Essays on the Constitution of the United States Part 18

Is it not certain that government would be weak and irregular, and that the people would be poor and contemptible? And still it must be allowed, that each town would entirely surrender its boasted independence if they should unite in State government, and would retain only about one-eightieth part of the administration of their own affairs.

Has it ever been found, that people's property or persons were less regarded and less protected in large states than in small?

Have not the Legislature in large states been as careful not to over-burden the people with taxes as in small? But still it must be admitted, that a single town in a small state holds a greater proportion of the authority than in a large.

If the United States were one single government, provided the const.i.tution of this extensive government was as good as the const.i.tution of this State now is, would this part of it be really in greater danger of oppression or tyranny, than at present? It is true that many people who are _great men_ because they go to Hartford to make laws for us once or twice in a year, would then be no greater than their neighbours, as much fewer representatives would be chosen. But would not the people be as safe, governed by their representatives a.s.sembled in New York or Philadelphia, as by their representatives a.s.sembled in Hartford or New Haven? Many instances can be quoted, where people have been unsafe, poor and contemptible, because they were governed only in small bodies; but can any instance be found where they were less safe for uniting? Has not every instance proved somewhat similar to the so much dreaded union between England and Scotland, where the Scots, instead of becoming a poor, despicable, dependent people, have become much more secure, happy, and respectable? If then, the const.i.tution is a good one, why should we be afraid of uniting, even if the Union was to be much more complete and entire than is proposed?

A Countryman, II.

The New Haven Gazette, (Number 40)

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 22, 1787.

TO THE PEOPLE OF CONNECTICUT.

It is fortunate that you have been but little distressed with that torrent of impertinence and folly, with which the newspaper politicians have over whelmed many parts of our country.

It is enough that you should have heard, that one party has seriously urged, that we should adopt the _New Const.i.tution_ because it has been approved by _Was.h.i.+ngton_ and _Franklin_: and the other, with all the solemnity of apostolic address to _Men_, _Brethren_, _Fathers_, _Friends and Countryman_, have urged that we should reject, as dangerous, every clause thereof, because that _Was.h.i.+ngton_ is more used to command as a soldier, than to reason as a politician-_Franklin is old_, others are _young_-and _Wilson_ is _haughty_.(52) You are too well informed to decide by the opinion of others, and too independent to need a caution against undue influence.

Of a very different nature, tho' only one degree better than the other reasoning, is all that sublimity of _nonsense_ and _alarm_, that has been thundered against it in every shape of _metaphoric terror_, on the subject of a _bill of rights_, the _liberty of the press_, _rights of conscience_, _rights of taxation and election_, _trials in the vicinity_, _freedom of speech_, _trial by jury_, and a _standing army_. These last are undoubtedly important points, much too important to depend on mere paper protection. For, guard such privileges by the strongest expressions, still if you leave the legislative and executive power in the hands of those who are or may be disposed to deprive you of them-you are but slaves. Make an absolute monarch-give him the supreme authority, and guard as much as you will by bills of rights, your liberty of the press, and trial by jury;-he will find means either to take them from you, or to render them useless.

The only real security that you can have for all your important rights must be in the nature of your government. If you suffer any man to govern you who is not strongly interested in supporting your privileges, you will certainly lose them. If you are about to trust your liberties with people whom it is necessary to bind by stipulation, that they shall not keep a standing army, your stipulation is not worth even the trouble of writing.

No bill of rights ever yet bound the supreme power longer than the _honeymoon_ of a new married couple, unless the _rulers were interested_ in preserving the rights; and in that case they have always been ready enough to declare the rights, and to preserve them when they were declared.-The famous English _Magna Charta_ is but an act of parliament, which every subsequent parliament has had just as much const.i.tutional power to repeal and annul, as the parliament which made it had to pa.s.s it at first. But the security of the nation has always been, that their government was so formed, that at least _one branch_ of their legislature must be strongly interested to preserve the rights of the nation.

