The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Ramanuja Part 29

4. Nor like gra.s.s and so on; because (milk) does not exist elsewhere.

This argumentation does not hold good; for as gra.s.s and the like do not transform themselves without the guidance of an intelligent principle, your proving instance is not established.--But why is it not established?-- 'Because it does not exist elsewhere.' If gra.s.s, water and so on changed into milk even when consumed by a bull or when not consumed at all, then indeed it might be held that they change without the guidance of an intelligent principle. But nothing of the kind takes place, and hence we conclude that it is the intelligent principle only which turns the gra.s.s eaten by the cow into milk.--This point has been set forth above under Sutra 3; the present Sutra is meant to emphasise and particularise it.

5. And if you say--as the man and the stone; thus also.

Here the following view might be urged. Although the soul consists of mere intelligence and is inactive, while the Pradhana is dest.i.tute of all power of thought; yet the non-sentient Pradhana may begin to act owing to the mere nearness of the soul. For we observe parallel instances. A man blind but capable of motion may act in some way, owing to the nearness to him of some lame man who has no power of motion but possesses good eyesight and a.s.sists the blind man with his intelligence.

And through the nearness of the magnetic stone iron moves. In the same way the creation of the world may result from the connexion of Prakriti and the soul. As has been said, 'In order that the soul may know the Pradhana and become isolated, the connexion of the two takes place like that of the lame and the blind; and thence creation springs' (Sankhya Ka.

21). This means--to the end that the soul may experience the Pradhana, and for the sake of the soul's emanc.i.p.ation, the Pradhana enters on action at the beginning of creation, owing to the nearness of the soul.

To this the Sutra replies 'thus also.' This means--the inability of the Pradhana to act remains the same, in spite of these instances. The lame man is indeed incapable of walking, but he possesses various other powers--he can see the road and give instructions regarding it; and the blind man, being an intelligent being, understands those instructions and directs his steps accordingly. The magnet again possesses the attribute of moving towards the iron and so on. The soul on the other hand, which is absolutely inactive, is incapable of all such changes. As, moreover, the mere nearness of the soul to the Pradhana is something eternal, it would follow that the creation also is eternal. If, on the other hand, the soul is held to be eternally free, then there can be no bondage and no release.

6. And on account of the impossibility of the relation of princ.i.p.al (and subordinate) matter.

You Sankhyas maintain that the origination of the world results from a certain relation between princ.i.p.al and subordinate ent.i.ties which depends on the relative inferiority and superiority of the gunas-- 'according to the difference of the abodes of the several gunas'

(Sankhya Ka. I, 16).

But, as in the pralaya state the three gunas are in a state of equipoise, none of them being superior or inferior to the others, that relation of superiority and subordination cannot then exist, and hence the world cannot originate. Should it, on the other hand, be maintained that even in the pralaya state there is a certain inequality, it would follow therefrom that creation is eternal.

7. And if another inference be made (the result remains unchanged), on account of (the Pradhana) being dest.i.tute of the power of a knowing subject.

Even if the Pradhana were inferred by some reasoning different from the arguments so far refuted by us, our objections would remain in force because, anyhow, the Pradhana is devoid of the power of a cognising subject. The Pradhana thus cannot be established by any mode of inference.

8. And even if it be admitted; on account of the absence of a purpose.

Even if it were admitted that the Pradhana is established by Inference, the Sankhya theory could not be accepted for the reason that the Pradhana is without a purpose. For, according to the view expressed in the pa.s.sage, 'In order that the soul may know the Pradhana and become isolated' (Sankhya Ka. I, 21), the purpose of the Pradhana is fruition and final release on the part of the soul; but both these are impossible.

For, as the soul consists of pure intelligence, is inactive, changeless, and spotless, and hence eternally emanc.i.p.ated, it is capable neither of fruition which consists in consciousness of Prakriti, nor of Release which consists in separation from Prakriti. If, on the other hand, it be held that the soul const.i.tuted as described is, owing to the mere nearness of Prakriti, capable of fruition, i.e. of being conscious of pleasure and pain, which are special modifications of Prakriti, it follows that, as Prakriti is ever near, the soul will never accomplish emanc.i.p.ation.

