarded altogether.

While the theory of the pradhana being the cause of the world has been accepted by some adherents of the Veda--as, for instance, Manu--with a view to the doctrines of the effect existing in the cause already, and so on, the atomic doctrine has not been accepted by any persons of authority in any of its parts, and therefore is to be disregarded entirely by all those who take their stand on the Veda.

There are, moreover, other objections to the Vai/s/es.h.i.+ka doctrine.--The Vai/s/es.h.i.+kas a.s.sume six categories, which const.i.tute the subject-matter of their system, viz. substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, and inherence. These six categories they maintain to be absolutely different from each other, and to have different characteristics; just as a man, a horse, a hare differ from one another.

Side by side with this a.s.sumption they make another which contradicts the former one, viz. that quality, action, &c. have the attribute of depending on substance. But that is altogether inappropriate; for just as ordinary things, such as animals, gra.s.s, trees, and the like, being absolutely different from each other do not depend on each other, so the qualities, &c. also being absolutely different from substance, cannot depend on the latter. Or else let the qualities, &c. depend on substance; then it follows that, as they are present where substance is present, and absent where it is absent, substance only exists, and, according to its various forms, becomes the object of different terms and conceptions (such as quality, action, &c.); just as Devadatta, for instance, according to the conditions in which he finds himself is the object of various conceptions and names. But this latter alternative would involve the acceptation of the doctrine[372] and the abandonment of the Vai/s/es.h.i.+ka standpoint.--But (the Vai/s/es.h.i.+ka may say) smoke also is different from fire and yet it is dependent on it.--True, we reply; but we ascertain the difference of smoke and fire from the fact of their being apperceived in separation. Substance and quality, on the other hand, are not so apperceived; for when we are conscious of a white blanket, or a red cow, or a blue lotus, the substance is in each case cognised by means of the quality; the latter therefore has its Self in the substance. The same reasoning applies to action, generality, particularity, and inherence.

If you (the Vai/s/es.h.i.+ka) say that qualities, actions, &c. (although not non-different from substances) may yet depend on the latter because substances and qualities stand in the relation of one not being able to exist without the other (ayutasiddhi[373]); we point out that things which are ayutasiddha must either be non-separate in place, or non-separate in time, or non-separate in nature, and that none of these alternatives agrees with Vai/s/es.h.i.+ka principles. For the first alternative contradicts your own a.s.sumptions according to which the cloth originating from the threads occupies the place of the threads only, not that of the cloth, while the qualities of the cloth, such as its white colour, occupy the place of the cloth only, not that of the threads. So the Vai/s/es.h.i.+ka-sutras say (I, 1, 10), 'Substances originate another substance and qualities another quality.' The threads which const.i.tute the causal substance originate the effected substance, viz. the cloth, and the qualities of the threads, such as white colour, &c., produce in the cloth new corresponding qualities. But this doctrine is clearly contradicted by the a.s.sumption of substance and quality being non-separate in place.--If, in the second place, you explain ayutasiddhatva as non-separation in time, it follows also that, for instance, the right and the left horn of a cow would be ayutasiddha.--And if, finally, you explain it to mean 'non-separation in character,' it is impossible to make any further distinction between the substance and the quality, as then quality is conceived as being identical with substance.

Moreover, the distinction which the Vai/s/es.h.i.+kas make between conjunction (sa/m/yoga) as being the connexion of things which can exist separately, and inherence (samavaya) as being the connexion of things which are incapable of separate existence is futile, since the cause which exists before the effect[374] cannot be said to be incapable of separate existence. Perhaps the Vai/s/es.h.i.+ka will say that his definition refers to one of the two terms only, so that samavaya is the connexion, with the cause, of the effect which is incapable of separate existence. But this also is of no avail; for as a connexion requires two terms, the effect as long as it has not yet entered into being cannot be connected with the cause. And it would be equally unavailing to say that the effect enters into the connexion after it has begun to exist; for if the Vai/s/es.h.i.+ka admits that the effect may exist previous to its connexion with the cause, it is no longer ayutasiddha (incapable of separate existence), and thereby the principle that between effect and cause conjunction and disjunction do not take place is violated.[375]

And[376] just as conjunction, and not samavaya, is the connexion in which every effected substance as soon as it has been produced stands with the all-pervading substances as ether, &c.--although no motion has taken place on the part of the effected substance--so also the connexion of the effect with the cause will be conjunction merely, not samavaya.

