Sea-Power and Other Studies Part 11

As has been stated already, the defence of our sea-borne trade, being in practice the keeping open of our ocean lines of communication, carried with it the protection, in part at any rate, of our transmarine territories. Napoleon held pertinaciously to the belief that British prosperity was chiefly due to our position in India. We owe it to Captain Mahan that we now know that the eminent American Fulton--a name of interest to the members of this Inst.i.tution--told Pitt of the belief held abroad that 'the fountains of British wealth are in India and China.' In the great scheme of naval concentration which the Emperor devised, seizure of British Colonies in the West Indies had a definite place. We kept in that quarter, and varied as necessary, a force capable of dealing with a naval raid as well as guarding the neighbouring lines of communication. In 1803 we had four s.h.i.+ps of the line in the West Indian area. In 1804 we had six of the same cla.s.s; and in 1805, while the line-of-battle s.h.i.+ps were reduced to four, the number of frigates was increased from nine to twenty-five. Whether our Government divined Napoleon's designs on India or not, it took measures to protect our interests there.

In January 1804 we had on the Cape of Good Hope and the East Indies stations, both together, six sail of the line, three smaller two-deckers, six frigates, and six sloops, or twenty-one s.h.i.+ps of war in all. This would have been sufficient to repel a raiding attack made in some strength. By the beginning of 1805 our East Indies force had been increased; and in the year 1805 itself we raised it to a strength of forty-one s.h.i.+ps in all, of which nine were of the line and seventeen were frigates. Had, therefore, any of the hostile s.h.i.+ps managed to get to the East Indies from the Atlantic or the Mediterranean ports, in which they were being watched by our navy, their chances of succeeding in their object would have been small indeed.

When we enter the domain of tactics strictly so-called, that is to say, when we discuss the proceedings of naval forces--whether single s.h.i.+ps, squadrons, or fleets--in hostile contact with one another, we find the time of Trafalgar full of instructive episodes.

Even with the most recent experience of naval warfare vividly present to our minds, we can still regard Nelson as the greatest of tacticians. Naval tactics may be roughly divided into two great cla.s.ses or sections, viz. the tactics of groups of s.h.i.+ps, that is to say, fleet actions; and the tactics of what the historian James calls 'single s.h.i.+p actions,' that is to say, fights between two individual s.h.i.+ps. In the former the achievements of Nelson stand out with incomparable brilliancy. It would be impossible to describe his method fully in such a paper as this. We may, however, say that Nelson was an innovator, and that his tactical principles and methods have been generally misunderstood down to this very day. If ever there was an admiral who was opposed to an unthinking, headlong rush at an enemy, it was he. Yet this is the character that he still bears in the conception of many.

He was, in truth, an industrious and patient student of tactics, having studied them, in what in these days we should call a scientific spirit, at an early period, when there was but little reason to expect that he would ever be in a position to put to a practical test the knowledge that he had acquired and the ideas that he had formed. He saw that the old battle formation in single line-ahead was insufficient if you wanted--as he himself always did--to gain an overwhelming victory. He also saw that, though an improvement on the old formation, Lord Howe's method of the single line-abreast was still a good deal short of tactical perfection. Therefore, he devised what he called, with pardonable elation, the 'Nelson touch,' the attack in successive lines so directed as to overwhelm one part of the enemy's fleet, whilst the other part was prevented from coming to the a.s.sistance of the first, and was in its turn overwhelmed or broken up. His object was to bring a larger number of his own s.h.i.+ps against a smaller number of the enemy's. He would by this method destroy the part attacked, suffering in the process so little damage himself that with his whole force he would be able to deal effectively with the hostile remnant if it ventured to try conclusions with him. It is of the utmost importance that we should thoroughly understand Nelson's fundamental tactical principle, viz. the bringing of a larger number of s.h.i.+ps to fight against a smaller number of the enemy's. There is not, I believe, in the whole of the records of Nelson's opinions and actions a single expression tending to show that tactical efficiency was considered by him to be due to superiority in size of individual s.h.i.+ps of the same cla.s.s or--as far as _materiel_ was concerned--to anything but superior numbers, of course at the critical point. He did not require, and did not have, more s.h.i.+ps in his own fleet than the whole of those in the fleet of the enemy. What he wanted was to bring to the point of impact, when the fight began, a larger number of s.h.i.+ps than were to be found in that part of the enemy's line.

