Fighting Instructions, 1530-1816 Part 27

[4] _Cf._ note 1, p. 224.

[5] Howe's insistence on these points both here and in Articles XXII.-XXV. is curious in view of the fact that the use of fires.h.i.+ps in action had gone out of fas.h.i.+on. From 1714 to 1763 only one English fires.h.i.+p is known to have been 'expended,' and that was by Commander Callis when he destroyed the Spanish galleys at St. Tropez in 1742. At the peace of 1783 the Navy List contained only 17 fires.h.i.+ps out of a total of 468 sail. Howe had two fires.h.i.+ps on the First of June, 1794, but did not use them.

THE SIGNAL BOOKS OF THE GREAT WAR

INTRODUCTORY

The second form in which the new Fighting Instructions, originated by Lord Howe, have come down to us, is that which became fixed in the service after 1790; that is, instead of two folio volumes with the Signals in one and the Explanatory Instructions in the other, we have, at least after 1799, one small quarto containing both, and ent.i.tled 'Signal Book for s.h.i.+ps of War.' The earliest known example, however, of the new quarto form is a Signal Book only, which refers to a set of Instructions apparently similar to those of 1799. These have not been found, but presumably they were in a separate volume. The Signal Book is in the Admiralty Library labelled in ma.n.u.script '1792-3(?),' but, as before, no date or signature appears in the body of it. From internal evidence, however, as well as from collateral testimony, there is little difficulty in identifying it as Lord Howe's second code issued in 1790.

The feature of the book that first strikes us is that, though the bulk of it is printed, all the most important battle signals, as well as many others, have been added in MS., while at the end are the words, 'Given on board the Queen Charlotte, to Capt. ----, commander of his majesty's s.h.i.+p the ----, by command of the admiral.' It is thus obvious that the original printed form, which contains many further unfilled blanks for additional signals, was used as a draft for a later edition. No such edition is known to exist in print, but both the original signals and the additions correspond exactly with the MS. code which was used by Lord Howe in his campaign of 1794. In editing this code for the Society in his _Logs of the Great Sea Fights_, Admiral Sturges Jackson hazarded the conjecture that it had not then been printed, but was supplied to each s.h.i.+p in the fleet in MS. The admiralty volume goes far to support his conjecture, and it is quite possible that we have here the final draft from which the MS. copies were made.

As to the actual date at which the code was completed there is not much difficulty. The Queen Charlotte was Howe's flags.h.i.+p in the Channel fleet from 1792-4, but it was also his flags.h.i.+p in 1790 at the time of the 'Spanish Armament,' when he put to sea in immediate expectation of war with Spain. While the tension lasted he is known to have used the critical period in exercising his fleet in tactical evolutions, in order to perfect it in a new code of signals which he had been elaborating for several years.[1] It is probable therefore that this Signal Book belongs to that year, and that it is one of several copies which Howe had printed with the battle signals blank for his own use while he was elaborating his system by practical experiment. This conjecture is brought to practical certainty by a rough and much-worn copy of it in the United Service Inst.i.tution. It was made by Lieut. John Walsh, of H.M.S. Marlborough, one of Howe's fleet, and inside the cover he has written 'Earl Howe's signals by which the Grand Fleet was governed 1790, 1791, and 1794.'

It was upon the tactical system contained in this book that all the great actions of the Nelson period were fought. The alterations which took place during the war were slight. The codes used by Howe himself in 1794, and by Duncan at Camperdown in 1797, follow it exactly. A slightly modified form was issued by Jervis to the Mediterranean fleet, and was used by him at St. Vincent in 1797. No copy of this is known to exist, but from the logs of the s.h.i.+ps there engaged it would appear that, though the numbering of the code had been changed, the princ.i.p.al battle signals remained the same. In 1799 a new edition was printed in the small quarto form. In this the Signal Book and the Instructions were bound together, and were issued to the whole navy, but here again, though the numbers were changed, the alterations were of no great importance.[2] Reprints appeared in 1806 and 1808, but the code itself continued in use till 1816. In that year an entirely new Signal Book based on Sir Home Popham's code was issued with a fresh set of Explanatory Instructions, or, as they had come to be called, 'Instructions relating to the line of battle and the conduct of the fleet preparatory to their engaging and when engaged with an enemy.'[3] Both these sets of 'Explanatory Instructions' are printed below, but, as we have seen, they throw but little light by themselves on the progress of tactical thought during the great period they covered. They were no longer 'Fighting Instructions' in the old sense, unless read with the princ.i.p.al battle signals, and to these we have to go to get at the ideas that underlay the tactics of Nelson and his contemporaries.

