The Theological Tractates and The Consolation of Philosophy Part 22

X.

Huc omnes pariter uenite capti Quos fallax ligat improbis catenis Terrenas habitans libido mentes, Haec erit uobis requies laborum, Hic portus placida manens quiete, 5 Hoc patens unum miseris asylum, Non quidquid Tagus aureis harenis Donat aut Hermus rutilante ripa Aut Indus calido propinquus...o...b.. Candidis miscens uirides lapillos, 10 Inl.u.s.trent aciem magisque caecos In suas condunt animos tenebras.

Hoc quidquid placet excitatque mentes, Infimis tellus aluit cauernis; Splendor quo regitur uigetque caelum, 15 Vitat obscuras animae ruinas.

Hanc quisquis poterit notare lucem, Candidos Phoebi radios negabit."

X.[137]

Come hither, all you that are bound, Whose base and earthly minds are drowned By l.u.s.t which doth them tie in cruel chains: Here is a seat for men opprest, Here is a port of pleasant rest; Here may a wretch have refuge from his pains.

No gold, which Tagus' sands bestow, Nor which on Hermus' banks doth flow, Nor precious stones which scorched Indians get[138], Can clear the sharpness of the mind, But rather make it far more blind, And in the farther depth of darkness set.

For this that sets our souls on work Buried in caves of earth doth lurk.

But heaven is guided by another light, Which causeth us to shun the dark[139], And who this light doth truly mark, Must needs deny that Phoebus' beams are bright."

[137] For the discussion on the nature of good in this poem and the next piece of prose cf. _supra_, pp. 38 ff.

[138] Literally, "Nor Indus, neighbour of the torrid zone, blending its green and white pebbles."

[139] Literally, "The light which gives guidance and vigour to the sky shuns the darkness of ruined minds."

XI.

"a.s.sentior," inquam, "cuncta enim firmissimis nexa rationibus constant."

Tum illa, "Quanti," inquit, "aestimabis, si bonum ipsum quid sit agnoueris?" "Infinito," inquam, "si quidem mihi pariter deum quoque qui bonum est continget agnoscere." "Atqui hoc uerissima," inquit, "ratione patefaciam, maneant modo quae paulo ante conclusa sunt." "Manebunt."

"Nonne," inquit, "monstrauimus ea quae appetuntur pluribus idcirco uera perfectaque bona non esse quoniam a se inuicem discreparent c.u.mque alteri abesset alterum, plenum absolutumque bonum afferre non posse? Tum autem uerum bonum fieri c.u.m in unam ueluti formam atque efficientiam colliguntur, ut quae sufficientia est, eadem sit potentia, reuerentia, claritas atque iucunditas, nisi uero unum atque idem omnia sint, nihil habere quo inter expetenda numerentur?" "Demonstratum," inquam, "nec dubitari ullo modo potest." "Quae igitur c.u.m discrepant minime bona sunt, c.u.m uero unum esse coeperint, bona fiunt; nonne haec ut bona sint, unitatis fieri adeptione contingit?" "Ita," inquam, "uidetur." "Sed omne quod bonum est boni partic.i.p.atione bonum esse concedis an minime?" "Ita est." "Oportet igitur idem esse unum atque bonum simili ratione concedas; eadem namque substantia est eorum quorum naturaliter non est diuersus effectus." "Negare," inquam, "nequeo." "Nostine igitur," inquit, "omne quod est tam diu manere atque subsistere quam diu sit unum, sed interire atque dissolui pariter atque unum dest.i.terit?" "Quonam modo?" "Vt in animalibus," inquit, "c.u.m in unum coeunt ac permanent anima corpusque, id animal uocatur; c.u.m uero haec unitas utriusque separatione dissoluitur, interire nec iam esse animal liquet. Ipsum quoque corpus c.u.m in una forma membrorum coniunctione permanet, humana uisitur species; at si distributae segregataeque partes corporis distraxerint unitatem, desinit esse quod fuerat. Eoque modo percurrenti cetera procul dubio patebit subsistere unumquodque, dum unum est, c.u.m uero unum esse desinit, interire." "Consideranti," inquam, "mihi plura minime aliud uidetur." "Estne igitur," inquit, "quod in quantum naturaliter agat relicta subsistendi appetentia uenire ad interitum corruptionemque desideret?" "Si animalia," inquam, "considerem quae habent aliquam uolendi nolendique naturam, nihil inuenio quod nullis extra cogentibus abiciant manendi intentionem et ad interitum sponte festinent.

