Slavery and Four Years of War Part 45

"I am of opinion that it is my duty to pitch into his rear, although in so doing the head of his column may reach Warrenton before I can return."

The President, answering, said:

"I have but one idea which I think worth suggesting to you, and that is, in case you find Lee coming to the north of the Rappahannock, I would by no means cross to the south of it. If he should leave a rear force at Fredericksburg, tempting you to fall upon it, it would fight in intrenchments and have you at disadvantage, and so, man for man, worst you at that point, while his main force would in some way be getting the advantage of you northward. In one word, I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river, _like an ox jumped half over the fence and liable to be torn by dogs front and rear, without a fair chance to gore one way or kick the other_."( 1)

The President, answering another dispatch from Hooker, June 10th, said:

"I think Lee's army, and not Richmond, is your objective point.

If he comes towards the upper Potomac, follow him on his flank and on his inside track, shortening your lines while he lengthens him.

Fight him, too, when opportunity offers. If he stays where he is, _fret him and fret him_."( 2)

When deeply concerned about the fate of Winchester (June 14th), this dispatch was sent:

"Major General Hooker:

"So far as we can make out here, the enemy have Milroy surrounded at Winchester and Tyler at Martinsburg. If they could hold out a few days, could you help them? _If the head of Lee's army is at Martinsburg, and the tail of it on the plank road between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim somewhere.

Could you not break him?_"

"A. Lincoln."( 2)

Hooker did not cross the river and attack the rear of Lee's army, nor did he "_fret_" Lee's army, nor "_break_" it, however "_slim_"

"_the animal_" must have been, and hence Milroy was sacrificed, and the rich towns, cities, and districts of Maryland and Pennsylvania were overrun by a hungry and devastating foe; but Gettysburg came; the Union hosts there being successfully led by another commander --Meade!

George Gordon Meade came to the command of the Army of the Potomac under the most trying circ.u.mstances. The situation of that army and the country was critical. He had been distinguished as a brigade, division, and corps commander under McClellan, Burnside, and Hooker; in brief, he had won laurels on many fields, especially at Fredericksburg, where he broke through the enemy's right and reached his reserves, yet he never had held an independent command.

He was of Revolutionary stock (Pennsylvania), though born in Cadiz, Spain, December 31, 1815, where his parents then resided, his father being a merchant and s.h.i.+powner there. He was graduated at West Point; was a modest, truthful, industrious, studious man, with the instincts of a soldier. He was wounded at New Market, or Glendale, in the Peninsula campaign (1862). He was commanding in person, and ambitious to succeed, prudent, yet obstinate, and when aroused showed a fierce temper; yet he was, in general, just. On the third day after he a.s.sumed command of the army its advance corps opened the battle of Gettysburg. What great soldier ever before took an army and moved it into battle against a formidable adversary in so short a time? It must also be remembered that the troops composing his army were not used to material success. They had never been led to a decisive victory. Some of them had been defeated at Bull Run; some of them on the Peninsula; some of them at the Second Bull Run; some of them were in the drawn battle of Antietam; some of them had suffered repulse at Fredericksburg, and defeat at Chancellorsville, and the army in general had experienced more of defeat than success, although composed of officers and soldiers equal to the best ever called to battle. When Meade a.s.sumed command, Lee's army was, in the main, far up the c.u.mberland Valley, and pressing on; Ewell had orders to take Harrisburg, and was then, with most of his corps, at Carlisle, Pennsylvania. York and Wrightsville, Pa., were taken on the 28th by Gordon of Early's division. On the 29th Ewell ordered his engineer, with Jenkins'

cavalry, to reconnoitre the defences of Harrisburg, and he was starting for that place himself on the same day when Lee recalled him and his corps to join the main army at Cashtown, or Gettysburg.( 3)

Longstreet's corps marched from Fredericksburg, June 3d, _via_ Culpeper Court-House, thence up the Rappahannock and along the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge; on the 19th occupied Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps, leading to the Valley; on the 23d marched _via_ Martinsburg and Williamsport into Maryland, reaching Chambersburg on the 27th; thence marched on the 30th to Greenwood, and the next day to Marsh Creek, four miles from Gettysburg, Pickett's division and Hood's brigade being left, respectively, at Chambersburg and New Guilford.( 4)

