The Theological Tractates and The Consolation of Philosophy Part 21

IX.

"Let it suffice that we have hitherto discovered the form of false felicity, which if thou hast plainly seen, order now requireth that we show thee in what true happiness consisteth." "I see," quoth I, "that neither sufficiency by riches, nor power by kingdoms, nor respect by dignities, nor renown by glory, nor joy can be gotten by pleasures."

"Hast thou also understood the causes why it is so?" "Methink I have a little glimpse of them, but I had rather thou wouldst declare them more plainly."

"The reason is manifest, for that which is simple and undivided of itself, is divided by men's error, and is translated from true and perfect to false and unperfect. Thinkest thou that which needeth nothing, to stand in need of power?" "No," quoth I. "Thou sayest well, for if any power in any respect be weak, in this it must necessarily stand in need of the help of others." "It is true," quoth I. "Wherefore sufficiency and power have one and the same nature." "So it seemeth."

"Now thinkest thou, that which is of this sort ought to be despised, or rather that it is worthy to be respected above all other things?" "There can be no doubt of this," quoth I. "Let us add respect then to sufficiency and power, so that we judge these three to be one." "We must add it if we confess the truth."

"What now," quoth she, "thinkest thou this to be obscure and base, or rather most excellent and famous? Consider whether that which thou hast granted to want nothing, to be most potent, and most worthy of honour, may seem to want fame, which it cannot yield itself, and for that cause be in some respect more abject." "I must needs confess," quoth I, "that, being what it is, this is also most famous." "Consequently then we must acknowledge that fame differeth nothing from the former three." "We must so," quoth I. "Wherefore that which wanteth nothing, which can perform all things by its own power, which is famous and respected, is it not manifest that it is also most pleasant?" To which I answered: "How such a man should fall into any grief, I can by no means imagine. Wherefore if that which we have said hitherto be true, we must needs confess that he is most joyful and content." "And by the same reason it followeth that sufficiency, power, fame, respect, pleasure have indeed divers names, but differ not in substance." "It followeth indeed," quoth I.

"This then, which is one and simple by nature, man's wickedness divideth, and while he endeavoureth to obtain part of that which hath no parts, he neither getteth a part, which is none, nor the whole, which he seeketh not after." "How is this?" quoth I. "He who seeketh after riches," quoth she, "to avoid want, taketh no thought for power, he had rather be base and obscure, he depriveth himself even of many natural pleasures that he may not lose the money which he hath gotten. But by this means he attaineth not to sufficiency, whom power forsaketh, whom trouble molesteth, whom baseness maketh abject, whom obscurity overwhelmeth. Again, he that only desireth power, consumeth wealth, despiseth pleasures, and setteth light by honour or glory, which is not potent. But thou seest how many things are wanting to this man also. For sometimes he wanteth necessaries, and is perplexed with anxieties, and being not able to rid himself, ceaseth to be powerful, which was the only thing he aimed at. The like discourse may be made of honours, glory, pleasures. For since every one of these things is the same with the rest, whosoever seeketh for any of them without the rest obtaineth not that which he desireth." "What then?" quoth I. "If one should desire to have them all together, he should wish for the sum of happiness, but shall he find it in these things which we have showed cannot perform what they promise?" "No," quoth I. "Wherefore we must by no means seek for happiness in these things which are thought to afford the several portions of that which is to be desired." "I confess it," quoth I, "and nothing can be more true than this." "Now then," quoth she, "thou hast both the form and causes of false felicity; cast but the eyes of thy mind on the contrary, and thou shalt presently espy true happiness, which we promised to show thee." "This," quoth I, "is evident, even to him that is blind, and thou showedst it a little before, while thou endeavouredst to lay open the causes of the false. For, if I be not deceived, that is true and perfect happiness which maketh a man sufficient, potent, respected, famous, joyful. And that thou mayest know that I understood thee aright, that which can truly perform any one of these because they are all one, I acknowledge to be full and perfect happiness." "O my scholar, I think thee happy by having this opinion, if thou addest this also." "What?" quoth I. "Dost thou imagine that there is any mortal or frail thing which can cause this happy estate?" "I do not," quoth I, "and that hath been so proved by thee, that more cannot be desired." "Wherefore these things seem to afford men the images of the true good, or certain unperfect goods, but they cannot give them the true and perfect good itself." "I am of the same mind," quoth I. "Now then, since thou knowest wherein true happiness consisteth, and what have only a false show of it, it remaineth that thou shouldst learn where thou mayest seek for this which is true." "This is that," quoth I, "which I have long earnestly expected." "But since, as Plato teacheth (in Timaeus),[132] we must implore G.o.d's a.s.sistance even in our least affairs, what, thinkest thou, must we do now, that we may deserve to find the seat of that sovereign good?" "We must," quoth I, "invocate the Father of all things, without whose remembrance no beginning hath a good foundation." "Thou sayest rightly," quoth she, and withal sung in this sort.

