The Marne, 1914 Part 3

Of Ruffey's other two army corps, Victor-Rene Boelle's IV Corps fared no better: Its advance on Virton ran head-on into Hermann von Strantz's V Corps; one of its infantry divisions also broke and ran.39 Maurice Sarrail's VI Corps, beefed up with the addition of a third infantry division, stood its ground alone on the right side against Konrad von Goler's VI Reserve Corps. The German artillery fire, a French officer recalled, was lethal. "Thousands of dead were still standing, supported as if by a flying b.u.t.tress made of bodies lying in rows on top of each other in an ascending arc from the horizontal to an angle of 60." A French sergeant likewise commented on the horror of the slaughter. "Heaps of corpses, French and German, are lying every which way, rifles in hand. Rain is falling, sh.e.l.ls are screaming and bursting ... we hear the wounded crying from all over the woods." Maurice Sarrail's VI Corps, beefed up with the addition of a third infantry division, stood its ground alone on the right side against Konrad von Goler's VI Reserve Corps. The German artillery fire, a French officer recalled, was lethal. "Thousands of dead were still standing, supported as if by a flying b.u.t.tress made of bodies lying in rows on top of each other in an ascending arc from the horizontal to an angle of 60." A French sergeant likewise commented on the horror of the slaughter. "Heaps of corpses, French and German, are lying every which way, rifles in hand. Rain is falling, sh.e.l.ls are screaming and bursting ... we hear the wounded crying from all over the woods."40 A corporal with French 31st Infantry Regiment (IR) recalled his comrades jumping from tree trunk to tree trunk in the dense forest, seeking shelter in ditches and potholes, "dazed by the thunderous explosions that followed them from clearing to clearing." A corporal with French 31st Infantry Regiment (IR) recalled his comrades jumping from tree trunk to tree trunk in the dense forest, seeking shelter in ditches and potholes, "dazed by the thunderous explosions that followed them from clearing to clearing."41 In the small villages, women and children dressed in their Sunday best were swept up in the carnage and tried to flee, carrying whatever goods they could on their shoulders. Eventually, the panic of the other two corps forced Sarrail's VI Corps also to retreat to avoid a flanking movement by two German corps. In the small villages, women and children dressed in their Sunday best were swept up in the carnage and tried to flee, carrying whatever goods they could on their shoulders. Eventually, the panic of the other two corps forced Sarrail's VI Corps also to retreat to avoid a flanking movement by two German corps.

Ruffey, finally apprised of the existence of the Army of Lorraine at Verdun, at 1:30 PM PM on 22 August contacted General Maunoury and pleaded for help for his embattled right wing. Maunoury responded at once. on 22 August contacted General Maunoury and pleaded for help for his embattled right wing. Maunoury responded at once.42 He ordered Jules Chailley's 54th Reserve Infantry Division (RID) to advance to the line Ollieres-Domprix, and Henry Marabail's 67th RID to take up positions around Senon and Amel. He ordered Jules Chailley's 54th Reserve Infantry Division (RID) to advance to the line Ollieres-Domprix, and Henry Marabail's 67th RID to take up positions around Senon and Amel.43 But delays in relaying the general's orders resulted in neither formation arriving in time to turn the tide of battle. But delays in relaying the general's orders resulted in neither formation arriving in time to turn the tide of battle.