I believe that I am right in saying that, from the date of Salamis downwards, history records no decisive naval victory in which the victorious fleet has not succeeded in concentrating against a relatively weak point in its enemy's formation a greater number of its own s.h.i.+ps. I know of nothing to show that this has not been the rule throughout the ages of which detailed history furnishes us with any memorial--no matter what the cla.s.s of s.h.i.+p, what the type of weapon, what the mode of propulsion. The rule certainly prevailed in the battle of the 10th August 1904 off Port Arthur, though it was not so overwhelmingly decisive as some others. We may not even yet know enough of the sea fight in the Straits of Tsus.h.i.+ma to be able to describe it in detail; but we do know that at least some of the Russian s.h.i.+ps were defeated or destroyed by a combination of j.a.panese s.h.i.+ps against them.

Looking back at the tactics of the Trafalgar epoch, we may see that the history of them confirms the experience of earlier wars, viz. that victory does not necessarily fall to the side which has the biggest s.h.i.+ps. It is a well-known fact of naval history that generally the French s.h.i.+ps were larger and the Spanish much larger than the British s.h.i.+ps of corresponding cla.s.ses. This superiority in size certainly did not carry with it victory in action. On the other hand, British s.h.i.+ps were generally bigger than the Dutch s.h.i.+ps with which they fought; and it is of great significance that at Camperdown the victory was due, not to superiority in the size of individual s.h.i.+ps, but, as shown by the different lists of killed and wounded, to the act of bringing a larger number against a smaller. All that we have been able to learn of the occurrences in the battle of the j.a.pan Sea supports instead of being opposed to this conclusion; and it may be said that there is nothing tending to upset it in the previous history of the present war in the Far East.

I do not know how far I am justified in expatiating on this point; but, as it may help to bring the strategy and tactics of the Trafalgar epoch into practical relation with the stately science of which in our day this Inst.i.tution is, as it were, the mother-shrine and metropolitical temple, I may be allowed to dwell upon it a little longer. The object aimed at by those who favour great size of individual s.h.i.+ps is not, of course, magnitude alone. It is to turn out a s.h.i.+p which shall be more powerful than an individual antagonist. All recent development of man-of-war construction has taken the form of producing, or at any rate trying to produce, a more powerful s.h.i.+p than those of earlier date, or belonging to a rival navy. I know the issues that such statements are likely to raise; and I ask you, as naval architects, to bear with me patiently when I say what I am going to say. It is this: If you devise for the s.h.i.+p so produced the tactical system for which she is specially adapted you must, in order to be logical, base your system on her power of defeating her particular antagonist.

Consequently, you must abandon the principle of concentration of superior numbers against your enemy; and, what is more, must be prepared to maintain that such concentration on his part against yourself would be ineffectual. This will compel a reversion to tactical methods which made a fleet action a series of duels between pairs of combatants, and--a thing to be pondered on seriously--never enabled anyone to win a decisive victory on the sea. The position will not be made more logical if you demand both superior size and also superior numbers, because if you adopt the tactical system appropriate to one of the things demanded, you will rule out the other. You cannot employ at the same time two different and opposed tactical systems.

It is not necessary to the line of argument above indicated to ignore the merits of the battles.h.i.+p cla.s.s. Like their predecessors, the s.h.i.+ps of the line, it is really battles.h.i.+ps which in a naval war dominate the situation. We saw that it was so at the time of Trafalgar, and we see that it has been so in the war between Russia and j.a.pan, at all events throughout the 1904 campaign.

The experience of naval war, down to the close of that in which Trafalgar was the most impressive event, led to the virtual abandonment of s.h.i.+ps of the line[92] above and below a certain cla.s.s. The 64-gun s.h.i.+ps and smaller two-deckers had greatly diminished in number, and repet.i.tions of them grew more and more rare. It was the same with the three-deckers, which, as the late Admiral Colomb pointed out, continued to be built, though in reduced numbers, not so much for their tactical efficiency as for the convenient manner in which they met the demands for the accommodation required in flag-s.h.i.+ps. The tactical condition which the naval architects of the Trafalgar period had to meet was the employment of an increased number of two-deckers of the medium cla.s.ses.

[Footnote 92: Experience of war, as regards increase in the number of medium-sized men-of-war of the different cla.s.ses, tended to the same result in both the French Revolutionary war (1793 to 1801) and the Napoleonic war which began in 1803. Taking both contests down to the end of the Trafalgar year, the following table will show how great was the development of the line-of-battle-s.h.i.+p cla.s.s below the three-decker and above the 64-gun s.h.i.+p. It will also show that there was no development of, but a relative decline in, the three-deckers and the 64's, the small additions, where there were any, being generally due to captures from the enemy.