Omne namque animal tueri salutem laborat, mortem uero perniciemque deuitat.

Sed quid de herbis arboribusque, quid de inanimatis omnino consentiam rebus prorsus dubito."

"Atqui non est quod de hoc quoque possis ambigere, c.u.m herbas atque arbores intuearis primum sibi conuenientibus innasci locis, ubi quantum earum natura queat cito exarescere atque interire non possint. Nam aliae quidem campis aliae montibus oriuntur, alias ferunt paludes, aliae saxis haerent, aliarum fecundae sunt steriles harenae, quas si in alia quispiam loca transferre conetur, arescant. Sed dat cuique natura quod conuenit et ne, dum manere possunt, intereant, elaborat. Quid quod omnes uelut in terras ore demerso trahunt alimenta radicibus ac per medullas robur corticemque diffundunt? Quid quod mollissimum quidque, sicuti medulla est, interiore semper sede reconditur, extra uero quadam ligni firmitate, ultimus autem cortex aduersum caeli intemperiem quasi mali patiens defensor opponitur?

Iam uero quanta est naturae diligentia, ut cuncta semine multiplicato propagentur! Quae omnia non modo ad tempus manendi uerum generatim quoque quasi in perpetuum permanendi ueluti quasdam machinas esse quis nesciat? Ea etiam quae inanimata esse creduntur nonne quod suum est quaeque simili ratione desiderant? Cur enim flammas quidem sursum leuitas uehit, terras uero deorsum pondus deprimit, nisi quod haec singulis loca motionesque conueniunt? Porro autem quod cuique consentaneum est, id unumquodque conseruat, sicuti ea quae sunt inimica corrumpunt. Iam uero quae dura sunt ut lapides, adhaerent tenacissime partibus suis et ne facile dissoluantur resistunt. Quae uero liquentia ut aer atque aqua, facile quidem diuidentibus cedunt, sed cito in ea rursus a quibus sunt abscisa relabuntur, ignis uero omnem refugit sectionem. Neque nunc nos de uoluntariis animae cognoscentis motibus, sed de naturali intentione tractamus, sicuti est quod acceptas escas sine cogitatione transigimus, quod in somno spiritum ducimus nescientes; nam ne in animalibus quidem manendi amor ex animae uoluntatibus, uerum ex naturae principiis uenit. Nam saepe mortem cogentibus causis quam natura reformidat uoluntas amplect.i.tur, contraque illud quo solo mortalium rerum durat diuturnitas gignendi opus, quod natura semper appet.i.t, interdum coercet uoluntas. Adeo haec sui caritas non ex animali motione sed ex naturali intentione procedit. Dedit enim prouidentia creatis a se rebus hanc uel maximam manendi causam ut quoad possunt naturaliter manere desiderent; quare nihil est quod ullo modo queas dubitare cuncta quae sunt appetere naturaliter constantiam permanendi, deuitare perniciem."

"Confiteor," inquam, "nunc me indubitato cernere quae dudum incerta uidebantur." "Quod autem," inquit, "subsistere ac permanere pet.i.t, id unum esse desiderat; hoc enim sublato ne esse quidem cuiquam permanebit." "Verum est," inquam. "Omnia igitur," inquit, "unum desiderant." Consensi. "Sed unum id ipsum monstrauimus esse quod bonum." "Ita quidem." "Cuncta igitur bonum petunt, quod quidem ita describas licet: ipsum bonum esse quod desideretur ab omnibus." "Nihil," inquam, "uerius excogitari potest. Nam uel ad nihil unum cuncta referuntur et uno ueluti uertice dest.i.tuta sine rectore fluitabunt, aut si quid est ad quod uniuersa festinent, id erit omnium summum bonorum." Et illa: "Nimium," inquit, "o alumne laetor, ipsam enim mediae ueritatis notam mente fixisti. Sed in hoc patuit tibi quod ignorare te paulo ante dicebas." "Quid?" inquam. "Quis esset," inquit, "rerum omnium finis. Is est enim profecto, quod desideratur ab omnibus, quod quia bonum esse collegimus, oportet rerum omnium finem bonum esse fateamur.