Ruffey's offensive had collapsed. The "staircase" effect noted previously now set in for Langle de Cary's neighboring Fourth Army advancing on Neufchateau. Augustin Gerard's II Corps, Fifth Army, on the extreme right was stopped dead in its tracks around 8 AM AM, first by a ma.s.sive artillery barrage and then by murderous machine-gun fire from Kurt von Pritzelwitz's VI Corps (Fourth Army). On its left, Lefevre's colonial corps, veterans of France's wars in Africa and IndoChina, nevertheless pushed on between the Forest of Chiny and Neufchateau.44 The early-morning fog and rain had turned into searing heat and enervating humidity. Georges Goullet's 5th Colonial Brigade and Arthur Poline's XVII Corps were surprised in the thick woods near Bertrix, initially by German uhlans fighting dismounted and then by Kuno von Steuben's XVII Reserve Corps and Dedo von Schenck's XVIII Corps. Desperate, violent combat ensued. The early-morning fog and rain had turned into searing heat and enervating humidity. Georges Goullet's 5th Colonial Brigade and Arthur Poline's XVII Corps were surprised in the thick woods near Bertrix, initially by German uhlans fighting dismounted and then by Kuno von Steuben's XVII Reserve Corps and Dedo von Schenck's XVIII Corps. Desperate, violent combat ensued.45 When Otto von Pluskow's XI Corps of Saxon Third Army appeared from the north, the German iron ring around Bertrix was virtually complete. Without an escape route, Poline's XVII Corps panicked, abandoned its artillery, and fled, leaving a breach in the front of Langle de Cary's Fourth Army similar to that left by V Corps in the front of Ruffey's Third Army. When Otto von Pluskow's XI Corps of Saxon Third Army appeared from the north, the German iron ring around Bertrix was virtually complete. Without an escape route, Poline's XVII Corps panicked, abandoned its artillery, and fled, leaving a breach in the front of Langle de Cary's Fourth Army similar to that left by V Corps in the front of Ruffey's Third Army.

A poilu, Desire Renault of 88th IR with Poline's XVII Corps, on 22 August wrote home of the frightful slaughter. "The fighting has ended, all my buddies are beaten into retreat, and we, the wounded, have been left abandoned without care, dying of thirst. What a terrible night!" The coming dawn brought only more misery. "A new torture has added itself to the others: since the sun rose, the flies, drawn by the smell of blood, go after me fiercely."46 Utterly exhausted and seriously wounded in the bludgeoning in the Ardennes, Renault was spared death or capture by two Red Cross nurses who carried him to a field hospital at Longwy. Utterly exhausted and seriously wounded in the bludgeoning in the Ardennes, Renault was spared death or capture by two Red Cross nurses who carried him to a field hospital at Longwy.

Worse was yet to come at the small village of Rossignol, north of the Semois River and fifteen kilometers south of Neufchateau. There, 3d Colonial Division ran hard up against 12th ID of Pritzelwitz's VI Army Corps. In short order, it sent five battalions of pantalon rouges pantalon rouges in waves against the Germans on a front roughly six hundred meters wide. One furious frontal bayonet charge after another, accompanied by l.u.s.ty cries of in waves against the Germans on a front roughly six hundred meters wide. One furious frontal bayonet charge after another, accompanied by l.u.s.ty cries of "En avant!," "En avant!,"* was mowed down by murderous artillery and machine-gun fire. As darkness fell, 3d Colonial Division had ceased to exist: Eleven thousand of its fifteen thousand soldiers had been killed or wounded; its commander, General Leon Raffenel, had been shot; and its last remnants gallantly buried the regimental colors. was mowed down by murderous artillery and machine-gun fire. As darkness fell, 3d Colonial Division had ceased to exist: Eleven thousand of its fifteen thousand soldiers had been killed or wounded; its commander, General Leon Raffenel, had been shot; and its last remnants gallantly buried the regimental colors.

Rossignol for France const.i.tuted the deadliest campaign of the Battle of the Frontiers. Langle de Cary in cla.s.sic understatement reported to Joffre from his headquarters at Stenay: "On the whole results hardly satisfactory."47 He ignored the generalissimo's demand that he resume the offensive the next day and instead ordered a retreat behind the Meuse and Chiers rivers near Sedan. Ruffey, furious that his infantry charges had not been supported by artillery, fell back on Verdun. Lanrezac's hard-pressed Fifth Army at the Sambre could expect no help from either Third or Fourth armies. Maunoury's unbloodied Army of Lorraine limped off to the safety of Amiens. He ignored the generalissimo's demand that he resume the offensive the next day and instead ordered a retreat behind the Meuse and Chiers rivers near Sedan. Ruffey, furious that his infantry charges had not been supported by artillery, fell back on Verdun. Lanrezac's hard-pressed Fifth Army at the Sambre could expect no help from either Third or Fourth armies. Maunoury's unbloodied Army of Lorraine limped off to the safety of Amiens.

