The War of Independence Part 6

This was because the Continental Congress had no power to enforce its decrees. It could only _ask_ for troops and it could only _ask_ for money. It found just the same difficulty in getting anything that the British ministry and the royal governors used to find,--the very same difficulty that led Grenville to devise the Stamp Act. Everything had to be talked over in thirteen different legislatures, one state would wait to see what another was going to do, and meanwhile Was.h.i.+ngton was expected to fight battles before his army was fit to take the field.

Something was gained, no doubt, by Congress furnis.h.i.+ng the money. But as Congress could not tax anybody, it had no means of raising a revenue, except to beg, borrow, or issue its promissory notes, the so-called Continental paper currency.

[Sidenote: The British plan for conquering New York in 1777.]

While Congress was trying to raise an adequate army, the British ministry laid its plans for the summer campaign. The conquest of the state of New York must be completed at all hazards; and to this end a threefold system of movements was devised:--

_First_, the army in Canada was to advance upon Ticonderoga, capture it, and descend the Hudson as far as Albany. This work was now entrusted to General Burgoyne.

_Secondly_, in order to make sure of efficient support from the Six Nations and the Tories of the frontier, a small force under Colonel Barry St. Leger was to go up the St. Lawrence to Lake Ontario, land at Oswego, and march down the Mohawk valley to reinforce Burgoyne on the Hudson.

_Thirdly_, after leaving a sufficient force to hold the city of New York, the main army, under Sir William Howe, was to ascend the Hudson, capture the forts in the Highlands, and keep on to Albany, so as to effect a junction with Burgoyne and St. Leger.

It was thought that such an imposing display of military force would make the Tory party supreme in New York, put an end to all resistance there, and effectually cut the United States in two. Then if the southern states on the one hand and the New England states on the other did not hasten to submit, they might afterward be attacked separately and subdued.

In this plan the ministry made the fatal mistake of underrating the strength of the feeling which, from one end of the United States to the other, was setting itself every day more and more decidedly against the Tories and in favour of independence. This feeling grew as fast as the anti-slavery feeling grew among the northern people during our Civil War. In 1861 President Lincoln thought it necessary to rebuke his generals who were too forward in setting free the slaves of persons engaged in rebellion against the United States. In 1862 he announced his purpose to emanc.i.p.ate all such slaves; and then it took less than three years to put an end to slavery forever. It was just so with the sentiment in favour of separation from Great Britain. In July, 1775, Thomas Jefferson expressly declared that the Americans had not raised armies with any intention of declaring their independence of the mother-country. In July, 1776, the Declaration of Independence, written by Jefferson, was proclaimed to the world, though the consent of the middle colonies and of South Carolina seemed somewhat reluctant. By the summer of 1777 the Tories were almost everywhere in a hopeless minority.

Every day of warfare, showing Great Britain more and more clearly as an enemy to be got rid of, diminished their strength; so that, even in New York and South Carolina, where they were strongest, it would not do for the British ministry to count too much upon any support they might give.

It was natural enough that King George and his ministers should fail to understand all this, but their mistake was their ruin. If they had understood that Burgoyne's march from Lake Champlain to the Hudson river was to be a march through a country thoroughly hostile, perhaps they would not have been so ready to send him on such a dangerous expedition.

It would have been much easier and safer to have sent his army by sea to New York, to reinforce Sir William Howe. Threatening movements might have been made by some of the Canada forces against Ticonderoga, so as to keep Schuyler busy in that quarter; and then the army at New York, thus increased to nearly 40,000 men, might have had a fair chance of overwhelming Was.h.i.+ngton by sheer weight of numbers. Such a plan might have failed, but it is not likely that it would have led to the surrender of the British army. And if they could have disposed of Was.h.i.+ngton, the British might have succeeded. It was more necessary for them to get rid of him than to march up and down the valley of the Hudson. But it was not strange that they did not see this as we do. It is always easy enough to be wise after things have happened.

Even as it was, if their plan had really been followed, they might have succeeded. If Howe's army had gone up to meet Burgoyne, the history of the year 1777 would have been very different from what it was. We shall presently see why it did not do so. Let us now recount the fortunes of Burgoyne and St. Leger.

[Sidenote: Burgoyne takes Ticonderoga, July 5, 1777.]

