Essays on the Constitution of the United States Part 19

The New Haven Gazette, (Number 44)

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 20, 1787.

TO THE PEOPLE OF CONNECTICUT.

You do not hate to read Newspaper Essays on the new const.i.tution, more than I hate to write them. Then _we will be short_-which I have often found the _best_ expression in a dull sermon, except the _last_.

Whether the mode of election pointed out in the proposed const.i.tution is well calculated to support the principles which were designed to be established in the different branches of the legislature, may perhaps be justly doubted:-and may perhaps in some future day be discussed.

The design undoubtedly was, that the house of representatives should be a _popular_ a.s.sembly,-that the senate should, in its nature, be somewhat more permanent, and that the two houses should be completely independent of each other. These _principles_ are right-for the present we will suppose they will be supported-there then remains to be considered no considerable difference between the const.i.tutional government which is proposed, and your present government, except that the time for which you choose your present rulers is only for six and twelve months, and the time for which you are to choose your continental rulers is for two, four and six years.

The convention were mistaken if they supposed they should lessen the evils of tumultuous elections by making elections less frequent. But are your liberties endangered by this measure? Philosophy may mislead you. Ask experience. Are not the liberties of the people of England as safe as yours?-They are not as free as yours, because much of their government is in the hands of _hereditary majesty_ and _n.o.bility_. But is not that part of the government which is under the control of the commons exceedingly well guarded? But still the house of commons is only a third branch-the _only_ branch who are appointed by the people-and they are chosen but once in _seven years_. Is there then any danger to be apprehended from the length of time that your rulers are to serve? when none are to serve more than six years-one whole house but two years, and your President but four.

The great power and influence of an hereditary monarch of Britain has spread many alarms, from an apprehension that the commons would sacrifice the liberties of the people to the money or influence of the crown: but the influence of a powerful _hereditary_ monarch, with the national Treasury-Army-and fleet at his command-and the whole executive government-and one-third of the legislative in his hands constantly operating on a house of commons, whose duration is never less than _seven years_, unless this same monarch should _end_ it, (which he can do in an hour,) has never yet been sufficient to obtain one vote of the house of commons which has taken from the people the _liberty of the press_,-_trial by jury_,-_the rights of conscience, or of private property_.

Can you then apprehend danger of oppression and tyranny from the too great duration of the power of _your_ rulers?

THE LETTERS OF A CITIZEN OF NEW HAVEN, WRITTEN BY ROGER SHERMAN.

Printed In The New Haven Gazette, December, 1789.

Note.

These letters are ascribed to Sherman on the authority mentioned at page 213.

In a letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph, (_Correspondence_, 1, 63), he says:

On the subject of amendments, nothing has been publickly, and very little privately, said. Such as I am known to have espoused will, as far as I can gather, be attainable from the federalists, who sufficiently predominate in both branches, though with some the concurrence will proceed from a spirit of conciliation rather than conviction. Connecticut is least inclined, though I presume not inflexibly opposed, to a moderate revision.

A paper, which will probably be republished in the Virginia gazettes, under the signature of a citizen of New Haven, unfolds Mr. Sherman's opinions.

In the _Writings of John Adams_, (VI, 427), is a correspondence between Adams and Sherman, produced by these articles, which should be studied in connection with them.

A Citizen Of New Haven, I.

The New Haven Gazette, (Number 48)

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1788.

_Observations on the Alterations Proposed as Amendments to the new Federal Const.i.tution._

Six of the states have adopted the new const.i.tution without proposing any alteration, and the most of those proposed by the conventions of other states may be provided for by congress in a code of laws without altering the const.i.tution. If congress may be safely trusted with the affairs of the Union, and have sufficient powers for that purpose, and possess no powers but such as respect the common interest of the states (as I have endeavored to show in a former piece), then all the matters that can be regulated by law may safely be left to their discretion, and those will include all that I have noticed except the following, which I think on due consideration will appear to be improper or unnecessary.

1. It is proposed that the consent of two-thirds or three-fourths of the members present in this branch of the congress shall be required for pa.s.sing certain acts.

On which I would observe, that this would give a minority in congress power to controul the majority, joined with the concurrent voice of the president, for if the president dissents, no act can pa.s.s without the consent of two-thirds of the members in each branch of congress; and would not that be contrary to the general principles of republican government?