XI.

"I consent," quoth I, "for all is grounded upon most firm reasons." "But what account wilt thou make," quoth she, "to know what goodness itself is?" "I will esteem it infinitely," quoth I, "because by this means I shall come to know G.o.d also, who is nothing else but goodness." "I will conclude this," quoth she, "most certainly, if those things be not denied which I have already proved." "They shall not," quoth I. "Have we not proved," quoth she, "that those things which are desired of many, are not true and perfect goods, because they differ one from another and, being separated, cannot cause complete and absolute goodness, which is only found when they are united as it were into one form and causality, that the same may be sufficiency, power, respect, fame, and pleasure? And except they be all one and the same thing, that they have nothing worth the desiring?" "It hath been proved," quoth I, "neither can it be any way doubted of." "Those things, then, which, when they differ, are not good and when they are one, become good, are they not made good by obtaining unity?" "So methink," quoth I. "But dost thou grant that all that is good is good by partaking goodness?" "It is so."

"Thou must grant then likewise that unity and goodness are the same. For those things have the same substance, which naturally have not diverse effects." "I cannot deny it," quoth I. "Knowest thou then," quoth she, "that everything that is doth so long remain and subsist as it is one, and perisheth and is dissolved so soon as it ceaseth to be one?" "How?"

"As in living creatures," quoth she, "so long as the body and soul remain united, the living creature remaineth. But when this unity is dissolved by their separation, it is manifest that it perisheth, and is no longer a living creature. The body also itself, so long as it remaineth in one form by the conjunction of the parts, appeareth the likeness of a man. But if the members of the body, being separated and sundered, have lost their unity, it is no longer the same. And in like manner it will be manifest to him that will descend to other particulars, that everything continueth so long as it is one, and perisheth when it loseth unity." "Considering more particulars, I find it to be no otherwise." "Is there anything," quoth she, "that in the course of nature, leaving the desire of being, seeketh to come to destruction and corruption?" "If," quoth I, "I consider living creatures which have any nature to will and nill, I find nothing that without extern compulsion forsake the intention to remain, and of their own accord hasten to destruction. For every living creature laboureth to preserve his health, and escheweth death and detriment. But what I should think of herbs, and trees, and of all things without life, I am altogether doubtful."

"But there is no cause why thou shouldst doubt of this, if thou considerest first that herbs and trees grow in places agreeable to their nature, where, so much as their const.i.tution permitteth, they cannot soon wither and perish. For some grow in fields, other upon hills, some in fenny, other in stony places, and the barren sands are fertile for some, which if thou wouldst transplant into other places they die. But nature giveth every one that which is fitting, and striveth to keep them from decaying so long as they can remain. What should I tell thee, if all of them, thrusting as it were their lips into the ground, draw nourishment by their roots, and convey substance and bark by the inward pith? What, that always the softest, as the pith, is placed within, and is covered without by the strength of the wood, and last of all the bark is exposed to the weather, as being best able to bear it off? And how great is the diligence of nature that all things may continue by the multiplication of seed; all which who knoweth not to be, as it were, certain engines, not only to remain for a time, but successively in a manner to endure for ever? Those things also which are thought to be without all life, doth not every one in like manner desire that which appertaineth to their own good? For why doth levity lift up flames, or heaviness weigh down the earth, but because these places and motions are convenient for them? And that which is agreeable to everything conserveth it, as that which is opposite causeth corruption. Likewise those things which are hard, as stones, stick most firmly to their parts, and make great resistance to any dissolution. And liquid things, as air and water, are indeed easily divided, but do easily also join again. And fire flieth all division. Neither do we now treat of the voluntary motions of the understanding soul, but only of natural operations. Of which sort is, to digest that which we have eaten, without thinking of it, to breathe in our sleep not thinking what we do.

For even in living creatures the love of life proceedeth not from the will of the soul, but from the principles of nature. For the will many times embraceth death upon urgent occasions, which nature abhorreth; and contrariwise the act of generation, by which alone the continuance of mortal things is maintained, is sometimes bridled by the will, though nature doth always desire it. So true it is that this self-love proceedeth not from any voluntary motion, but from natural intention.

