Albert Gallatin Part 12

In 1838, on the foundation of the Bank of Commerce under the free banking law of the State of New York, the presidency of it was first tendered to Mr. Gallatin. The directors of this bank were among the most distinguished financiers of the city, and its object was to provide a conservative inst.i.tution with sufficient power and capital to act as a regulator upon the New York banks. Profit to the stockholders was secondary to the reserve power for general advantage.

In June, 1839, Mr. Gallatin resigned his post as president of the National Bank of New York. In 1841 he published a financial essay, which he ent.i.tled "Suggestions on the Banks and Currency of the United States," a paper full of information, but from the nature of the subject not to be compared in general interest with his earlier paper, which is as fresh to-day as when it was written. Mr. Gallatin condemned paper currency as an artificial stimulus, and the ultimate object of his essays was to annihilate what he termed the "dangerous instrument." He admitted its utility and convenience, when used with great sobriety, but he deprecated its tendency to degenerate into a depreciated and irredeemable currency. This tendency the present national banking law arrests, but the law rather invites than prohibits the stimulus of increased issues. The last word has not yet been said on national currency, which, though the basis of all commercial transactions, has necessarily no other relation to banks than that which it holds to any individual in the community.

Economic questions have interested the highest order of mind on the two continents. Sismondi published a paper on commercial wealth in 1803, and in 1810 a memoir on paper money, which he prepared to show how it might be suppressed in the Austrian dominions; Humboldt made a special study of the sources and quant.i.ty of the precious metals in the world, in which Mr. Gallatin aided him by investigation in America. Michel Chevalier was interested in the same subjects; surviving his two masters in the art and witnessing the marvelous effects of the additions made by America to the store of precious metals, he continued the study in the spirit of his predecessors, and favored the world with instructive papers. Mr. Gallatin's contributions to this science are remarkable for minute research and careful deductions.

In 1843 President Tyler tendered the Treasury portfolio to Mr. Gallatin.

The venerable financier looked upon the offer as an act of folly to which a serious answer seemed hardly necessary. Yet as silence might be misconstrued, he replied that he wanted no office, and to accept at his age that of secretary of the treasury would "be an act of insanity." He was then in his eighty-third year. The offer of the post was but an ill-considered caprice of Mr. Tyler.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 10: Cents are omitted as confusing figures.]

[Footnote 11: The first Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury.

This was under the Supplementary Treasury Act.]

[Footnote 12: Excess of receipts, notwithstanding the purchase of Louisiana and payments on account of princ.i.p.al and interest of the debt.]

[Footnote 13: These were the banks of New York, Boston, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. Seven presidents formed the committee. John A. Stevens of New York was chairman, by request of the Secretary of the Treasury. The other members were named by him. The sum advanced to the government was one hundred and fifty millions of dollars in coin.]

[Footnote 14: At Portland, $120,000; Salem, $183,600; Boston, $75,300; Providence, $67,800; Richmond, $49,000; Norfolk, $103,000; Charleston, $354,000.]

[Footnote 15: Report of Secretary Dallas, September 20, 1816.]

[Footnote 16: Act of March 3, 1817.]

[Footnote 17: _Democratic Review_, xii. 641.]

[Footnote 18: Chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means.]

CHAPTER VII

IN THE CABINET

The general principles which Mr. Jefferson proposed to apply in his conduct of the government were not principles of organization but of administration. The establishments devised by Hamilton, in accordance with or in development of the provisions of the Const.i.tution, were organic. The new policy was essentially restrictive and economic. The military and naval establishments were to be kept at their lowest possible limit. The Treasury Department was to be conducted on strictly business principles. The debt was to be reduced and finally paid by a fixed annual appropriation. The revenue was to be raised by imposts on importation and tonnage, and by direct taxation, if necessary. The public land system was to be developed. A scheme of internal improvements by land and water highways was to be devised. All these purposes except the last had been declared by the opposition during the last part of Was.h.i.+ngton's second term and during Adams's presidency, and had been lucidly expounded by Madison, Gallatin, Giles, Nicholas, and others of the Republican leaders. On all these subjects Mr. Gallatin was in accord with his chief. Only upon the bank question were they at issue. Mr. Jefferson detested or feared the aristocracy of money, while Gallatin, with a clearer insight into commercial and financial questions, recognized that in a young country where capital was limited, and specie in still greater disproportion to the increasing demands of trade, a well-ordered, well-managed money inst.i.tution was an enormous advantage, if not an imperative necessity to the government and the people.