Now the most remarkable feature of Howe's Second Signal Book, 1790, is the apparent disappearance from it of the signal for breaking the line which in his first code, 1782, he had borrowed from Hood in consequence of Rodney's manoeuvre. The other two signals introduced by Hood and Pigot for breaking the line on Rodney's plan are equally absent. In their stead appears a signal for an entirely new manoeuvre, never before practised or even suggested, so far as is known, by anyone. The 'signification' runs as follows: 'If, when having the weather-gage of the enemy, the admiral means to pa.s.s between the s.h.i.+ps of their line for engaging them to leeward or, being to leeward, to pa.s.s between them for obtaining the weather-gage. N.B.--The different captains and commanders not being able to effect the specified intention in either case are at liberty to act as circ.u.mstances require.' In the Signal Book of 1799 the wording is changed. It there runs 'To break through the enemy's line in all parts where practicable, and engage on the other side,' and in the admiralty copy delivered to Rear-Admiral Frederick there is added this MS. note, 'If a blue pennant is hoisted at the fore topmast-head, to break through the van; if at the main topmast-head, to break through the centre; if at the mizen topmast-head, to break through the rear.'[4]

This form of the signification shows that the intention of the signal was something different from what is usually understood in naval literature by 'breaking the line.' By that we generally understand the manoeuvre practised by Lord Rodney in 1782, a manoeuvre which was founded on the conception of 'leading through' the enemy's line in line ahead, and all the s.h.i.+ps indicated pa.s.sing through in succession at the same point. Whereas in Lord Howe's signal the tactical idea is wholly different. In his manoeuvre the conception is of an attack by bearing down all together in line abreast or line of bearing, and each s.h.i.+p pa.s.sing through the enemy's line at any interval it found practicable; and this was actually the method of attack which he adopted on June 1, 1794. In intention the two signals are as wide as the poles asunder. In Rodney's case the idea was to sever the enemy's line and cut off part of it from the rest. In Howe's case the idea of severing the line is subordinate to the intention of securing an advantage by engaging on the opposite side from which the attack is made. The whole of the attacking fleet might in principle pa.s.s through the intervals in the enemy's line without cutting off any part of it. In principle, moreover, the new attack was a parallel attack in line abreast or in line of bearing, whereas the old attack was a perpendicular or oblique attack in line ahead.

Nothing perhaps in naval literature is more remarkable than the fact that this fundamental difference is never insisted on, or even, it may be said, so much as recognised. Whenever we read of a movement for breaking the line in this period it is almost always accompanied with remarks which a.s.sume that Rodney's manoeuvre is intended and not Howe's. Probably it is Nelson who is to blame. At Trafalgar, after carefully elaborating an attack based on Howe's method of line abreast, he delivered it in line ahead, as though he had intended to use Rodney's method. His reasons were sound enough, as will be seen later. But as a piece of scientific tactics it was as though an engineer besieging a fortress, instead of drawing his lines of approach diagonally, were to make them at right angles to the ditch. When the greatest of the admirals apparently (but only apparently) confused the two antagonistic conceptions of breaking the line, there is much excuse for civilian writers being confused in fact.

The real interest of the matter, however, is to inquire, firstly, by what process of thought Howe in his second code discarded Rodney's manoeuvre as the primary meaning of his signal after having adopted it in his first, and, secondly, how and to what end did he arrive at his own method.

On the first point there can be little doubt. Sir Charles H. Knowles gives us to understand that Howe still had Hoste's Treatise at his elbow, and with Hoste for his mentor we may be sure that, in common with other tactical students of his time, he soon convinced himself that Rodney's manoeuvre was usually dangerous and always imperfect. Knowles himself in his old age, though a devout admirer of Rodney, denounced it in language of characteristic violence, and maintained to the last that Rodney never intended it, as every one now agrees was the truth. Nelson presumably also approved Howe's cardinal improvement, or even in his most impulsive mood he would hardly have called him 'the first and greatest sea officer the world has ever produced.'[5]

