The Marne, 1914 Part 2

As Rupprecht rode toward his new headquarters at Dieuze, he came across more scenes of carnage. At Conthil, the fields were studded with ma.s.s graves, for both men and horses. Houses were burned out, shot to pieces by the artillery. Cows not milked for days, their udders nearly bursting, roamed about "bellowing in pain." At Morhange, artillery sh.e.l.ls had hit the gasworks, and fires ravaged the city. On a nearby hillside, where an enemy unit had been caught in the flank, French dead, recognizable by their red pants, "lay in rows and looked like a field of poppies." The corpses presented an eerie sight. "They lie man to man. Some still hold their rifles at the ready. Due to the intense heat, most of the men's faces have already turned a bluish black." Yet again, the crown prince witnessed the effects of "friendly fire": Bavarian artillery had mistakenly fired on its own advancing infantry.

Next, Rupprecht made his way through the Forest of Dieuze. s.h.i.+rts, boots, hats, rifles, and knapsacks had been hastily abandoned. In the city itself-"a typical French town: ugly and dirty"-the scene of abandonment was even greater. Where earlier the citizenry had thrown a ball for the approaching French forces, automobiles now lay overturned in ditches, knapsacks and uniforms scattered about, and rifles with smashed b.u.t.ts littered the streets. The barracks attested to the "flight" of two French divisions. "An indescribable filth. Bones and pieces of meat from butchered animals lay in the courtyard and torn pieces of uniforms inside the rooms." Rupprecht estimated recent enemy losses at thirty thousand dead and wounded.

Ominously, reports again began to filter in to Sixth Army headquarters from company to regimental levels that the fighting had not been restricted to the battlefield or to regular forces. Countless commanders stated that armed civilians had shot at their troops with hunting pieces from windows and rooftops as they entered a town. Francs-tireurs! Word about French civilians firing on German troops spread like wildfire. Reprisals were swift. Already on the first day of the Bavarian offensive, 20 August, at Nomeny, a small town on the Meuse River between Metz and Nancy,84 men of French 277th IR at a bridge over the Seille River had held up the advancing Bavarian 2d IR and 4th IR; when the Germans finally took the bridge, French enfilading fire from a nearby field inflicted heavy casualties. Karl von Riedl's 8th IB and Viktor Bausch's 33d RID were convinced that the men of French 277th IR at a bridge over the Seille River had held up the advancing Bavarian 2d IR and 4th IR; when the Germans finally took the bridge, French enfilading fire from a nearby field inflicted heavy casualties. Karl von Riedl's 8th IB and Viktor Bausch's 33d RID were convinced that the poilus poilus of the French 277th had been a.s.sisted by civilians, who also had sheltered sharpshooters after the battle. That night 3d Battalion, 8th IR, burned much of the village; the next day, its inhabitants were expelled. Fifty-five residents of Nomeny died on 2021 August; of those, forty-six had been shot. of the French 277th had been a.s.sisted by civilians, who also had sheltered sharpshooters after the battle. That night 3d Battalion, 8th IR, burned much of the village; the next day, its inhabitants were expelled. Fifty-five residents of Nomeny died on 2021 August; of those, forty-six had been shot.

At Gerbeviller, southeast of Nancy, a similar scenario had developed.85 Soldiers of French 2d Battalion and 19th Dragoons as well as some cha.s.seurs had stiffly defended a bridge over the Mortagne River against units of Bavarian 60th IR and 166th IR. Frustrated by this rearguard action and seeing French civilians firing on them, the Germans between 24 and 27 August pillaged and burned the city. Albert von Berrer, commanding 31st ID, ordered Gerbeviller destroyed. Sixty civilians reportedly died in the process. Soldiers of French 2d Battalion and 19th Dragoons as well as some cha.s.seurs had stiffly defended a bridge over the Mortagne River against units of Bavarian 60th IR and 166th IR. Frustrated by this rearguard action and seeing French civilians firing on them, the Germans between 24 and 27 August pillaged and burned the city. Albert von Berrer, commanding 31st ID, ordered Gerbeviller destroyed. Sixty civilians reportedly died in the process.

At Luneville, southeast of Nancy, savage "reprisals" took place on 25 August.86 For three days, Friedrich Kress von Kressenstein's 5th RID and Maximilian von Hohn's 6th ID had taken heavy losses-25,003 casualties-attempting to breach General de Castelnau's defensive line before Nancy. For three days, Friedrich Kress von Kressenstein's 5th RID and Maximilian von Hohn's 6th ID had taken heavy losses-25,003 casualties-attempting to breach General de Castelnau's defensive line before Nancy.87 Demoralized by failure, the men returned to Luneville in a foul mood. They found the city clogged with columns of supply wagons and carts full of the wounded. They were sure that armed civilians on rooftops were firing at them, at supply columns, and at field hospitals. They shot wildly into homes and shops, at anything that moved. Several civilians were caught carrying cartridges to fellow shooters. "Mindless fear," in the words of the Bavarian semiofficial history, "was the reaction. Vehicles rushed in every direction, while guards returned the fire without plan or purpose." As darkness fell, seventy homes had been burned and nineteen civilians killed. For the soldiers, it was "a horribly beautiful, wild scene, one which deepened and reinforced their impression of this b.l.o.o.d.y and fateful day." Demoralized by failure, the men returned to Luneville in a foul mood. They found the city clogged with columns of supply wagons and carts full of the wounded. They were sure that armed civilians on rooftops were firing at them, at supply columns, and at field hospitals. They shot wildly into homes and shops, at anything that moved. Several civilians were caught carrying cartridges to fellow shooters. "Mindless fear," in the words of the Bavarian semiofficial history, "was the reaction. Vehicles rushed in every direction, while guards returned the fire without plan or purpose." As darkness fell, seventy homes had been burned and nineteen civilians killed. For the soldiers, it was "a horribly beautiful, wild scene, one which deepened and reinforced their impression of this b.l.o.o.d.y and fateful day."88 Major von Xylander of Rupprecht's staff wrote in his war diary: "In Luneville, murder and slaughter. Fires. Panic among our rear-guard formations. Wild rumors." The young officer found it simply "unbelievable" how an army victorious in the Battle of the Saar Major von Xylander of Rupprecht's staff wrote in his war diary: "In Luneville, murder and slaughter. Fires. Panic among our rear-guard formations. Wild rumors." The young officer found it simply "unbelievable" how an army victorious in the Battle of the Saar* just three days earlier "in such a short time" could have degraded "to such a state." He blamed it on the "overly excited nerves" of troops engaged in almost daily combat. just three days earlier "in such a short time" could have degraded "to such a state." He blamed it on the "overly excited nerves" of troops engaged in almost daily combat.89 A larger ma.s.sacre was avoided by the swift action of Major Berthold Schenk von Stauffenberg of XXI Corps, who ordered his troops to stop plundering and who took sixty civilians hostage as a human s.h.i.+eld to end the shooting. Crown Prince Rupprecht denounced the "foolish" torching of villages, which held up his train and denied the soldiers quarters. A larger ma.s.sacre was avoided by the swift action of Major Berthold Schenk von Stauffenberg of XXI Corps, who ordered his troops to stop plundering and who took sixty civilians hostage as a human s.h.i.+eld to end the shooting. Crown Prince Rupprecht denounced the "foolish" torching of villages, which held up his train and denied the soldiers quarters.90 Fritz Nieser, the Grand Duchy of Baden's acting plenipotentiary at Munich, reported that the capital was decked with flags to celebrate Rupprecht's victory in the Battle of the Saar, and that King Ludwig III had received enthusiastic public ovations. The French army "obviously had been totally defeated in the west."91 THE BATTLE OF THE Saar had not fulfilled Rupprecht's dream of a great flanking movement primarily because Heeringen's Seventh Army, although augmented by Bavarian I Corps, had not been able to make sufficient progress north of the Marne-Rhine Ca.n.a.l. By attacking more than six hours later than Rupprecht, Heeringen had surrendered the element of surprise. Moreover, his Landwehr brigades had become bogged down in the Vosges in countless encounters with crack French Alpine troops. Saar had not fulfilled Rupprecht's dream of a great flanking movement primarily because Heeringen's Seventh Army, although augmented by Bavarian I Corps, had not been able to make sufficient progress north of the Marne-Rhine Ca.n.a.l. By attacking more than six hours later than Rupprecht, Heeringen had surrendered the element of surprise. Moreover, his Landwehr brigades had become bogged down in the Vosges in countless encounters with crack French Alpine troops.92 Unlike the French, the Germans had neither specially trained Alpine troops nor high-angle-fire mountain artillery. The going was nearly impossible. Dense fog not only inhibited accurate fire but also turned the battlefields into semi darkness. Combat was close and personal, in most cases ending with bloodcurdling bayonet charges. The small creeks of the Vosges at times ran red. The din was unbearable. The woods rang with the screams of wounded soldiers rolling on the ground. Drums and bugles sounded advance and retreat, alternately. Men accidentally shot their own. And even in the mountains, there was little relief from the broiling heat. Unlike the French, the Germans had neither specially trained Alpine troops nor high-angle-fire mountain artillery. The going was nearly impossible. Dense fog not only inhibited accurate fire but also turned the battlefields into semi darkness. Combat was close and personal, in most cases ending with bloodcurdling bayonet charges. The small creeks of the Vosges at times ran red. The din was unbearable. The woods rang with the screams of wounded soldiers rolling on the ground. Drums and bugles sounded advance and retreat, alternately. Men accidentally shot their own. And even in the mountains, there was little relief from the broiling heat.