Nor is there any proof for the existence of any connexion, samavaya or sa/m/yoga, apart from the things which it connects. If it should be maintained that sa/m/yoga and samavaya have such an existence because we observe that there are names and ideas of them in addition to the names and ideas of the things connected, we point out that one and the same thing may be the subject of several names and ideas if it is considered in its relations to what lies without it. Devadatta although being one only forms the object of many different names and notions according as he is considered in himself or in his relations to others; thus he is thought and spoken of as man, Brahma/n/a learned in the Veda, generous, boy, young man, father, grandson, brother, son-in-law, &c. So, again, one and the same stroke is, according to the place it is connected with, spoken of and conceived as meaning either ten, or hundred, or thousand, &c. a.n.a.logously, two connected things are not only conceived and denoted as connected things, but in addition const.i.tute the object of the ideas and terms 'conjunction' or 'inherence' which however do not prove themselves to be separate ent.i.ties.--Things standing thus, the non-existence of separate ent.i.ties (conjunction, &c.), which ent.i.ties would have to be established on the ground of perception, follows from the fact of their non-perception.--Nor, again[377], does the circ.u.mstance of the word and idea of connexion having for its object the things connected involve the connexion's permanent existence, since we have already shown above that one thing may, on account of its relations to other things, be conceived and denoted in different ways.

Further[378], conjunction cannot take place between the atoms, the soul, and the internal organ, because they have no parts; for we observe that conjunction takes place only of such substances as consist of parts. If the Vai/s/es.h.i.+ka should say that parts of the atoms, soul and mind may be a.s.sumed (in order to explain their alleged conjunction), we remark that the a.s.sumption of actually non-existing things would involve the result that anything might be established; for there is no restrictive rule that only such and such non-existing things--whether contradictory to reason or not--should be a.s.sumed and not any other, and a.s.sumptions depend on one's choice only and may be carried to any extent. If we once allow a.s.sumptions, there is no reason why there should not be a.s.sumed a further hundred or thousand things, in addition to the six categories a.s.sumed by the Vai/s/es.h.i.+kas. Anybody might then a.s.sume anything, and we could neither stop a compa.s.sionate man from a.s.suming that this transmigratory world which is the cause of so much misery to living beings is not to be, nor a malicious man from a.s.suming that even the released souls are to enter on a new cycle of existences.

Further, it is not possible that a binary atomic compound, which consists of parts, should be connected with the simple indivisible atoms by an intimate connexion (sa/ms/lesha) any more than they can thus be connected with ether; for between ether and earth, &c. there does not exist that kind of intimate connexion which exists, for instance, between wood and varnish[379].

Let it then be said (the Vai/s/es.h.i.+ka resumes) that the samavaya relation must be a.s.sumed, because otherwise the relation of that which abides and that which forms the abode--which relation actually exists between the effected substance and the causal substance--is not possible.--That would, we reply, involve the vice of mutual dependence; for only when the separateness of cause and effect is established, the relation of the abode and that which abides can be established; and only when the latter relation is established, the relation of separateness can be established. For the Vedantins acknowledge neither the separateness of cause and effect, nor their standing to each other in the relation of abode and thing abiding, since according to their doctrine the effect is only a certain state of the cause[380].--Moreover, as the atoms are limited (not of infinite extension), they must in reality consist of as many parts as we acknowledge regions of s.p.a.ce[381], whether those be six or eight or ten, and consequently they cannot be permanent; conclusions contrary to the Vai/s/es.h.i.+ka doctrine of the indivisibility and permanency of the atoms.--If the Vai/s/es.h.i.+ka replies that those very parts which are owing to the existence of the different regions of s.p.a.ce are his (indestructible) atoms; we deny that because all things whatever, forming a series of substances of ever-increasing minuteness, are capable of dissolution, until the highest cause (Brahman) is reached.

