The War of Independence Part 5

[Sidenote: Lord Howe's effort toward conciliation.]

On the arrival of the fleet it was decided to attack and capture Charleston, and overthrow the new government there. General Charles Lee was sent down by Congress to defend the city, but the South Carolina patriots proved quite able to take care of themselves. On Sullivan's Island in Charleston harbour Colonel William Moultrie built a low elastic fortress of palmetto logs supported by banks of sand and mounting several heavy guns. In the cannonade which took place on the 28th of June this rude structure escaped with little injury, while its guns inflicted such serious damage upon the fleet that the British were obliged to abandon for the present all thought of taking Charleston. In the course of July they sailed for New York harbour to reinforce General Howe. On the 12th of that month the general's brother, Richard, Lord Howe, arrived at Staten Island to take the chief command of the fleet.

He was one of the ablest seamen of his time, and was a favourite with his sailors, by whom, on account of his swarthy complexion, he was familiarly known as "Black d.i.c.k." Lord Howe and his brother were authorized to offer terms to the Americans and endeavour to restore peace by negotiation. It was not easy, however, to find any one in America with whom to negotiate. Lord Howe was sincerely desirous of making peace and doing something to heal the troubles which had brought on the war; and he seems to have supposed that some good might be effected by private interviews with leading Americans. To send a message to Congress was, of course, not to be thought of; for that would be equivalent to recognizing Congress as a body ent.i.tled to speak for the American people. He brought with him an a.s.surance of amnesty and pardon for all such rebels as would lay down their arms, and decided that it would be best to send it to the American commander; but as it was not proper to recognize the military rank which had been conferred upon Was.h.i.+ngton by a revolutionary body, he addressed his message to "George Was.h.i.+ngton, Esq.," as to a private citizen. When Was.h.i.+ngton refused to receive such a message, his lords.h.i.+p could think of no one else to approach except the royal governors. But they had all fled, except Governor Franklin of New Jersey, who was under close confinement in East Windsor, Connecticut. All British authority in the United States had disappeared, and there was no one for Lord Howe to negotiate with, unless he should bethink himself of some way of laying his case before Congress.

[Sidenote: Change in the British military plan, due to the union of the colonies in the Declaration of Independence.]

Military operations were now taken up in earnest by the British, and were briskly carried on for nearly six months. They were for the most part concentrated upon the state of New York. Before 1776 it was Ma.s.sachusetts that was the chief object of military measures on the part of the British. That was the colony that since the summer of 1774 had defied the king's troops and set at naught the authority of Parliament; and the first object of the British was to make an example of that colony, to suppress the rebellion there, and to reinstate the royal government. The king believed that it would not take long to do this, and there is some reason for supposing that if he had succeeded in humbling Ma.s.sachusetts, he would have been ready to listen to Hutchinson's request that the vindictive acts of April, 1774, should be repealed and the charter restored. At all events, he seems to have felt confident that things could soon be made so quiet that Hutchinson could return and resume the office of governor. If the king and his friends had not entertained such ill-founded hopes, they would not have been so ready to resort to violent measures. They made the fatal mistake of supposing that such a man as Samuel Adams represented only a small party and not the majority of the people. They had also supposed that the other colonies would not make common cause with Ma.s.sachusetts. But now, before they had accomplished any of their objects, and while their troops had even been driven from Boston, they found that the rebellion had spread through the whole country. They had a belligerent government to confront, and must now enter upon the task of conquering the United States.

[Sidenote: Why the British concentrated their attack upon the state of New York.]

The first and most obvious method of attempting this was to strike at New York as the military centre. In such a plan everything seemed to favour the British. The state was comparatively weak in population and resources; a large proportion of the people were Tories; and close at hand on the frontier, which was then in the Mohawk valley, were the most formidable Indians on the continent. These Iroquois had long been under the influence of the famous Sir William Johnson, of Johnson Hall, near Schenectady, and his son Sir John Johnson. Their princ.i.p.al sachem, Joseph Brant, or Thayendanegea, was connected by the closest bonds of friends.h.i.+p with the Johnsons, and the latter were staunch Tories. It might reasonably be expected that the entire force of these Indians could be enlisted on the British side. The work for the regular army seemed thus to be reduced to the single problem of capturing the city of New York and obtaining full control of the Hudson river.