A. P. Hill's corps did not leave Fredericksburg until the 14th of June, just after Hooker put the Army of the Potomac in motion to the northward. Hill marched into the Valley and joined Longstreet at Berryville, and from there preceded him to Chambersburg, and by one day to Cashtown and Gettysburg.( 5)

General J. E. B. Stuart, in command of the Confederate cavalry, crossed the upper Rappahannock, June 16th, and moved east of the Blue Ridge on Longstreet's right flank, leaving only a small body of cavalry on the Rappahannock, in observation, with instructions to follow on the right flank of Hill's corps. Severe cavalry engagements took place at Aldie, the 17th, and at Middleburg, Uppeville, and Snicker's Gap, without decisive results, both sides claiming victories. On the 24th Stuart, with the main body of his cavalry, succeeded in eluding the Union cavalry and Hooker's army (then feeling its way north), and pa.s.sed east of Centreville, thence _via_ Fairfax Court-House and Dranesville, and crossed, July 27th, the Potomac at Rowser's Ford, and captured a large supply train between Was.h.i.+ngton and Rockville. Stuart's cavalry caused some damage in the rear and east of the Army of the Potomac, but, on the whole, this bold movement contributed little, if any, towards success in Lee's campaign. Stuart's advance reached the Confederate left _via_ Dover and Carlisle, Pennsylvania, late on the afternoon of the second day of the battle, his troopers and horses in a somewhat exhausted condition. The consensus of opinion among military critics was then, and since is, that Lee committed a great strategic error in authorizing his main cavalry force to be separated from close contact with the right of his moving army. General Lee seems to have come to this conclusion himself, as frequently, in his official reports of the campaign, he deplores the absence of his cavalry and his consequent inability to obtain reliable information of the movements of the Army of the Potomac.( 6) Longstreet severely criticises Stuart's raid, and attributes to the absence of the cavalry, in large part, the failure of the Gettysburg campaign.( 7) Cavalry, under an energetic commander, are the _eyes and ears_ of a large army, especially when it is on an active campaign against a vigilant enemy.

Having with some particularity traced the main bodies composing Lee's army, as to time and routes, to the vicinity of Gettysburg, it remains to briefly follow the Army of the Potomac to the same place. While some of its corps moved earlier, the headquarters of that army did not leave Falmouth until the 14th of June, when it was established at Dumfries; on the next day at Fairfax Station, on the 18th at Fairfax Court-House, on the 26th at Poolesville, Maryland, and the next day at Frederick, Maryland, where Meade succeeded Hooker. Before the Army of the Potomac left Falmouth a division of the Sixth Corps had been thrown across the river to observe the enemy, but it did not attack him, and was withdrawn on the 13th.

Meade found his army, mainly, in the vicinity of Frederick, though some of his corps had pa.s.sed northward and others were moving up by converging lines, the Sixth Corps having just arrived at Poolesville from Virginia. June 29th, Meade moved his headquarters from Frederick to Middleburg, the next day to Taneytown, Maryland, about fifteen miles south of Gettysburg.

The movements of the Army of the Potomac were such as to cover Was.h.i.+ngton and Baltimore, and at the same time bring, as soon as possible, the invading army to battle.

The First, Eleventh, and Third Corps, under Major-General John F.

Reynolds, were in the advance on Gettysburg on July 1st, the First Corps leading, and preceded only by General John Buford's division of cavalry. Lee was then rapidly concentrating his army at Gettysburg. Reynolds found Buford fiercely engaging infantry of Hill's corps as they were debouching through the mountains on the Cashtown road. He promptly moved the First Corps to Buford's support, and it soon became hotly engaged. The Eleventh Corps, commanded by General Oliver O. Howard, was ordered to hasten to join in the battle. Howard arrived about 11.30 A.M., just as Reynolds fell mortally wounded, and the command of the field devolved on Howard. He pushed forward two divisions of the Eleventh to the support of the First Corps, then engaged on Seminary Hill, northeast of Gettysburg, and posted a third division on Cemetery Ridge, south of the town. The battle continued with great fierceness on the Cashtown road. For a time the Union success was considerable, and the Confederates were forced back, and numerous prisoners, including General Archer, were captured; but reinforcements from Cashtown and the unexpected arrival, at 1.30 P.M., over the York and Harrisburg roads, of Ewell's corps on Howard's right left him outnumbered and outflanked. He maintained the unequal contest until about 4 P.M., then ordered a withdrawal to Cemetery Ridge, which was accomplished with considerable loss, chiefly in prisoners taken in the streets of Gettysburg. Meade, learning of Reynolds' death, dispatched General W. S. Hanc.o.c.k to represent him on the field. Hanc.o.c.k arrived in time to aid Howard in posting the troops advantageously on the Ridge, where they handsomely repulsed an attack on the right flank. Sloc.u.m and Sickles' corps arrived about 7 P.M., and were posted on the right and left, respectively, of those in position.