Burgoyne came up Lake Champlain in June, and easily won Ticonderoga, because the Americans had failed to secure a neighbouring position which commanded the fortress. Burgoyne took Ticonderoga from Mount Defiance, just as the Americans would have taken Boston from Bunker Hill, if they had been able to stay there, just as they afterward did take it from Dorchester Heights, and just as Howe took New York after he had won Brooklyn Heights. When you have secured a position from which you can kill the enemy twice as fast as he can kill you, he must of course retire from the situation; and the sooner he goes, the better chance he has of living to fight another day. The same principle worked in all these cases, and it worked with General Howe at Harlem Heights and at White Plains.

[Sidenote: Schuyler and Gates.]

When it was known that Burgoyne had taken Ticonderoga, there was dreadful dismay in America and keen disappointment among those Whigs in England whose declared sympathies were with us. George III. was beside himself with glee, and thought that the Americans were finally defeated and disposed of. But they were all mistaken. The garrison of Ticonderoga had taken the alarm and retreated, so that Burgoyne captured only an empty fortress. He left 1000 men in charge of it, and then pressed on into the wilderness between Lake Champlain and the upper waters of the Hudson river. His real danger was now beginning to show itself, and every day it could be seen more distinctly. He was plunging into a forest, far away from all possible support from behind, and as he went on he found that there were not Tories enough in that part of the country to be of any use to him. As Burgoyne advanced, General Schuyler prudently retreated, and used up the enemy's time by breaking down bridges and putting every possible obstacle in his way. Schuyler was a rare man, thoroughly disinterested and full of sound sense; but he had many political enemies who were trying to pull him down. A large part of his army was made up of New England men, who hated him partly for the mere reason that he was a New Yorker, and partly because as such he had taken part in the long quarrel between New York and New Hamps.h.i.+re over the possession of the Green Mountains. The disaffection toward Schuyler was fomented by General Horatio Gates, who had for some time held command under him, but was now in Philadelphia currying favour with the delegates in Congress, especially with those from New England, in the hope of getting himself appointed to the command of the northern army in Schuyler's place. Gates was an extremely weak man, but so vain that he really believed himself equal to the highest command that Congress could be persuaded to give him. On the battle-field he seems to have been wanting even in personal courage, as he certainly was in power to handle his troops; but in society he was quite a lion. He had a smooth courteous manner and a plausible tongue which paid little heed to the difference between truth and falsehood. His lies were not very ingenious, and so they were often detected and pointed out. But while many people were disgusted by his selfishness and trickery, there were always some who insisted that he was a great genius. History can point to a good many men like General Gates. Such men sometimes s.h.i.+ne for a while, but sooner or later they always come to be recognized as humbugs.

[Ill.u.s.tration: BURGOYNE'S CAMPAIGN.]

[Sidenote: Battle of Hubbardton, July 7, 1777.]

While Gates was intriguing, Schuyler was doing all in his power to impede the enemy's progress. It was on the night of July 5 that the garrison of Ticonderoga, under General St. Clair, had abandoned the fortress and retreated southward. On the 7th a battle was fought at Hubbardton between St. Clair's rear, under Seth Warner, and a portion of the British army under Fraser and Riedesel. Warner was defeated, but only after such an obstinate resistance as to check the pursuit, so that by the 12th St. Clair was able to bring his retreating troops in safety to Fort Edward, where they were united with Schuyler's army. Schuyler managed his obstructions so well that Burgoyne's utmost efforts were required to push into the wilderness at the rate of one mile per day; and meanwhile Schuyler was collecting a force of militia in the Green Mountains, under General Lincoln, to threaten Burgoyne in the rear and cut off his communications with Lake Champlain.

Burgoyne was accordingly marching into a trap, and Schuyler was doing the best that could be done. But on the first of August the intrigue against him triumphed in Congress, and Gates was appointed to supersede him in the command of the northern army. Gates, however, did not arrive upon the scene until the 19th of August, and by that time Burgoyne's situation was evidently becoming desperate.

On the last day of July Burgoyne reached Fort Edward, which Schuyler had evacuated just before. Schuyler crossed the Hudson river, and continued his retreat to Stillwater, about thirty miles above Albany. It was as far as the American retreat was to go. Burgoyne was already getting short of provisions, and before he could advance much further he needed a fresh supply of horses to drag the cannon and stores. He began to realize, when too late, that he had come far into an enemy's country.