You have a bill of rights in Connecticut (i. e.) your legislature many years since enacted that the subjects of this state should enjoy certain privileges. Every a.s.sembly since that time, could, by the same authority, enact that the subjects should enjoy none of those privileges; and the only reason that it has not long since been so enacted, is that your legislature were as strongly interested in preserving those rights as any of the subjects; and this is your only security that it shall not be so enacted at the next session of a.s.sembly: and it is security enough.

Your General a.s.sembly under your present const.i.tution are supreme. They may keep troops on foot in the most profound peace, if they think proper.

They have heretofore abridged the trial by jury in some cases, and they can again in all. They can restrain the press, and may lay the most burdensome taxes if they please, and who can forbid? But still the people are perfectly safe that not one of these events shall take place so long as the members of the General a.s.sembly are as much interested, and interested in the same manner, as the other subjects.

On examining the new proposed const.i.tution, there can be no question but that there is authority enough lodged in the proposed Federal Congress, if abused, to do the greatest injury. And it is perfectly idle to object to it, that there is no bill of rights, or to propose to add to it a provision that a trial by jury shall in no case be omitted, or to patch it up by adding a stipulation in favor of the press, or to guard it by removing the paltry objection to the right of Congress to regulate the time and manner of elections.

If you cannot prove by the best of all evidence, viz., by the _interest of the rulers_, that this authority will not be abused, or at least that those powers are not more likely to be abused by the Congress, than by those who now have the same powers, you must by no means adopt the const.i.tution:-No, not with all the bills of rights and with all the stipulations in favor of the people that can be made.

But if the members of Congress are to be interested just as you and I are, and just as the members of our present legislatures are interested, we shall be just as safe, with even supreme power (if that were granted) in Congress, as in the General a.s.sembly. If the members of Congress can take no improper step which will not affect them as much as it does us, we need not apprehend that they will usurp authorities not given them to injure that society of which they are a part.

The sole question, (so far as any apprehension of tyranny and oppression is concerned) ought to be, how are Congress formed? how far have you a control over them? Decide this, and then all the questions about their power may be dismissed for the amus.e.m.e.nt of those politicians whose business it is to catch flies, or may occasionally furnish subjects for _George Bryan's_ Pomposity, or the declamations of _Cato_-_An Old Whig_-_Son of Liberty_-_Brutus_-_Brutus junior_-_An Officer of the Continental Army_,-the more contemptible _Timoleon_, and the residue of that rabble of writers.

A Countryman, III.

The New Haven Gazette, (Number 41)

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 1787.

TO THE PEOPLE OF CONNECTICUT.

The same thing once more-I am a plain man, of few words; for this reason perhaps it is, that when I have said a thing I love to repeat it. Last week I endeavored to evince, that the only surety you could have for your liberties must be in the nature of your government; that you could derive no security from bills of rights, or stipulations, on the subject of a standing army, the liberty of the press, trial by jury, or on any other subject. Did you ever hear of an absolute monarchy, where those rights which are proposed by the pigmy politicians of this day, to be secured by stipulation, were ever preserved? Would it not be mere trifling to make any such stipulations, in any absolute monarchy?

On the other hand, if your interest and that of your rulers are the same, your liberties are abundantly secure. Perhaps the most secure when their power is most complete. Perhaps a provision that they should never raise troops in time of peace, might at some period embarra.s.s the public concerns and endanger the liberties of the people. It is possible that in the infinite variety of events, it might become improper strictly to adhere to any one provision that has ever been proposed to be stipulated.

At all events, the people have always been perfectly safe without any stipulation of the kind, when the rulers were interested to make them safe; and never otherwise.

No people can be more secure against any oppression in their rulers than you are at present; and no rulers can have more supreme and unlimited authority than your general a.s.sembly have.

When you consult on the subject of adopting the new const.i.tution, you do not enquire whether the powers therein contained can be safely lodged in any hands whatever. For not only those very powers, but all other powers, are already in the general a.s.sembly.-The enquiry is, whether Congress is by this new const.i.tution so formed that a part of the power now in the general a.s.sembly would be as well lodged in Congress. Or, as was before said, it depends on how far the members are under your control; and how far their interest and yours are the same; to which careful attention must be given.