Adolf Hartner, a Bavarian telegraph specialist, noted that the artillery reduced the great trees of the Vosges to matchsticks and enemy soldiers to grotesque heaps of body parts. "Here a torn off foot, there an arm, a leg, then another body torn apart to the point of non-recognition; one was missing half his face & both hands; truly horrible." At Lucy, Hartner almost became sick at the sight of a pitiful French corporal.

A grenade had ripped open his body & he now attempted to push back into it the intestines that had spilled out of it-until death took mercy on him. Thus he lay there with distorted eyes & a snarl on his teeth. I believe that none of us could resist a mild shudder.93 Karl Gruber, an architect from Freiburg in charge of an infantry company, noted in his diary that the war enthusiasm of the first days of August quickly wilted in the heat and savagery of mountain warfare. More and more, his Baden soldiers badgered him with questions such as: "Lieutenant, will we be in Paris soon?" and "Lieutenant, won't the murdering soon stop?"94 The Bavarian semi official history of the war reproduced the travails of two battalions of 15th RIR and 30th RID in the area around Markirch in Upper Alsace on 24 August. What today is a charming resort known for its Munster cheese and Gewurztraminer wine was in 1914 a tough textile town of twelve thousand people. The countryside was still studded with open pits and slag heaps from earlier days of lead and silver mining. Bavarian infantry ran up against a natural fortress. "Everywhere, felled trees, barricades made with branches, barbed-wire entanglements, and tripwires impeded progress." Enemy sharpshooters hid behind "bushes, boulders, rock walls," in "holes and trenches," as well as "in tree tops."95 The battle raged all day across the face of the 772-meter-high Col de Sainte-Marie and the Robinot and Liepvrette rivers. At Brifosse, the advance of 5th RIR over a bridge crossing the Robinot was halted by French machine gunners. Panic ensued. The battle raged all day across the face of the 772-meter-high Col de Sainte-Marie and the Robinot and Liepvrette rivers. At Brifosse, the advance of 5th RIR over a bridge crossing the Robinot was halted by French machine gunners. Panic ensued.

The troops, seized by fear, run for their lives down the southern hillside ... to seek safety in Brifosse. The horses, hit by the bullets, roll on the ground and wildly flay their legs into the harnesses. The wagons, wheels inter-locked, crash into one another; are pulled to the side; then pushed over the edge. Dead and wounded men and horses lie about everywhere. There was neither any going "forward" nor any going "backward."96 The arrival of the 5th in Markirch later that night brought no relief. A rumor circulated that a French infantry brigade from 58th RID of Paul Pouradier-Duteil's XIV Corps was attacking the regiment's artillery en route to Liepvre (Leberau). The supply wagons took off down the single, narrow road-only to run headlong into their own artillery. "A wicked chaos ensued. The wagons b.u.mp each other and collide. Shafts splinter. Horses spook and collapse. Oaths and agitated cries ring out into the darkness. One artillery piece even falls into the stream alongside the road." Suddenly, shots rang out. "Now the disaster is complete. Whoever has a rifle or can lay their hands on one begins to shoot about wildly."97 It took several hours to restore order. The French infantry brigade never appeared. The source of the rumor was never uncovered. In fact, the occupying units of French 71st RID from epinal had withdrawn from Markirch during the night of 23 August. From 7 It took several hours to restore order. The French infantry brigade never appeared. The source of the rumor was never uncovered. In fact, the occupying units of French 71st RID from epinal had withdrawn from Markirch during the night of 23 August. From 7 AM AM until 2 until 2 PM PM the next day, German reserves drove the remaining French up and across the strategic Sainte-Marie Pa.s.s. the next day, German reserves drove the remaining French up and across the strategic Sainte-Marie Pa.s.s.98 b.l.o.o.d.y engagements, whether in open fields or along mountain slopes, brought Seventh Army's reserve troops greater losses in August 1914 than their forefathers had encountered in the entire Franco-Prussian War (187071).99 At Lagarde, 2d Jager Battalion lost 161 men and the Kaiser-Ulanen-Regiment, 158 riders and 149 mounts. At Badonviller, the King's Own Infantry Regiment sustained losses of 97 dead, 322 wounded, and 17 missing. At Dies.p.a.ch, 15th RIR lost 408 men. And the closer the troops came to the French border, the l.u.s.tier became the civilian cries, "Beat the Prussian filth." At Lagarde, 2d Jager Battalion lost 161 men and the Kaiser-Ulanen-Regiment, 158 riders and 149 mounts. At Badonviller, the King's Own Infantry Regiment sustained losses of 97 dead, 322 wounded, and 17 missing. At Dies.p.a.ch, 15th RIR lost 408 men. And the closer the troops came to the French border, the l.u.s.tier became the civilian cries, "Beat the Prussian filth."* In many instances, the reply of the "Prussian filth" was to burn down hostile villages and remove their inhabitants. In many instances, the reply of the "Prussian filth" was to burn down hostile villages and remove their inhabitants.

Nor were conditions much better on the Plain of Alsace. There, the heat was abominable, the roads dry and dusty, and the still-unripe fruit fuel for intestinal disorders. In the region where, almost two millennia before, Caesar had clashed with Ariovistus, French and German troops engaged each other in ancient combat.100 By and large without artillery, they resorted to savage bayonet charges and hand-to-hand fighting. The steep, terraced vineyards of the eastern slopes of the Vosges around Colmar, Turckheim (Turkheim), Kaysersberg, Riquewihr (Reichenweier), and Ribeauville (Rappoltsweiler) were easily turned into miniature fortresses by interweaving felled trees with chest-high grapevines and barbed wire. Bavarian 1st and 2nd Landwehr regiments each lost 150 to 200 men in the first few days of fighting alone-as did French 13th and 30th cha.s.seur brigades ranged against them. By and large without artillery, they resorted to savage bayonet charges and hand-to-hand fighting. The steep, terraced vineyards of the eastern slopes of the Vosges around Colmar, Turckheim (Turkheim), Kaysersberg, Riquewihr (Reichenweier), and Ribeauville (Rappoltsweiler) were easily turned into miniature fortresses by interweaving felled trees with chest-high grapevines and barbed wire. Bavarian 1st and 2nd Landwehr regiments each lost 150 to 200 men in the first few days of fighting alone-as did French 13th and 30th cha.s.seur brigades ranged against them.

THE BAVARIAN ARMY ALSO experienced a new logistical impediment to maneuver warfare-mail. Whereas in the Franco-Prussian War, the postal services of Prussia, Baden, and Wurttemberg daily had to move 500,000 letters and packets, that figure in 1914 shot up to 9.9 million pieces to the front and 6.8 million back home experienced a new logistical impediment to maneuver warfare-mail. Whereas in the Franco-Prussian War, the postal services of Prussia, Baden, and Wurttemberg daily had to move 500,000 letters and packets, that figure in 1914 shot up to 9.9 million pieces to the front and 6.8 million back home per day per day. Roughly eight thousand postal employees handled the increasing flood of mail.101 In part, the explosive expansion was due to the fact that German authorities allowed these mailings postage-free. For the government saw a potential for patriotic uplifting at home by publis.h.i.+ng many of the letters in local newspapers and in special book editions-sixty in 1914 alone. In part, the explosive expansion was due to the fact that German authorities allowed these mailings postage-free. For the government saw a potential for patriotic uplifting at home by publis.h.i.+ng many of the letters in local newspapers and in special book editions-sixty in 1914 alone.

Apart from sheer volume, a second problem lay in the nature of many of the packets sent to the front. Especially after the death of Pope Pius X on the day of Rupprecht's offensive in Lorraine-20 August-these took on a macabre composition. Officers reported a host of "forbidden" items reaching their men: amulets rubbed with herbs, playing cards, engagement or wedding rings, vials of wine mixed with gunpowder, creams to ward off bullets, identification cards, chain letters, Bible verses, curses, and "hexes" of all manner and form.102 For their part, soldiers reported sighting the Madonna smiling down on them through the black powder smoke. For their part, soldiers reported sighting the Madonna smiling down on them through the black powder smoke.

Furthermore, relations between the "Old Reichsland" and German military authorities rapidly deteriorated. General Gaede, head of a special Army Detachment Gaede on the Vosges front, so distrusted the indigenous population that he literally fenced in the front in Upper Alsace with three Landsturm battalions and hundreds of kilometers of barbed wire. "A fluidum "A fluidum of betrayal," he reminded his officers, "runs throughout the entire population." of betrayal," he reminded his officers, "runs throughout the entire population."103 He arrested 574 civilians for "anti-German utterances" and 913 for "anti-German sentiments." He deported 752 Alsatians and ordered summary executions for 6. Finally, he called up 15,000 Alsatian reservists, transferred them to the right bank of the Rhine, and with the consent of the Prussian War Ministry distributed them in groups of 100 throughout the Reich. "A very severe but also very necessary and salutary measure," he informed Grand Duke Friedrich II of Baden. He arrested 574 civilians for "anti-German utterances" and 913 for "anti-German sentiments." He deported 752 Alsatians and ordered summary executions for 6. Finally, he called up 15,000 Alsatian reservists, transferred them to the right bank of the Rhine, and with the consent of the Prussian War Ministry distributed them in groups of 100 throughout the Reich. "A very severe but also very necessary and salutary measure," he informed Grand Duke Friedrich II of Baden.104 TO JOSEPH JOFFRE'S PLEASANT surprise, the Bavarians, equally exhausted by the Battle of the Saar, took three days to pursue Dubail and Castelnau. At times, they lagged twenty kilometers behind the beaten foe. Especially French Second Army used these precious seventy-two hours to regroup, resupply, refresh, and reinforce Nancy's defensive belt along the line Gerbeviller-Luneville-Amance. Joffre created a new Army of Lorraine under Michel-Joseph Maunoury and ordered it not only to hold Lorraine but to "fix" as many German units as possible in the south while he launched his great a.s.sault across the Ardennes. surprise, the Bavarians, equally exhausted by the Battle of the Saar, took three days to pursue Dubail and Castelnau. At times, they lagged twenty kilometers behind the beaten foe. Especially French Second Army used these precious seventy-two hours to regroup, resupply, refresh, and reinforce Nancy's defensive belt along the line Gerbeviller-Luneville-Amance. Joffre created a new Army of Lorraine under Michel-Joseph Maunoury and ordered it not only to hold Lorraine but to "fix" as many German units as possible in the south while he launched his great a.s.sault across the Ardennes.105 Still, Luneville fell to the Bavarians on 23 August and Saint-Die shortly thereafter. Given that Pau had done little to be of help at Sarrebourg and had lingered in the Alsatian vineyards for six days since 20 August, Joffre dissolved the Army of Alsace on 26 August. He left a single division to guard the Col de la Schlucht and transferred the rest of Pau's units into Vautier's VII Corps, which he then sent to reinforce Fortress Paris-a major reshuffle that required 110 to 120 trains and five to six days of travel. Four days later, German 55th Landwehr Brigade retook luckless Mulhouse. Still, Luneville fell to the Bavarians on 23 August and Saint-Die shortly thereafter. Given that Pau had done little to be of help at Sarrebourg and had lingered in the Alsatian vineyards for six days since 20 August, Joffre dissolved the Army of Alsace on 26 August. He left a single division to guard the Col de la Schlucht and transferred the rest of Pau's units into Vautier's VII Corps, which he then sent to reinforce Fortress Paris-a major reshuffle that required 110 to 120 trains and five to six days of travel. Four days later, German 55th Landwehr Brigade retook luckless Mulhouse.