[132] Cf. _Tim._ 27.

IX.

"O qui perpetua mundum ratione gubernas Terrarum caelique sator qui tempus ab aeuo Ire iubes stabilisque manens das cuncta moueri.

Quem non externae pepulerunt fingere causae Materiae fluitantis opus, uerum insita summi 5 Forma boni liuore carens, tu cuncta superno Ducis ab exemplo, pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse Mundum mente gerens similique in imagine formans Perfectasque iubens perfectum absoluere partes.

Tu numeris elementa ligas ut frigora flammis 10 Arida conueniant liquidis, ne purior ignis Euolet aut mersas deducant pondera terras.

Tu triplicis mediam naturae cuncta mouentem Conectens animam per consona membra resoluis.

Quae c.u.m secta duos motum glomerauit in orbes, 15 In semet reditura meat mentemque profundam Circuit et simili conuert.i.t imagine caelum.

Tu causis animas paribus uitasque minores Prouehis et leuibus sublimes curribus aptans In caelum terramque seris quas lege benigna 20 Ad te conuersas reduci facis igne reuerti.

Da pater augustam menti conscendere sedem, Da fontem l.u.s.trare boni, da luce reperta In te conspicuos animi defigere uisus.

Dissice terrenae nebulas et pondera molis 25 Atque tuo splendore mica! Tu namque serenum, Tu requies tranquilla piis, te cernere finis, Principium, uector, dux, semita, terminus idem.

IX.[133]

"O Thou, that dost the world in lasting order guide, Father of heaven and earth, Who makest time swiftly slide, And, standing still Thyself, yet fram'st all moving laws, Who to Thy work wert moved by no external cause: But by a sweet desire, where envy hath no place, Thy goodness moving Thee to give each thing his grace, Thou dost all creatures' forms from highest patterns take, From Thy fair mind the world fair like Thyself doth make.

Thus Thou perfect the whole perfect each part dost frame.

Thou temp'rest elements, making cold mixed with flame And dry things join with moist, lest fire away should fly, Or earth, opprest with weight, buried too low should lie.

Thou in consenting parts fitly disposed hast Th'all-moving soul in midst of threefold nature placed, Which, cut in several parts that run a different race, Into itself returns, and circling doth embrace The highest mind, and heaven with like proportion drives.

Thou with like cause dost make the souls and lesser lives, Fix them in chariots swift, and widely scatterest O'er heaven and earth; then at Thy fatherly behest They stream, like fire returning, back to Thee, their G.o.d.

Dear Father, let my mind Thy hallowed seat ascend, Let me behold the spring of grace and find Thy light, That I on Thee may fix my soul's well cleared sight.

Cast off the earthly weight wherewith I am opprest, s.h.i.+ne as Thou art most bright, Thou only calm and rest To pious men whose end is to behold Thy ray, Who their beginning art, their guide, their bound, and way.[134]

[133] This poem is a masterly abridgment of the first part of the _Timaeus_, and was eagerly fastened on by commentators of the early Middle Ages whose direct knowledge of Plato was confined to the translation of that dialogue by Chalcidius.

[134] Cf. the string of nouns in _Tr._ iv. (_supra_, p. 70 _ad fin._).

X.

Quoniam igitur quae sit imperfecti, quae etiam perfecti boni forma uidisti, nunc demonstrandum reor quonam haec felicitatis perfectio const.i.tuta sit.