A Countryman, IV.

The New Haven Gazette, (Number 42)

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1787.

TO THE PEOPLE OF CONNECTICUT.

If the propriety of trusting your government in the hands of your representatives was now a perfectly new question, the expediency of the measure might be doubted. A very great portion of the objections which we daily find made against adopting the new const.i.tution (and which are just as weighty objections against our present government, or against any government in existence) would doubtless have their influence; and perhaps would determine you against trusting the powers of sovereignty out of your own hands.

The best theory, the best philosophy on the subject, would be too uncertain for you to hazard your freedom upon.

But your freedom, in that sense of the expression (if it could be called sense), is already totally gone. Your Legislature is not only supreme in the usual sense of the word, but they have _literally, all the powers of society_. Can you-can you _possibly_ grant anything new? Have you any power which is not already granted to your General a.s.sembly? You are indeed called on to say whether a part of the powers now exercised by the General a.s.sembly, shall not, in future, be exercised by Congress. And it is clearly much better for your interest, that Congress should experience those powers than that they should continue in the General a.s.sembly, provided you can trust Congress as safely as the General a.s.sembly.

What forms your security under the General a.s.sembly? Nothing save that the interest of the members is the same as yours. Will it be the same with Congress? There are essentially only two differences between the formation of Congress and of your General a.s.sembly. One is,-that Congress are to govern a much larger tract of country, and a much greater number of people, consequently your proportion of the government will be much smaller than at present. The other difference is-that the members of Congress when elected, hold their places for two, four and six years, and the members of a.s.sembly only six and twelve months.

The first of these differences was discussed pretty fully in the first number, (when there was no idea of proceeding thus far on the subject), and has all the force as an objection against the powers of Congress, that it would have if applied to a proposal to give up the sovereignty of the several towns of the state, (if such sovereignty had existed,) and unite in state government.

It would be only a repet.i.tion to enter into a consideration of this difference between Congress and your a.s.sembly.

It has been suggested that the six or eight members which we shall send to Congress will be men of property, who can little feel any burthens they may lay on society. How far is this idea supported by experience? As the members are to pay their proportion, will they not be as careful of laying too great burthens as poorer people? Are they less careful of their money than the poor? This objection would be much stronger against trusting the power out of your hands at all. If the several towns were now independent, this objection would be much more forcible against uniting in state government, and sending one or two of your most wealthy men to Hartford or New Haven, to vote away your money. But this you have tried, and found that a.s.semblies of representatives are less willing to vote away money than even their const.i.tuents. An individual of any tolerable economy, pays all his debts, and perhaps has money beforehand. A small school district, or a small parish, will see what sum they want, and usually provide sufficiently for their wants, and often have a little money at interest.

Town voters are partly representatives, i. e. many people pay town taxes who have no right to vote, but the money they vote away is princ.i.p.ally their own. The towns in this state tax themselves less willingly than smaller bodies. They generally however tax themselves sufficiently to nearly pay the demands against them within the year, very seldom raise money beforehand by taxes. The General a.s.sembly of this state could never be induced to _attempt_ to do more than pay the annual interest of what they owe, and occasionally sink very small parts of the princ.i.p.al, and they never in fact did thus much, and we are all witnesses that they are full as careful of the public money as we can wish. It never was a complaint that they were too ready to allow individuals large sums. A man who has a claim against a town, and applies to a town-meeting, is very likely to obtain justice: but he who has a claim against the state, and applies to the General a.s.sembly, stands but a poor chance to obtain justice. Some rule will be found to exclude his claim,-or to lessen it,-or he will be paid in a security-not worth half the money.

You have uniformly experienced that your representatives are as careful, if not more so, of your money, than you yourselves are in your town-meetings; but still your representatives are generally men of property, and those of them who are most independent, and those whom you have sent to Congress, have not been by any means the least careful.

A Countryman, V.