9. And (it is) objectionable on account of the contradictions.

The Sankhya-system, moreover, labours from many internal contradictions.-- The Sankhyas hold that while Prakriti is for the sake of another and the object of knowledge and fruition, the soul is independent, an enjoying and knowing agent, and conscious of Prakriti; that the soul reaches isolation through the instrumentality of Prakriti only, and that as its nature is pure, permanent, unchanging consciousness, absence of all activity and isolation belong to that nature; that for this reason the accomplis.h.i.+ng of the means of bondage and release and of release belong to Prakriti only; and that, owing to Prakriti's proximity to the unchanging non-active soul, Prakriti, by a process of mutual superimposition (adhyasa), works towards the creation of a world and subserves the purposes of the soul's fruition and emanc.i.p.ation.--'Since the aggregate of things is for the sake of another; since there is an opposite of the three gunas and the rest; since there is superintendence; since there is an experiencing subject; and since there is activity for the sake of isolation; the soul exists' (Sankhya Ka. 17); 'And from that contrast the soul is proved to be a witness, isolated, neutral, cognising and inactive' (18).--And after having stated that the activity of the Pradhana is for the purpose of the release of the Self, the text says, 'therefore no (soul) is either bound or released, nor does it migrate; it is Prakriti which, abiding in various beings, is bound and released and migrates' (62). And 'From this connexion therewith (i.e.

with the soul) the non-intelligent appears as intelligent; and although all agency belongs to the gunas, the indifferent (soul) becomes an agent.

In order that the soul may know the Pradhana and become isolated, the connexion of the two takes place like that of the lame and the blind; and thence creation springs' (20, 21).--Now to that which is eternally unchanging, non-active and isolated, the attributes of being a witness and an enjoying and cognising agent can in no way belong. Nor also can such a being be subject to error resting on superimposition; for error and superimposition both are of the nature of change. And, on the other hand, they also cannot belong to Prakriti, since they are attributes of intelligent beings. For by superimposition we understand the attribution, on the part of an intelligent being, of the qualities of one thing to another thing; and this is the doing of an intelligent being, and moreover a change. Nor is it possible that superimposition and the like should take place in the soul only if it is in approximation to Prakriti.-- They may take place just on account of the non-changing nature of the soul!--Then, we reply, they would take place permanently. And that mere proximity has no effective power we have already shown under II, 1, 4.

And if it is maintained that it is Prakriti only that migrates, is bound and released, how then can she be said to benefit the soul, which is eternally released? That she does so the Sankhyas distinctly a.s.sert, 'By manifold means Prakriti, helpful and endowed with the gunas, without any benefit to herself, accomplishes the purpose of the soul, which is thankless and not composed of the gunas' (Sankhya Ka. 60).--The Sankhyas further teach that Prakriti, on being seen by any soul in her true nature, at once retires from that soul--'As a dancer having exhibited herself on the stage withdraws from the soul, so Prakriti withdraws from the soul when she has manifested herself to it' (59); 'My opinion is that there exists nothing more sensitive than Prakriti, who knowing "I have been seen" does not again show itself to the soul' (61). But this doctrine also is inappropriate. For, as the soul is eternally released and above all change, it never sees Prakriti, nor does it attribute to itself her qualities; and Prakriti herself does not see herself since she is of non-intelligent nature; nor can she wrongly impute to herself the soul's seeing of itself as her own seeing of herself, for she herself is non-intelligent and the soul is incapable of that change which consists in seeing or knowing.--Let it then be said that the 'seeing' means nothing more than the proximity of Prakriti to the soul!-- But this also does not help you; for, as said above, from that there would follow eternal seeing, since the two are in eternal proximity.

Moreover, the ever unchanging soul is not capable of an approximation which does not form an element of its unchanging nature.--Moreover, if you define the seeing as mere proximity and declare this to be the cause of Release, we point out that it equally is the cause of bondage--so that bondage and release would both be permanent.--Let it then be said that what causes bondage is wrong seeing--while intuition of the true nature of things is the cause of Release!--But as both these kinds of seeing are nothing but proximity, it would follow that both take place permanently. And if, on the other hand, the proximity of Soul and Prakriti were held not to be permanent, then the cause of such proximity would have to be a.s.signed, and again the cause of that, and so on _ad infinitum_.--Let us then, to escape from these difficulties, define proximity as nothing more than the true nature of soul and Prakriti!--As the true nature is permanent, we reply, it would follow therefrom that bondage and release would be alike permanent.--On account of all these contradictory views the system of the Sankhyas is untenable.