Peace was necessary to the success of this general policy of internal progress, but peace was not to be had for the asking. It was not till half a century later that the power of the western continent as a food-producing country was fully felt by Europe, and peace with the United States became almost a condition of existence to millions in the old world, while this country became independent, in fact as in name, to the fullest meaning of the word. Peace was not menaced during Jefferson's first administration, for the Federalists had left no legacy of diplomatic discord to embarra.s.s their successors. The divisions of opinion were on home affairs. The Republican party was the first opposition which had reached power since the formation of the government. The Federalists had not hesitated to confine the patronage of the executive to men of their own way of thinking. The Republicans had attacked that principle. There were men even in the ranks of Jefferson's administration who scouted the idea that the President of the United States could become "the President of a party." But practice and principle are not always in accord, even in administrations of sentimental purity, and the pressure for office was as great in 1800 as it has ever since been on the arrival of a new party to power. Beyond all other departments of government, the Treasury depends for its proper service upon business capacity and a knowledge of the principles of accounting and office routine. Mr. Gallatin was well aware of the difficulties his predecessors had encountered in finding and retaining competent examining and auditing clerks. As there was no reason to suppose that all this talent was to be found in the ranks of the Republican party, and his common sense pointed out the folly of limiting the market of supply, he early (July 25, 1801) prepared a circular to collectors, in which he informed them "that the door of office was no longer to be shut against any man because of his political opinions, but that integrity and capacity suitable to the station were to be the only qualifications required; and further, the President, considering freedom of opinion or freedom of suffrage at public elections imprescriptible rights of citizens, would regard any exercise of official influence to sustain or control the same rights in others as injurious to the public administration and practically destructive of the fundamental principles of a republican Const.i.tution." But Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison opposed this simple declaration of a principle which has since been the base of every attempt at reform in the civil service. Mr. Jefferson answered that after one half of the subordinates were exchanged, talents and worth might alone be inquired into in the case of new vacancies.

This was a miserable shuffling policy which defeated itself. For a Federalist to retain office when such a discrimination was applied was of itself a degradation. Mr. Jefferson here threw away and forever lost the power to establish the true system, and fixed the curse of patronage upon American administration. The true principle may be stated in the form of an axiom. Administrations should rely for continuation upon measures, not on patronage. Gallatin yielded with reluctance to the spirit of persecution which he did not hesitate to say disgraced the Republican cause, and sank them to a level with their predecessors.

Notwithstanding his aversion, he was compelled to follow the policy of the cabinet. Its first result was to divide the Republican party, and to alienate Burr, whose recommendation of Matthew L. Davis for the naval office at New York was disregarded. Had the new administration declined to make removals except for cause, such a dispute would have been avoided. As it was, the friends of Burr considered the refusal as a declaration of war. Appointments became immediately a part of the machinery of Republican administration, as it had been part of that of their predecessors, and each was carefully weighed and considered in its reference to party quite as much as to public service.

Already looking forward to the next presidential election, Gallatin was anxious for an agreement upon Jefferson's successor, and even before the meeting of the first Congress of his term he advised the President on this point, and he also proposed the division of every State into election districts by a general const.i.tutional provision.

Jefferson submitted the draft of his annual messages to the head of each department, and invited their comments. Gallatin was minute in his observations, and it is interesting to note the peculiar precision and caution of his character in the nice criticisms of language and style, sometimes declaratory, sometimes non-committal, but always and obviously reasonable, and often presenting a brief argument for the change proposed. In these days of woman's rights it is curious to read "Th. J.

to Mr. Gallatin. The appointment of a woman to office is an innovation for which the public is not prepared, nor am I."

Gallatin suggested a weekly general conference of the President and the secretaries at what is now styled a cabinet meeting, and private conferences of the President with each of the secretaries once or twice a week on certain days and at fixed hours. The business to come before the House was also to be considered, and the policy to be pursued determined upon. Unfortunately in this case again Jeffersonian theory did not accord with Jeffersonian practice. Even erratic Randolph complained of the want of system at these cabinet meetings, where each was at liberty to do and say as he chose; a severe trial, this, to Gallatin. In 1845 Mr. Gallatin wrote to Edward Coles that it was "quite unusual to submit to the cabinet the manner in which the land or naval forces authorized by Congress, and for which appropriations had been made, should be employed," and added that on no occasion, in or out of cabinet, was he ever consulted on those subjects prior to the year 1812.

In the difficulty which arose with the Barbary powers Mr. Gallatin earnestly urged the payment of an annuity to Tripoli, if necessary for peace. He considered it a mere matter of calculation whether the purchase of peace was not cheaper than the expense of a war. This policy was to be continued for eight years, at the end of which he hoped that a different tone might be a.s.sumed. In a note on the message of 1802, Gallatin expressed the hope to Jefferson that his administration would "afford but few materials for historians." He would never sacrifice permanent prosperity to temporary glitter.

Mr. Gallatin's counsel was sought, and his opinion deferred to, on subjects which did not fall directly within the scope of administration.

Even on questions of fundamental const.i.tutional law his judgment was not inferior to that of Madison himself. In one notable instance he differed from Mr. Lincoln, the attorney-general, whom he held in high esteem as a good lawyer, a fine scholar, "a man of great discretion and sound judgment." This was in 1803, when the acquisition of East Louisiana and West Florida was a cabinet question. Mr. Lincoln considered that there was a difference between a power to acquire territory for the United States and the power to extend by treaty the territory of the United States, and held that the first was unconst.i.tutional. Mr. Gallatin held that the United States as a nation have an inherent right to acquire territory, and that, when acquisition is by treaty, the same const.i.tuted authorities in whom the treaty power is vested have a const.i.tutional right to sanction the acquisition, and that when the territory has been acquired Congress has the power either of admitting into the Union as a new State or of annexing to a State, with the consent of that State, or of making regulations for the government of the territory. Mr. Jefferson concurred in this opinion, while at the same time he thought it safer not to permit the enlargement of the Union except by amendment of the Const.i.tution. Mr. Gallatin's view was practically applied in the cases named, and later in the annexation of Texas, although he disapproved of the latter as contrary to good faith and the law of nations. He advised Jefferson, also, not to lay the treaty by which Louisiana was acquired before the House until after its ratification by the Senate, taking the ground that until then it was not a treaty, and urging that great care should be taken to do nothing which might be represented as containing any idea of encroachment on the rights of the Senate. He personally interested himself in the arrangements for taking possession of New Orleans, and, considering the expense as trifling compared with the object, urged the dispatch of an imposing force of not less than fifteen thousand men, which would add to the opinion entertained abroad of our power, resources, and energy; five thousand of these to be active troops; ten thousand an enrolled reserve. The acquisition of Louisiana was the grand popular feature of the foreign policy of the first term of Jefferson's administration. The internal management left much to be desired.

While his general views were exalted, and his principles would stand the nicest examination in their application, Mr. Jefferson was not fortunate in his choice of methods or men. It is not enough for an administration to be pure; it should be above suspicion. This his was not. Time has not washed out the stain of his intimacy with William Duane, the editor of the infamous "Aurora." Citizen Duane, as he styled himself in the first days of the administration, quarreled with Gallatin because he would not apply the official guillotine, and thereafter pursued him with uncompromising hostility. Of favoritism in appointments Mr. Gallatin could not be accused. During his twelve years in the Treasury he procured places for but two friends; one was given an obscure clerks.h.i.+p in the department; the other, John Badollet, was made register in the land office at Vincennes, against whom Gallatin said in the application for appointment which he reluctantly made, there was but one objection, "that of being his personal and college friend."

The dispositions for the sale of lands in the western territory, the extinguishment of t.i.tles, and the surveys fell under Mr. Gallatin's general supervision, and were the objects of his particular care. So also was the establishment of the authority of the United States in the Louisiana territory. In the course of these arrangements he was brought into contact with Mr. Pierre Choteau of St. Louis, who controlled the Indian trade of a vast territory. The foundation of an intimate acquaintance was then laid. The influence of this remarkable man over the Western Indians and the extent of his trading operations with them was great, and has never since been equaled. About this period Mr. John Jacob Astor informed the government that he had an opportunity, of which he intended to take advantage, to purchase one half of the interest of the Canadian Fur Company, which, notwithstanding the treaty of 1794, engrossed the trade by way of Michilimackinac with our own Indians.

Before that period this lucrative traffic had been exclusively in British hands, and the hostility of the Indian tribes rendered any interference in it by Americans dangerous to life and property, and their partic.i.p.ation since had been merely nominal. Jefferson's cabinet received the proposal with satisfaction, but, in their strict interpretation of the Const.i.tution, could find no way of giving any aid to the scheme beyond the _official_ promise of protection, which it fell to Mr. Gallatin to draft. Mr. Jefferson wrote to Mr. Astor a letter to the same effect. Mr. Astor, however, was not deterred from his enterprise, but, under the charter of the American Fur Company granted by the State of New York, extended his project to the Indians west of the Rocky Mountains, and made of it an immense business, employing several vessels at the mouth of the Columbia River and a large land party beyond the Rocky Mountains. He finally founded the establishment of Astoria. This settlement fell into the hands of the British during the war of 1812. Mr. Astor sought to persuade the American government to permit him to renew the establishment at its close, only asking a flag and a lieutenant's command, but Mr. Madison would not commit himself to the plan.

Among Mr. Jefferson's pet schemes was that of a subst.i.tution of gunboats for fortifications, and for supporting the authority of the laws within harbors. The mind of Mr. Jefferson had no doubt been favorably disposed to this mode of offensive defense by the experience of Lafayette at Annapolis, in his southern expedition in the spring of 1781, when his entire flotilla, ammunition of war, and even the city of Annapolis, were saved from destruction by two improvised gunboats, which, armed with mortars and hot shot, drove the British blockading vessels out of the harbor. Jefferson first suggested the scheme in his annual message of 1804, and Gallatin did not interfere; but when, in 1807, the President insisted, in a special message, on the building of two hundred vessels of this cla.s.s, Mr. Gallatin objected, because of the expense in construction and maintenance, and secondly, of their infallible decay.

Mr. Jefferson persisted, and Mr. Gallatin's judgment was vindicated by the result. Two years later, of one hundred and seventy-six gunboats constructed, only twenty-four were in actual service. In his letter of criticism, Mr. Gallatin gave as his opinion, that "it would be an economical measure for every naval nation to burn their navy at the end of a war and to build a new one when again at war, if it was not that time was necessary to build s.h.i.+ps of war." The principle was the same as to gunboats, and the objection of time necessary for building did not exist.

This year he also laid before the President a memorandum of preparatory measures for defense against Great Britain, from whom an attack was expected by land and sea, and a second plan for offensive operations on the northern frontier, which is complete in its geographical and topographical information, and its estimate of resources in men, material, and money. At the same time he urged upon Mr. Jefferson to moderate the tone of his message, so as not to widen the breach by hurting the pride of Great Britain.

In connection with the land system, Mr. Jefferson favored, and Mr.

Gallatin devised, an extensive plan of internal improvements. The route of the c.u.mberland road from the Potomac to the Ohio was reported to Congress in 1807; a coast survey was ordered in the same year. The first superintendent was Ha.s.sler, a Swiss, whom Mr. Gallatin brought to the notice of Mr. Jefferson. In 1808 a general plan of improvement was submitted to the Senate. This included ca.n.a.ls parallel with the seacoast, making a continuous line of inland navigation from the Hudson to Cape Fear; a great turnpike from Maine to Georgia; the improvement of the Susquehanna, Potomac, James, and Santee rivers to serve the slope from the Alleghanies to the Atlantic; of the Alleghany, Monongahela, and Kanawha, to serve the country westward to the Mississippi, the head waters of these rivers to be connected by four roads across the Appalachian range; a ca.n.a.l at the falls of the Ohio; a connection of the Hudson with Lake Champlain, and of the same river with Lake Ontario at Oswego; and a ca.n.a.l around Niagara Falls. The entire expense he estimated at $20,000,000, to be met by an appropriation of $2,000,000 a year for ten years; the stock created for turnpikes and ca.n.a.ls to be a permanent fund for repairs and improvements.

A national university for education in the higher sciences was also recommended by Jefferson in his message of 1806, but Mr. Gallatin had little faith in the popularity of this scheme. After the convulsion of 1794 in Geneva, Gallatin's old college mate, D'Yvernois, conceived the plan of transporting the entire University of Geneva to the United States, and wrote on the subject to Jefferson and Adams; but his idea was based on the supposition that fifteen thousand dollars' income could be had from the United States in support of the inst.i.tution, which was, of course, at the time impracticable. Jefferson believed that these plans of national improvement could be carried into effect only by an amendment to the Const.i.tution; but Mr. Gallatin, as in the bank question, was disturbed by no such scruples, and he recommended Mr.

Jefferson to strike from his message the words "general welfare," as questionable in their nature, and because the proposition seemed to acknowledge that the words are susceptible of a very dangerous meaning.

To a permanent embargo act Mr. Gallatin was from the beginning opposed.

He recognized the mischief of government prohibitions, and thought that statesmen might well hesitate before they took the hazard of regulating the concerns of individuals. The sequel proved the correctness of this judgment. But Mr. Jefferson could not bring his mind to any more decisive measure, indeed, it may justly be said, to any measure whatever. Taking advantage of Mr. Madison's election to the presidency, he simply withdrew from the triumvirate, and, pa.s.sing over the subject in silence in his last message, he ignominiously left to Mr. Madison and Mr. Gallatin the entire responsibility which the threatening state of the foreign relations of the country imposed on the Republican party.

The question was now between the enforcement of the Embargo Act and war.

To take off the embargo seemed a declaration of weakness. To add to it a non-importation clause was the only alternative. In November, 1808, Mr.

Gallatin prepared for George W. Campbell, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the House, the declaration known as Campbell's report, which recited, in clear, compact form, the injuries done to the United States by Great Britain, and closed with resolutions to the effect that the United States could not submit to the edicts of Great Britain and France, and with a recommendation of non-intercourse and for placing of the country in a state of defense. After long debate the resolutions were adopted by large majorities, and the policy of resistance was finally determined upon--resistance, not war. Thus the United States resorted, as the colonies had resorted in 1774, to a policy of non-importation. But the condition of the States was not that of the colonies. Then all the colonies were commercial, and the entire population was on the seaboard; the prohibition fell with equal weight upon all. Now there were large interior communities whom restrictions upon commerce would rather benefit than injure. Yet neither the Sons of Liberty nor the non-importation a.s.sociations had been able to enforce their voluntary agreements either before or after the Congress of 1774.

If this were to be the mode of resistance, stringent measures must be adopted to make it effective. Mr. Gallatin accordingly called upon Congress for the necessary powers. They at once responded with the Enforcement Act, which Mr. Gallatin proceeded to apply with characteristic administrative vigor, and summoned Jefferson to authorize the collectors of revenue to call the military force of the United States to support them in the exercise of their restrictive authority.

There was to be no evasion under the systems which Hamilton devised and Gallatin knew so well how to administer.

His annual report made to Congress on December 10 had clearly set forth the situation, and, without recommending war, had pointed out how it might be carried on. Macon wrote of him on December 4 to their mutual friend, Joseph H. Nicholson, "Gallatin is decidedly for war." After his report was sent in the situation became still more perplexing. Rumors came of an intention to call a convention of the five New England States, with New York, if possible, to take ground against the embargo.

As these indications of dissatisfaction became manifest, and the contingency of the employment of force at home presented itself, Gallatin made a careful balance of the advantages and inconveniences of embargo, non-intercourse, and letters of marque. This paper, dated February, 1809, and ent.i.tled, "Notes on the Political Situation," no doubt served as a brief for consultation with Madison upon his inaugural message, it being then understood that Gallatin was to be secretary of state. As he states one of the advantages of letters of marque to be "a greater chance of unity at home," this measure he probably preferred.

The Senate had already, on January 4, pa.s.sed a bill ordering out the entire naval force of the country, and on the 10th the House adopted the same bill by a vote of 64 to 59. Mr. Gallatin opposed this action strenuously. On February 2 the House voted by a large majority to remove the embargo on March 4. Non-intercourse with Great Britain and France and trade everywhere else were now the conditions. This significant expression of the feeling of Congress no doubt determined Mr. Gallatin to suggest letters of marque. Whether he pressed them upon Mr. Madison or not is uncertain. Meanwhile Mr. Gallatin suffered the odium of opposition to the will of Congress, and Mr. Madison's power was broken before he took his seat. A few Republican senators inaugurated an opposition to their chief after the fas.h.i.+on of modern days, and Mr.

Madison was given to understand that Mr. Gallatin would not be confirmed if nominated as secretary of state. Mr. Madison yielded to this dictation, and from that day forward was, as he deserved to be, perplexed and hara.s.sed by a petty oligarchy. Mr. John Quincy Adams, in a note on this affair, says that, "had Mr. Gallatin been appointed secretary of state, it is highly probable war with Great Britain would not have taken place." But it is improbable that any step in foreign intercourse was taken without Mr. Gallatin's knowledge and approbation.

Such are the traditions of the triumvirate.

The first term of Madison's administration was not eventful. There was discord in the cabinet. In the Senate the "invisibles," as the faction which supported Robert Smith, the secretary of state, was aptly termed, rejected Madison's nominations and opposed Gallatin's financial policy as their interests or whims prompted. Randolph said of Madison at this time, that he was "President _de jure_ only." Besides this domestic strife, the cabinet was engaged in futile efforts to resist the gradually tightening cordon of British aggression. Erskine's amateur negotiations, quickly disavowed by the British government, and the short and impertinent mission of Jackson, who succeeded him and was dismissed from the United States, well served Canning's policy of delay. Madison, whose prejudices were as strongly with Englishmen and English ways as those of Jefferson were with the men and manners of France, averse to war and withheld also by Gallatin's persistent objections, negotiated and procrastinated until there was little left to argue about. In December, 1809, Macon made an effort to pa.s.s a stringent navigation act to meet the British Orders in Council and the French decrees. The bill pa.s.sed the House but was emasculated in the Senate, the Republican cabal voting with the Federalists to strike out the effective clauses. The act interdicting commercial intercourse with Great Britain and France expired in May, 1810, and was not revived. A new act was pa.s.sed, which was a virtual surrender of every point in dispute. Resistance was abandoned, and our s.h.i.+ps and seamen were left to the mercy of both belligerents.