Earth--which is, in comparison with a binary compound, the grossest thing of all--undergoes decomposition; so do the substances following next which belong to the same cla.s.s as earth; so does the binary compound; and so does, finally, the atom which (although the minutest thing of all) still belongs to the same general cla.s.s (i.e. matter) with earth, &c. The objection (which the Vai/s/es.h.i.+ka might possibly raise here again) that things can be decomposed only by the separation of their parts[382], we have already disposed of above, where we pointed out that decomposition may take place in a manner a.n.a.logous to the melting of ghee. Just as the hardness of ghee, gold, and the like, is destroyed in consequence of those substances being rendered liquid by their contact with fire, no separation of the parts taking place all the while; so the solid shape of the atoms also may be decomposed by their pa.s.sing back into the indifferenced condition of the highest cause. In the same way the origination of effects also is brought about not merely in the way of conjunction of parts; for we see that milk, for instance, and water originate effects such as sour milk and ice without there taking place any conjunction of parts.

It thus appears that the atomic doctrine is supported by very weak arguments only, is opposed to those scriptural pa.s.sages which declare the Lord to be the general cause, and is not accepted by any of the authorities taking their stand on Scripture, such as Manu and others.

Hence it is to be altogether disregarded by highminded men who have a regard for their own spiritual welfare.

18. (If there be a.s.sumed) the (dyad of) aggregates with its two causes, (there takes place) non-establishment of those (two aggregates).

The reasons on account of which the doctrine of the Vai/s/es.h.i.+kas cannot be accepted have been stated above. That doctrine may be called semi-destructive (or semi-nihilistic[383]). That the more thorough doctrine which teaches universal non-permanency is even less worthy of being taken into consideration, we now proceed to show.

That doctrine is presented in a variety of forms, due either to the difference of the views (maintained by Buddha at different times), or else to the difference of capacity on the part of the disciples (of Buddha). Three princ.i.p.al opinions may, however, be distinguished; the opinion of those who maintain the reality of everything (Realists, sarvast.i.tvavadin); the opinion of those who maintain that thought only is real (Idealists, vij/n/anavadin); and the opinion of those who maintain that everything is void (unreal; Nihilists, /s/unyavadin[384]).--We first controvert those who maintain that everything, external as well as internal, is real. What is external is either element (bhuta) or elementary (bhautika); what is internal is either mind (/k/itta) or mental (/k/aitta). The elements are earth, water, and so on; elemental are colour, &c. on the one hand, and the eye and the other sense-organs on the other hand. Earth and the other three elements arise from the aggregation of the four different kinds of atoms; the atoms of earth being hard, those of water viscid, those of fire hot, those of air mobile.:--The inward world consists of the five so-called 'groups' (skandha), the group of sensation (rupaskandha), the group of knowledge (vij/n/anaskandha), the group of feeling (vedanaskandha), the group of verbal knowledge (samj/n/askandha), and the group of impressions (sa/m/skaraskandha)[385]; which taken together const.i.tute the basis of all personal existence[386].

With reference to this doctrine we make the following remarks.--Those two aggregates, const.i.tuting two different cla.s.ses, and having two different causes which the Bauddhas a.s.sume, viz. the aggregate of the elements and elementary things whose cause the atoms are, and the aggregate of the five skandhas whose cause the skandhas are, cannot, on Bauddha principles, be established, i.e. it cannot be explained how the aggregates are brought about. For the parts const.i.tuting the (material) aggregates are devoid of intelligence, and the kindling (abhijvalana) of intelligence depends on an aggregate of atoms having been brought about previously[387]. And the Bauddhas do not admit any other permanent intelligent being, such as either an enjoying soul or a ruling Lord, which could effect the aggregation of the atoms. Nor can the atoms and skandhas be a.s.sumed to enter on activity on their own account; for that would imply their never ceasing to be active[388]. Nor can the cause of aggregation be looked for in the so-called abode (i.e. the alayavij/n/ana-pravaha, the train of self-cognitions); for the latter must be described either as different from the single cognitions or as not different from them. (In the former case it is either permanent, and then it is nothing else but the permanent soul of the Vedantins; or non-permanent;) then being admitted to be momentary merely, it cannot exercise any influence and cannot therefore be the cause of the motion of the atoms[389]. (And in the latter case we are not further advanced than before.)--For all these reasons the formation of aggregates cannot be accounted for. But without aggregates there would be an end of the stream of mundane existence which presupposes those aggregates.

19. If it be said that (the formation of aggregates may be explained) through (Nescience, &c.) standing in the relation of mutual causality; we say 'No,' because they merely are the efficient causes of the origin (of the immediately subsequent links).