For providence gave to her creatures this as the greatest cause of continuance, that they naturally desire to continue so long as they may, wherefore there is no cause why thou shouldst any way doubt that all things which are desire naturally stability of remaining, and eschew corruption."

"I confess," quoth I, "that I now see undoubtedly that which before seemed very doubtful." "Now that," quoth she, "which desireth to continue and remain seeketh to have unity. For if this be taken away, being itself cannot remain." "It is true," quoth I. "All things then,"

quoth she, "desire unity." I granted it to be so. "But we have showed that unity is the same as goodness." "You have indeed." "All things then desire goodness, which thou mayest define thus: Goodness is that which is desired of all things." "There can be nothing imagined more true. For either all things have reference to no one principle and, being dest.i.tute as it were of one head, shall be in confusion without any ruler: or if there be anything to which all things hasten, that must be the chiefest of all goods." "I rejoice greatly O scholar," quoth she, "for thou hast fixed in thy mind the very mark of verity. But in this thou hast discovered that which a little before thou saidest thou wert ignorant of." "What is that?" quoth I. "What the end of all things is,"

quoth she. "For certainly it is that which is desired of all things, which since we have concluded to be goodness, we must also confess that goodness is the end of all things.

XI.

Quisquis profunda mente uestigat uerum Cupitque nullis ille deuiis falli, In se reuoluat intimi lucem uisus Longosque in orbem cogat inflectens motus Animumque doceat quidquid extra molitur 5 Suis retrusum possidere thesauris.

Dudum quod atra texit erroris nubes Lucebit ipso perspicacius Phoebo.

Non omne namque mente depulit lumen Obliuiosam corpus inuehens molem. 10 Haeret profecto s.e.m.e.n introrsum ueri Quod excitatur uentilante doctrina.

Nam cur rogati sponte recta censetis, Ni mersus alto uiueret fomes corde?

Quod si Platonis Musa personat uerum, 15 Quod quisque discit immemor recordatur."

XI.

He that would seek the truth with thoughts profound And would not stray in ways that are not right, He to himself must turn his inward sight, And guide his motions in a circled round, Teaching his mind that ever she design Herself in her own treasures to possess: So that which late lay hidden in cloudiness More bright and clear than Phoebus' beams shall s.h.i.+ne.

Flesh hath not quenched all the spirit's light, Though this oblivion's lump holds her opprest.

Some seed of truth remaineth in our breast, Which skilful learning eas'ly doth excite.

For being askt how can we answer true Unless that grace within our hearts did dwell?

If Plato's heavenly muse the truth us tell, We learning things remember them anew."[140]

[140] For Plato's doctrine of Reminiscence cf. _Meno_ 81-86, and _Phaedo_ 72-76.

XII.

Tum ego: "Platoni," inquam, "uehementer a.s.sentior, nam me horum iam secundo commemoras, primum quod memoriam corporea contagione, dehinc c.u.m maeroris mole pressus amisi." Tum illa: "Si priora," inquit, "concessa respicias, ne illud quidem longius aberit quin recorderis quod te dudum nescire confessus es." "Quid?" inquam. "Quibus," ait illa, "gubernaculis mundus regatur."

"Memini," inquam, "me inscitiam meam fuisse confessum, sed quid afferas, licet iam prospiciam, planius tamen ex te audire desidero." "Mundum,"

inquit, "hunc deo regi paulo ante minime dubitandum putabas." "Ne nunc quidem arbitror," inquam, "nec umquam dubitandum putabo quibusque in hoc rationibus accedam breuiter exponam. Mundus hic ex tam diuersis contrariisque partibus in unam formam minime conuenisset, nisi unus esset qui tam diuersa coniungeret. Coniuncta uero naturarum ipsa diuersitas inuicem discors dissociaret atque diuelleret, nisi unus esset qui quod nexuit contineret. Non tam uero certus naturae ordo procederet nec tam dispositos motus locis, temporibus, efficientia, spatiis, qualitatibus explicarent, nisi unus esset qui has mutationum uarietates manens ipse disponeret. Hoc quidquid est quo condita manent atque agitantur, usitato cunctis uocabulo deum nomino."