Mr. Gallatin's entire energies were bent upon strengthening the Treasury and opposing reckless expenditures. His most grievous disappointment, however, was in the refusal of Congress to renew the charter of the Bank of the United States. He used every possible effort to save this inst.i.tution, which, in the condition of the country, was indispensable to a sound currency and the maintenance of specie payment. But with the dead weight of Mr. Madison's silence, if not indifference, the struggle was unequal and the bank fell. The course of Mr. Madison can hardly be excused. Political history records few examples of a more cruel desertion of a cabinet minister by his chief. Mr. Gallatin felt it deeply and tendered his resignation. The administration was going to pieces by sheer incapacity. The leaders took alarm and the cabinet was reconstructed, Monroe being called to the Department of State. But the enemies of Mr. Gallatin still clung to his skirts, determined to drag him to the dust. Duane attacked him in the most dangerous manner.

Probably no man in America has ever been abused, vilified, maligned with such deliberate persistency as was Gallatin in the "Aurora" from the beginning of 1811 until the cabinet crisis, when Mr. Madison was compelled to choose between Smith and himself. Day after day leaders were devoted to personal a.s.sault upon him and to indirect insinuations of his superiority to Madison, by which the artful editor sought to arouse the jealousy of the President. The "Atlas at the side of the President," the "Great Treasury Law Giver," the "First Lord of the Treasury," the "Dagon of the Philistines," were favorite epithets. He was charged by turns with betraying cabinet secrets to Randolph, with amateur negotiation with Erskine, and with subserviency to British gold in the support of the Bank of the United States. Here is an instance of Duane's style: "We can say with perfect conviction that, if Mr. Madison suffer this man to lord it over him, Mr. Gallatin will drag him down, for no honest man in the country can support an administration of which he is a member with consistency or a pure conscience." It was charged upon Gallatin that his friends considered him as the real, while Madison was the nominal, president. More than this, he was accused of embezzlement and enormous speculations in the public lands. Gallatin's party pride must have been strong indeed to have induced him to stay an hour in an administration which granted its favors to the author of such a.s.saults upon one of its chosen leaders.

Jefferson wrote to Mr. Wirt in May following, that, because of the bank, endeavors were made to drive from the administration (of Mr. Madison) the ablest man, except the President, who ever was in it, and to beat down the President himself because he was unwilling to part with such a counselor.

Monroe was appointed secretary of state in Smith's place in April, 1811.

Other changes followed in the cabinet, but brought little relief to Mr.

Gallatin. Financial affairs now occupied his entire attention; on the one hand was a diminis.h.i.+ng treasury; on the other an expenditure reckless in itself and beyond the demands of the administration. Without the sympathy of either the Senate or House, Mr. Gallatin's position became daily more irksome, until at last he abandoned all attempt to control the drift of party policy, took the war party at their word, and sent in to the House a war budget.

Unfortunately for the country, the Republican party knew neither how to prepare for war, nor how to keep the peace. Mr. Madison had none of the qualifications of a war President; neither executive ability, decision of character, nor yet that more important faculty, knowledge of men. In his attachment to Mr. Madison and in loyalty to what remained of the once proud triumvirate of talent and power, Mr. Gallatin supplied the deficiencies of his fellows as best he could, until an offer of mediation between the United States and Great Britain on the part of the emperor of Russia presented an opportunity for honorable withdrawal and service in another and perhaps more congenial field. In March, 1813, the Russian minister, in a note to the secretary of state, tendered this offer. Mr. Gallatin had completed his financial arrangements for the year, and requested Mr. Madison to send him abroad on this mission.

Unwilling to take the risk of new appointments, the President acceded to this proposal, and gave him leave of absence from his post in the Treasury. Mr. Gallatin did not antic.i.p.ate a long absence, and felt, as he said to his old friend Badollet, that he could nowhere be more usefully employed than in this negotiation. Certainly he could have no regret in leaving a cabinet which had so little regard to his own feelings and so little political decency as to confer the appointment of adjutant-general in the United States army on his malignant a.s.sailant, William Duane of the "Aurora."