We finally remark that the arguments here set forth by us at the same time prove the untenableness of the view of those who teach that there is an eternally unchanging Brahman whose nature is pure, non-differenced intelligence, and which by being conscious of Nescience experiences unreal bondage and release. For those philosophers can show no more than the Sankhyas do how their Brahman can be conscious of Nescience, can be subject to adhyasa, and so on. There is, however, the following difference between the two theories. The Sankhyas, in order to account for the definite individual distribution of birth, death, and so on, a.s.sume a plurality of souls. The Vedantins, on the other hand, do not allow even so much, and their doctrine is thus all the more irrational.

The a.s.sertion that there is a difference (in favour of the Vedantins) between the two doctrines, in so far as the Vedantins hold Prakriti to be something unreal, while the Sankhyas consider it to be real, is unfounded; for pure, h.o.m.ogeneous intelligence, eternally non-changing, cannot possibly be conscious of anything different from itself, whether it be unreal or real. And if that thing is held to be unreal, there arise further difficulties, owing to its having to be viewed as the object of knowledge, of refutation, and so on.

Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the impossibility of construction.'

10. Or in the same way as the big and long from the short and the atomic.

We have shown that the theory of the Pradhana being the universal cause is untenable, since it rests on fallacious arguments, and suffers from inner contradictions. We shall now prove that the view of atoms const.i.tuting the universal cause is untenable likewise. 'Or in the same way as the big and long from the short and the atomic' 'Is untenable'

must be supplied from the preceding Sutra; 'or' has to be taken in the sense of 'and.' The sense of the Sutra is--in the same way as the big and long, i.e. as the theory of ternary compounds originating from the short and the atomic, i.e. from binary compounds and simple atoms is untenable, so everything else which they (the Vaises.h.i.+kas) maintain is untenable; or, in other words--as the theory of the world originating from atoms through binary compounds is untenable, so everything else is likewise untenable.--Things consisting of parts, as e.g. a piece of cloth, are produced by their parts, e.g. threads, being joined by means of the six sides which are parts of those parts. a.n.a.logously the atoms also must be held to originate binary compounds in the way of combining by means of their six sides; for if the atoms possessed no distinction of parts (and hence filled no s.p.a.ce), a group of even a thousand atoms would not differ in extension from a single atom, and the different kinds of extension--minuteness, shortness, bigness, length, &c.--would never emerge. If, on the other hand, it is admitted that the atoms also have distinct sides, they have parts and are made up of those parts, and those parts again are made up of their parts, and so on in infinitum.-- But, the Vaises.h.i.+ka may object, the difference between a mustard seed and a mountain is due to the paucity of the const.i.tuent parts on the one hand, and their mult.i.tude on the other. If, now, it be held that the atom itself contains an infinity of parts, the mustard seed and the mountain alike will contain an infinity of parts, and thus their inequality cannot be accounted for. We must therefore a.s.sume that there is a limit of subdivision (i.e. that there are real atoms which do not themselves consist of parts).--Not so, we reply. If the atoms did not possess distinct parts, there could originate no extension greater than the extension of one atom (as already shown), and thus neither mustard seed nor mountain would ever be brought about.--But what, then, are we to do to get out of this dilemma?--You have only to accept the Vedic doctrine of the origination of the world.

Others explain the above Sutra as meant to refute an objection against the doctrine of Brahman being the general cause. But this does not suit the arrangement of the Sutras, and would imply a meaningless iteration.

The objections raised by some against the doctrine of Brahman have been disposed of in the preceding pada, and the present pada is devoted to the refutation of other theories. And that the world admits of being viewed as springing from an intelligent principle such as Brahman was shown at length under II, 1, 4. The sense of the Sutra, therefore, is none other than what we stated above.--But what are those other untenable views to which the Sutra refers?--To this question the next Sutra replies.