In quo illud primum arbitror inquirendum, an aliquod huiusmodi bonum quale paulo ante definisti in rerum natura possit exsistere, ne nos praeter rei subiectae ueritatem ca.s.sa cogitationis imago decipiat. Sed quin exsistat sitque hoc ueluti quidam omnium fons bonorum negari nequit. Omne enim quod inperfectum esse dicitur, id inminutione perfecti inperfectum esse perhibetur. Quo fit, ut si in quolibet genere inperfectum quid esse uideatur, in eo perfectum quoque aliquid esse necesse sit. Etenim perfectione sublata, unde illud quod inperfectum perhibetur exst.i.terit ne fingi quidem potest. Neque enim ab deminutis inconsummatisque natura rerum coepit exordium, sed ab integris absolutisque procedens in haec extrema atque effeta dilabitur. Quod si, uti paulo ante monstrauimus, est quaedam boni fragilis inperfecta felicitas, esse aliquam solidam perfectamque non potest dubitari." "Firmissime," inquam, "uerissimeque conclusum est." "Quo uero," inquit, "habitet, ita considera. Deum rerum omnium principem bonum esse communis humanorum conceptio probat animorum. Nam c.u.m nihil deo melius excogitari queat, id quo melius nihil est bonum esse quis dubitet? Ita uero bonum esse deum ratio demonstrat, ut perfectum quoque in eo bonum esse conuincat. Nam ni tale sit, rerum omnium princeps esse non poterit. Erit enim eo praestantius aliquid perfectum possidens bonum, quod hoc prius atque antiquius esse uideatur; omnia namque perfecta minus integris priora esse claruerunt. Quare ne in infinitum ratio prodeat, confitendum est summum deum summi perfectique boni esse plenissimum. Sed perfectum bonum ueram esse beat.i.tudinem const.i.tuimus; ueram igitur beat.i.tudinem in summo deo sitam esse necesse est." "Accipio," inquam, "nec est quod contradici ullo modo queat." "Sed quaeso," inquit, "te uide quam id sancte atque inuiolabiliter probes quod boni summi summum deum diximus esse plenissimum." "Quonam," inquam, "modo?" "Ne hunc rerum omnium patrem illud summum bonum quo plenus esse perhibetur uel extrinsecus accep.i.s.se uel ita naturaliter habere praesumas, quasi habentis dei habitaeque beat.i.tudinis diuersam cogites esse substantiam. Nam si extrinsecus acceptum putes, praestantius id quod dederit ab eo quod acceperit existimare possis. Sed hunc esse rerum omnium praecellentissimum dignissime confitemur. Quod si natura quidem inest, sed est ratione diuersum, c.u.m de rerum principe loquamur deo, fingat qui potest: quis haec diuersa coniunxerit? Postremo quod a qualibet re diuersum est, id non est illud a quo intellegitur esse diuersum. Quare quod a summo bono diuersum est sui natura, id summum bonum non est--quod nefas est de eo cogitare quo nihil constat esse praestantius.

Omnino enim nullius rei natura suo principio melior poterit exsistere, quare quod omnium principium sit, id etiam sui substantia summum esse bonum uerissima ratione concluserim." "Rectissime," inquam. "Sed summum bonum beat.i.tudinem esse concessum est." "Ita est," inquam. "Igitur," inquit, "deum esse ipsam beat.i.tudinem necesse est confiteri." "Nec propositis,"

inquam, "prioribus refragari queo et illis hoc inlatum consequens esse perspicio."

"Respice," inquit, "an hinc quoque idem firmius approbetur, quod duo summa bona quae a se diuersa sint esse non possunt. Etenim quae discrepant bona, non esse alterum quod sit alterum liquet; quare neutrum poterit esse perfectum, c.u.m alterutri alterum deest. Sed quod perfectum non sit, id summum non esse manifestum est; nullo modo igitur quae summa sunt bona ea possunt esse diuersa. Atqui et beat.i.tudinem et deum summum bonum esse collegimus; quare ipsam necesse est summam esse beat.i.tudinem quae sit summa diuinitas." "Nihil," inquam, "nec reapse uerius[135] nec ratiocinatione firmius nec deo dignius concludi potest." "Super haec," inquit, "igitur ueluti geometrae solent demonstratis propositis aliquid inferre quae porismata ipsi uocant, ita ego quoque tibi ueluti corollarium dabo. Nam quoniam beat.i.tudinis adeptione fiunt homines beati, beat.i.tudo uero est ipsa diuinitas, diuinitatis adeptione beatos fieri manifestum est: sed uti iust.i.tiae adeptione iusti, sapientiae sapientes fiunt, ita diuinitatem adeptos deos fieri simili ratione necesse est. Omnis igitur beatus deus, sed natura quidem unus; partic.i.p.atione uero nihil prohibet esse quam plurimos." "Et pulchrum," inquam, "hoc atque pretiosum, siue porisma siue corollarium uocari mauis." "Atqui hoc quoque pulchrius nihil est, quod his annectendum esse ratio persuadet." "Quid?" inquam.