More than eleven thousand poilus poilus paid the butcher's bill. At Virton, 8th ID lost 5,500 of its 16,000 men. At Ethe, 7th ID was so badly mauled that it was depicted as having been "stomped." At Ochamps, 20th IR lost almost half (1,300) of its soldiers; the neighboring 11th IR, 2,700 out of 3,300 men. Goullet's 5th Colonial Brigade had entered the Ardennes with 6,600 effectives; it left with only 3,400. paid the butcher's bill. At Virton, 8th ID lost 5,500 of its 16,000 men. At Ethe, 7th ID was so badly mauled that it was depicted as having been "stomped." At Ochamps, 20th IR lost almost half (1,300) of its soldiers; the neighboring 11th IR, 2,700 out of 3,300 men. Goullet's 5th Colonial Brigade had entered the Ardennes with 6,600 effectives; it left with only 3,400.48 Langle de Cary reported to Joffre that of one of his corps (40,000 men), roughly 15,000 remained combat-ready; more than 15,000 had been killed or wounded. The survivors were evacuated to Vouziers between 23 and 31 August. Langle de Cary reported to Joffre that of one of his corps (40,000 men), roughly 15,000 remained combat-ready; more than 15,000 had been killed or wounded. The survivors were evacuated to Vouziers between 23 and 31 August.49 But the Germans had not escaped unscathed. Duke Albrecht's Fourth Army suffered 7,540 men dead or missing and 11,678 wounded between 21 and 31 August, with Schenck's XVIII Corps and Pritzel-witz's VI Corps each sustaining about 6,000 casualties. Crown Prince Wilhelm's Fifth Army in the same period lost 7,488 men dead and missing and 11,529 wounded.50 Still, a delirious Wilhelm II awarded his son the Iron Cross, First and Second Cla.s.s-as he had earlier to Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria. Still, a delirious Wilhelm II awarded his son the Iron Cross, First and Second Cla.s.s-as he had earlier to Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria.

AS THE TWO OPPOSING sides battled each other into b.l.o.o.d.y exhaustion in the Ardennes, the final drama of the Battle of Charleroi unfolded south of the Sambre River. Once Bulow realized that his corps commanders had attacked an entire French army across the wide Sambre front, he quickly appreciated that he needed help to secure both his flanks and victory. A discussion with Otto von Lauenstein, his chief of staff, on the night of 23 August confirmed the tension at Bulow's headquarters at Walcourt. "There were critical hours yesterday and during the night," Lauenstein noted, "in which the worry whether all would go according to plan almost gained the upper hand. Our operation had undoubtedly been most audacious." sides battled each other into b.l.o.o.d.y exhaustion in the Ardennes, the final drama of the Battle of Charleroi unfolded south of the Sambre River. Once Bulow realized that his corps commanders had attacked an entire French army across the wide Sambre front, he quickly appreciated that he needed help to secure both his flanks and victory. A discussion with Otto von Lauenstein, his chief of staff, on the night of 23 August confirmed the tension at Bulow's headquarters at Walcourt. "There were critical hours yesterday and during the night," Lauenstein noted, "in which the worry whether all would go according to plan almost gained the upper hand. Our operation had undoubtedly been most audacious."51 There existed only one option: to renew the attack on Lanrezac the next morning, 24 August, and to call on the two flanking armies to lend support. There existed only one option: to renew the attack on Lanrezac the next morning, 24 August, and to call on the two flanking armies to lend support.