If this could be done, the United States would be cut in two. As the Americans had no s.h.i.+ps of war, they could not dispute the British command of the water. There was no way in which the New England states could hold communication with the South except across the southern part of the state of New York. To gain this central position would thus be to deal a fatal blow to the American cause, and it seemed to the British government that, with the forces now in the field, this ought easily to be accomplished. General Carleton was ready to come down from the north by way of Lake Champlain, with 12,000 men, and General Schuyler could scarcely muster half as many to oppose him. On Staten Island there were more than 25,000 British troops ready to attack New York, while Was.h.i.+ngton's utmost exertions had succeeded in getting together only about 18,000 men for the defence of the city. The American army was as yet very poor in organization and discipline, badly equipped, and scantily fed; and it seemed very doubtful whether it could long keep the field in the presence of superior forces.

[Sidenote: Was.h.i.+ngton's military genius.]

But in spite of all these circ.u.mstances, so favourable to the British, there was one obstacle to their success upon which at first they did not sufficiently reckon. That obstacle was furnished by the genius and character of the wonderful man who commanded the American army. In Was.h.i.+ngton were combined all the highest qualities of a general,--dogged tenacity of purpose, endless fertility in resource, sleepless vigilance, and unfailing courage. No enemy ever caught him unawares, and he never let slip an opportunity of striking back. He had a rare geographical instinct, always knew where the strongest position was, and how to reach it. He was a master of the art of concealing his own plan and detecting his adversary's. He knew better than to hazard everything upon the result of a single contest, and because of the enemy's superior force he was so often obliged to refuse battle that some of his impatient critics called him slow; but no general was ever quicker in dealing heavy blows when the proper moment arrived. He was neither unduly elated by victory nor discouraged by defeat. When all others lost heart he was bravest; and at the very moment when ruin seemed to stare him in the face, he was craftily preparing disaster and confusion for the enemy.

To the highest qualities of a military commander there were united in Was.h.i.+ngton those of a political leader. From early youth he possessed the art of winning men's confidence. He was simple without awkwardness, honest without bluntness, and endowed with rare discretion and tact. His temper was fiery and on occasion he could use pretty strong language, but anger or disappointment was never allowed to disturb the justice and kindness of his judgment. Men felt themselves safe in putting entire trust in his head and his heart, and they were never deceived. Thus he soon obtained such a hold upon the people as few statesmen have ever possessed. It was this grand character that, with his clear intelligence and unflagging industry, enabled him to lead the nation triumphantly through the perils of the Revolutionary War. He had almost every imaginable hards.h.i.+p to contend with,--envious rivals, treachery and mutiny in the camp, interference on the part of Congress, jealousies between the states, want of men and money; yet all these difficulties he vanquished. Whether victorious or defeated on the field, he baffled the enemy in the first year's great campaign and in the second year's, and then for four years more upheld the cause until heart-sickening delay was ended in glorious triumph. It is very doubtful if without Was.h.i.+ngton the struggle for independence would have succeeded as it did. Other men were important, he was indispensable.

[Sidenote: Battle of Long Island, Aug. 27, 1776.]

The first great campaign began, as might have been expected, with defeat on the field. In order to keep possession of the city of New York it was necessary to hold Brooklyn Heights. That was a dangerous position for an American force, because it was entirely separated from New York by deep water, and could thus be cut off from the rest of the American army by the enemy's fleet. It was necessary, however, for Was.h.i.+ngton either to occupy Brooklyn Heights or to give up the city of New York without a struggle. But the latter course was out of the question. It would never do to abandon the Whigs in New York to the tender mercies of the Tories, without at least one good fight. So the position in Brooklyn must be fortified, and there was perhaps one chance in a hundred that, through some blunder of the enemy, we might succeed in holding it. Accordingly 9000 men were stationed on Brooklyn Heights under Putnam, who threw forward about half of this force, under Sullivan and Stirling, to defend the southern approaches through the rugged country between Gowa.n.u.s bay and Bedford. On the 22d of August General Howe crossed from Staten Island to Gravesend bay with 20,000 men, and on the 27th he defeated Sullivan and Stirling in what has ever since been known as the battle of Long Island. About 400 men were killed and wounded on each side, and 1000 Americans, including both generals, were taken captive. A more favourable result for the Americans was not to be expected, as the British outnumbered them four to one, and could therefore march where they pleased and turn the American flank without incurring the slightest risk. The wonder is, not that 5000 half-trained soldiers were defeated by 20,000 veterans, but that they should have given General Howe a good day's work in defeating them.

[Sidenote: Was.h.i.+ngton's skilful retreat.]

The American forces were now withdrawn into their works on Brooklyn Heights, and Howe advanced to besiege them. During the next two days Was.h.i.+ngton collected boats and on the night of the 29th conveyed the army across the East River to New York. With the enemy's fleet patrolling the harbour and their army watching the works, this was a most remarkable performance. To this day one cannot understand, unless on the supposition that the British were completely dazed and moonstruck, how Was.h.i.+ngton could have done it.