As to the second point--the fundamental intention of the new manoeuvre--we get again a valuable hint from Knowles. Upon his second visit to the admiralty, after Howe had succeeded Keppel at the end of 1783, Knowles brought with him by request a tactical treatise written by his father, as well as certain of his own tactical studies, and discussed with Howe a certain manoeuvre which he believed the French employed for avoiding decisive actions. He showed that when engaged to leeward they fell off by alternate s.h.i.+ps as soon as they were hard pressed, and kept reforming their line to leeward, so that the British had continually to bear up, and expose themselves to be raked aloft in order to close again. In this way, as he pointed out, the French were always able to clip the British wings without receiving any decisive injury themselves. In a MS. note to his 'Fighting and Sailing Instructions,' he puts the matter quite clearly. 'In the battle off Granada,' he says, 'in the year 1779 the French s.h.i.+ps partially executed this manoeuvre, and Sir Charles [H.] Knowles (then 5th lieutenant of the Prince of Wales of 74 guns, the flags.h.i.+p of the Hon. Admiral Barrington) drew this manoeuvre, and which he showed Admiral Lord Howe, when first lord of the admiralty, during the peace. His lords.h.i.+p established a signal to break through the enemy's line and engage on the other side to leeward, and which he executed himself in the battle of the 1st of June, 1794.' The note adds that before Knowles drew Howe's attention to the supposed French manoeuvre he had been content with his original Article XIV., modifying Article XXI. of the old Fighting Instructions as already explained. Whether therefore Knowles's account is precisely accurate or not, we may take it as certain that it was to baffle the French practice of avoiding close action by falling away to leeward that Howe hit on his brilliant conception of breaking through their line in all parts.

No finer manoeuvre was ever designed. In the first place it developed the utmost fire-face by bringing both broadsides into play. Secondly, by breaking up the enemy's line into fragments it deprived their admiral of any shadow of control over the part attacked. Thirdly, by seizing the leeward position (the essential postulate of the French method of fighting) it prevented individual captains making good their escape independently to leeward and ensured a decisive _melee_, such as Nelson aimed at. And, fourthly, it permitted a concentration on any part of the enemy's line, since it actually severed it at any desired point quite as effectually as did Rodney's method. Whether Howe ever appreciated the importance of concentration to the extent it was felt by Nelson, Hood and Rodney is doubtful. Yet his invention did provide the best possible form of concentrated attack. It had over Rodney's imperfect manoeuvre this inestimable advantage, that by the very act of breaking the line you threw upon the severed portion an overwhelming attack of the most violent kind, and with the utmost development of fire-surface. Finally it could not be parried as Rodney's usually could in Hoste's orthodox way by the enemy's standing away together upon the same tack. By superior gunnery Howe's attack might be _stopped_, but by no possibility could it be _avoided_ except by flight. It was no wonder then that Howe's invention was received with enthusiasm by such men as Nelson.

Still it is clear that in certain cases, and especially in making an attack from the leeward, as Clerk of Eldin had pointed out, and where it was desirable to preserve your own line intact, Rodney's manoeuvre might still be the best. Howe's manoeuvre moreover supplied its chief imperfection, for it provided a method of dealing drastically with the portion of the enemy's line that had been cut off. Thus, although it is not traceable in the Signal Book, it was really reintroduced in Howe's third code. This is clear from the last article of the Explanatory Instructions of 1799 which distinguishes between the two manoeuvres; but whether or not this article was in the Instructions of 1790 we cannot tell. The probability is that it was not, for in the Signal Book of 1790 there is no reference to a modifying instruction.

Further, we know that in the code proposed by Sir Charles H. Knowles the only signal for breaking the line was word for word the same as Howe's. This code he drew up in its final form in 1794, but it was not printed till 1798. The presumption is therefore that until the code of 1799 was issued Howe's method of breaking the line was the only one recognised. In that code the primary intention of Signal 27 'for breaking through the enemy's line in all parts' is still for Howe's manoeuvre, but the instruction provides that it could be modified by a red pennant over, and in that case it meant 'that the fleet is to preserve the line of battle as it pa.s.ses through the enemy's line, and to preserve it in very close order, that such of the enemy's s.h.i.+ps as are cut off may not find an opportunity of pa.s.sing through it to rejoin their fleet.' This was precisely Rodney's manoeuvre with the proviso for close order introduced by Pigot. The instruction also provided for the combining of a numeral to indicate at which number in the enemy's line the attempt was to be made. No doubt the distinction between manoeuvres so essentially different might have been more logically made by entirely different signals.[6] But in practice it was all that was wanted. It is only posterity that suffers, for in studying the actions of that time it is generally impossible to tell from the signal logs or the tactical memoranda which movement the admiral had in mind. Not only do we never find it specified whether the signal was made simply or with the pennant over, but admirals seem to have used the expressions 'breaking' and 'cutting' the line, and 'breaking through,' 'cutting through,' 'pa.s.sing through,' and 'leading through,' as well as others, quite indiscriminately of both forms of the manoeuvre. Thus in Nelson's first, or Toulon, memorandum he speaks of 'pa.s.sing through the line' from to-windward, meaning presumably Howe's manoeuvre, and of 'cutting through' their fleet from to-leeward when presumably he means Rodney's. In the Trafalgar memorandum he speaks of 'leading through' and 'cutting' the line from to-leeward, and of 'cutting through' from to-windward, when he certainly meant to perform Howe's manoeuvre. Whereas Howe, in his Instruction x.x.xI. of 1799, uses 'breaking the line' and 'pa.s.sing through it' indifferently of both forms.