Bulow had already contacted Hausen's Third Army earlier that day to press across the Meuse at Dinant; he repeated that plea on 24 August. At noon welcome (if deceptive) news arrived from Third Army. "Sector seized; French gone; our right wing [at] Florennes-Philippeville." Bulow was ecstatic. The battle was almost won. Around 3 PM PM, he triumphantly cabled Moltke. "Enemy's right flank decisively defeated by 2 Army. 3 Army across the Maas toward Philippeville. To be pa.s.sed on to the Kaiser. All [armies] continue the attack."52 Still, Bulow worried that he had received no news from Kluck or his chief of staff, Kuhl. First Army seemed to be continuing its march southwest, ignoring Bulow's repeated requests that it turn onto a more southerly course and thereby maintain contact with Second Army's right flank. Lauenstein shared his commander's anxiety. "If my friend and my right neighbor Kuhl now deals with the English as we have dealt with the French, then the first phase of the campaign in the western theater will have been decided in our favor."53 It was time for Bulow to issue a direct order to First Army: "IX Army Corps is to advance immediately west of Maubeuge in order to carry out an enveloping attack against the enemy's left wing. III Army Corps is to join it in echelon formation." It was time for Bulow to issue a direct order to First Army: "IX Army Corps is to advance immediately west of Maubeuge in order to carry out an enveloping attack against the enemy's left wing. III Army Corps is to join it in echelon formation."54 But whereas Bulow was able to intimidate Hausen and his chief of staff, Ernst von Hoeppner, the same was not the case with Kluck and Kuhl. First Army's duumvirate appreciated that they were the hammer that was to smash the Allied armies around Paris, and they were not about to let Bulow interfere with that goal. "Hour after hour went by," in the words of the German official history, without a reply from First Army. Bulow and Lauenstein seethed with anger. Moltke had, after all, put First Army under Bulow's command. By late afternoon, Bulow had lost all patience. "Where II and IV Army Corps today?" he testily demanded to know from Kluck. "How does the battle stand today?" Finally, he issued a barely concealed reminder of their command relations.h.i.+p. "Request daily to be notified accordingly."55 Moltke at Koblenz chose not to pull his field commanders into line. Moltke at Koblenz chose not to pull his field commanders into line.

FIRST ARMY WAS ABOUT to make contact with the British Expeditionary Force. On 19 August, Wilhelm II reportedly to make contact with the British Expeditionary Force. On 19 August, Wilhelm II reportedly* had "commanded" Kluck to "exterminate the treacherous English" and to roll over Field Marshal French's "contemptible little army." had "commanded" Kluck to "exterminate the treacherous English" and to roll over Field Marshal French's "contemptible little army."56 First Army stood west of Lanrezac's Fifth Army. It had marched nearly 250 kilometers in eleven days, much of it in excruciating heat and suffocating dust. Information gathered from local villagers suggested to Kluck that seventy thousand British troops were moving on Mons. But communications with Second Army remained nonexistent, and no orders had been received from Moltke. Nor had anyone thought of sending out liaison officers to coordinate the operations of First and Second armies, so critical to the Moltke-Schlieffen design. First Army stood west of Lanrezac's Fifth Army. It had marched nearly 250 kilometers in eleven days, much of it in excruciating heat and suffocating dust. Information gathered from local villagers suggested to Kluck that seventy thousand British troops were moving on Mons. But communications with Second Army remained nonexistent, and no orders had been received from Moltke. Nor had anyone thought of sending out liaison officers to coordinate the operations of First and Second armies, so critical to the Moltke-Schlieffen design.57 Kluck and Kuhl simply planned "to cut the English off" from establis.h.i.+ng contact with Lanrezac's Fifth Army. Kluck and Kuhl simply planned "to cut the English off" from establis.h.i.+ng contact with Lanrezac's Fifth Army.

They did not have long to wait. Friedrich Sixt von Arnim's IV Corps, Ferdinand von Quast's IX Corps, and Ewald von Lochow's III Corps blindly advanced from north to south along the twenty-meter-wide Mons-Conde Ca.n.a.l against Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien's II Army Corps.58 Had Kluck finally turned toward the south as requested by Bulow? Not a word of this reached Second Army. At the bend in the British line at Mons, where it turned southeast toward Peissant, Manfred von Richthofen's Had Kluck finally turned toward the south as requested by Bulow? Not a word of this reached Second Army. At the bend in the British line at Mons, where it turned southeast toward Peissant, Manfred von Richthofen's* I Cavalry Corps was approaching Sir Douglas Haig's I Army Corps. Field Marshal French's role was to protect Lanrezac's left flank; Kluck's was to roll up the British left flank between Saint-Aybert and Jemappes. I Cavalry Corps was approaching Sir Douglas Haig's I Army Corps. Field Marshal French's role was to protect Lanrezac's left flank; Kluck's was to roll up the British left flank between Saint-Aybert and Jemappes.