[Sidenote: Howe takes New York, Sept. 15, 1776.]

People were much disheartened by the defeat on Long Island and the immediate prospect of losing New York. Lord Howe turned his thoughts once more to negotiation, and at length, on September 11, succeeded in obtaining an informal interview with Franklin, John Adams, and Edward Rutledge. But nothing was accomplished, and seventeen eventful months elapsed before the British again seriously tried negotiation. General Howe had extended his lines northward, and on the 15th his army crossed the East River in boats, and landed near the site of Thirty-Fourth street. On the same day Was.h.i.+ngton completed the work of evacuating the city. His army was drawn up across the island from the mouth of Harlem river to Fort Was.h.i.+ngton, and over on the Jersey side of the Hudson, opposite Fort Was.h.i.+ngton, a detachment occupied Fort Lee. It was hoped that these two forts would be able to prevent British s.h.i.+ps from going up the Hudson river, but this hope soon proved to be delusive.

On the 16th General Howe tried to break through the centre of Was.h.i.+ngton's position at Harlem Heights, but after losing 300 men he gave up the attempt, and spent the next three weeks in studying the situation. A sad incident came now to remind the people of the sternness of military law. Nathan Hale, a young graduate of Yale College, captain of a company of Connecticut rangers, had been for several days within the British lines gathering information. Just as he had accomplished his purpose, and was on the point of departing with his memoranda, he was arrested as a spy and hanged next morning, lamenting on the gallows that he had but one life to lose for his country.

[Sidenote: Battle of White Plains, Oct. 28, 1776.]

As Howe deemed it prudent not to attack Was.h.i.+ngton in front, he tried to get around into his rear, and began on October 12 by landing a large force at Throg's Neck, in the Sound. But Was.h.i.+ngton baffled him by changing front, swinging his left wing northward as far as White Plains.

After further reflection Howe decided to try a front attack once more; on the 28th he a.s.saulted the position at White Plains, and carried one of the outposts, losing twice as many men as the Americans. Not wis.h.i.+ng to continue the fight at such a disadvantage he paused again, and Was.h.i.+ngton improved the occasion by retiring to a still stronger position at Northcastle. These movements had separated Was.h.i.+ngton's main body from his right wing at Forts Was.h.i.+ngton and Lee, and Howe now changed his plan. Desisting from the attempt against the American main body, he moved southward against this exposed wing.

A sad catastrophe now followed, which showed how many obstacles Was.h.i.+ngton had to contend with. It was known that Carleton's army was on the way from Canada. Congress was nervously afraid of losing its hold upon the Hudson river, and Was.h.i.+ngton accordingly selected West Point as the strongest position upon the river, to be fortified and defended at all hazards. He sent Heath, with 3000 men, to hold the Highland pa.s.ses, and went up himself to inspect the situation and give directions about the new fortifications. He left 7000 of his main body at Northcastle, in charge of Lee, who had just returned from South Carolina. He sent 5000, under Putnam, across the river to Hackensack; and ordered Greene, who had some 5000 men at Forts Was.h.i.+ngton and Lee, to prepare to evacuate both those strongholds and join his forces to Putnam's.

If these orders had been carried out, Howe's movement against Fort Was.h.i.+ngton would have accomplished but little, for on reaching that place, he would have found nothing but empty works, as at Brooklyn. The American right wing would have been drawn together at Hackensack, and the whole army could have been concentrated on either bank of the great river, as the occasion might seem to require. If Howe should aim at the Highlands, it could be kept close to the river and cover all the pa.s.ses.

If, on the other hand, Howe should threaten the Congress at Philadelphia, the whole army could be collected in New Jersey to hold him in check.

[Sidenote: Howe takes Fort Was.h.i.+ngton, Nov. 16, 1776.]

But Was.h.i.+ngton's orders were not obeyed. Congress was so uneasy that it sent word to Greene to hold both his forts as long as he could.

Accordingly he strengthened the garrison at Fort Was.h.i.+ngton, just in time for Howe to overwhelm and capture it, on the 16th of November, after an obstinate resistance. In killed and wounded the British loss was three times as great as that of the garrison, but the Americans were in no condition to afford the loss of 8000 men taken prisoners. It was a terrible blow. On the 19th Greene barely succeeded in escaping from Fort Lee, with his remaining 2000 men, but without his cannon and stores.

[Sidenote: Treachery of Charles Lee.]