Although there exists no permanent intelligent principle of the nature either of a ruling Lord or an enjoying soul, under whose influence the formation of aggregates could take place, yet the course of mundane existence is rendered possible through the mutual causality[390] of Nescience and so on, so that we need not look for any other combining principle.

The series beginning with Nescience comprises the following members: Nescience, impression, knowledge, name and form, the abode of the six, touch, feeling, desire, activity, birth, species, decay, death, grief, lamentation, pain, mental affliction, and the like[391]. All these terms const.i.tute a chain of causes and are as such spoken of in the Bauddha system, sometimes cursorily, sometimes at length. They are, moreover, all acknowledged as existing, not by the Bauddhas only, but by the followers of all systems. And as the cycles of Nescience, &c. forming uninterrupted chains of causes and effects revolve unceasingly like water-wheels, the existence of the aggregates (which const.i.tute bodies and minds) must needs be a.s.sumed, as without such Nescience and so on could not take place.

This argumentation of the Bauddha we are unable to accept, because it merely a.s.signs efficient causes for the origination of the members of the series, but does not intimate an efficient cause for the formation of the aggregates. If the Bauddha reminds us of the statement made above that the existence of aggregates must needs be inferred from the existence of Nescience and so on, we point out that, if he means thereby that Nescience and so on cannot exist without aggregates and hence require the existence of such, it remains to a.s.sign an efficient cause for the formation of the aggregates. But, as we have already shown--when examining the Vaijes.h.i.+ka doctrine--that the formation of aggregates cannot be accounted for even on the a.s.sumption of permanent atoms and individual souls in which the ad/ri/sh/t/a abides[392]; how much less then are aggregates possible if there exist only momentary atoms not connected with enjoying souls and devoid of abodes (i.e. souls), and that which abides in them (the ad/ri/sh/t/a).--Let us then a.s.sume (the Bauddha says) that Nescience, &c. themselves are the efficient cause of the aggregate.--But how--we ask--can they be the cause of that without which--as their abode--they themselves are not capable of existence?

Perhaps you will say that in the eternal sa/m/sara the aggregates succeed one another in an unbroken chain, and hence also Nescience, and so on, which abide in those aggregates. But in that case you will have to a.s.sume either that each aggregate necessarily produces another aggregate of the same kind, or that, without any settled rule, it may produce either a like or an unlike one. In the former case a human body could never pa.s.s over into that of a G.o.d or an animal or a being of the infernal regions; in the latter case a man might in an instant be turned into an elephant or a G.o.d and again become a man; either of which consequences would be contrary to your system.--Moreover, that for the purpose of whose enjoyment the aggregate is formed is, according to your doctrine, not a permanent enjoying soul, so that enjoyment subserves itself merely and cannot be desired by anything else; hence final release also must, according to you, be considered as subserving itself only, and no being desirous of release can be a.s.sumed. If a being desirous of both were a.s.sumed, it would have to be conceived as permanently existing up to the time of enjoyment and release, and that would be contrary to your doctrine of general impermanency.--There may therefore exist a causal relation between the members of the series consisting of Nescience, &c., but, in the absence of a permanent enjoying soul, it is impossible to establish on that ground the existence of aggregates.

20. (Nor can there be a causal relation between Nescience, &c.), because on the origination of the subsequent (moment) the preceding one ceases to be.

We have hitherto argued that Nescience, and so on, stand in a causal relation to each other merely, so that they cannot be made to account for the existence of aggregates; we are now going to prove that they cannot even be considered as efficient causes of the subsequent members of the series to which they belong.