The two armies were advancing through some of the ugliest real estate in Europe. Once a medieval textile town, Mons in 1914 was in the heart of the Belgian coalfields. It had all the flavor of the Industrial Revolution-polluted ditches, swamps, watercourses, and ca.n.a.ls. Railroads and cobbled roads further dissected the fields and farms and willow forests. Pitheads and smoking slag heaps, some as high as thirty meters, rounded off the landscape.

This phase of the Battle of the Frontiers began inauspiciously enough near Casteau. Field Marshal French, wisely having rejected a plea from Lanrezac to wheel east to strike Bulow's Second Army in the flank and thus expose the BEF to Kluck's First Army, was advancing in the direction of Soignies, as Joffre had requested in Special Order No. 15 of 21 August. Suddenly, 4th Dragoon Guards of 2d Cavalry Brigade came upon riders of Kluck's 9th Cavalry Division; a small skirmish ensued. Owing to inadequate reconnaissance, neither commander suspected the imminent clash of their entire forces. Both were thus surprised when, between 9 and 10 AM AM on the misty and rainy morning of Sunday, 23 August, Quast's IX Corps blundered into Smith-Dorrien's II Corps near Mons. A furious battle ensued all along the grimy Mons-Conde Ca.n.a.l: While Quast's artillery mercilessly battered the BEF's lines with sh.e.l.l and shrapnel, Smith-Dorrien's Fourth Middles.e.x and Second Royal Irish riflemen endlessly directed their accurate Lee-Enfield fire ("fifteen rounds a minute") into wave after wave of gray German infantry coming at them in close formation. Corporal John Lucy later recalled the carnage: on the misty and rainy morning of Sunday, 23 August, Quast's IX Corps blundered into Smith-Dorrien's II Corps near Mons. A furious battle ensued all along the grimy Mons-Conde Ca.n.a.l: While Quast's artillery mercilessly battered the BEF's lines with sh.e.l.l and shrapnel, Smith-Dorrien's Fourth Middles.e.x and Second Royal Irish riflemen endlessly directed their accurate Lee-Enfield fire ("fifteen rounds a minute") into wave after wave of gray German infantry coming at them in close formation. Corporal John Lucy later recalled the carnage: A great roar of musketry rent the air. ... For us the battle took the form of well ordered, rapid rifle-fire at close range as the field of grey human targets appeared, or were struck down, to be replaced by further waves of German infantry who shared the same fate. ... Such tactics amazed us, and after the first shock of seeing men slowly and helplessly falling down as they were hit [it] gave us a great sense of power and pleasure.59 Captain Walter Bloem of 12th Brandenburg Grenadiers also attested to the lethality of the battlefield. The gently undulating hills and meadows around the ca.n.a.l were "dotted with little grey heaps," fallen German infantrymen. "Wherever I looked, right or left," he noted, "were dead and wounded, quivering in convulsions, groaning terribly, blood oozing from fresh wounds."60 It was much the same story farther west at Jemappes, where Lochow's III Corps similarly fed its infantry into deadly enemy rifle fire. By day's end, the BEF had suffered sixteen hundred casualties; Kluck and Kuhl chose not to reveal German losses, which have been estimated at about five thousand. Although the British abandoned both Mons and Jemappes by nightfall and began to fall back toward Le Cateau, the day's battle had ended inconclusively. Kluck and Kuhl, who had wanted to sweep around the British left flank while anchoring their own left flank on Mons, felt cheated of victory over the BEF by Bulow's constant demands that First Army at all times maintain close contact with Second Army. Moreover, they were annoyed that the enemy had once again eluded encirclement and that their own infantry had shown such profound contempt for the enemy's firepower. Mons was thus best forgotten.

For the British-both soldiers and the public at home, both then and now-Mons became one of the great legends of the war. There were many stories of what occurred that day, but they all had some elements in common: At one point in the battle, when the waves of gray German infantry seemed about to sweep across the ca.n.a.l and mop up the remnants of Smith-Dorrien's "Old Contemptibles," the skies parted brightly to reveal a knight in s.h.i.+ning armor mounted on a white horse (Saint George?) while archers from above showered the German lines with arrows and white-robed angels s.h.i.+elded the BEF from hostile fire. The "Angel of Mons"61 thus became for the British both a sign of divine intervention on their behalf and a symbol of hope for the duration of the war. thus became for the British both a sign of divine intervention on their behalf and a symbol of hope for the duration of the war.