In fact, the Bavarian army had been temporarily derailed by the Army Supreme Command to deal with a nagging problem: Fort Manonviller, perhaps the strongest French fortress, which commanded the strategically important Paris-Nancy-Strasbourg rail line.106 General Karl Ritter von Brug, chief of the Bavarian Corps of Engineers, was given an enhanced brigade of I Corps to take the fort. At 10:30 General Karl Ritter von Brug, chief of the Bavarian Corps of Engineers, was given an enhanced brigade of I Corps to take the fort. At 10:30 AM AM on 25 August, the 300mm and 210mm howitzers opened fire on the giant fortress. They were joined at 2 on 25 August, the 300mm and 210mm howitzers opened fire on the giant fortress. They were joined at 2 PM PM by Krupp 420mm howitzers and at 6 by Krupp 420mm howitzers and at 6 PM PM by 150mm coastal howitzers. By dusk the next day, the fort "looked like a hill spouting fire." It surrendered at 5:30 by 150mm coastal howitzers. By dusk the next day, the fort "looked like a hill spouting fire." It surrendered at 5:30 PM PM on 27 August. The Germans over fifty-two hours had fired about sixteen hundred artillery rounds at Manonviller, including two hundred sh.e.l.ls, 922kg each, from the mammoth Krupp "Big Berthas" that had been hauled to Manonviller by Daimler Benz tractors and sited at Elfringen, 14.5 kilometers from the fort. on 27 August. The Germans over fifty-two hours had fired about sixteen hundred artillery rounds at Manonviller, including two hundred sh.e.l.ls, 922kg each, from the mammoth Krupp "Big Berthas" that had been hauled to Manonviller by Daimler Benz tractors and sited at Elfringen, 14.5 kilometers from the fort.107 Deputy Officer Fritz Burger of 1st Foot Artillery Regiment was shocked at the "unbelievable devastation" caused by the Krupp howitzers. Manonviller looked like a "rooted-up molehill." Deputy Officer Fritz Burger of 1st Foot Artillery Regiment was shocked at the "unbelievable devastation" caused by the Krupp howitzers. Manonviller looked like a "rooted-up molehill."108 There had been just 2 fatalities among the 820 officers and men inside the well-protected fortress, but its defenders had been physically and psychologically shaken by the terrible pounding. A direct hit on Manonviller's ventilation plant had greatly accelerated the decision to surrender. In an act of "chivalry," General von Brug had requested that the French garrison be allowed to withdraw "with honor." Rupprecht vetoed the suggestion. The French had been "less than chivalrous" at Luneville, he countered, firing on German medics and wounded. There had been just 2 fatalities among the 820 officers and men inside the well-protected fortress, but its defenders had been physically and psychologically shaken by the terrible pounding. A direct hit on Manonviller's ventilation plant had greatly accelerated the decision to surrender. In an act of "chivalry," General von Brug had requested that the French garrison be allowed to withdraw "with honor." Rupprecht vetoed the suggestion. The French had been "less than chivalrous" at Luneville, he countered, firing on German medics and wounded.109 It was a new, "hard" war. It was a new, "hard" war.

Kaiser Wilhelm II was "simply ecstatic" over the battlefield success of a fellow royal and on 27 August bestowed the Iron Cross, First and Second Cla.s.s, on Crown Prince Rupprecht. Moltke, in the words of a Bavarian staff officer, had been "moved to tears" by the gesture. But their Prussian paladins were less charitable. Rupprecht's failure to dispatch his "tired" cavalry to cut the defeated French Second Army to pieces after the Battle of the Saar, War Minister Erich von Falkenhayn testily recalled on the eve of the Battle of the Marne, meant that the Bavarians had missed a "golden moment" to decide the war on the southern flank, the so-called Sudflugel Sudflugel. Prussian cavalry, unlike its Bavarian counterpart, he savagely noted, was never "too tired" to pursue a beaten foe!110 With Fort Manonviller taken and the French driven to the line of the Meurthe River, Rupprecht and Krafft began preparations to send a major portion of their forces north to a.s.sist Fifth Army in and around Verdun. This had been "Case 3" of the modified Schlieffen Plan that Moltke had distributed on 6 August as the Bavarian part in the great Westaufmarsch Westaufmarsch. They awaited new instructions from the OHL. Eventually, Lieutenant Colonel Tappen informed them that since the German rail net in the southwest only ran as far north as Aachen-after which the troops would face a very long march to the front-they would arrive much too late to a.s.sist in the envelopment of Paris.111 The Bavarians were left alone to plot their future course of action. The Bavarians were left alone to plot their future course of action.

* Actions in German Alsace are given in German General Time (DGZ); in French Lorraine, in Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), one hour earlier. Actions in German Alsace are given in German General Time (DGZ); in French Lorraine, in Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), one hour earlier.* A patriotic military march arranged by Joseph Francois Rauski in 1879, after the Franco-Prussian War. A patriotic military march arranged by Joseph Francois Rauski in 1879, after the Franco-Prussian War.* In today's terminology, "partisans" to one side and "terrorists" to the other. In today's terminology, "partisans" to one side and "terrorists" to the other. The others were the Ardennes, Sambre-et-Meuse (Battle of Charleroi), and Mons. The others were the Ardennes, Sambre-et-Meuse (Battle of Charleroi), and Mons.* Weather descriptions were taken from a special compilation, Weather descriptions were taken from a special compilation, Das Wetter Das Wetter, in the German official history, Der Weltkrieg Der Weltkrieg, vol. 1, p. 893, and were cross-checked against army and corps war diaries (KTB) as well as soldiers' letters from the front.* On 2 December 1805, Napoleon I with a "lion leap" charged the Austrian and Russian right flank at the Battle of Austerlitz through a thick morning fog; at 7:45 AM, the sun rose over the battlefield. On 2 December 1805, Napoleon I with a "lion leap" charged the Austrian and Russian right flank at the Battle of Austerlitz through a thick morning fog; at 7:45 AM, the sun rose over the battlefield.* I follow the established practice of letting the victor name the battle. Allied historians usually refer to the Battle of the Saar as the Battle of Sarrebourg-Morhange. I follow the established practice of letting the victor name the battle. Allied historians usually refer to the Battle of the Saar as the Battle of Sarrebourg-Morhange.* "Il faut battre les sales Prussiens!" "Il faut battre les sales Prussiens!"

CHAPTER FOUR.

THE b.l.o.o.d.y ROAD WEST: LIeGE TO LOUVAIN.

No plan of operations survives with any certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy's major forces.-HELMUTH VON MOLTKE THE ELDER THE CITY OF LIeGE WAS NOT ONE OF EUROPE'S DESIRED TOURIST destinations before 1914. In fact, it was a grimy industrial city of about 168,000 inhabitants that straddled the Meuse (Maas) River in northeastern Belgium-thirty kilometers from the German border to the east and fifteen from the Dutch border to the north. But it did get the occasional visitor. Among these in 1911 was a foreboding German dressed in a nondescript business suit. He was conspicuous not so much by his large round head with its receding hairline, jowled red face, piercing blue eyes, drooping bushy mustache, or barrel chest, but rather by a face that never smiled and a demeanor that never showed a hint of kindness or compa.s.sion. Humor was beyond his range. destinations before 1914. In fact, it was a grimy industrial city of about 168,000 inhabitants that straddled the Meuse (Maas) River in northeastern Belgium-thirty kilometers from the German border to the east and fifteen from the Dutch border to the north. But it did get the occasional visitor. Among these in 1911 was a foreboding German dressed in a nondescript business suit. He was conspicuous not so much by his large round head with its receding hairline, jowled red face, piercing blue eyes, drooping bushy mustache, or barrel chest, but rather by a face that never smiled and a demeanor that never showed a hint of kindness or compa.s.sion. Humor was beyond his range.