2. That impeachments ought not to be tried by the senate, or not by the senate alone.

But what good reason can be a.s.signed why the senate is not the most proper tribunal for that purpose? The members are to be chosen by the legislatures of the several states, who will doubtless appoint persons of wisdom and probity, and from their office can have no interested motives to partiality. The house of peers in Great Britain try impeachments and are also a branch of the legislature.

3. It is said that the president ought not to have power to grant pardons in cases of high treason, but the congress.

It does not appear that any great mischief can arise from the exercise of this power by the president (though perhaps it might as well have been lodged in congress). The president cannot pardon in case of impeachment, so that such offenders may be excluded from office notwithstanding his pardon.

4. It is proposed that members of congress be rendered ineligible to any other office during the time for which they are elected members of that body.

This is an objection that will admit of something plausible to be said on both sides, and it was settled in convention on full discussion and deliberation. There are some offices which a member of congress may be best qualified to fill, from his knowledge of public affairs acquired by being a member, such as minister to foreign courts, &c., and on accepting any other office his seat in congress will be vacated, and no member is eligible to any office that shall have been inst.i.tuted or the emoluments increased while he was a member.

5. It is proposed to make the president and senators ineligible after certain periods.

But this would abridge the privilege of the people, and remove one great motive to fidelity in office, and render persons incapable of serving in offices, on account of their experience, which would best qualify them for usefulness in office-but if their services are not acceptable they may be left out at any new election.

6. It is proposed that no commercial treaty should be made without the consent of two-thirds of the senators, nor any cession of territory, right of navigation or fishery, without the consent of three-fourths of the members present in each branch of congress.

It is provided by the const.i.tution that no commercial treaty shall be made by the president without the consent of two-thirds of the senators present, and as each state has an equal representation and suffrage in the senate, the rights of the state will be as well secured under the new const.i.tution as under the old; and it is not probable that they would ever make a cession of territory or any important national right without the consent of congress. The king of Great Britain has by the const.i.tution a power to make treaties, yet in matters of great importance he consults the parliament.

7. There is one amendment proposed by the convention of South Carolina respecting religious tests, by inserting the word _other_, between the words _no_ and _religious_ in that article, which is an ingenious thought, and had that word been inserted, it would probably have prevented any objection on that head. But it may be considered as a clerical omission and be inserted without calling a convention; as it now stands the effect will be the same.

On the whole it is hoped that all the states will consent to make a fair trial of the const.i.tution before they attempt to alter it; experience will best show whether it is deficient or not, on trial it may appear that the alterations that have been proposed are not necessary, or that others not yet thought of may be necessary; everything that tends to disunion ought to be avoided. Instability in government and laws tends to weaken a state and render the rights of the people precarious.

If another convention should be called to revise the const.i.tution, 'tis not likely they would be more unanimous than the former; they might judge differently in some things, but is it certain that they would judge better? When experience has convinced the states and people in general that alterations are necessary, they may be easily made, but attempting it at present may be detrimental if not fatal to the union of the states.

The judiciary department is perhaps the most difficult to be precisely limited by the const.i.tution, but congress have full power to regulate it by law, and it may be found necessary to vary the regulations at different times as circ.u.mstances may differ.

Congress may make requisitions for supplies previous to direct taxation, if it should be thought to be expedient, but if requisitions be made and some states comply and others not, the non-complying states must be considered and treated as delinquents, which will tend to excite disaffection and disunion among the states, besides occasioning delay; but if congress lay the taxes in the first instance these evils will be prevented, and they will doubtless accommodate the taxes to the customs and convenience of the several states.

Some suppose that the representation will be too small, but I think it is in the power of congress to make it too large, but I believe that it may be safely trusted with them. Great Britain contains about three times the number of the inhabitants in the United States, and according to Burgh's account in his political disquisitions, the members of parliament in that kingdom do not exceed 131, and if 69 more be added from the princ.i.p.al cities and towns the number would be 200; and strike off those who are elected by the small boroughs, which are called the rotten part of the const.i.tution by their best patriots and politicians, that nation would be more equally and better represented than at present; and if that would be a sufficient number for their national legislature, one-third of that number will be more than sufficient for our federal legislature who will have few general matters to transact. But these and other objections have been considered in a former paper, before referred to. I shall therefore conclude this with my best wishes for the continuance of the peace, liberty and union of these states.

A CITIZEN OF NEW HAVEN.

A Citizen Of New Haven, II.