As Kluck resumed his attack the next day, 24 August, the entire Allied front suddenly seemed to collapse. Lanrezac, upon receiving news that Namur had capitulated and that Hausen's Third Army was crossing the Meuse south of Dinant, had decided by ten o'clock on the night of 23 August to fall back along the line Givet-Maubeuge. He reached his decision without consulting Joffre and without informing Sir John French, thus further eroding an already shaky relations.h.i.+p with the British commander. Fifth Army's precipitous retreat caused a twelve-kilometer-wide gap to develop between French Fifth Army's left and the BEF's right. "Johnnie" French felt "left alone" by Lanrezac and poured out his bitterness to Joffre at GQG. At 2 AM AM on 24 August, he ordered a general retreat from Mons southwest to Le Cateau. Despondency seemed to have overtaken him. He queried Lord Kitchener about the possibility of falling back on Le Havre-and Britain? He toyed with the idea of sheltering his forces in Maubeuge. on 24 August, he ordered a general retreat from Mons southwest to Le Cateau. Despondency seemed to have overtaken him. He queried Lord Kitchener about the possibility of falling back on Le Havre-and Britain? He toyed with the idea of sheltering his forces in Maubeuge.62 And he threatened to withdraw the entire BEF behind "the lower Seine"-that is, behind Fortress Paris. For the Allies, the Great Retreat had begun. And he threatened to withdraw the entire BEF behind "the lower Seine"-that is, behind Fortress Paris. For the Allies, the Great Retreat had begun.

The agony of defeat was recorded by future historian Marc Bloch, a sergeant with French 272d IR. The retreat for him began in the "stifling heat" of the morning of 25 August. In village after village on the left bank of the Meuse, he encountered fleeing French peasants. "Wrenched from their homes, disoriented, dazed, and bullied by the gendarmes, they were troublesome but pathetic figures." Men, women, and children pa.s.sed by in silent marches taking what little they could in small hand-pulled wagons. On 26 August, the burning suns.h.i.+ne cruelly turned to steaming rain. The retreat, "the monotony of each day," plodded onward toward the west, "continually retreating without fighting." Where and how would it end? "Oh, what bitter days of retreat, of weariness, boredom, and anxiety!"63 THE DECISION IN THE campaign in the west still lay ahead, but it would be fought by a much-reduced German field army. For Moltke and his deputy chief of staff, Hermann von Stein, panicked by the unexpectedly rapid Russian advance in the east, stripped Bulow's Second Army of Max von Gallwitz's Guard Reserve Corps and Hausen's Third Army of Pluskow's XI Corps to derail the Russian steamroller. As the two corps marched east from Namur, Moltke, in what he pathetically called a "counter-movement," ordered Max von Boehn's IX Reserve Corps to depart Schleswig-Holstein and join Kluck's First Army. campaign in the west still lay ahead, but it would be fought by a much-reduced German field army. For Moltke and his deputy chief of staff, Hermann von Stein, panicked by the unexpectedly rapid Russian advance in the east, stripped Bulow's Second Army of Max von Gallwitz's Guard Reserve Corps and Hausen's Third Army of Pluskow's XI Corps to derail the Russian steamroller. As the two corps marched east from Namur, Moltke, in what he pathetically called a "counter-movement," ordered Max von Boehn's IX Reserve Corps to depart Schleswig-Holstein and join Kluck's First Army.64 Stein had vetoed a suggestion by Wilhelm Groener, chief of the Field Railway Section of the General Staff, to send Bavarian I Corps and Prussian XXI Corps from Lorraine to East Prussia instead, with the revealing comment, "One cannot expect Bavarians to defend East Prussia." Stein had vetoed a suggestion by Wilhelm Groener, chief of the Field Railway Section of the General Staff, to send Bavarian I Corps and Prussian XXI Corps from Lorraine to East Prussia instead, with the revealing comment, "One cannot expect Bavarians to defend East Prussia."65 As well, Moltke and Stein ordered Kluck to leave Hans von Beseler's III Corps to cover Fortress Antwerp and one brigade of Hans von Gronau's IV Reserve Corps to garrison Brussels. Finally, Bulow had detached Hans von Zwehl's VII Reserve Corps as well as one brigade of Einem's VII Corps to lay siege to the French garrison of fifty thousand men at Maubeuge. As well, Moltke and Stein ordered Kluck to leave Hans von Beseler's III Corps to cover Fortress Antwerp and one brigade of Hans von Gronau's IV Reserve Corps to garrison Brussels. Finally, Bulow had detached Hans von Zwehl's VII Reserve Corps as well as one brigade of Einem's VII Corps to lay siege to the French garrison of fifty thousand men at Maubeuge.66 Heat and exhaustion as well as almost uninterrupted combat had further weakened the two "strike armies." During the entire month of August, Kluck's First Army of 217,384 soldiers had lost 7,869 men wounded as well as 2,863 killed or missing. Slightly less than eight thousand men had reported sick-mostly from heatstroke and dehydration, but also from foot sores due to the extended march of some four hundred kilometers in thirty days.67 Bulow's Second Army of 199,486 soldiers listed 12,151 wounded and 5,061 killed or missing for August. Almost nine thousand soldiers had reported sick for much the same reasons as those in First Army. There had been three suicides in each army. Bulow's Second Army of 199,486 soldiers listed 12,151 wounded and 5,061 killed or missing for August. Almost nine thousand soldiers had reported sick for much the same reasons as those in First Army. There had been three suicides in each army.68 But if one takes into account the figures for just the last ten days of August-that is, the period of the heaviest fighting in the Battle of the Frontiers-the totals for First Army were 4,932 wounded, 2,145 killed or missing, and 2,567 reported sick; and for Second Army, 8,052 wounded, 3,516 killed or missing, and 4,125 reported sick. But if one takes into account the figures for just the last ten days of August-that is, the period of the heaviest fighting in the Battle of the Frontiers-the totals for First Army were 4,932 wounded, 2,145 killed or missing, and 2,567 reported sick; and for Second Army, 8,052 wounded, 3,516 killed or missing, and 4,125 reported sick.69 Paris was still more than 130 kilometers away. Paris was still more than 130 kilometers away.