Hanc.o.c.k reported to Meade the position held was a strong one, and advised that the army be concentrated there for battle. At 10 P.M.

Meade left Taneytown and reached the battle-field at 1 A.M. of the 2d of July, having, on the reports received, decided to stand and give general battle there.( 8) The Second and Fifth Corps and the rest of the Third arrived early on the 2nd. The Second and Third Corps went into position on the Union left on a continuation of the ridge towards Little Round Top Mountain. The Fifth was held in reserve until the arrival of the Sixth at 2 P.M., when it was moved to the extreme left, the Sixth taking its place in reserve owing to the exhaustion of its troops, they having just accomplished a thirty-two mile march from 9 P.M. of the day previous. The Third, under Sickles, was moved by him to a peach orchard about one half mile in advance, and out of line with the corps on its right and left. Here it received the shock of battle, precipitated about 3 P.M. by Longstreet's corps from the Confederate right. The Second and Fifth Corps were hastened to cover the flanks of the Third.

The battle raged furiously for some hours and until night put an end to it. The Third was forced, after a desperate conflict, to retire on its proper line. Sickles was severely wounded, losing a leg. The Fifth, after a most heroic conflict, succeeded in gaining and holding Round Top (big) Mountain, the key to the position on the Union left, as were Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill, on its right. Longstreet, at nightfall, after suffering great loss, was forced to retire, having gained no substantial advantage. The Sixth and part of the First Corps, having been ordered to the left, partic.i.p.ated in this battle and aided in Longstreet's repulse.

Geary's division of the Twelfth, moving from the extreme right, had also reinforced the left. It was this withdrawal from the right which enabled Ewell's corps to capture and occupy a part of the Union line in the vicinity of Culp's Hill. An a.s.sault was made about 8 P.M. on the Eleventh Corps at Cemetery Hill, where the enemy penetrated to a battery, over which a _melee_ took place, the Confederates, after a hand-to-hand fight, being driven from the hill and forced to retreat. Thus the second day's fighting at Gettysburg ended, neither side having gained any decisive advantage.

Most of the Union Army had been, however, more or less engaged, while Longstreet's corps (save Pickett's division), and only portions of Ewell's corps of the Confederate Army, had been seriously in battle. There had been some spirited artillery duels, but these rarely contribute materially to important results.

The third day opened, at early dawn, by Geary's division (returned from the left) attacking, and after a lively battle retaking its former position on the right. A spirited contest also raged on the right at Culp's Hill and along Rock Creek all the morning, in which Wheaton's brigade of the Sixth Corps partic.i.p.ated. With this exception, quiet reigned along the lines of the two great armies during the forenoon of the 3d.

Lee, flushed with some appearance of success on the first and second days, and over-confident of the fighting qualities of his splendid army, born of its defeats of the Army of the Potomac on the Rappahannock, decided to deliver offensive battle, though far from his natural base. Orders were accordingly given to Longstreet to ma.s.s a column of not less than 15,000 men for an a.s.sault, under cover of artillery, on the Union left centre, to be supported by simultaneous real or pretended attacks by other portions of the Confederate Army.

Longstreet did not believe in the success of the attack, and hence offered many objections to it, and predicted its failure. He advised swinging the Confederate Army by its right around the Union left, and thus compel Meade to withdraw from his naturally strong position.( 9) Lee would not listen to his great Lieutenant.