The German visitor parked his open-top automobile on a promontory southeast of what to him was Luttich, above the Maas Valley.1 One hundred meters below him spread the sights of Liege: the curve of the river, the gleaming steel bands of the Belgian railway, and the spires of the Cathedral de Liege, the eglise Saint-Barthelemy, and the eglise Saint-Jacques. He neatly unfolded a map on the hood of the car. On his right, the river flowed through a deep ravine in the center of the city and then disappeared off to the north; on his left, wooded hills stretched to the Ardennes Plateau, off to the southeast. But mostly, the visitor took careful note of a sixteen-kilometer-wide pa.s.sageway, the Liege Gap, which ran through the city and stretched between the Netherlands and the Ardennes; beyond lay the rolling plains of the Hesbaye region. As well, he studied the city's outer belt of a dozen fortresses. For Colonel Erich Ludendorff, chief of the Mobilization and Deployment Section of the German General Staff, was in charge of drafting plans for the One hundred meters below him spread the sights of Liege: the curve of the river, the gleaming steel bands of the Belgian railway, and the spires of the Cathedral de Liege, the eglise Saint-Barthelemy, and the eglise Saint-Jacques. He neatly unfolded a map on the hood of the car. On his right, the river flowed through a deep ravine in the center of the city and then disappeared off to the north; on his left, wooded hills stretched to the Ardennes Plateau, off to the southeast. But mostly, the visitor took careful note of a sixteen-kilometer-wide pa.s.sageway, the Liege Gap, which ran through the city and stretched between the Netherlands and the Ardennes; beyond lay the rolling plains of the Hesbaye region. As well, he studied the city's outer belt of a dozen fortresses. For Colonel Erich Ludendorff, chief of the Mobilization and Deployment Section of the German General Staff, was in charge of drafting plans for the Handstreich Handstreich (bold strike) against Liege that would kick off the Schlieffen-Moltke deployment plan in a future war. (bold strike) against Liege that would kick off the Schlieffen-Moltke deployment plan in a future war.

LIeGE, EVENING OF 6 AUGUST 1914.

LIeGE WAS FOUNDED IN 558 when Saint Monulph, bishop of Tongres, built a chapel at the confluence of the Meuse and Legia rivers. It saw its share of Europe's violent past. In 1467 and again in 1468, when the Liegois foolishly declared war on the Duchy of Burgundy, Charles the Bold razed the walls of the city. In 1703, the Duke of Marlborough stormed Liege's two forts, the Citadel and La Chartreuse, preparatory to his invasion of the German states the next year. In 1794, French Revolutionary armies sacked the city and destroyed the great cathedral of Saint-Lambert. Napoleon I occupied Liege for the duration of his rule. 558 when Saint Monulph, bishop of Tongres, built a chapel at the confluence of the Meuse and Legia rivers. It saw its share of Europe's violent past. In 1467 and again in 1468, when the Liegois foolishly declared war on the Duchy of Burgundy, Charles the Bold razed the walls of the city. In 1703, the Duke of Marlborough stormed Liege's two forts, the Citadel and La Chartreuse, preparatory to his invasion of the German states the next year. In 1794, French Revolutionary armies sacked the city and destroyed the great cathedral of Saint-Lambert. Napoleon I occupied Liege for the duration of his rule.

But Liege survived-and prospered. The high-grade coal of the Meuse Valley between Seraing and Herstal fueled Liege's factories, and the city quickly developed into Belgium's chief manufacturing center-the fabled "Birmingham of Belgium." The faubourg of Herstal became world-renowned as a producer of fine arms-to the point that Ludwig Loewe of Berlin, manufacturer of the famous Mauser small arms, in 1896 seized a controlling interest in the giant Fabrique nationale d'armes de guerre. The railway brought further wealth and prominence, and Liege became a major hub on the main rail line leading from Berlin to Brussels-and on to Paris.

All this strategic wealth demanded protection. Beginning in 1888, Henri Alexis Brialmont, a military engineer who had built Bucharest's belt of defenses, began work on what over time became a fifty-two-kilometer ring of twelve forts some six to seven kilometers from Liege's center. From north to south, there were six on the right bank of the Meuse (Barchon, Evegnee, Fleron, Chaudfontaine, Embourg, and Boncelles), and another six on the river's left bank (Pontisse, Liers, Lantin, Loncin, Hollogne, and Flemalle). The average distance between the forts was nineteen hundred meters, with the largest gap seven thousand meters. Friedrich Krupp of Essen had won the contract to modernize the forts' four hundred guns, with the result that by 1914 a new mix of modern 120mm, 150mm, and 210mm heavy guns, mortars, and howitzers overlapped one another's zones of fire.

Brialmont built well. All the forts were constructed with concrete casemates. The turtle-shaped steel cupolas that housed the heavy guns could be elevated automatically to fire and then to retract. A clear field of fire was a.s.sured by sloping the cleared terrain down and away from the guns. Brialmont studded this glacis with barbed-wire entanglements. Underground tunnels connected the forts, each of which was self-contained with its own ammunition chambers, storerooms, kitchens, water cisterns, power generators, latrines, and laundry facilities. A ventilation system a.s.sured fresh air for each fort's peacetime complement of eighty defenders.

General Gerard Mathieu Leman, an officer of engineers and a longtime instructor at the Belgian War College, had been selected as governor of Liege only a few months before the outbreak of the war. He had under his command twenty-five thousand regular troops of 3d Infantry Division (ID) as well as 15th Infantry Brigade (IB) of the field army, forty-five hundred garrison troops, and about twelve thousand soldiers of the reserves and the Garde civique (militia). His handwritten orders from King Albert on 4 August 1914 were simple: "I charge you to hold to the end with your division the position which you have been entrusted to defend."2 DURING THE NIGHT OF 12 August, advance elements of German 29th and 69th regiments, 16th ID, crossed into the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg on bicycles, in armored cars and automobiles, and by train. 12 August, advance elements of German 29th and 69th regiments, 16th ID, crossed into the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg on bicycles, in armored cars and automobiles, and by train.3 They met no resistance and no sabotage. They secured the duchy's bridges, railways, and roads, and occupied its capital on the morning of 2 August. The next day, Germany declared war on France and Belgium. They met no resistance and no sabotage. They secured the duchy's bridges, railways, and roads, and occupied its capital on the morning of 2 August. The next day, Germany declared war on France and Belgium.

Hors.e.m.e.n from 2d, 4th, and 9th cavalry divisions (CD) smartly moved westward out of Aachen and into Belgium. Their mission was to scout the thirty kilometers of terrain that lay between Aachen and Liege. They encountered no resistance. Late in the morning of 3 August, they entered the small village of Battice, about ten kilometers east of Liege. They a.s.sumed that the "neutral" Belgians would put up only token resistance. Several shots rang out from one of the houses. Three or four riders tumbled out of their saddles onto the cobbled street. Francs-tireurs! For four decades, German soldiers had been fed stories of how French "irregulars" had ambushed, mutilated, and poisoned German forces during the Franco-Prussian War (187071). In short order, the cavalrymen executed three Belgian civilians, drove the rest out of their homes, and set Battice on fire.4 Still farther north, Georg von der Marwitz advanced with the remainder of II Cavalry Corps and 34th IB against Vise, on the Meuse River just south of the Dutch border. At Warsage, his uhlans took fire from several houses.5 Marwitz's troopers seized and then executed six hostages. At Vise, Marwitz discovered that the Meuse bridges had been destroyed. For a third time that day, his hors.e.m.e.n came under fire from civilians. He ordered suspected houses burned to the ground and 627 hostages rounded up and eventually deported to Germany. Heavy fire from Liege's northernmost fort (Pontisse) prevented the uhlans from crossing the river on 4 August. But at four o'clock Marwitz's troopers seized and then executed six hostages. At Vise, Marwitz discovered that the Meuse bridges had been destroyed. For a third time that day, his hors.e.m.e.n came under fire from civilians. He ordered suspected houses burned to the ground and 627 hostages rounded up and eventually deported to Germany. Heavy fire from Liege's northernmost fort (Pontisse) prevented the uhlans from crossing the river on 4 August. But at four o'clock* the next morning, units of Otto von Garnier's 4th CD managed to ford the Meuse at Lixhe, hard against the Dutch frontier. They strapped together numerous steel boats, laid boards across them, and thus a.s.sisted 34th IB across the river. the next morning, units of Otto von Garnier's 4th CD managed to ford the Meuse at Lixhe, hard against the Dutch frontier. They strapped together numerous steel boats, laid boards across them, and thus a.s.sisted 34th IB across the river.6 Marwitz's riders then pushed on toward Tongeren, northwest of Liege. Marwitz's riders then pushed on toward Tongeren, northwest of Liege.