11. On both a.s.sumptions also there is no motion, and thence non-being (of the origination of the world).

The atomic theory teaches that the world is produced by the successive formation of compounds, binary, ternary, and so on, due to the aggregation of atoms--such aggregation resulting from the motion of the atoms. The primary motion of the atoms--which are the cause of the origination of the entire world--is a.s.sumed to be brought about by the unseen principle (adrishta), 'The upward flickering of fire, the sideway motion of air, the primary motion on the part of atoms and of the manas are caused by the unseen principle.'--Is then, we ask, this primary motion of the atoms caused by an adrishta residing in them, or by an adrishta residing in the souls? Neither alternative is possible. For the unseen principle which is originated by the good and evil deeds of the individual souls cannot possibly reside in the atoms; and if it could, the consequence would be that the atoms would constantly produce the world. Nor again can the adrishta residing in the souls be the cause of motion originating in the atoms.--Let it then be a.s.sumed that motion originates in the atoms, owing to their being in contact with the souls in which the adrishta abides!--If this were so, we reply, it would follow that the world would be permanently created, for the adrishta, of the souls forms an eternal stream.-But the adrishta requires to be matured in order to produce results. The adrishtas of some souls come to maturity in the same state of existence in which the deeds were performed; others become mature in a subsequent state of existence only; and others again do not become mature before a new Kalpa has begun. It is owing to this dependence on the maturation of the adrishtas that the origination of the world does not take place at all times.--But this reasoning also we cannot admit. For there is nothing whatever to establish the conclusion that all the different adrishtas which spring from the manifold actions performed at different times, without any previous agreement, by the infinite mult.i.tude of individual Selfs should reach a state of uniform maturation at one and the same moment of time (so as to give rise to a new creation). Nor does this view of yours account for the fact of the entire world being destroyed at the same time, and remaining in a state of non-maturation for the period of a dviparardha.--Nor can you say that the motion of the atoms is due to their conjunction with (souls whose) adrishta possesses certain specific qualities imparted to them by the will of the Lord; for by mere inference the existence of a Lord cannot be proved, as we have shown under I, 1. The origin of the world cannot, therefore, be due to any action on the part of the atoms.

12. And because owing to the acknowledgment of samavaya, there results a _regressus in infinitum_ from equality.

The Vaises.h.i.+ka doctrine is further untenable on account of the acknowledgment of samavaya.--Why so?--Because the samavaya also, like part, quality, and generic characteristics, requires something else to establish it, and that something else again requires some further thing to establish it--from which there arises an infinite regress. To explain.

The Vaises.h.i.+kas a.s.sume the so-called samavaya relation, defining it as 'that connexion which is the cause of the idea "this is here," in the case of things permanently and inseparably connected, and standing to each other in the relation of abode and thing abiding in the abode.' Now, if such a samavaya relation is a.s.sumed in order to account for the fact that things observed to be inseparably connected--as, e.g., cla.s.s characteristics are inseparably connected with the individuals to which they belong--are such, i.e. inseparably connected, a reason has also to be searched for why the samavaya, which is of the same nature as those things (in so far, namely, as it is also inseparably connected with the things connected by it), is such; and for that reason, again, a further reason has to be postulated, and so on, _in infinitum_. Nor can it be said that inseparable connexion must be a.s.sumed to const.i.tute the essential nature of samavaya (so that no further reason need be demanded for its inseparable connexion); for on this reasoning you would have to a.s.sume the same essential nature for cla.s.s characteristics, qualities, and so on (which would render the a.s.sumption of a samavaya needless for them also). Nor is it a legitimate proceeding to postulate an unseen ent.i.ty such as the samavaya is, and then to a.s.sume for it such and such an essential nature.--These objections apply to the samavaya whether it be viewed as eternal or non-eternal. The next Sutra urges a further objection against it if viewed as eternal.

13. And because (the world also) would thus be eternal.

The samavaya is a relation, and if that relation is eternal that to which the relation belongs must also be eternal, so that we would arrive at the unacceptable conclusion that the world is eternal.

14. And on account of (the atoms) having colour and so on, the reverse (takes place); as it is observed.

From the view that the atoms of four kinds--viz. of earth or water or fire or air--possess colour, taste, smell, and touch, it would follow that the atoms are non-eternal, gross, and made up of parts--and this is the reverse of what the Vaises.h.i.+kas actually teach as to their atoms, viz. that they are eternal, subtle, and not made up of parts. For things possessing colour, e.g. jars, are non-eternal, because it is observed that they are produced from other causes of the same, i.e. non-eternal nature, and so on. To a non-perceived thing which is a.s.sumed in accordance with what is actually perceived, we may not ascribe any attributes that would be convenient to us; and it is in accordance with actual experience that you Vaises.h.i.+kas a.s.sume the atoms to possess colour and other qualities. Hence your theory is untenable.--Let it then, in order to avoid this difficulty, be a.s.sumed that the atoms do not possess colour and other sensible qualities. To this alternative the next Sutra refers.