"c.u.m multa," inquit, "beat.i.tudo continere uideatur, utrumne haec omnia unum ueluti corpus beat.i.tudinis quadam partium uarietate coniungant an sit eorum aliquid quod beat.i.tudinis substantiam compleat, ad hoc uero cetera referantur?" "Vellem," inquam, "id ipsarum rerum commemoratione patefaceres." "Nonne," inquit, "beat.i.tudinem bonum esse censemus?" "Ac summum quidem," inquam. "Addas," inquit, "hoc omnibus licet. Nam eadem sufficientia summa est, eadem summa potentia, reuerentia quoque, claritas ac uoluptas beat.i.tudo esse iudicatur. Quid igitur? Haecine omnia bonum--sufficientia potentia ceteraque--ueluti quaedam beat.i.tudinis membra sunt an ad bonum ueluti ad uerticem cuncta referuntur?" "Intellego,"

inquam, "quid inuestigandum proponas, sed quid const.i.tuas audire desidero."

"Cuius discretionem rei sic accipe. Si haec omnia beat.i.tudinis membra forent, a se quoque inuicem discreparent. Haec est enim partium natura ut unum corpus diuersa componant. Atqui haec omnia idem esse monstrata sunt; minime igitur membra sunt. Alioquin ex uno membro beat.i.tudo uidebitur esse coniuncta--quod fieri nequit." "Id quidem," inquam, "dubium non est, sed id quod restat exspecto." "Ad bonum uero cetera referri palam est. Idcirco enim sufficientia pet.i.tur quoniam bonum esse iudicatur, idcirco potentia quoniam id quoque esse creditur bonum; idem de reuerentia, claritudine, iucunditate coniectare licet. Omnium igitur expetendorum summa atque causa bonum est. Quod enim neque re neque similitudine ullum in se retinet bonum, id expeti nullo modo potest. Contraque etiam quae natura bona non sunt, tamen si esse uideantur, quasi uere bona sint appetuntur. Quo fit uti summa, cardo atque causa expetendorum omnium bonitas esse iure credatur.

Cuius uero causa quid expet.i.tur, id maxime uidetur optari, ueluti si salutis causa quispiam uelit equitare, non tam equitandi motum desiderat quam salutis effectum. c.u.m igitur omnia boni gratia petantur, non illa potius quam bonum ipsum desideratur ab omnibus. Sed propter quod cetera optantur, beat.i.tudinem esse concessimus; quare sic quoque sola quaeritur beat.i.tudo. Ex quo liquido apparet ipsius boni et beat.i.tudinis unam atque eandem esse substantiam." "Nihil uideo cur dissentire quispiam possit."

"Sed deum ueramque beat.i.tudinem unum atque idem esse monstrauimus." "Ita,"

inquam. "Securo igitur concludere licet dei quoque in ipso bono nec usquam alio sitam esse substantiam.

[135] reapse uerius _Schepss_: re ab seuerius _uel_ re ipsa uerius _codd.

opt._

X.

Wherefore since thou hast seen what is the form of perfect and imperfect good, now I think we must show in what this perfection of happiness is placed. And inquire first whether there can be any such good extant in the world, as thou hast defined; lest, contrary to truth, we be deceived with an empty show of thought. But it cannot be denied that there is some such thing extant which is as it were the fountain of all goodness.

For all that is said to be imperfect is so termed for the want it hath of perfection. Whence it followeth that if in any kind we find something imperfect, there must needs be something perfect also in the same kind.

For if we take away perfection we cannot so much as devise how there should be any imperfection. For the nature of things began not from that which is defective and not complete, but, proceeding from entire and absolute, falleth into that which is extreme and enfeebled. But if, as we showed before, there be a certain imperfect felicity of frail goods, it cannot be doubted but that there is some solid and perfect happiness also." "Thou hast," quoth I, "concluded most firmly and most truly."

"Now where this good dwelleth," quoth she, "consider this. The common conceit of men's minds proveth that G.o.d the Prince of all things is good. For, since nothing can be imagined better than G.o.d, who doubteth but that is good than which is nothing better? And reason doth in such sort demonstrate G.o.d to be good that it convinceth Him to be perfectly good. For unless He were so, He could not be the chief of all things.

For there would be something better than He, having perfect goodness, which could seem to be of greater antiquity and eminence than He. For it is already manifest that perfect things were before the imperfect.

Wherefore, lest our reasoning should have no end, we must confess that the Sovereign G.o.d is most full of sovereign and perfect goodness. But we have concluded that perfect goodness is true happiness, wherefore true blessedness must necessarily be placed in the most high G.o.d." "I agree,"

quoth I, "neither can this be any way contradicted." "But I pray thee,"

quoth she, "see how boldly and inviolably thou approvest that which we said, that the Sovereign G.o.d is most full of sovereign goodness." "How?"

quoth I. "That thou presumest not that this Father of all things hath either received from others that sovereign good with which He is said to be replenished, or hath it naturally in such sort that thou shouldst think that the substance of the blessedness which is had, and of G.o.d who hath it, were diverse. For if thou thinkest that He had it from others, thou mayest also infer that he who gave it was better than the receiver.

But we most worthily confess that He is the most excellent of all things. And if He hath it by nature, but as a diverse thing, since we speak of G.o.d the Prince of all things, let him that can, invent who united these diverse things. Finally, that which is different from anything, is not that from which it is understood to differ. Wherefore that which is naturally different from the sovereign good, is not the sovereign good itself. Which it were impious to think of G.o.d, than whom, we know certainly, nothing is better. For doubtless the nature of nothing can be better than the beginning of it. Wherefore I may most truly conclude that which is the beginning of all things to be also in His own substance the chiefest good." "Most rightly," quoth I. "But it is granted that the chiefest good is blessedness?" "It is," quoth I.

"Wherefore," quoth she, "we must needs confess that blessedness itself is G.o.d." "I can neither contradict," quoth I, "thy former propositions, and I see this illation followeth from them."

"Consider," saith she, "if the same be not more firmly proved hence, because there cannot be two chief goods, the one different from the other. For it is manifest that of those goods which differ, the one is not the other, wherefore neither of them can be perfect, wanting the other. But manifestly that which is not perfect, is not the chiefest, wherefore the chief goods cannot be diverse. Now we have proved that both blessedness and G.o.d are the chiefest good, wherefore that must needs be the highest blessedness which is the highest divinity." "There can be nothing," quoth I, "concluded more truly than this, nor more firmly in arguing, nor more worthy G.o.d himself." "Upon this then," quoth she, "as the geometricians[136] are wont, out of their propositions which they have demonstrated, to infer something which they call _porismata_ (deductions) so will I give thee as it were a _corollarium_. For since that men are made blessed by the obtaining of blessedness, and blessedness is nothing else but divinity, it is manifest that men are made blessed by the obtaining of divinity. And as men are made just by the obtaining of justice, and wise by the obtaining of wisdom, so they who obtain divinity must needs in like manner become G.o.ds. Wherefore everyone that is blessed is a G.o.d, but by nature there is only one G.o.d; but there may be many by partic.i.p.ation." "This is,"

quoth I, "an excellent and precious _porisma_ or _corollarium_." "But there is nothing more excellent than that which reason persuadeth us to add." "What?" quoth I.

"Since," quoth she, "blessedness seemeth to contain many things, whether do they all concur as divers parts to the composition of one entire body of blessedness, or doth some one of them form the substance of blessedness to which the rest are to be referred?" "I desire," quoth I, "that thou wouldst declare this point, by the enumeration of the particulars." "Do we not think," quoth she, "that blessedness is good?"

"Yea, the chiefest good," quoth I. "Thou mayest," quoth she, "add this to them all. For blessedness is accounted the chiefest sufficiency, the chiefest power, respect, fame, and pleasure. What then? Are all these-- sufficiency, power, and the rest--the good, in the sense that they are members of it, or rather are they referred to good as to the head?" "I understand," quoth I, "what thou proposest, but I desire to hear what thou concludest." "This is the decision of this matter. If all these were members of blessedness, they should differ one from another. For this is the nature of parts, that being divers they compose one body.

But we have proved that all these are one and the same thing. Wherefore they are no members, otherwise blessedness should be compacted of one member, which cannot be." "There is no doubt of this," quoth I, "but I expect that which is behind." "It is manifest that the rest are to be referred to goodness; for sufficiency is desired, because it is esteemed good, and likewise power, because that likewise is thought to be good.

And we may conjecture the same of respect, fame, and pleasure. Wherefore goodness is the sum and cause of all that is desired. For that which is neither good indeed, nor beareth any show of goodness, can by no means be sought after. And contrariwise those things which are not good of their own nature, yet, if they seem such, are desired as if they were truly good. So that the sum, origin, and cause of all that is sought after is rightly thought to be goodness. And that on account of which a thing is sought, seemeth to be the chief object of desire. As if one would ride for his health, he doth not so much desire the motion of riding, as the effect of health. Wherefore, since all things are desired in respect of goodness, they are not so much wished for as goodness itself. But we granted that to be blessedness for which other things are desired, wherefore in like manner only blessedness is sought after; by which it plainly appeareth, that goodness and blessedness have one and the self-same substance." "I see not how any man can dissent." "But we have showed that G.o.d and true blessedness are one and the self-same thing." "It is so," quoth I. "We may then securely conclude that the substance of G.o.d consisteth in nothing else but in goodness.

[136] _Vide supra_, _Tr_. iii. p. 40.