Those who maintain that everything has a momentary existence only admit that when the thing existing in the second moment[393] enters into being the thing existing in the first moment ceases to be. On this admission it is impossible to establish between the two things the relation of cause and effect, since the former momentary existence which ceases or has ceased to be, and so has entered into the state of non-existence, cannot be the cause of the later momentary existence.--Let it then be said that the former momentary existence when it has reached its full development becomes the cause of the later momentary existence.--That also is impossible; for the a.s.sumption that a fully developed existence exerts a further energy, involves the conclusion that it is connected with a second moment (which contradicts the doctrine of universal momentariness).--Then let the mere existence of the antecedent ent.i.ty const.i.tute its causal energy.--That a.s.sumption also is fruitless, because we cannot conceive the origination of an effect which is not imbued with the nature of the cause (i.e. in which the nature of the cause does not continue to exist). And to a.s.sume that the nature of the cause does continue to exist in the effect is impossible (on the Bauddha doctrine), as that would involve the permanency of the cause, and thus necessitate the abandonment of the doctrine of general non-permanency.--Nor can it be admitted that the relation of cause and effect holds good without the cause somehow giving its colouring to the effect; for that doctrine might unduly be extended to all cases[394].--Moreover, the origination and cessation of things of which the Bauddha speaks must either const.i.tute a thing's own form or another state of it, or an altogether different thing. But none of these alternatives agrees with the general Bauddha principles. If, in the first place, origination and cessation const.i.tuted the form of a thing, it would follow that the word 'thing' and the words 'origination' and 'cessation' are interchangeable (which is not the case).--Let then, secondly, the Bauddha says, a certain difference be a.s.sumed, in consequence of which the terms 'origination' and 'cessation' may denote the initial and final states of that which in the intermediate state is called thing.--In that case, we reply, the thing will be connected with three moments, viz. the initial, the intermediate, and the final one, so that the doctrine of general momentariness will have to be abandoned.--Let then, as the third alternative, origination and cessation be altogether different from the thing, as much as a buffalo is from a horse.--That too cannot be, we reply; for it would lead to the conclusion that the thing, because altogether disconnected with origination and cessation, is everlasting. And the same conclusion would be led up to, if we understood by the origination and cessation of a thing merely its perception and non-perception; for the latter are attributes of the percipient mind only, not of the thing itself.--Hence we have again to declare the Bauddha doctrine to be untenable.

21. On the supposition of there being no (cause: while yet the effect takes place), there results contradiction of the admitted principle; otherwise simultaneousness (of cause and effect).

It has been shown that on the doctrine of general non-permanency, the former momentary existence, as having already been merged in non-existence, cannot be the cause of the later one.--Perhaps now the Bauddha will say that an effect may arise even when there is no cause.--That, we reply, implies the abandonment of a principle admitted by yourself, viz. that the mind and the mental modifications originate when in conjunction with four kinds of causes[395]. Moreover, if anything could originate without a cause, there would be nothing to prevent that anything might originate at any time.--If, on the other hand, you should say that we may a.s.sume the antecedent momentary existence to last until the succeeding one has been produced, we point out that that would imply the simultaneousness of cause and effect, and so run counter to an accepted Bauddha tenet, viz. that all things[396]

are momentary merely.

22. Cessation dependent on a sublative act of the mind, and cessation not so dependent cannot be established, there being no (complete) interruption.

The Bauddhas who maintain that universal destruction is going on constantly, a.s.sume that 'whatever forms an object of knowledge and is different from the triad is produced (sa/m/sk/ri/ta) and momentary.' To the triad there mentioned they give the names 'cessation dependent on a sublative act of the mind,' 'cessation not dependent on such an act,'

and 's.p.a.ce.' This triad they hold to be non-substantial, of a merely negative character (abhavamatra), devoid of all positive characteristics. By 'cessation dependent on a sublative act of the mind,' we have to understand such destruction of ent.i.ties as is preceded by an act of thought[397]; by 'cessation not so dependent' is meant destruction of the opposite kind[398]; by 's.p.a.ce' is meant absence in general of something covering (or occupying s.p.a.ce). Out of these three non-existences 's.p.a.ce' will be refuted later on (Sutra 24), the two other ones are refuted in the present Sutra.

Cessation which is dependent on a sublative act of the mind, and cessation which is not so dependent are both impossible, 'on account of the absence of interruption.' For both kinds of cessation must have reference either to the series (of momentary existences) or to the single members const.i.tuting the series.--The former alternative is impossible, because in all series (of momentary existences) the members of the series stand in an unbroken relation of cause and effect so that the series cannot be interrupted[399].--The latter alternative is likewise inadmissible, for it is impossible to maintain that any momentary existence should undergo complete annihilation entirely undefinable and disconnected (with the previous state of existence), since we observe that a thing is recognised in the various states through which it may pa.s.s and thus has a connected existence[400]. And in those cases also where a thing is not clearly recognised (after having undergone a change) we yet infer, on the ground of actual observations made in other cases, that one and the same thing continues to exist without any interruption.--For these reasons the two kinds of cessation which the Bauddhas a.s.sume cannot be proved.