Tum illa: "c.u.m haec," inquit, "ita sentias, paruam mihi restare operam puto ut felicitatis compos patriam sospes reuisas. Sed quae proposuimus intueamur. Nonne in beat.i.tudine sufficientiam numerauimus deumque beat.i.tudinem ipsam esse consensimus?" "Ita quidem." "Et ad mundum igitur,"

inquit, "regendum nullis extrinsecus adminiculis indigebit; alioquin si quo egeat, plenam sufficientiam non habebit." "Id," inquam, "ita est necessarium." "Per se igitur solum cuncta disponit." "Negari," inquam, "nequit." "Atqui deus ipsum bonum esse monstratus est." "Memini," inquam.

"Per bonum igitur cuncta disponit, si quidem per se regit omnia quem bonum esse consensimus et hic est ueluti quidam clauus atque gubernaculum quo mundana machina stabilis atque incorrupta seruatur." "Vehementer a.s.sentior," inquam, "et id te paulo ante dicturam tenui licet suspicione prospexi." "Credo;" inquit, "iam enim ut arbitror uigilantius ad cernenda uera oculos deducis. Sed quod dicam non minus ad contuendum patet." "Quid?"

inquam. "c.u.m deus," inquit, "omnia bonitatis clauo gubernare iure credatur eademque omnia sicuti docui ad bonum naturali intentione festinent, num dubitari potest quin uoluntaria regantur seque ad disponentis nutum ueluti conuenientia contemperataque rectori sponte conuertant?" "Ita," inquam, "necesse est; nec beatum regimen esse uideretur, si quidem detrectantium iugum foret, non obtemperantium salus." "Nihil est igitur quod naturam seruans deo contraire conetur." "Nihil," inquam. "Quod si conetur," ait, "num tandem proficiet quidquam aduersus eum quem iure beat.i.tudinis potentissimum esse concessimus?" "Prorsus," inquam, "nihil ualeret." "Non est igitur aliquid quod summo huic bono uel uelit uel possit obsistere."

"Non," inquam, "arbitror." "Est igitur summum," inquit, "bonum quod regit cuncta fort.i.ter suauiterque disponit." Tum ego: "Quam," inquam, "me non modo ea quae conclusa est summa rationum, uerum multo magis haec ipsa quibus uteris uerba delectant, ut tandem aliquando stult.i.tiam magna lacerantem sui pudeat."

"Accepisti," inquit, "in fabulis lacessentes caelum Gigantas; sed illos quoque, uti condignum fuit, benigna fort.i.tudo disposuit. Sed uisne rationes ipsas inuicem collidamus? Forsitan ex huiusmodi conflictatione pulchra quaedam ueritatis scintilla dissiliat." "Tuo," inquam, "arbitratu." "Deum,"

inquit, "esse omnium potentem nemo dubitauerit." "Qui quidem," inquam, "mente consistat, nullus prorsus ambigat." "Qui uero est," inquit, "omnium potens, nihil est quod ille non possit." "Nihil," inquam. "Num igitur deus facere malum potest?" "Minime," inquam. "Malum igitur," inquit, "nihil est, c.u.m id facere ille non possit, qui nihil non potest." "Ludisne," inquam, "me inextricabilem labyrinthum rationibus texens, quae nunc quidem qua egrediaris introeas, nunc uero quo introieris egrediare, an mirabilem quendam diuinae simplicitatis...o...b..m complicas? Etenim paulo ante beat.i.tudine incipiens eam summum bonum esse dicebas quam in summo deo sitam loquebare. Ipsum quoque deum summum esse bonum plenamque beat.i.tudinem disserebas; ex quo neminem beatum fore nisi qui pariter deus esset quasi munusculum dabas. Rursus ipsam boni formam dei ac beat.i.tudinis loquebaris esse substantiam ipsumque unum id ipsum esse bonum docebas quod ab omni rerum natura peteretur. Deum quoque bonitatis gubernaculis uniuersitatem regere disputabas uolentiaque cuncta parere nec ullam mali esse naturam.

Atque haec nullis extrinsecus sumptis sed ex altero altero fidem trahente insitis domesticisque probationibus explicabas."

Tum illa: "Minime," inquit, "ludimus remque omnium maximam dei munere quem dudum deprecabamur exegimus. Ea est enim diuinae forma substantiae ut neque in externa dilabatur nec in se externum aliquid ipsa suscipiat, sed, sicut de ea Parmenides ait: