The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Ramanuja Part 34

objects of fruition, enjoying subjects, and a Ruler; that origination and so on which are characteristic of the objects do not belong to the subjects, and that the latter are eternal; that the characteristic qualities of the objects and likewise those of the subjects--viz.

liability to pain and suffering--do not belong to the Ruler; that the latter is eternal, free from all imperfections, omniscient, immediately realising all his purposes, the Lord of the lords of the organs, the highest Lord of all; and that sentient and non-sentient beings in all their states const.i.tute the body of the Lord while he const.i.tutes their Self. While Brahman thus has for its modes (prakara) the sentient and non-sentient beings in which it ever is embodied, during certain periods those beings abide in so subtle a condition as to be incapable of receiving designations different from that of Brahman itself; Brahman then is said to be in its causal state. When, on the other hand, its body is const.i.tuted by all those beings in their gross state, when they have separate, distinct names and forms, Brahman is said to be in its effected condition. When, now, Brahman pa.s.ses over from the causal state into the effected state, the aggregate of non-sentient things which in the causal state were dest.i.tute of name and form undergoes an essential change of nature--implying the possession of distinct names and so on-- so as to become fit to const.i.tute objects of fruition for sentient beings; the change, on the other hand, which the sentient beings (the souls) undergo on that occasion is nothing more than a certain expansion of intelligence (or consciousness), capacitating them to experience the different rewards or punishments for their previous deeds. The ruling element of the world, i.e. the Lord, finally, who has the sentient and non-sentient beings for his modes, undergoes a change in so far as he is, at alternating periods, embodied in all those beings in their alternating states. The two modes, and he to whom the modes belong, thus undergo a common change in so far as in the case of all of them the causal condition pa.s.ses over into a different condition.

It is with reference to this change undergone by one substance in pa.s.sing over into a different state that the Chandogya says that through the knowledge of one thing everything is known, and ill.u.s.trates this by the case of the lump of clay (knowing which we know all things made of clay). Texts such as 'Praj.a.pati sent forth the creatures,' which declare the origination of the soul, really mean only to state that the souls are by turns a.s.sociated with or dissociated from bodies--the effect of which is that their intelligence is either contracted or expanded. Texts again which deny the origination of the soul and affirm its permanency ('He is not born and does not die,' &c.) mean to say that the soul does not, like the non-sentient element of creation, undergo changes of essential nature. And finally there are texts the purport of which it is to declare the absence of change of essential nature as well as of alternate expansion and contraction of intelligence--cp. 'That is the great unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, Brahman' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 25); 'the eternal thinker,' &c. (Ka. Up. II, 5, 13); such texts have for their subject the highest Lord.--All this also explains how Brahman, which is at all times differentiated by the sentient and non-sentient beings that const.i.tute its body, can be said to be one only previous to creation; the statement is possible because at that time the differentiation of names and forms did not exist. That that which makes the difference between plurality and unity is the presence or absence of differentiation through names and forms, is distinctly declared in the text, 'Now all this was undifferentiated. It became differentiated by form and name' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7).--Those also who hold that the individual soul is due to Nescience; and those who hold it to be due to a real limiting adjunct (upadhi); and those who hold that Brahman, whose essential nature is mere Being, a.s.sumes by itself the threefold form of enjoying subjects, objects of enjoyment, and supreme Ruler; can all of them explain the unity which Scripture predicates of Brahman in the pralaya state, only on the basis of the absence of differentiation by names and forms; for according to them also (there is no absolute unity at any time, but) either the potentiality of Nescience, or the potentiality of the limiting adjunct, or the potentialities of enjoying subjects, objects of enjoyment, and supreme Ruler persist in the pralaya condition also. And, moreover, it is proved by the two Sutras, II, 1, 33; 35, that the distinction of the several individual souls and the stream of their works are eternal.

There is, however, the following difference between those several views.

The first-mentioned view implies that Brahman itself is under the illusive influence of beginningless Avidya. According to the second view, the effect of the real and beginningless limiting adjunct is that Brahman itself is in the state of bondage; for there is no other ent.i.ty but Brahman and the adjunct. According to the third view, Brahman itself a.s.sumes different forms, and itself experiences the various unpleasant consequences of deeds. Nor would it avail to say that that part of Brahman which is the Ruler is not an experiencing subject; for as Brahman is all-knowing it recognises the enjoying subject as non- different from itself, and thus is itself an enjoying subject.-- According to our view, on the other hand, Brahman, which has for its body all sentient and non-sentient beings, whether in their subtle or their gross state, is always--in its effected as well as in its causal condition free from all shadow of imperfection, and a limitless ocean as it were of all exalted qualities. All imperfections, and suffering, and all change belong not to Brahman, but only to the sentient and non- sentient beings which are its modes. This view removes all difficulties.-- Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the Self.'

19. For this very reason (the individual soul is) a knower.

It has been shown that, different therein from Ether and the rest, the soul is not produced. This leads to the consideration of the soul's essential nature. Is that essential nature const.i.tuted by mere intelligence as Sugata and Kapila hold; or is the soul as Kanada thinks, essentially non-intelligent, comparable to a stone, while intelligence is merely an advent.i.tious quality of it; or is it essentially a knowing subject?--The soul is mere intelligence, the Purvapaks.h.i.+n maintains; for the reason that Scripture declares it to be so. For in the antaryamin- brahmana the clause which in the Madhyandina-text runs as follows, 'he who abides in the Self,' is in the text of the Kanvas represented by the clause 'he who abides in knowledge.' Similarly the text 'knowledge performs the sacrifice and all sacred acts' (Taitt. Up. II, 5, I) shows that it is knowledge only which is the true nature of the active Self.

And Smriti texts convey the same view, as e.g. 'it in reality is of the nature of absolutely spotless intelligence.' A second Purvapaks.h.i.+n denies the truth of this view. If, he says, we a.s.sume that the Self's essential nature consists either in mere knowledge or in its being a knowing subject, it follows that as the Self is omnipresent there must be consciousness at all places and at all times. On that doctrine we, further, could not account for the use of the instruments of cognition (i.e. the sense-organs, &c.); nor for the fact that in the states of deep sleep, swoon and so on, the Self although present is not observed to be conscious, while on the other hand consciousness is seen to arise as soon as the conditions of the waking state are realised. We therefore conclude that neither intelligence or consciousness, nor being a knowing agent, const.i.tutes the essence of the soul, but that consciousness is a mere advent.i.tious or occasional attribute. And the omnipresence of the Self must needs be admitted since its effects are perceived everywhere.

Nor is there any valid reason for holding that the Self moves to any place; for as it is a.s.sumed to be present everywhere the actual accomplishment of effects (at certain places only) may be attributed to the moving of the body only.--Scripture also directly declares that in the state of deep sleep there is no consciousness, 'I do not indeed at the present moment know myself, so as to be able to say "that am I," nor do I know those beings.' Similarly Scripture declares the absence of consciousness in the state of final release, 'when he has departed there is no consciousness' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 12); where the Self is spoken of as having knowledge for its essential nature, the meaning only is that knowledge const.i.tutes its specific quality, and the expression is therefore not to be urged in its literal sense.

Against all this the Sutra declares 'for this very reason a knower.'

This Self is essentially a knower, a knowing subject; not either mere knowledge or of non-sentient nature.--Why?--'For this very reason,' i.e.

on account of Scripture itself. 'For this reason' refers back to the 'on account of Scripture' in the preceding Sutra. For in the Chandogya, where the condition of the released and the non-released soul is described, the text says 'He who knows, let me smell this, he is the Self--with the mind seeing those pleasures he rejoices-the devas who are in the world of Brahman--whose desires are true, whose purposes are true-- not remembering the body into which he was born' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 4-5; 1, 5; 12, 3). And elsewhere 'The seer does not see death' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2). Similarly we read in the Vajasaneyaka, in reply to the question 'Who is that Self?'--'He who is within the heart, surrounded by the Pranas, the person of light, consisting of knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 7); 'By what should one know the knower?' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15); 'That person knows.' And 'for he is the knower, the hearer, the smeller, the taster, the perceiver, the thinker, the agent--he the person whose Self is knowledge'; and 'thus these sixteen parts of that seer' (Pra. Up. IV, 9; VI, 5). To the objection that if being a cognising subject const.i.tuted the essential nature of the Self it would follow that as the Self is omnipresent, there would be consciousness always and everywhere, the next Sutra replies.

20. On account of (its) pa.s.sing out, moving and returning.

The Self is not omnipresent, but on the contrary, of atomic size (anu).-- How is this known?--Since Scripture says that it pa.s.ses out, goes and returns. Its pa.s.sing out is described in the following pa.s.sage 'by that light this Self departs, either through the eye, or through the skull, or through other parts of the body' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 2). Its going in the following text 'all those who pa.s.s away out of this world go to the moon,' and its returning in the text 'from that world he comes again into this world, for action.' All this going, and so on, cannot be reconciled with the soul being present everywhere.

21. And on account of the latter two (being effected) through the Self.

The 'and' has affirming power. The 'pa.s.sing out' might somehow be reconciled with a non-moving Self (such as the omnipresent Self would be) if it were taken in the sense of the Self separating from the body; but for the going and returning no a.n.a.logous explanation is possible.

They, therefore, must be taken as effected by the Self itself (which, then, cannot be omnipresent and non-moving).

22. If it be said that (the soul) is not atomic, on account of scriptural statement of (what is) not that; we say no, on account of the other one being the topic.