The hostile feelings of the people were roused to fury by the atrocities committed by the Indians employed in Burgoyne's army. The British supposed that the savages would prove very useful as scouts and guides, and that by offers of reward and threats of punishment they might be restrained from deeds of violence. They were very unruly, however, and apt to use the tomahawk when they found a chance.

[Sidenote: Jane McCrea.]

The sad death of Miss Jane McCrea has been described in almost as many ways as there have been people to describe it, but no one really knows how it happened. What is really known is that, on the 27th of July, while Miss McCrea was staying with her friend Mrs. McNeil, near Fort Edward, a party of Indians burst into the house and carried off both ladies. They were pursued by some American soldiers, and a few shots were exchanged. In the course of the scrimmage the party got scattered, and Mrs. McNeil was taken alone to the British camp. Next day an Indian came into the camp with Miss McCrea's scalp, which her friend recognized from its long silky hair. A search was made, and the body of the poor girl was found lying near a spring, pierced with three bullet-wounds.

The Indian's story, that she was accidentally killed by a volley from the American soldiers, may well enough have been true. It is also known that she was betrothed to David Jones, a lieutenant in Burgoyne's army, and, as her own home was in New Jersey, her visit to Mrs. McNeil may very likely have been part of a plan for meeting her lover. These facts were soon woven into a story, in which Jenny was said to have been murdered while on her way to her wedding, escorted by a party of Indians whom her imprudent lover had sent to take charge of her.

[Sidenote: Battle of Bennington, Aug. 16, 1777.]

The people of the neighbouring counties, in New York and Ma.s.sachusetts, enraged at the death of Miss McCrea and alarmed for the safety of their own firesides, began rising in arms. St.u.r.dy recruits began marching to join Schuyler at Stillwater and Lincoln at Manchester in the Green Mountains. Meanwhile Burgoyne had made up his mind to attack the village of Bennington, which was Lincoln's centre of supplies. By seizing these supplies, he could get for himself what he stood sorely in need of, while at the same time the loss would cripple Lincoln and perhaps oblige him to retire from the scene. Accordingly 1000 Germans were sent out, in two detachments under colonels Baum and Breymann, to capture the village. But instead they were captured themselves. Baum was first outmanoeuvred, surrounded, and forced to surrender by John Stark, after a hot fight, in which Baum was mortally wounded. Then Breymann was put to flight and his troops dispersed by Seth Warner. Of the whole German force, 207 were killed or wounded, and at least 700 captured. Not more than 70 got back to the British camp. The American loss in killed and wounded was 56.

This brilliant victory at Bennington had important consequences. It checked Burgoyne's advance until he could get his supplies, and it decided that Lincoln's militia could get in his rear and cut off his communications with Ticonderoga. It furthermore inspired the Americans with the exulting hope that Burgoyne's whole army could be surrounded and forced to surrender.

[Sidenote: St. Leger in the Mohawk valley.]

If, however, the British had been successful in gaining the Mohawk valley and ensuring the supremacy over that region for the Tories, the fate of Burgoyne might have been averted. The Tories in that region, under Sir John Johnson and Colonel John Butler, were really formidable.

As for the Indians of the Iroquois league, they had always been friendly to the English and hostile to the French; but now, when it came to making their choice between two kinds of English--the Americans and the British, they hesitated and differed in opinion. The Mohawks took sides with the British because of the friends.h.i.+p between Joseph Brant and the Johnsons. The Cayugas and Senecas followed on the same side; but the Onondagas, in the centre of the confederacy, remained neutral, and the Oneidas and Tuscaroras, under the influence of Samuel Kirkland and other missionaries, showed active sympathy with the Americans. It turned out, too, that the Whigs were much stronger in the valley than had been supposed.

[Sidenote: Battle of Oriskany, Aug. 6, 1777.]

After St. Leger had landed at Oswego and joined hands with his Tory and Indian allies, his entire force amounted to about 1700 men. The princ.i.p.al obstacle to his progress toward the Hudson river was Fort Stanwix, which stood where the city of Rome now stands. On the 3d of August St. Leger reached Fort Stanwix and laid siege to it. The place was garrisoned by 600 men under Colonel Peter Gansevoort, and the Whig yeomanry of the neighbourhood, under the heroic General Nicholas Herkimer, were on the way to relieve it, to the number of at least 800.