Bad as the situation was, however, it did not become really alarming until it was complicated with the misconduct of General Lee. Was.h.i.+ngton had returned from West Point on the 14th, too late to prevent the catastrophe; but after all it was only necessary for Lee's wing of the army to cross the river, and there would be a solid force of 14,000 men on the Jersey side, able to confront the enemy on something like equal terms, for Howe had to keep a good many of his troops in New York. On the 17th Was.h.i.+ngton ordered Lee to come over and join him; but Lee disobeyed, and in spite of repeated orders from Was.h.i.+ngton he stayed at Northcastle till the 2d of December. General Ward had some time since resigned, so that Lee now ranked next to Was.h.i.+ngton. A good many people were finding fault with the latter for losing the 3000 men at Fort Was.h.i.+ngton, although, as we have seen, that was not his fault but the fault of Congress. Lee now felt that if Was.h.i.+ngton were ruined, he would surely become his successor in the command of the army, and so, instead of obeying his orders, he spent his time in writing letters calculated to injure him.

[Sidenote: Was.h.i.+ngton's retreat through New Jersey.]

Lee's disobedience thus broke the army in two, and did more for the British than they had been able to do for themselves since they started from Staten Island. It was the cause of Was.h.i.+ngton's flight through New Jersey, ending on the 8th of December, when he put himself behind the Delaware river, with scarcely 3000 men. Here was another difficulty. The American soldiers were enlisted for short terms, and when they were discouraged, as at present, they were apt to insist upon going home as soon as their time had expired. It was generally believed that Was.h.i.+ngton's army would thus fall to pieces within a few days. Howe did not think it worth while to be at the trouble of collecting boats wherewith to follow him across the Delaware. Congress fled to Baltimore.

People in New Jersey began taking the oath of allegiance to the crown.

Howe received the news that he had been knighted for his victory on Long Island, and he returned to New York to celebrate the occasion.

[Sidenote: Arnold's naval battle at Valcour Island, Oct. 11, 1776.]

While the case looked so desperate for Was.h.i.+ngton, events at the north had taken a less unfavourable turn. Carleton had embarked on Lake Champlain early in the autumn with his fine army and fleet. Arnold had fitted up a small fleet to oppose his advance, and on the 11th of October there had been a fierce naval battle between the two near Valcour Island, in which Arnold was defeated, while Carleton suffered serious damage. The British general then advanced upon Ticonderoga, but suddenly made up his mind that the season was too late for operations in that lat.i.tude. The resistance he had encountered seems to have made him despair of achieving any speedy success in that quarter, and on the 3d of November he started back for Canada. This retreat relieved General Schuyler at Albany of immediate cause for anxiety, and presently he detached seven regiments to go southward to Was.h.i.+ngton's a.s.sistance.

[Sidenote: Charles Lee is captured by British dragoons, Dec. 13, 1776.]

On the 2d of December Lee crossed the Hudson with 4000 men, and proceeded slowly to Morristown. Just what he designed to do was never known, but clearly he had no intention of going beyond the Delaware to a.s.sist Was.h.i.+ngton, whom he believed to be ruined. Perhaps he thought Morristown a desirable position to hold, as it certainly was. Whatever his plans may have been, they were nipped in the bud. For some unknown reason he pa.s.sed the night of the 12th at an unguarded tavern, about four miles from his army; and there he was captured next morning by a party of British dragoons, who carried him off to their camp at Princeton. The dragoons were very gleeful over this unexpected exploit, but really they could not have done the Americans a greater service than to rid them of such a worthless creature. The capture of Lee came in the nick of time, for it set free his men to go to the aid of Was.h.i.+ngton.

Even after this force and that sent by Schuyler had reached the commander-in-chief, he found he had only 6000 men fit for duty.

[Sidenote: Battle of Trenton, Dec. 26, 1776.]

[Ill.u.s.tration: Was.h.i.+ngton's Campaigns IN NEW JERSEY & PENNSYLVANIA.]

With this little force Was.h.i.+ngton instantly took the offensive. It was the turning-point in his career and in the history of the Revolutionary War. On Christmas, 1776, and the following nine days, all Was.h.i.+ngton's most brilliant powers were displayed. The British centre, 10,000 strong, lay at Princeton. The princ.i.p.al generals, thinking the serious business of the war ended, had gone to New York. An advanced party of Hessians, 1000 strong, was posted on the bank of the Delaware at Trenton, and another one lower down, at Burlington. Was.h.i.+ngton decided to attack both these outposts, and arranged his troops accordingly, but when Christmas night arrived, the river was filled with great blocks of floating ice, and the only division which succeeded in crossing was the one that Was.h.i.+ngton led in person. It was less than 2500 in number, but the moment had come when the boldest course was the safest. By daybreak Was.h.i.+ngton had surprised the Hessians at Trenton and captured them all.