The pa.s.sage 'He who is within the heart, surrounded by the Pranas, the person consisting of knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 7) introduces as the topic of discussion the personal Self, and further on in the same chapter we read 'the unborn Self, the great one' (IV, 4, 22). The personal Self, being expressly called _great_, cannot, therefore, be atomic!--Not so, we reply. 'Since the other one is the topic.' In the second text quoted that Self which is other than the personal Self--i.e.

the highest Self (prajna) const.i.tutes the topic. In the beginning of the chapter, indeed, the individual Self is introduced, but later on, between the two texts quoted, the instruction begins to concern itself with the highest Self, 'he by whom there is known the Self of intelligence' (pratibuddha atma; IV, 4, 13). It is this latter Self which, in 22 is called _great_, not the individual Self.

23. And on account of the very word, and of measure.

Scripture directly applies the word 'anu' to the individual Self, 'By thought is to be known that atomic Self into which Breath has entered fivefold' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 9).--By the term 'unmana' in the Sutra we have to understand measurement by selection of comparative instances.

Scripture declares the minuteness of the individual Self by reference to things which are like atoms in size, 'The individual soul is to be known as part of the hundredth part of the point of a hair divided a hundred times, and yet it is to be infinite' (Svet. Up. V, 9); 'that lower one is seen of the measure of the point of a goad' (V, 8). For these reasons also the individual Self must be viewed as atomic.--But this conflicts with the fact that sensation extends over the whole body!--This objection the next Sutra refutes by means of an a.n.a.logous instance.

24. There is no contradiction, as in the case of sandal-ointment.

As a drop of sandal-ointment, although applied to one spot of the body only, yet produces a refres.h.i.+ng sensation extending over the whole body; thus the Self also, although dwelling in one part of the body only, is conscious of sensations taking place in any part of the body.

25. Should it be said (that this is not so) on account of specialisation of abode; we say no, on account of the acknowledgment (of a place of the Self), viz. in the heart.

There is a difference. The drop of ointment can produce its effect as at any rate it is in contact with a definite part of the body. But we know of no such part in the case of the soul!--Not so, we reply. Scripture informs us that the Self abides in a definite part of the body, viz. the heart. 'For that Self is in the heart, there are a hundred and one veins.'

And in reply to the question 'What is that Self?' the text has 'He who is within the heart, surrounded by the Pranas, the Person of light, consisting of knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 7).--The parallel case of the sandal-ointment is referred to in order to point out that the Self abides in some particular part of the body; while the ointment is not bound to any special place.--In the next Sutra the Sutrakara proceeds to state how, according to his own view, the Self, although abiding in one spot only, gives rise to effects extending over the whole body.

26. Or on account of its quality as light.

The 'or' is meant to set aside the view previously stated. The Self extends through the whole body by means of its quality, viz. knowledge or consciousness. 'As light.' As the light of things abiding in one place--such as gems, the sun, and so on--is seen to extend to many places, so the consciousness of the Self dwelling in the heart pervades the entire body. That the knowledge of the knowing subject may extend beyond its substrate, as the light of a luminous body does, we have already explained under the first Sutra.--But it has been said that the Self is _mere_ knowledge; how then can knowledge be said to be a quality-- which is something different from the essential nature of a thing?--This the next Sutra explains.

27. There is distinction as in the case of smell; and thus Scripture declares.

Just as smell, which is perceived as a quality of earth, is distinct from earth; thus knowledge of which we are conscious as the quality of a knowing subject--which relation expresses itself in judgments such as 'I know'--is different from the knowing subject. Scriptural texts also prove this relation, as e.g. 'This Person knows.'

28. On account of the separate statement.

Scripture even states quite directly that knowledge is something distinct from the knowing subject, viz. in the pa.s.sage 'For there is not known any intermission of the knowing of the knower' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 30).--It has been said that in pa.s.sages such as 'he who abiding in knowledge' (Bri. Up. III, 7, 22); 'Knowledge performs the sacrifice'

(Taitt. Up. II, 5, 1); 'having knowledge for its nature, absolutely free from stain,'Scripture speaks of the Self as being mere knowledge (not a knower). This point the next Sutra elucidates.

29. But (the Self) is designated as that because it has that quality (viz. knowledge) for its essential quality; as in the case of the intelligent (prajna) Self.

The 'but' discards the objection. Because that quality, viz. the quality of knowledge, is the essential quality, therefore the Self is, in the pa.s.sages quoted, designated as knowledge. For knowledge const.i.tutes the essential quality of the Self. Similarly, the intelligent highest Self is occasionally called 'Bliss,' because bliss is its essential quality.

Compare 'If that bliss existed not in the ether' (Taitt. Up. II, 7, 1); 'He perceived that bliss is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 6, 1). That bliss is the essential attribute of Brahman is proved by texts such as 'That is one bliss of Brahman'; 'He who knows the bliss of Brahman is afraid of nothing' (Taitt. Up. II, 4, 1).--Or else the a.n.a.logous case to which the Sutra refers may be that of the intelligent Brahman being designated by the term 'knowledge,' in texts such as 'Truth, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1). That knowledge is the essential quality of Brahman is known from pa.s.sages such as 'together with the intelligent Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); 'He who is all-knowing' (Mu.

Up. I, 1, 9).