Herkimer made an excellent plan for surprising St. Leger with an attack in the rear, while the garrison should sally forth and attack him in front. But St. Leger's Indian scouts were more nimble than Herkimer's messengers, so that he obtained his information sooner than Gansevoort.

An ambush was skilfully prepared by Brant in a ravine near Oriskany, and there, on the 6th of August, was fought the most desperate and murderous battle of the Revolutionary War. It was a hand to hand fight, in which about 800 men were engaged on each side, and each lost more than one-third of its number. As the Tories and Indians were giving way, their retreat was hastened by the sounds of battle from Fort Stanwix, where the garrison was making its sally and driving back the besiegers.

Herkimer remained in possession of the field at Oriskany, but his plan had been for the moment thwarted, and in the battle he had received a wound from which he died.

[Sidenote: St. Leger's flight, Aug. 22, 1777.]

Benedict Arnold had lately been sent by Was.h.i.+ngton to be of such a.s.sistance as he could to Schuyler. Arnold stood high in the confidence of both these generals. He had shown himself one of the ablest officers in the American army, he was especially skilful in getting good work out of raw troops, and he was a great favourite with his men. On hearing of the danger of Fort Stanwix, Schuyler sent him to the rescue, with 1200 men. When he was within twenty miles of that stronghold, he contrived, with the aid of some friendly Oneidas and a Tory captive whose life he spared for the purpose, to send on before him exaggerated reports of the size of his army. The device accomplished far more than he could have expected. The obstinate resistance at Oriskany had discouraged the Tories and angered the Indians. Distrust and dissension were already rife in St. Leger's camp, when such reports came in as to lead many to believe that Burgoyne had been totally defeated, and that the whole of Schuyler's army, or a great part of it, was coming up the Mohawk. This news led to riot and panic among the troops, and on August 22 St. Leger took to flight and made his way as best he could to his s.h.i.+ps at Oswego, with scarcely the shred of an army left. This catastrophe showed how sadly mistaken the British had been in their reliance upon Tory help.

The battle of Bennington was fought on the 16th of August. Now by the overthrow of St. Leger, six days later, Burgoyne's situation had become very alarming. It was just in the midst of these events that Gates arrived, on August 19, and took command of the army at Stillwater, which was fast growing in numbers. Militia were flocking in, Arnold's force was returning, and Daniel Morgan was at hand with 500 Virginian sharpshooters. Unless Burgoyne could win a battle against overwhelming odds, there was only one thing that could save him; and that was the arrival of Howe's army at Albany, according to the ministry's programme.

But Burgoyne had not yet heard a word from Howe; and Howe never came.

[Sidenote: Why Howe failed to cooperate with Burgoyne.]

This failure of Howe to cooperate with Burgoyne was no doubt the most fatal military blunder made by the British in the whole course of the war. The failure was of course unintentional on Howe's part. He meant to extend sufficient support to Burgoyne, but the trouble was that he attempted too much. He had another plan in his mind at the same time, and between the two he ended by accomplis.h.i.+ng nothing. While he kept one eye on Albany, he kept the other on Philadelphia. He had not relished being driven back across New Jersey by Was.h.i.+ngton, and the hope of defeating that general in battle, and then pus.h.i.+ng on to the "rebel capital" strongly tempted him. In such thoughts he was encouraged by the advice of the captive General Lee. That unscrupulous busybody felt himself in great danger, for he knew that the British regarded him in the light of a deserter from their army. While his fate was in suspense, he informed the brothers Howe that he had abandoned the American cause, and he offered them his advice and counsel for the summer campaign. This villainy of Lee's was not known till eighty years afterward, when a paper of his was discovered that revealed it in all its blackness. The Howes were sure to pay some heed to Lee's opinions, because he was supposed to have acquired a thorough knowledge of American affairs. He advised them to begin by taking Philadelphia, and supported this plan by plausible arguments. Sir William Howe seems to have thought that he could accomplish this early in the summer, and then have his hands free for whatever might be needed on the Hudson river. Accordingly on the 12th of June he started to cross the state of New Jersey with 18,000 men.

[Sidenote: Was.h.i.+ngton's masterly campaign in New Jersey, June, 1777.]