Pickett's division of three brigades was a.s.signed to the right of the column, and it became the division of direction. Kemper's division of four brigades from Hill's corps was formed on the left of Pickett, and Wilc.o.x's brigade of Hill's corps was placed in echelon in support on Pickett's right, and the brigades of Scales and Lane of Hill's corps, under Trimble, were to move in support of Kemper's left. The whole column of ten brigades, composed of forty-six regiments, numbered about 20,000 men.

Generals Pendleton and Alexander, chiefs of artillery of the Army of Northern Virginia and of Longstreet's corps, respectively, ma.s.sed 150 guns on a ridge extending generally parallel to the left of the Union Army and about one mile therefrom, and so as to be able to pour a converging fire on its left centre.(10) While this preparation for decisive battle went on in the Confederate lines, the Union Army stood at bay, in readiness for the battle-storm foreboded by the long lull and the active preparations observed in its front. At 1 P.M. Longstreet's batteries opened, and the superior guns of the Union Army, though not in position in such great number, promptly responded. This terrific duel lasted about two hours.

Meade, recognizing the futility of his artillery fire, and in antic.i.p.ation of the a.s.sault soon to come, ordered a large portion of his artillery withdrawn under cover, to give the guns time to cool and to be resupplied with ammunition. This led the enemy to believe he had silenced them effectively, and the a.s.saulting column went forward.(11) The Union artillery, with fresh batteries added, was again quickly put in position for its real work. The close ma.s.sed column of a.s.sault, well led, gallantly moved to the charge down the slope and across the open ground, directed against a portion of the Union line partially on Cemetery Ridge. The supporting Confederate batteries now almost ceased firing. As the a.s.saulting column went forward the Union guns turned on it, cutting gaps in it at each discharge. These were generally closed from the support, but when the head of the column got well up to, and in one place into, the Union breastworks, the fire of the Union infantry became irresistible. Longstreet ordered the divisions of McLaws and Hood, holding his line on the right of the a.s.saulting column, to advance to battle. Union forces moved out and attacked Pickett's supporting brigade on the right. Under the fierce fire of infantry and artillery the head of the great Confederate column fast melted away. Generals Garnett, Pender, Semmes, Armistead, and Barksdale were killed, Generals Kemper, Trimble, Pettigrew, and many other officers fell wounded, and many Confederate colors were shot down.

The Confederates who penetrated the Union line were killed or captured. When success was demonstrated to be impossible, Pickett ordered a retreat, and such of his men as were not cut off by the fire that continued to sweep the field escaped to cover behind the batteries, leaving the broad track of the a.s.saulting column strewn with dead, dying, and wounded. The great battle was now substantially ended. Meade did not draw out his army and pursue the broken Confederates, as their leaders expected him to do. Lee, while personally aiding in restoring the lines of his shattered troops, recognized the fearful consequences of Pickett's a.s.sault, and magnanimously said to an officer, "_It is all my fault_."

Generals Hanc.o.c.k and Gibbon and many important Union officers were wounded. This, together with other causes, prevented Meade from a.s.suming the offensive. Two-thirds of the Confederate Army had not been engaged actively in the last struggle, and the day was too far spent for Meade to make the combinations indispensable to the success of an immediate attack.

Longstreet withdrew McLaws and Hood from their advance position.

Kilpatrick moved his cavalry division to attack the Confederate right, and Farnsworth's cavalry brigade made a gallant charge on the rear of Longstreet's infantry, riding over detachments until the das.h.i.+ng leader lost his life and his command was cut to pieces by the terrific fire of the enemy's artillery and infantry. A great fight also ensued on the Union right near Rock Creek, between the Confederate cavalry under Stuart and the main body of the Union cavalry under General Alfred Pleasanton, in which our cavalry held the field and drove back Stuart from an attempt to penetrate behind the Union right. The infantry corps of the two armies were not again engaged at Gettysburg. Lee drew in his left to compact his army, holding his cavalry still on his left.