The noose around Liege was beginning to tighten. Allied fliers at dusk on 4 August had caught brief glimpses of an awe-inspiring sight: six gray-clad, reinforced infantry brigades and an entire cavalry corps-twenty-five thousand soldiers, eight thousand hors.e.m.e.n, and 124 guns-advancing in five mighty columns out of the east along a forty-kilometer front from Aachen to Malmedy. They were part of Otto von Emmich's X Army Corps, Second Army. While the latter's commander, Karl von Bulow, was leisurely making his way west from Hanover, his deputy chief of staff was already on the scene. Erich Ludendorff instantly became one of the few staff planners in history ever to draft and then take part in the execution of his own operations plan.

The Handstreich Handstreich prepared for Liege by Ludendorff in 1911 was based on a garrison force of six thousand regulars, augmented by three thousand militiamen. prepared for Liege by Ludendorff in 1911 was based on a garrison force of six thousand regulars, augmented by three thousand militiamen.7 This proved to be a gross miscalculation. As noted earlier, Leman in early August 1914 had under his command about thirty thousand soldiers of 3d ID, 15th IB, the garrison force, and the Garde civique. But it was a motley collection, as if imported directly from the stage of a Franz Lehar operetta: the regular infantry in blue-and-white uniforms, the This proved to be a gross miscalculation. As noted earlier, Leman in early August 1914 had under his command about thirty thousand soldiers of 3d ID, 15th IB, the garrison force, and the Garde civique. But it was a motley collection, as if imported directly from the stage of a Franz Lehar operetta: the regular infantry in blue-and-white uniforms, the cha.s.seurs a pied cha.s.seurs a pied in green and yellow with flowing capes and peaked caps, and the Civic Guard in high round hats and red facings. Flemish milk-cart dogs pulled the machine guns in green and yellow with flowing capes and peaked caps, and the Civic Guard in high round hats and red facings. Flemish milk-cart dogs pulled the machine guns (mitrailleuses) (mitrailleuses) only recently begged from France. How would this ragtag rabble, led by a quiet academic from the Belgian War College, stand up against the approaching only recently begged from France. How would this ragtag rabble, led by a quiet academic from the Belgian War College, stand up against the approaching furor teutonicus? furor teutonicus?

The answer was not long in coming. On the afternoon of 4 August, the defenders of Barchon bloodily repulsed an attack by units of 53d Infantry Regiment (IR) as it charged the glacis leading up to the fort's walls. The next day, 34th IB lost 30 officers and 1,150 men at Vise. On 6 August, 14th IB, attacking the center line of Liege, sustained more than 50 percent casualties.* In the south, the Belgians warded off all attempts by 9th CD to cross the Meuse between Liege and Huy. Not even a spectacular night bombing attack on Liege by Zeppelin VI out of Cologne intimidated Leman; while its thirteen small bombs killed nine civilians and in the process launched a new form of warfare, the military effect was negligible. Moreover, the airs.h.i.+p leaked gas on the way home and had to crash-land at Bonn. In the south, the Belgians warded off all attempts by 9th CD to cross the Meuse between Liege and Huy. Not even a spectacular night bombing attack on Liege by Zeppelin VI out of Cologne intimidated Leman; while its thirteen small bombs killed nine civilians and in the process launched a new form of warfare, the military effect was negligible. Moreover, the airs.h.i.+p leaked gas on the way home and had to crash-land at Bonn.8 And when Emmich sent an emissary under a white flag to demand Leman's surrender, the plucky professor, who had earlier barely escaped an attempt by the Germans to take him prisoner, replied, "Force your way through the gap." And when Emmich sent an emissary under a white flag to demand Leman's surrender, the plucky professor, who had earlier barely escaped an attempt by the Germans to take him prisoner, replied, "Force your way through the gap."9 Leman's valiant defenders had caused five of the six German attacking brigades to beat a hasty retreat. Headlines in Brussels papers screamed out the news: "Grande Victoire Belge!" "Grande Victoire Belge!" Those in London and Paris spoke of a major "rout" of no fewer than 125,000 German troops, and of at least 20,000 enemy casualties. The French republic bestowed the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honor on Liege and the Military Medal on King Albert. However, Chief of the General Staff Joseph Joffre adamantly refused to divert French troops from his concentration plan to a.s.sist the beleaguered Belgians. Firmly convinced that the main German thrust would not come across the Meuse, he only reluctantly dispatched Louis Franchet d'Esperey's I Corps to secure the Meuse bridges between Givet and Namur and Jean-Francois Sordet's I Cavalry Corps to scout southern Belgium. Those in London and Paris spoke of a major "rout" of no fewer than 125,000 German troops, and of at least 20,000 enemy casualties. The French republic bestowed the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honor on Liege and the Military Medal on King Albert. However, Chief of the General Staff Joseph Joffre adamantly refused to divert French troops from his concentration plan to a.s.sist the beleaguered Belgians. Firmly convinced that the main German thrust would not come across the Meuse, he only reluctantly dispatched Louis Franchet d'Esperey's I Corps to secure the Meuse bridges between Givet and Namur and Jean-Francois Sordet's I Cavalry Corps to scout southern Belgium.10 For almost ten days, Sordet managed mainly to exhaust both men and horses. For almost ten days, Sordet managed mainly to exhaust both men and horses.

What had happened to the German a.s.sault? Carl von Clausewitz's proverbial "fog of uncertainty" ruled the battlefield. Already during the advance, units lost their way in the dark. Officers were separated from their horses. Maps could not be located. Field kitchens were left behind. Soldiers panicked and shot at one another. Suspected fire from civilians added to the chaos. German units stopped to shoot and burn. Moreover, war in its primordial form, as Clausewitz stated, was "slaughter" (Schlacht) (Schlacht). German infantry a.s.saults in close formation were a target-rich environment even for Leman's half-trained soldiers. The mitrailleuses mitrailleuses spat out a steady stream of death at 150 rounds every sixty seconds. A withering artillery fire swept the ma.s.sed German infantry columns before the forts' walls. spat out a steady stream of death at 150 rounds every sixty seconds. A withering artillery fire swept the ma.s.sed German infantry columns before the forts' walls.

Still, the Hanoverians and Westphalians of Emmich's X Corps continued to advance. They made their way over a veritable wall of dead-only to be gunned down in turn. A letter by an anonymous Belgian officer told the story well: As line after line of German infantry advanced, we simply mowed them down. ... They made no attempt at deploying, but came on, line after line, almost shoulder to shoulder, until, as we shot them down, the fallen were heaped one on top of the other, in an awful barricade of dead and wounded men that threatened to mask our guns and cause us trouble.11 Perhaps some of the veterans on the German General Staff remembered that in 1895, Martin Kopke had warned Alfred von Schlieffen against expecting "quick, decisive victories," as even "the most offensive spirit" could achieve little more than "a tough, patient and stouthearted crawling forward step-by-step." Liege in 1914 confirmed Kopke's dire prediction. The campaign in Belgium, to use the general's words, had degenerated into "siege-style" warfare.12 Only the means had changed, with monstrous howitzers, still to be brought up, becoming the modern trebuchet. Only the means had changed, with monstrous howitzers, still to be brought up, becoming the modern trebuchet.

Numerous German commanders lamented that there had not been sufficient prewar nighttime training, that neither war games nor staff rides had prepared the army for the lethality of the modern battlefield, and that commanders from the company level on up had sought to overcome firepower with dash and daring. The results had been staggering casualty rates, especially among infantry officers. With regard to nighttime fighting, many units adopted special white armbands as well as common pa.s.swords, and officers ordered the men to advance with unloaded rifles to cut down on the devastating occurrences of friendly fire.13 Not surprisingly, the Germans were furious that the Belgians had refused them free pa.s.sage through what they considered a neutral country. They denied the legitimacy of Belgian military resistance. The result was predictable: a veritable orgy of shooting and burning. By 8 August, almost 850 civilians had been killed and thirteen hundred buildings burned down in such nondescript places as Micheroux, Retinne, Soumagne, and Melen, among others.14 Whereas Schlieffen had believed that Liege could be invested by a single division, and Ludendorff that it could be stormed by thirty-nine thousand men, the reality was that by 8 August, the Belgians had beaten back all attempts by X Corps to storm the forts-at the cost in blood of fifty-three hundred casualties. The corpses bloated in the broiling sun. Whereas Schlieffen had believed that Liege could be invested by a single division, and Ludendorff that it could be stormed by thirty-nine thousand men, the reality was that by 8 August, the Belgians had beaten back all attempts by X Corps to storm the forts-at the cost in blood of fifty-three hundred casualties. The corpses bloated in the broiling sun.

Still, the German attack threatened to cut Liege off from the rest of the country. Faced with this possibility, General Leman on 6 August released 3d ID and 15th IB to withdraw to the line of the Gette (Gete) River and fight another day. But he was determined to hold the twelve forts with their skeletal complements for as long as possible in accordance with the instructions he had received from King Albert.

The one bright note in the otherwise disastrous German a.s.sault was the plan's architect, Ludendorff. As deputy chief of Second Army, he was not scheduled to play an active role in the campaign. But fate intervened. While waiting for Bulow to make his way to Belgium, Ludendorff found himself caught up in the maelstrom of the battle for Liege. He followed Emmich into the outskirts of the city. At Retinne, just north of Fort Fleron, he stumbled across 14th IB, whose commander, Friedrich von Wussow, had recently been killed. Ludendorff did not hesitate for even a moment. He took command of the brigade and in house-to-house fighting made his way through the Queuede-Bois, up out of the Meuse Valley, and onto the heights near the old Carthusian monastery of La Chartreuse. After overnighting there, Ludendorff at around noon on 7 August spied a white flag flying from the Citadel. Surrender? He sent an officer to investigate. No such luck. At 6 PM, the officer returned to report that General Leman had informed him that the white flag had been raised against his will.

By then, Ludendorff and 14th IB found themselves in a precarious position-short of ammunition and food, down to a strength of only fifteen hundred men, burdened with a thousand Belgian prisoners of war, isolated within the iron ring of Leman's forts, and cut off from the rest of their forces. The men were nervous. "I shall never forget the night of August 6/7," Ludendorff later wrote. "It was cold. ... I listened feverishly for the sound of fighting. I still hoped that at least one brigade or another had broken through the line of forts."15 None had. None had.

Undaunted, Ludendorff pushed on into the city the next morning. He dispatched an advance guard under Colonel Burghardt von Oven to take the Citadel. Then he commandeered an automobile and with his adjutant drove up to the Citadel. There was not a German sentry to be seen, only Belgian soldiers. In a piece of audacious cheek, Ludendorff straightened himself up, dusted off his uniform, clenched the monocle into his right eye socket, strode up to the Citadel's gates, and rapped on them with the pommel of his sword. The gates opened. The courtyard was filled with startled Belgian troops. One of the truly great "what if?" scenarios of modern history was at hand. What if a Belgian soldier had shot the general? What if he had been arrested and turned over to the French? Modern German history may well have taken a different course.* "The few hundred Belgians [inside the Citadel]," Ludendorff later triumphantly recorded, "surrendered at my summons." "The few hundred Belgians [inside the Citadel]," Ludendorff later triumphantly recorded, "surrendered at my summons."16 For some reason, Colonel von Oven had opted to bypa.s.s the Citadel and to head for Fort Loncin. For some reason, Colonel von Oven had opted to bypa.s.s the Citadel and to head for Fort Loncin.

A grateful Kaiser Wilhelm II "smothered" Helmuth von Moltke, chief of the General Staff, with kisses.17 Next, he awarded the war's first prestigious Pour le Merite medal to Ludendorff. Next, he awarded the war's first prestigious Pour le Merite medal to Ludendorff.* Then, remembering that Emmich was the field commander of X Corps, he bestowed the decoration on that officer as well. Then, remembering that Emmich was the field commander of X Corps, he bestowed the decoration on that officer as well.

News of the coup de main at the Citadel hit the newspapers in Germany immediately. Joyous celebrations erupted in many cities. Bulow's staff-without a direct connection to the troops besieging Liege, since X Corps had not been provided with a communications detachment-had intercepted Emmich's terse private telegram to his wife: "Hurrah, at Liege." A more formal epistle informed Second Army that Emmich had entered the city at 7:45 AM AM on 7 August. "The Governor in Flight. The Bishop a prisoner. Liege evacuated by Belgian troops. Citadel of Liege occupied by our troops. As yet not known which forts have been taken." on 7 August. "The Governor in Flight. The Bishop a prisoner. Liege evacuated by Belgian troops. Citadel of Liege occupied by our troops. As yet not known which forts have been taken."18 The last sentence raised eyebrows at Bulow's headquarters-as did the fact that thereafter a deafening silence ensued. For almost two days, no word came out of Liege. Wild rumors circulated at once: The entire 14th IB had been taken prisoner by the Belgians; Ludendorff had been killed in action; Bulow had been shot by his sentry; losses on both sides had been horrendous; and all the forts had surrendered. The last sentence raised eyebrows at Bulow's headquarters-as did the fact that thereafter a deafening silence ensued. For almost two days, no word came out of Liege. Wild rumors circulated at once: The entire 14th IB had been taken prisoner by the Belgians; Ludendorff had been killed in action; Bulow had been shot by his sentry; losses on both sides had been horrendous; and all the forts had surrendered.

The delay at Liege caused near panic on the morning of 8 August at Army Supreme Command (Oberste-Heeresleitung, or OHL) in Berlin as well as at Bulow's temporary headquarters at Aachen. In Berlin, Wilhelm II maliciously accused Moltke of having "brought the English down about my ears for nothing" with his invasion of neutral Belgium. For a second time since 1 August, when the kaiser had brutally rebuked Moltke for his refusal to concentrate solely against Russia after Amba.s.sador Karl von Lichnowsky had sent word that London would keep Paris out of the war if Germany did not attack France, the chief of the General Staff collapsed psychologically. His deputy, Hermann von Stein, witnessed "a most serious nervous breakdown," a "cascade of tears," and eventual "utter apathy" on the part of Moltke. The latter "never forgot those words;" they "weighed heavily on him" in subsequent days. Moltke eventually recovered and put on a brave front. "Gentlemen, you have seen me weak and agitated," he informed his staff. "The struggles before mobilization and the Kaiser's words had made me brittle. I have now overcome that and you shall witness a different me."19 At Aachen, Bulow's staff also became anxious. First and Second armies, roughly six hundred thousand soldiers and a quarter million horses, had to squeeze through the narrow corridors first of Aachen and then of Liege before they could debouch on the Hesbaye Plateau. Martial law had been declared at Aachen and the streets cleared for the troops; it would take five days to march them through its narrow medieval lanes. Their equipment had been routed through Dusseldorf to ease the congestion. Each army corps occupied thirty kilometers of road, each division fifteen, and each corps' munitions trains twenty. If Liege held out much longer, First and Second armies would have to march through the Netherlands-and thus violate another neutral nation.

Bulow took charge. On 8 August, with Moltke's consent, he augmented Emmich's original force of thirty-three thousand infantry and cavalry with a new siege army of sixty thousand (IX and VII corps) commanded by Karl von Einem-Rothmaler. A former Prussian war minister, Einem had won the Iron Cross as a lieutenant in the Franco-Prussian War and in 1914 commanded VII Corps at Munster. He took his time. He put an end to the senseless slaughter of ma.s.sed infantry charges at the Liege forts and waited for the heavy siege artillery-developed in peacetime by Ludendorff for just this purpose-to arrive on the scene.

As soon as he set foot on Belgian territory, Einem confessed to his wife that he deeply "regretted" the "brutal nature" of the conflict. "Unfortunately," he wrote on 8 August, "the [Belgian] populace takes part in the war." Men and women from concealed positions fired on the troops, especially under the cover of darkness. "I have ordered that the villages be burned down and everyone [seized] shot." Two days later, he repeated his outrage at "the insidious, detestable blood thirstiness of the Belgians." He maintained a hard stance. "Unfortunately, we had to singe and burn a lot and many inhabitants forfeited their lives." The burned-out villages between Battice and Herve, he noted, "defy description. This is what the ruins of Pompey ... must look like." He lamented that many soldiers in their eagerness to get at the enemy had fired on their fellow warriors.20 While he waited for the heavy artillery to arrive, Einem took stock of the situation. Not a single fort had fallen. Their garrisons had held tough. General von Emmich was in the "remarkable position" of having forced his way into the city between Forts Fleron and Evegnee-only to "find himself in a mousetrap." Military history, Einem wryly noted, had been "enriched by a new, paradoxical example" at this "d.a.m.ned fortress": "Emmich inside and we outside."21 The men were hungry, thirsty, and tired. What remained of Marwitz's eight thousand cavalry mounts were dangerously short on oats. The heat continued unabated. The only good news was that on 8 August, 14th IB finally managed to break out of the Belgian steel ring that encircled them and to take Fort Barchon. Fort d'Evegnee fell on the night of 11 August. The men were hungry, thirsty, and tired. What remained of Marwitz's eight thousand cavalry mounts were dangerously short on oats. The heat continued unabated. The only good news was that on 8 August, 14th IB finally managed to break out of the Belgian steel ring that encircled them and to take Fort Barchon. Fort d'Evegnee fell on the night of 11 August.

In the afternoon of 12 August, Einem spied a welcome sight: the monstrous black heavy siege guns. First came the 305mm Austrian koda howitzers. Moved in three sections, they could be a.s.sembled in forty minutes. Instead of tires, they crept forward on what their crews called "iron feet"-that is, steel tracks. Next came the four 420mm Krupp monsters. Each had a crew of two hundred. Each took six hours to emplace. Each could fire a sh.e.l.l with 150 kilograms of explosives a distance of fourteen kilometers. Each was fired electrically from a distance of three hundred meters by a gun crew wearing protective head padding. Celestin Demblon, a deputy of Liege, marveled at the Krupp piece.

The monster advanced in two parts, pulled by 36 horses. The pavement trembled. ... Hannibal's elephants could not have astonished the Romans more! The soldiers who accompanied it marched stiffly with an almost religious solemnity. It was the Belial* of cannons! of cannons!22 Both the kodas and the Krupp "Big Berthas" fired armor-piercing sh.e.l.ls with delayed fuses that allowed them to penetrate their targets before exploding. fired armor-piercing sh.e.l.ls with delayed fuses that allowed them to penetrate their targets before exploding.

The issue was never in doubt. Within forty-eight hours, Leman's forts were pulverized into submission: first Pontisse, then Chaudfontaine and Embourg, next Liers and Fleron and Evegnee east of the Meuse; thereafter, Boncelles, Lantin, and Loncin west of the river. The last two, Hollogne and Flemalle, lowered the Belgian tricolor on 16 August.23 Each fort took about thirty heavy sh.e.l.ls. Ludendorff had arrived at Fort Loncin just in time to see a single sh.e.l.l from a Big Bertha rip through the concrete roof, blow up its magazine, and cause the entire structure to collapse. Each fort took about thirty heavy sh.e.l.ls. Ludendorff had arrived at Fort Loncin just in time to see a single sh.e.l.l from a Big Bertha rip through the concrete roof, blow up its magazine, and cause the entire structure to collapse.

Dazed and blackened Belgian soldiers, accompanied by some Germans who had been taken prisoner on the night of August 5/6, crawled out of the ruins. Bleeding, with their hands up, they came toward us. "Ne pas tuer, ne pas tuer." "Ne pas tuer, ne pas tuer."* ... ... We were no Huns. Our men brought water to refresh our enemies. We were no Huns. Our men brought water to refresh our enemies.24 Loncin held a surprise for the Germans: Under its broken concrete slabs and twisted girders they found General Leman, unconscious and nearly asphyxiated by poisonous fumes. Emmich was at the scene. He had met Leman at peacetime military maneuvers and congratulated the Belgian on the tenacity of his defense. Leman's one concern was that it be recorded that he had carried out King Albert's orders to the letter. "Put in your dispatches that I was unconscious." He then offered Emmich his sword. In the war's first (and perhaps last) act of true chivalry, the German declined to take it. "No, keep your sword. To have crossed swords with you has been an honor."25 Leman had lost twenty thousand men at Liege. Leman had lost twenty thousand men at Liege.26 As soon as the debris could be cleared from the roads, German First and Second armies filed through and around the city and headed for the Liege Gap. Lieutenant Colonel Wilhelm Groener's Field Railway Service of twenty-six thousand men had restored the lines between Aachen and (now) Luttich, and only the great tunnel at Nasproue remained blocked, for the Belgians had rammed seventeen locomotives at full speed into one another inside the tunnel.27 Leman's gallant defense of Liege had cost the Germans perhaps two days on the Schlieffen-Moltke master timetable. Leman's gallant defense of Liege had cost the Germans perhaps two days on the Schlieffen-Moltke master timetable.28 MILITARY WISDOM NOW SUGGESTED that King Albert concentrate his remaining units at Namur, Belgium's second great fortress on the Meuse, and there force the Germans into another b.l.o.o.d.y siege. But