23. And on account of the objections presenting themselves in either case.

The cessation of Nescience, &c. which, on the a.s.sumption of the Bauddhas, is included in the two kinds of cessation discussed hitherto, must take place either in consequence of perfect knowledge together with its auxiliaries, or else of its own accord. But the former alternative would imply the abandonment of the Bauddha doctrine that destruction takes place without a cause, and the latter alternative would involve the uselessness of the Bauddha instruction as to the 'path'[401]. As therefore both alternatives are open to objections, the Bauddha doctrine must be declared unsatisfactory.

24. And in the case of s.p.a.ce also (the doctrine of its being a non-ent.i.ty is untenable) on account of its not differing (from the two other kinds of non-ent.i.ty).

We have shown so far that of the triad declared by the Bauddhas to be devoid of all positive characteristics, and therefore non-definable, two (viz. prati-sa/m/khyavirodha and aprati) cannot be shown to be such; we now proceed to show the same with regard to s.p.a.ce (ether, aka/s/a).

With regard to s.p.a.ce also it cannot be maintained that it is non-definable, since substantiality can be established in the case of s.p.a.ce no less than in the case of the two so-called non-ent.i.ties treated of in the preceding Sutras. That s.p.a.ce is a real thing follows in the first place from certain scriptural pa.s.sages, such as 's.p.a.ce sprang from the Self.'--To those, again, who (like the Bauddhas) disagree with us as to the authoritativeness of Scripture we point out that the real existence of s.p.a.ce is to be inferred from the quality of sound, since we observe that earth and other real things are the abodes of smell and the other qualities.--Moreover, if you declare that s.p.a.ce is nothing but the absence in general of any covering (occupying) body, it would follow that while one bird is flying--whereby s.p.a.ce is occupied--there would be no room for a second bird wanting to fly at the same time. And if you should reply that the second bird may fly there where there is absence of a covering body, we point out that that something by which the absence of covering bodies is distinguished must be a positive ent.i.ty, viz. s.p.a.ce in our sense, and not the mere non-existence of covering bodies[402].--Moreover, the Bauddha places himself, by his view of s.p.a.ce, in opposition to other parts of his system. For we find, in the Bauddha Scriptures, a series of questions and answers (beginning, 'On what, O reverend Sir, is the earth founded?'), in which the following question occurs, 'On what is the air founded?' to which it is replied that the air is founded on s.p.a.ce (ether). Now it is clear that this statement is appropriate only on the supposition of s.p.a.ce being a positive ent.i.ty, not a mere negation.--Further, there is a self-contradiction in the Bauddha statements regarding all the three kinds of negative ent.i.ties, it being said, on the one hand, that they are not positively definable, and, on the other hand, that they are eternal. Of what is not real neither eternity nor non-eternity can be predicated, since the distinction of subjects and predicates of attribution is founded entirely on real things. Anything with regard to which that distinction holds good we conclude to be a real thing, such as jars and the like are, not a mere undefinable negation.

25. And on account of remembrance.

The philosopher who maintains that all things are momentary only would have to extend that doctrine to the perceiving person (upalabdh/ri/) also; that is, however, not possible, on account of the remembrance which is consequent on the original perception. That remembrance can take place only if it belongs to the same person who previously made the perception; for we observe that what one man has experienced is not remembered by another man. How, indeed, could there arise the conscious state expressed in the sentences, 'I saw that thing, and now I see this thing,' if the seeing person were not in both cases the same? That the consciousness of recognition takes place only in the case of the observing and remembering subject being one, is a matter known to every one; for if there were, in the two cases, different subjects, the state of consciousness arising in the mind of the remembering person would be, '_I_ remember; another person made the observation.' But no such state of consciousness does arise.--When, on the other hand, such a state of consciousness does arise, then everybody knows that the person who made the original observation, and the person who remembers, are different persons, and then the state of consciousness is expressed as follows, 'I remember that that other person saw that and that.'--In the case under discussion, however, the Vaina/s/ika himself--whose state of consciousness is, 'I saw that and that'--knows that there is one thinking subject only to which the original perception as well as the remembrance belongs, and does not think of denying that the past perception belonged to himself, not any more than he denies that fire is hot and gives light.

As thus one agent is connected with the two moments of perception and subsequent remembrance, the Vaina/s/ika has necessarily to abandon the doctrine of universal momentariness. And if he further recognises all his subsequent successive cognitions, up to his last breath, to belong to one and the same subject, and in addition cannot but attribute all his past cognitions, from the moment of his birth, to the same Self, how can he maintain, without being ashamed of himself, that everything has a momentary existence only? Should he maintain that the recognition (of the subject as one and the same) takes place on account of the similarity (of the different self-cognitions; each, however, being momentary only), we reply that the cognition of similarity is based on two things, and that for that reason the advocate of universal momentariness who denies the existence of one (permanent) subject able mentally to grasp the two similar things simply talks deceitful nonsense when a.s.serting that recognition is founded on similarity. Should he admit, on the other hand, that there is one mind grasping the similarity of two successive momentary existences, he would thereby admit that one ent.i.ty endures for two moments and thus contradict the tenet of universal momentariness.--Should it be said that the cognition 'this is similar to that' is a different (new) cognition, not dependent on the apperception of the earlier and later momentary existences, we refute this by the remark that the fact of different terms--viz. 'this' and 'that'--being used points to the existence of different things (which the mind grasps in a judgment of similarity). If the mental act of which similarity is the object were an altogether new act (not concerned with the two separate similar ent.i.ties), the expression 'this is similar to that' would be devoid of meaning; we should in that case rather speak of 'similarity' only.--Whenever (to add a general reflexion) something perfectly well known from ordinary experience is not admitted by philosophers, they may indeed establish their own view and demolish the contrary opinion by means of words, but they thereby neither convince others nor even themselves. Whatever has been ascertained to be such and such must also be represented as such and such; attempts to represent it as something else prove nothing but the vain talkativeness of those who make those attempts. Nor can the hypothesis of mere similarity being cognised account for ordinary empirical life and thought; for (in recognising a thing) we are conscious of it being that which we were formerly conscious of, not of it being merely similar to that. We admit that sometimes with regard to an external thing a doubt may arise whether it is that or merely is similar to that; for mistakes may be made concerning what lies outside our minds. But the conscious subject never has any doubt whether it is itself or only similar to itself; it rather is distinctly conscious that it is one and the same subject which yesterday had a certain sensation and to-day remembers that sensation.--For this reason also the doctrine of the Nihilists is to be rejected.

26. (Ent.i.ty) does not spring from non-ent.i.ty on account of that not being observed.

The system of the Vaina/s/ikas is objectionable for this reason also that those who deny the existence of permanent stable causes are driven to maintain that ent.i.ty springs from non-ent.i.ty. This latter tenet is expressly enunciated by the Bauddhas where they say, 'On account of the manifestation (of effects) not without previous destruction (of the cause).' For, they say, from the decomposed seed only the young plant springs, spoilt milk only turns into curds, and the lump of clay has ceased to be a lump when it becomes a jar. If effects did spring from the unchanged causes, all effects would originate from all causes at once, as then no specification would be required[403]. Hence, as we see that young plants, &c. spring from seeds, &c. only after the latter have been merged in non-existence, we hold that ent.i.ty springs from non-ent.i.ty.