At nightfall, July 4th, Lee, having previously sent in advance his trains and ambulances filled with sick and wounded, commenced a retreat by the Fairfield and Emmittsburg roads through Hagerstown to the Potomac at Williamsport and Falling Waters, his cavalry covering his rear. The Sixth Corps and our cavalry followed in close pursuit on the morning of the 5th, but the main body of the Army of the Potomac marched on the Confederate flank, directed on Middletown, Maryland. French (left at Frederick) had pushed a column to Williamsport and Falling Waters, and destroyed a pontoon bridge and captured its guard and a wagon train. Buford's cavalry was sent by Meade to Williamsport, where it encountered Lee's advance, destroyed trains, and made many captures of guns and prisoners. Recent heavy rains had swollen the Potomac so that it could not be forded. Most of the Confederate sick and wounded were, with great effort, ferried over the swollen river in improvised boats, but not without several days' delay. Lee's army reached the Potomac on the 11th, having suffered considerable loss during its retreat in prisoners, arms, and trains. It took up a strong position, covering Williamsport and Falling Waters, and intrenched.

The Union Army, after reaching Middletown and being reinforced by French's command and somewhat reorganized, deployed on the 11th for battle, and on the 12th moved close up to the front of the Confederate Army. Orders were issued looking to an attack on the morning of the 13th, but the day was spent in reconnoissances and further preparations. On the following morning the enemy had succeeded in crossing the river, and only a rear-guard was taken.

Great disappointment was felt that Meade did not again force Lee to battle north of the Potomac. Certain it is that Lee's army was deficient in ammunition for all arms, and rations were scarce.

Lee, in dispatches to Jefferson Davis, dated July 7th, 8th, and 10th, showed great apprehension as to the result of a battle if attacked in his then situation.(12)

Meade's army was also greatly impeded by circ.u.mstances beyond human control. When, on the 13th of July, a general attack was contemplated, rain fell in torrents, and the cultivated fields were so soft as to render the movement of artillery and troops almost impossible.

The wheels of the gun-carriages sunk so deep in the soft earth as to forbid the guns being fired safely. Meade was urged, by dispatches from Halleck, and by one from President Lincoln, to attack Lee before he crossed the Potomac.(13) Meade was fully alive to the importance of doing this, but he displayed some timidity peculiar to his nature, and sought to have all the conditions in his favor before risking another battle. His combinations were made with too much precision for the time he had to do it in.

A less cautious commander might, during the first few days, have a.s.sailed Lee precipitately on his front or flank, or both simultaneously, relying on his not being able to concentrate his army to resist it. But after Lee had concentrated his forces and intrenched in a well selected position, covering Williamsport and Falling Waters, the result of an attack would have been doubtful, yet, in the light of what was later known, one should have been made. Meade, however, had done well under the circ.u.mstances at Gettysburg, and a two-weeks'-old independent commander, not yet accustomed to fighting a large army in aggressive battle, is ent.i.tled to considerate judgment.

The revised lists of losses in the battle and campaign of Gettysburg in the Army of the Potomac show 246 officers and 2909 enlisted men killed, 1145 officers and 13,384 enlisted men wounded, total 17,684; also 183 officers and 5182 enlisted men captured, grand total 23,049. The First and Eleventh Corps lost, chiefly on the first day, in captured, 3527.(14)

The imperfect lists of losses in the Army of Northern Virginia do not show the number of killed and wounded officers separately from enlisted men, and from some of the commands no reports are found, yet, so far as made, they show 2592 killed and 12,709 wounded, total 15,301, and 5150 captured, grand total 20,541.(15) The records of prisoners of war in the Adjutant-General's Office, U.S.A., give the names of 12,227 wounded and unwounded Confederates captured at Gettysburg, July 1st to 5th, inclusive.(15)

When the Gettysburg campaign ended I was fairly in the Army of the Potomac, destined to be with it and of it and to share its fortunes for two years and to the end of the war.

( 1) _War Records_, vol. xxvii., Part I., pp. 30-1.

( 2) _Ibid_., pp. 35, 39.

( 3) Ewell's Report, _War Records_, vol. xxvii., Part II., p. 443.

( 4) Longstreet's Report, _Ibid_., 358.

( 5) Lee's Report, _Ibid_., 317.

( 6) _War Records_, vol. xxvii., Part II., pp. 316, 321-2.

( 7) _Mana.s.sas to Appomattox_, pp. 342-3, 351-9, 362.

( 8) Meade's Report, _War Records_, vol. xxvii., Part I., p. 115.

( 9) _Mana.s.sas to Appomattox_, pp. 386-7.