All we can do is generally to a.s.sume that when the attack was to be made from to-windward Howe's manoeuvre was intended, and Rodney's when it was made from to-leeward. Yet this is far from being safe ground. For the signification of the plain signal without the red pennant over--_i.e._ 'to break through ... and engage on the other side'--seems to contemplate Howe's manoeuvre being made both from to-leeward and from to-windward.

The only notable disappearances in Howe's second code (1790) are the signals for 'doubling,' probably as a corollary of the new manoeuvre. For, until this device was. .h.i.t upon, Rodney's method of breaking the line apparently could only be made effective as a means of concentration by doubling on the part cut off in accordance with Hoste's method. This at least is what Clerk of Eldin seems to imply in some of his diagrams, in so far as he suggests any method of dealing with the part cut off. Yet in spite of this disappearance Nelson certainly doubled at the Nile, and according to Captain Edward Berry, who was captain of his flags.h.i.+p, he did it deliberately. 'It is almost unnecessary,' he wrote in his narrative, 'to explain his projected mode of attack at anchor, as that was minutely and precisely executed in the action.... These plans however were formed two months before, ... and the advantage now was that they were familiar to the understanding of every captain in the fleet.' Nelson probably felt that the dangers attending doubling in an action under sail are scarcely appreciable in an action at anchor with captains whose steadiness he could trust. Still Saumarez, his second in command, regarded it as a mistake, and there was a good deal of complaint of our s.h.i.+ps having suffered from each other's fire.[7]

Amongst the more important retentions of tactical signals we find that for Hoste's method of giving battle to a numerically superior force by leaving gaps in your own line between van, centre and rear. The wording however is changed. It is no longer enjoined as a means of avoiding being doubled. As Howe inserted it in MS. the signification now ran 'for the van or particular divisions to engage the headmost of the enemy's van, the rear the sternmost of the enemy's rear, and the centre the centre of the enemy. But with exception of the flag officers of the fleet who should engage those of the enemy respectively in preference.'[8] This signification again is considerably modified by the Explanatory Instructions. Article XXIV., it will be seen, says nothing of engaging the centre or of leaving regular gaps. The leading s.h.i.+p is to engage the enemy's leading s.h.i.+p, and the rearmost the rearmost, while the rest are to select the largest s.h.i.+ps they can get at, and leave the weaker ones alone till the stronger are disabled. It was in effect the adoption of Hoste's fifth rule for engaging a numerically superior fleet instead of his first, and it is a plan which he condemns except in the case of your being individually superior to your enemy, as indeed the English gunnery usually made them.

The curious signal No. 218 of 1782 for attacking the enemy's rear in succession by 'defiling' on the Elizabethan plan was also retained. In the Signal Book of 1799 it ran, 'to fire in succession upon the sternmost s.h.i.+ps of the enemy, then tack or wear and take station in rear of the squadron or division specified (if a part of the fleet is so appointed) until otherwise directed.'

It has been already said that the alterations in the edition of 1799 were not of great importance, but one or two additions must be noticed. The most noteworthy is a new signal for carrying out the important rule of Article IX. of the Instructions of 1782 (Article X. of 1799), providing for the formation of a _corps de reserve_ when you are numerically superior to the enemy, as was done by Villeneuve on Gravina's advice in 1805, although fortunately for Nelson it was not put in practice at Trafalgar.

The other addition appears in MS. at the end of the printed signals.

It runs as follows: 'When at anchor in line of battle to let go a bower anchor under foot, and pa.s.s a stout hawser from one s.h.i.+p to another, beginning at the weathermost s.h.i.+p,' an addition which would seem to have been suggested by what had recently occurred at the Nile.

Nelson's own order was as follows: '_General Memorandum_.--As the wind will probably blow along sh.o.r.e, when it is deemed necessary to anchor and engage the enemy at their anchorage it is recommended to each line-of-battle s.h.i.+p of the squadron to prepare to anchor with the sheet cable in abaft and springs, &c.'[9] Another copy of the signal book has a similar MS. addition to the signal 'Prepare for battle and for anchoring with springs, &c.'[10] It runs thus: 'A bower is to be unbent, and pa.s.sed through the stern port and bent to the anchor, leaving that anchor hanging by the stopper only.--Lord Nelson, St.

George, 26 March, 1801. If with a red pennant over with a spring only.--Commander-in-chiefs Order Book, 27 March, 1801.' These therefore were additions made immediately before the attack on the Danish fleet at Copenhagen.

No other change was made, and it may be said that Howe's new method of breaking the line was the last word on the form of attack for a sailing fleet. How far its full intention and possibilities were understood at first is doubtful. The accounts of the naval actions that followed show no lively appreciation on the part of the bulk of British captains. On the First of June the new signal for breaking through the line at all points was the first Howe made, and it was followed as soon as the moment for action arrived by that 'for each s.h.i.+p to steer for, independently of each other, and engage respectively the s.h.i.+p opposed in situation to them in the enemy's line.' The result was an action along the whole line, during which Howe himself at the earliest opportunity pa.s.sed through the enemy's line and engaged on the other side, though as a whole the fleet neglected to follow either his signal or his example.

In the next great action, that of St. Vincent, the circ.u.mstances were not suitable for the new manoeuvre, seeing that the Spaniards had not formed line. Jervis had surprised the enemy in disorder on a hazy morning after a change of wind, and this was precisely the 'not very probable case' which Clerk of Eldin had instanced as justifying a perpendicular attack. Whether or not Jervis had Clerk's instance in his mind, he certainly did deliver a perpendicular attack. The signal with which he opened, according to the signification as given in the flags.h.i.+p's log, was 'The admiral intends to pa.s.s through the enemy's line.'[11] There is nothing to show whether this meant Howe's manoeuvre or Rodney's, for we do not know whether at this time the instruction existed which enabled the two movements to be distinguished by a pennant over.

What followed however was that the fleet pa.s.sed between the two separated Spanish squadrons in line ahead as Clerk advised. The next thing to do, according to Clerk, was for the British fleet to wear or tack together, but instead of doing so Jervis signalled to tack in succession, and then repeated the signal to pa.s.s through the enemy's line although it was still unformed. It was at this moment that Nelson made his famous independent movement that saved the situation, and what he did was in effect as though Jervis had made the signal to tack together as Clerk enjoined. Thereupon Jervis, with the intention apparently of annulling his last order to pa.s.s through the line, made the signal, which seems to have been the only one which the captains of those days believed in--viz. to take suitable stations for mutual support and engage the enemy on arriving up with them in succession. In practice it was little more than a frank relapse to the methods of the early Commonwealth, and it was this signal and not that for breaking the line which made the action general.

Again, at the battle of Camperdown, Duncan, while trying to form single line from two columns of sailing, began with the signal for each s.h.i.+p to steer independently for her opponent. This was followed--the fleet having failed to form line parallel to the enemy, and being still in two disordered columns--by signals for the lee or van division to engage the enemy's rear, and as some thought the weather division his centre; and ten minutes later came the new signal for pa.s.sing through the line. The result was an action almost exactly like that of Nelson at Trafalgar--that is, though the leading s.h.i.+ps duly acted on the combination of the two signals for engaging their opposites and for breaking the line, each at its opposite interval, the rest was a _melee_; for, since what was fundamentally a parallel attack was attempted as a perpendicular one, it could be nothing but a scramble for the rear s.h.i.+ps.

In none of these actions therefore is there any evidence that Howe's attempt to impress the service with a serious scientific view of tactics had been successful, and the impression which they made upon our enemies suggests that the real spirit that inspired British officers at this time was something very different from that which Howe had tried to instil. Writing of the battle of St. Vincent, Don Domingo Perez de Grandallana, whose masterly studies of the French and English naval systems and tactics raised him to the highest offices of state, has the following pa.s.sage: 'An Englishman enters a naval action with the firm conviction that his duty is to hurt his enemies and help his friends and allies without looking out for directions in the midst of the fight; and while he thus clears his mind of all subsidiary distractions, he rests in confidence on the certainty that his comrades, actuated by the same principles as himself, will be bound by the sacred and priceless law of mutual support. Accordingly, both he and all his fellows fix their minds on acting with zeal and judgment upon the spur of the moment, and with the certainty that they will not be deserted. Experience shows, on the contrary, that a Frenchman or a Spaniard, working under a system which leans to formality and strict order being maintained in battle, has no feeling for mutual support, and goes into action with hesitation, preoccupied with the anxiety of seeing or hearing the commander-in-chief's signals for such and such manoeuvres.... Thus they can never make up their minds to seize any favourable opportunity that may present itself. They are fettered by the strict rule to keep station, which is enforced upon them in both navies, and the usual result is that in one place ten of their s.h.i.+ps may be firing on four, while in another four of their comrades may be receiving the fire of ten of the enemy. Worst, of all, they are denied the confidence inspired by mutual support, which is as surely maintained by the English as it is neglected by us, who will not learn from them.'[12]

This was probably the broad truth of the matter; it is summed up in the golden signal which was the panacea of British admirals when in doubt: 's.h.i.+ps to take station for mutual support and engage as they come up;' and it fully explains why, with all the scientific appreciation of tactics that existed in the leading admirals of this time, their battles were usually so confused and haphazard. The truth is that in the British service formal tactics had come to be regarded as a means of getting at your enemy, and not as a subst.i.tute for initiative in fighting him.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] _Dictionary of National Biography, sub voce_ 'Howe,' p. 97.

[2] A copy of this is in the Admiralty Library issued to 'Thomas Lenox Frederick esq., Rear-Admiral of the Blue,' and attested by the autographs of Vice-Admiral James Gambier, Vice-Admiral James Young, and another lord of the admiralty, and countersigned by William Marsden, the famous numismatist and Oriental scholar, who was 'second secretary' from 1795 to 1804. Another copy, also in the Admiralty Library, is attested by Gambier, Sir John Colpoys and Admiral Philip Patton, and countersigned by the new second secretary, John Barrow, all of whom came to the admiralty under Lord Melville on Pitt's return to office in 1804.

Two other copies are in the United Service Inst.i.tution.

[3] Sir Home Popham's code had been in use for many years for 'telegraphing.' It was by this code Nelson's famous signal was made at Trafalgar.

[4] In one of the United Service Inst.i.tution copies the signal has been added in MS. and the note is on a slip pasted in. In the other both signal and note are printed with blanks in which the distinguis.h.i.+ng pennants have been written in.

[5] Nelson to Howe, January 8, 1799. _Nicolas_, iii. 230.

[6] Sir Charles H. Knowles did modify his code in this way some time after 1798. For his original signal he subst.i.tuted two in MS. with the following neatly worded significations: 'No. 32. To break through the enemy's line together and engage on the opposite side. No. 33. To break through the enemy's line in succession and engage on the other side.'

Had these two lucid significations been adopted by Howe there would have been no possible ambiguity as to what was meant.

[7] Laughton, _Nelson's Letters and Despatches_, p. 151. Ross, _Memoir of Lord de Saumarez_, vol. i.

[8] This last mediaeval proviso was omitted in the later editions. It is not found in Hoste.

[9] Ross, _Memoir of Saumarez_, i. 212. Nelson refers to 'Signal 54, Art. x.x.xVII. of the Instructions,' which must have been a special and amplified set issued by Jervis. There is no Art. x.x.xVII. in Howe's set.

[10] In the United Service Inst.i.tution.

[11] _Logs of the Great Sea Fights_, i. 210. The log probably only gives an abbreviation of the signification. Unless Jervis had changed it, its exact wording was 'The admiral means to pa.s.s between the s.h.i.+ps of their line for engaging them to leeward,' &c. See _supra_, p. 255.

[12] Fernandez Duro, _Armada Espanola_, viii. 111.

_LORD HOWE'S EXPLANATORY INSTRUCTIONS_.

[+Signal Book, 1799+.[1]]

_Instructions for the conduct of the fleet preparatory to their engaging, and when engaged, with an enemy_.