But Sir William had reckoned without his host. In a campaign of eighteen days, Was.h.i.+ngton, with only 8000 men, completely blocked the way for him, and made him give up the game. The popular histories do not have much to say about these eighteen days, because they were not marked by battles. Was.h.i.+ngton won by his marvellous skill in choosing positions where Howe could not attack him with any chance of success. Howe understood this and did not attack. He could not entice Was.h.i.+ngton into fighting at a disadvantage, and he could not march on and leave such an enemy behind without sacrificing his own communications. Accordingly on June 30 he gave up his plan and retreated to Staten Island. If there ever was a general who understood the useful art of wasting his adversary's time, Was.h.i.+ngton was that general.

Howe now decided to take his army to Philadelphia by sea. He waited a while till the news from the north seemed to show that Burgoyne was carrying everything before him; and then he thought it safe to start.

He left Sir Henry Clinton in command at New York, with 7000 men, telling him to send a small force up the river to help Burgoyne, should there be any need of it, which did not then seem likely. Then he put to sea with his main force of 18,000 men, and went around to the Delaware river, which he reached at the end of July, just as Burgoyne was reaching Fort Edward.

[Sidenote: Howe's strange movement upon Philadelphia, by way of Chesapeake bay.]

Howe's next move was very strange. He afterward said that he did not go up the Delaware river, because he found that there were obstructions and forts to be pa.s.sed. But he might have gone up a little way and landed his forces on the Delaware coast at a point where a single march would have brought them to Elkton, at the head of Chesapeake bay, about fifty miles southwest from Philadelphia. Instead of this, he put out to sea again and sailed four hundred miles, to the mouth of Chesapeake bay and up that bay to Elkton, where he landed his men on the 25th of August.

Why he took such a roundabout course cannot be understood, unless he may have attached importance to Lee's advice that the presence of a British squadron in Chesapeake bay would help to arouse the Tories in Maryland.

The British generals could not seem to make up their minds that America was a hostile country. Small blame to them, brave fellows that they were! They could not make war against America in such a fierce spirit as that in which France would now make war against Germany if she could see her way clear to do so. They were always counting on American sympathy, and this was a will-o'-the-wisp that lured them to destruction.

On landing at Elkton, Howe received orders from London, telling him to ascend the Hudson river and support Burgoyne, in any event. This order had left London in May. It was well for the Americans that the telegraph had not then been invented. Now it was the 25th of August; Burgoyne was in imminent peril; and Howe was three hundred miles away from him!

[Sidenote: Battle of the Brandywine, Sept. 11, 1777.]

All these movements had been carefully watched by Was.h.i.+ngton; and as Howe marched toward Philadelphia he found that general blocking the way at the fords of the Brandywine creek. A battle ensued on the 11th of September. It was a well-contested battle. With 11,000 men against 18,000, Was.h.i.+ngton could hardly have been expected to win a victory. He was driven from the field, but not badly defeated. He kept his army well in hand, and manoeuvred so skilfully that the British were employed for two weeks in getting over the twenty-six miles to Philadelphia.

[Sidenote: Battle of Germantown, Oct. 4, 1777.]

Before Howe had reached that city, Congress had moved away to York in Pennsylvania. When he had taken Philadelphia, he found that he could not stay there without taking the forts on the Delaware river which prevented the British s.h.i.+ps from coming up; for by land Was.h.i.+ngton could cut off his supplies, and he could only be sure of them by water. So Howe detached part of his army to reduce these forts, leaving the rest of it at Germantown, six miles from Philadelphia. On the 4th of October, Was.h.i.+ngton attacked the force at Germantown in such a position that defeat would have quite destroyed it. The attempt failed at the critical moment because of a dense fog in which one American brigade fired into another and caused a brief panic. The forts on the Delaware were captured after hard fighting, and Was.h.i.+ngton went into winter quarters at Valley Forge.

The result of the summer's work was that, because Howe had made several mistakes and Was.h.i.+ngton had taken the utmost advantage of every one of them, the whole British plan was spoiled. Howe had used up the whole season in getting to Philadelphia, and Was.h.i.+ngton's activity had also kept Sir Henry Clinton's attention so much occupied with what was going on about the Delaware river as to prevent him from sending aid to the northward until it was too late. Sir Henry was once actually obliged to send reinforcements to Howe.