The two-deckers not 'fit to lie in a line' were at the end of the Trafalgar year about half what they were when the first period of the 'Great War' began. When we come to the frigate cla.s.ses we find the same result. In the earlier war 11 frigates of 44 and 40 guns were introduced into our navy. It is worth notice that this number was not increased, and by the end of the Trafalgar year had, on the contrary, declined to 10. The smallest frigates, of 28 guns, were 27 in 1793, and 13 at the end of the Trafalgar year. On the other hand, the increase in the medium frigate cla.s.ses (38, 36, and 32 guns) was very large. From 1793 to the end of the Trafalgar year the 38-gun frigates increased from 8 to 50, and the 36-gun frigates from 16 to 54.

------------------------------------------------------------- Napoleonic War to French the end of the Revolutionary War Trafalgar year Cla.s.ses of s.h.i.+ps ------------------- ------------------- Commence- Commence- Commence- Commence- ment of ment of ment of ment of 1793 1801 1803 1806 ------------------------------------------------------------- 3-deckers 31 32 29 29 2-deckers of 74 76 111 105 123 guns, and above 64 and 60 gun s.h.i.+ps 46 47 38 38 2-deckers not 'fit 43 31 21 22 to lie in a line' Frigates 44 guns 0 6 6 6 " 40 " 0 5 5 4 " 38 " 8 32 32 50 " 36 " 16 49 49 54 " 32 " 48 41 38 56 " 28 " 27 11 11 13 -------------------------------------------------------------

The liking for three-deckers, professed by some officers of Nelson's time, seems to have been due to a belief, not in the merit of their size as such, but in the value of the increased number of medium guns carried on a 'middle' deck. There is, I believe, nothing to show that the two-deckers _Gibraltar_ (2185 tons) and _Coesar_ (2003) were considered more formidable than the three-deckers _Balfleur_ (1947), _Glory_ (1944), or _Queen_ (1876). All these s.h.i.+ps were in the same fleet, and fought in the same battle.]

A fleet of s.h.i.+ps of the line as long as it could keep the sea, that is, until it had to retreat into port before a stronger fleet, controlled a certain area of water. Within that area smaller men-of-war as well as friendly merchant s.h.i.+ps were secure from attack. As the fleet moved about, so the area moved with it.

Skilful disposition and manoeuvring added largely to the extent of sea within which the maritime interests that the fleet was meant to protect would be safe. It seems reasonable to expect that it will be the same with modern fleets of suitable battles.h.i.+ps.

The tactics of 'single s.h.i.+p actions' at the time of Trafalgar were based upon pure seamans.h.i.+p backed up by good gunnery. The better a captain handled his s.h.i.+p the more likely he was to beat his antagonist. Superior speed, where it existed, was used to 'gain the weather gage,' not in order to get a suitable range for the faster s.h.i.+p's guns, but to compel her enemy to fight.

Superior speed was also used to run away, capacity to do which was not then, and ought not to be now, reckoned a merit in a s.h.i.+p expressly constructed for fighting, not fleeing. It is sometimes claimed in these days that superior speed will enable a modern s.h.i.+p to keep at a distance from her opponent which will be the best range for her own guns. It has not been explained why a range which best suits her guns should not be equally favourable for the guns of her opponent; unless, indeed, the latter is a.s.sumed to be weakly armed, in which case the distance at which the faster s.h.i.+p might engage her would be a matter of comparative indifference.

There is nothing in the tactics of the time of Trafalgar to make it appear that--when a fight had once begun--superior speed, of course within moderate limits, conferred any considerable tactical advantage in 'single s.h.i.+p actions,' and still less in general or fleet actions. Taking up a position ahead or astern of a hostile s.h.i.+p so as to be able to rake her was not facilitated by originally superior speed so much as by the more damaged state of the s.h.i.+p to be raked--raking, as a rule, occurring rather late in an action.

A remarkable result of long experience of war made itself clearly apparent in the era of Trafalgar. I have already alluded to the tendency to restrict the construction of line-of-battle s.h.i.+ps to those of the medium cla.s.ses. The same thing may be noticed in the case of the frigates.[93] Those of 44, 40, and 28 guns relatively or absolutely diminished in number; whilst the number of the 38-gun, 36-gun, and 32-gun frigates increased. The officers who had personal experience of many campaigns were able to impress on the naval architects of the day the necessity of recognising the sharp distinction that really exists between what we should now call the 'battles.h.i.+p' and what we should now call the 'cruiser.'

In the earlier time there were s.h.i.+ps which were intermediate between the s.h.i.+p of the line and the frigate. These were the two-deckers of 56, 54, 50, 44, and even 40 guns. They had long been regarded as not 'fit to lie in a line,' and they were never counted in the frigate cla.s.ses. They seemed to have held a nondescript position, for no one knew exactly how to employ them in war any more than we now know exactly how to employ our armoured cruisers, as to which it is not settled whether they are fit for general actions or should be confined to commerce defending or other cruiser service. The two-deckers just mentioned were looked upon by the date of Trafalgar as forming an unnecessary cla.s.s of fighting s.h.i.+ps. Some were employed, chiefly because they existed, on special service; but they were being replaced by true battles.h.i.+ps on one side and true frigates on the other.[94]

[Footnote 93: See footnote 92.]

[Footnote 94: See footnote 92.]

In conclusion, I would venture to say that the strategical and tactical lessons taught by a long series of naval campaigns had been mastered by our navy by the time of the Trafalgar campaign.

The effect of those lessons showed itself in our s.h.i.+p-building policy, and has been placed on permanent record in the history of maritime achievement and of the adaptation of material means to belligerent ends.

XII

THE SUPPLY AND COMMUNICATIONS OF A FLEET[95]

[Footnote 95: Written in 1902. (Read at the Hong-Kong United Service Inst.i.tution.)]

A problem which is not an attractive one, but which has to be solved, is to arrange the proper method of supplying a fleet and maintaining its communications. In time of peace as well as in time of war there is a continuous consumption of the articles of various kinds used on board s.h.i.+p, viz. naval stores, ordnance stores, engineers' stores, victualling stores, coal, water, &c.

If we know the quant.i.ty of each description of stores that a s.h.i.+p can carry, and if we estimate the progressive consumption, we can compute, approximately but accurately enough for practical purposes, the time at which replenishment would be necessary and to what amount it should be made up. As a general rule s.h.i.+ps stow about three months' stores and provisions. The amount of coal and engineers' stores, measured in time, depends on the proceedings of the s.h.i.+p, and can only be calculated if we know during what portion of any given period she will be under way.

Of course, this can be only roughly estimated. In peace time we know nearly exactly what the expenditure of ammunition within a given length of time--say, a quarter of a year--will be. For war conditions we can only form an estimate based upon a.s.sumptions.

The consumption of provisions depends upon the numbers of officers and men, and in war or peace would be much the same. The greater activity to be expected in war would lead to more wear and tear, and consequently to a larger expenditure of naval stores. In peaceful times the quarterly expenditure of ammunition does not vary materially. In case we were at war, a single action might cause us to expend in a few hours as much as half a dozen quarterly peace allowances. There is a certain average number of days that a s.h.i.+p of a particular cla.s.s is under way in a year, and the difference between that number and 365 is, of course, the measure of the length of time she is at anchor or in harbour. Expenditure of coal and of some important articles of engineers' stores depends on the relation between the time that she is stationary and the time she is under way. It should be particularly noted that the distinction is not between time at anchor and time at sea, but between time at anchor and 'time under way.' If a s.h.i.+p leaves her anchorage to run an engine-trial after refit, or to fire at a target, or to adjust compa.s.ses, or to go into dock--she burns more coal than if she remained stationary. These occasions of movement may be counted in with the days in which the s.h.i.+p is at sea, and the total taken as the number of days under way.

It may be a.s.sumed that altogether these will amount to six or seven a month. In time of war the period under way would probably be much longer, and the time spent in expectation of getting under way in a hurry would almost certainly be considerable, so that expenditure of coal and machinery lubricants would be greatly increased.

The point to be made here is that--independently of strategic conditions, which will be considered later--the difference in the supply of a given naval force in war and in peace is princ.i.p.ally that in the former the requirements of nearly everything except provisions will be greater; and consequently that the articles must be forwarded in larger quant.i.ties or at shorter intervals than in peace time. If, therefore, we have arranged a satisfactory system of peace supply, that system--defence of the line of communications being left out of consideration for the present--will merely have to be expanded in time of war. In other words, practice in the use of the system during peace will go a long way towards preparing us for the duty of working it under war conditions.

That a regular system will be absolutely indispensable during hostilities will not be doubted.

The general principles which I propose to indicate are applicable to any station. We may allow for a squadron composed of--

4 battles.h.i.+ps, 4 large cruisers, 4 second-cla.s.s cruisers, 13 smaller vessels of various kinds, and 3 destroyers,

being away from the princ.i.p.al base-port of the station for several months of the year. The number of officers and men would be, in round numbers, about 10,000.

In estimating the amounts of stores of different kinds required by men-of-war, it is necessary--in order to allow for proper means of conveyance--to convert tons of dead-weight into tons by measurement, as the two are not always exactly equivalent. In the following enumeration only estimated amounts are stated, and the figures are to be considered as approximate and not precise.

It is likely that in each item an expert maybe able to discover some variation from the rigorously exact; but the general result will be sufficiently accurate for practical purposes, especially as experience will suggest corrections.

A thousand men require about 3.1 tons of victualling stores, packages included, daily, We may make this figure up to 3.5 tons to allow for 'medical comforts' and canteen stores, Consequently 10,000 men require about 35 tons a day, and about 6300 tons for six months. The a.s.sumed squadron, judging from experience, would require in peace time about 600 tons of engineers' stores, about 400 tons of naval stores, and--if the s.h.i.+ps started with only their exact allowance on board and then carried out a full quarterly practice twice--the quant.i.ty of ordnance stores and ammunition required would be about 1140 tons, to meet the ordinary peace rate of expenditure, We thus get for a full six months' supply the following figures:--

Victualling stores 6,300 tons.

Engineers' stores 600 "

Naval stores 400 "

Ordnance stores and ammunition 1,140 "

----- Total 8,440 "

Some allowance must be made for the needs of the 'auxiliaries,'[96]

the vessels that bring supplies and in other ways attend on the fighting s.h.i.+ps. This may be put at 7 per cent. The tonnage required would accordingly amount in all to about 9000.

[Footnote 96: The 7 per cent. mentioned in the text would probably cover nearly all the demands--except coal--of auxiliaries, which would not require much or any ammunition. Coal is provided for separately.]

The squadron would burn in harbour or when stationary about 110 tons of coal a day, and when under way about 1050 tons a day. For 140 harbour-days the consumption would be about 15,400 tons; and for 43 days under way about 45,150: so that for coal requirements we should have the following:--

Harbour consumption 15,400 tons.

Under-way consumption 45,150 "

------ Total for fighting s.h.i.+ps 60,550 "

7 per cent. for auxiliaries (say) 4,250 "

------ Grand total 64,800 "

Some time ago (in 1902) a representation was made from the China station that, engine-room oil being expended whenever coal is expended, there must be some proportion between the quant.i.ties of each. It was, therefore, suggested that every collier should bring to the squadron which she was supplying a proportionate quant.i.ty of oil. This has been approved, and it has been ordered that the proportions will be 75 gallons of oil to every 100 tons of coal.[97] It was also suggested that the oil should be carried in casks of two sizes, for the convenience of both large and small s.h.i.+ps.

[Footnote 97: I was informed (on the 10th December 1902), some time after the above was written, that the colliers supplying the United States Navy are going to carry 100 gallons of oil for every 100 tons of coal.]

There is another commodity, which s.h.i.+ps have never been able to do without, and which they need now in higher proportion than ever. That commodity is fresh water. The squadron const.i.tuted as a.s.sumed would require an average of about 160 tons of fresh water a day, and nearly 30,000 tons in six months. Of this the s.h.i.+ps, without adding very inconveniently to their coal consumption, might themselves distil about one-half; but the remaining 15,000 tons would have to be brought to them; and another thousand tons would probably be wanted by the auxiliaries, making the full six months' demand up to 16,000 tons.

The tonnage requirements of the squadron and its 'auxiliaries'

for a full six months' period would be about 74,000, without fresh water. As, however, the s.h.i.+ps would have started with full store-rooms, holds, and bunkers, and might be expected to return to the princ.i.p.al base-port of the station at the end of the period, stores for four-and-a-half months', and coal to meet twenty weeks', consumption would be sufficient. These would be about 6750 tons of stores and ammunition and 46,000 tons of coal.[98]

[Footnote 98: To avoid complicating the question, the water or distilling vessel, the hospital s.h.i.+p, and the repair vessel have not been considered specially. Their coal and stores have been allowed for.]