To this Bauddha tenet we reply, '(Ent.i.ty does) not (spring) from non-ent.i.ty, on account of that not being observed.' If ent.i.ty did spring from non-ent.i.ty, the a.s.sumption of special causes would be purportless, since non-ent.i.ty is in all cases one and the same. For the non-existence of seeds and the like after they have been destroyed is of the same kind as the non-existence of horns of hares and the like, i.e. non-existence is in all cases nothing else but the absence of all character of reality, and hence there would be no sense (on the doctrine of origination from non-existence) in a.s.suming that sprouts are produced from seeds only, curds from milk only, and so on. And if non-distinguished non-existence were admitted to have causal efficiency, we should also have to a.s.sume that sprouts, &c. originate from the horns of hares, &c.--a thing certainly not actually observed.--If, again, it should be a.s.sumed that there are different kinds of non-existence having special distinctions--just as, for instance, blueness and the like are special qualities of lotuses and so on--we point out that in that case the fact of there being such special distinctions would turn the non-ent.i.ties into ent.i.ties no less real than lotuses and the like. In no case non-existence would possess causal efficiency, simply because, like the horn of a hare, it is non-existence merely.--Further, if existence sprang from non-existence, all effects would be affected with non-existence; while as a matter of fact they are observed to be merely positive ent.i.ties distinguished by their various special characteristics. Nor[404] does any one think that things of the nature of clay, such as pots and the like, are the effects of threads and the like; but everybody knows that things of the nature of clay are the effects of clay only.--The Bauddha's tenet that nothing can become a cause as long as it remains unchanged, but has to that end to undergo destruction, and that thus existence springs from non-existence only is false; for it is observed that only things of permanent nature which are always recognised as what they are, such as gold, &c., are the causes of effects such as golden ornaments, and so on. In those cases where a destruction of the peculiar nature of the cause is observed to take place, as in the case of seeds, for instance, we have to acknowledge as the cause of the subsequent condition (i.e. the sprout) not the earlier condition in so far as it is destroyed, but rather those permanent particles of the seed which are not destroyed (when the seed as a whole undergoes decomposition).--Hence as we see on the one hand that no ent.i.ties ever originate from nonent.i.ties such as the horns of a hare, and on the other hand that ent.i.ties do originate from ent.i.ties such as gold and the like the whole Bauddha doctrine of existence springing from non-existence has to be rejected.--We finally point out that, according to the Bauddhas, all mind and all mental modifications spring from the four skandhas discussed above and all material aggregates from the atoms; why then do they stultify this their own doctrine by the fanciful a.s.sumption of ent.i.ty springing from non-ent.i.ty and thus needlessly perplex the mind of every one?

27. And thus (on that doctrine) there would be an accomplishment (of ends) in the case of non-active people also.

If it were admitted that ent.i.ty issues from non-ent.i.ty, lazy inactive people also would obtain their purposes, since 'non-existence' is a thing to be had without much trouble. Rice would grow for the husbandman even if he did not cultivate his field; vessels would shape themselves even if the potter did not fas.h.i.+on the clay; and the weaver too lazy to weave the threads into a whole, would nevertheless have in the end finished pieces of cloth just as if he had been weaving. And n.o.body would have to exert himself in the least either for going to the heavenly world or for obtaining final release. All which of course is absurd and not maintained by anybody.--Thus the doctrine of the origination of ent.i.ty from non-ent.i.ty again shows itself to be futile.

28. The non-existence (of external things) cannot be maintained, on account of (our) consciousness (of them).

There having been brought forward, in what precedes, the various objections which lie against the doctrine of the reality of the external world (in the Bauddha sense), such as the impossibility of accounting for the existence of aggregates, &c., we are now confronted by those Bauddhas who maintain that only cognitions (or ideas, vij/n/ana) exist.--The doctrine of the reality of the external world was indeed propounded by Buddha conforming himself to the mental state of some of his disciples whom he perceived to be attached to external things; but it does not represent his own true view according to which cognitions alone are real.

According to this latter doctrine the process, whose const.i.tuting members are the act of knowledge, the object of knowledge, and the result of knowledge[405], is an altogether internal one, existing in so far only as it is connected with the mind (buddhi). Even if external things existed, that process could not take place but in connexion with the mind. If, the Bauddhas say, you ask how it is known that that entire process is internal and that no outward things exist apart from consciousness, we reply that we base our doctrine on the impossibility of external things. For if external things are admitted, they must be either atoms or aggregates of atoms such as posts and the like. But atoms cannot be comprehended under the ideas of posts and the like, it being impossible for cognition to represent (things as minute as) atoms.

Nor, again, can the outward things be aggregates of atoms such as pillars and the like, because those aggregates can neither be defined as different nor as non-different from the atoms[406].--In the same way we can show that the external things are not universals and so on[407].

Moreover, the cognitions--which are of a uniform nature only in so far as they are states of consciousness--undergo, according to their objects, successive modifications, so that there is presented to the mind now the idea of a post, now the idea of a wall, now the idea of a jar, and so on. Now this is not possible without some distinction on the part of the ideas themselves, and hence we must necessarily admit that the ideas have the same forms as their objects. But if we make this admission, from which it follows that the form of the objects is determined by the ideas, the hypothesis of the existence of external things becomes altogether gratuitous. From the fact, moreover, of our always being conscious of the act of knowledge and the object of knowledge simultaneously it follows that the two are in reality identical. When we are conscious of the one we are conscious of the other also; and that would not happen if the two were essentially distinct, as in that case there would be nothing to prevent our being conscious of one apart from the other. For this reason also we maintain that there are no outward things.--