The outpost at Burlington, on hearing the news, retreated to Princeton.

By the 31st Was.h.i.+ngton had got all his available force across to Trenton. Some of them were raw recruits just come in to replace others who had just gone home. At this critical moment the army was nearly helpless for want of money, and on New Year's morning Robert Morris was knocking at door after door in Philadelphia, waking up his friends to borrow the fifty thousand dollars which he sent off to Trenton before noon. The next day Cornwallis arrived at Princeton, and taking with him all the army, except a rear-guard of 2000 men left to protect his communications, came on toward Trenton.

When he reached that town, late in the afternoon, he found Was.h.i.+ngton entrenched behind a small creek just south of the town, with his back toward the Delaware river. "Oho!" said Cornwallis, "at last we have run down the old fox, and we will bag him in the morning." He sent back to Princeton, and ordered the rear-guard to come up. He expected next morning to cross the creek above Was.h.i.+ngton's right, and then press him back against the broad and deep river, and compel him to surrender.

Cornwallis was by no means a careless general, but he seems to have gone to bed on that memorable night and slept the sleep of the just.

[Sidenote: Battle of Princeton, Jan. 3, 1777.]

Was.h.i.+ngton meanwhile was wide awake. He kept his front line noisily at work digging and entrenching, and made a fine show with his campfires.

Then he marched his army to the right and across the creek, and got around Cornwallis's left wing and into his rear, and so went on gayly toward Princeton. At daybreak he encountered the British rear-guard, fought a sharp battle with it and sent it flying, with the loss of one-fourth of its number. The booming guns aroused Cornwallis too late.

To preserve his communications with New York, he was obliged to retreat with all haste upon New Brunswick, while Was.h.i.+ngton's victorious army pushed on and occupied the strong position at Morristown.

There was small hope of dislodging such a general from such a position.

But to leave Was.h.i.+ngton in possession of Morristown was to resign to him the laurels of this half-year's work. For that position guarded the Highlands of the Hudson on the one hand, and the roads to Philadelphia on the other. Except that the British had taken the city of New York--which from the start was almost a foregone conclusion--they were no better off than in July when Lord Howe had landed on Staten Island.

In nine days the tables had been completely turned. The attack upon an outpost had developed into a campaign which quite retrieved the situation. The ill-timed interference of Congress, which had begun the series of disasters, was remedied; the treachery of Lee was checkmated; and the cause of American Independence, which on Christmas Eve had seemed hopeless, was now fairly set on its feet. Earlier successes had been local; this was continental. Seldom has so much been done with such slender means.

[Sidenote: Effects of the campaign, in Europe.]

The American war had begun to awaken interest in Europe, especially in France, whither Franklin, with Silas Deane and Arthur Lee, had been sent to seek for military aid. The French government was not yet ready to make an alliance with the United States, but money and arms were secretly sent over to Congress. Several young French n.o.bles had asked the king's permission to go to America, but it was refused, and for the sake of keeping up appearances the refusal had something of the air of a reprimand. The king did not wish to offend Great Britain prematurely.

One of these n.o.bles was Lafayette, then eighteen years of age, who fitted up a s.h.i.+p at his own expense, and sailed from Bordeaux in April, 1777, in spite of the royal prohibition, taking with him Kalb and other officers. Lafayette and Kalb, with the Poles, Kosciuszko and Pulaski, who had come some time before, and the German Steuben, who came in the following December, were the five most eminent foreigners who received commissions in the Continental army.

[Sidenote: Difficulty in raising an army.]

During the winter season at Morristown the efforts of Was.h.i.+ngton were directed toward the establishment of a regular army to be kept together for three years or so long as the war should last. Hitherto the military preparations of Congress had been absurdly weak. Squads of militia had been enlisted for terms of three or six months, as if there were any likelihood of the war being ended within such a period. While the men thus kept coming and going, it was difficult either to maintain discipline or to carry out any series of military operations.

Accordingly Congress now proceeded to call upon the states for an army of 80,000 men to serve during the war. The enlisting was to be done by the states, but the money was to be furnished by Congress. Not half that number of men were actually obtained. The Continental army was larger in 1777 than in any other year, but the highest number it reached was only 34,820. In addition to these about 34,000 militia turned out in the course of the year. An army of 80,000 would have taken about the same proportion of all the fighting men in the country as an army of 1,000,000 in our great Civil War. Now in our Civil War the Union army grew with the occasion until it numbered more than 1,000,000. But in the Revolutionary War the Continental army was not only never equal to the occasion, but it kept diminis.h.i.+ng till in 1781 it numbered only 13,292.