Joffre was by far the princ.i.p.al loser. On 23 August, he flippantly notified War Minister Messimy that he had "terminated" his strategic plan.70 In fact, that plan lay in tatters-at the cost of 260,000 casualties (including 75,000 killed) and the loss of 83 percent of France's iron ore, 62 percent of its cast iron, and 60 percent of its steel production. French First and Second armies had attacked in Lorraine on 14 August; six days later, a German counterattack had driven them back. Third and Fourth armies had attacked in the Ardennes on 21 August; two days later, they had staggered back to their jump-off positions. Fifth Army had advanced to the Sambre on 20 August; three days later, it had begun its retreat to Givet. Joffre had been decisively beaten in the Battle of the Frontiers and had lost the initiative to the Germans. In fact, that plan lay in tatters-at the cost of 260,000 casualties (including 75,000 killed) and the loss of 83 percent of France's iron ore, 62 percent of its cast iron, and 60 percent of its steel production. French First and Second armies had attacked in Lorraine on 14 August; six days later, a German counterattack had driven them back. Third and Fourth armies had attacked in the Ardennes on 21 August; two days later, they had staggered back to their jump-off positions. Fifth Army had advanced to the Sambre on 20 August; three days later, it had begun its retreat to Givet. Joffre had been decisively beaten in the Battle of the Frontiers and had lost the initiative to the Germans.

He took no responsibility.71 Both at the time and subsequently in his memoirs, Joffre insisted that he had placed "the main body of his army against the most sensitive point of the enemy," and that he had secured "numerical superiority at this point." But the troops, despite this "numerical superiority," had not displayed the "offensive qualities" he had expected of them. Worse, there had been "many individual failures" and "grave shortcomings" among his commanders. All too many had not "understood" his Field Regulation; all too many had failed to display the Napoleonic Both at the time and subsequently in his memoirs, Joffre insisted that he had placed "the main body of his army against the most sensitive point of the enemy," and that he had secured "numerical superiority at this point." But the troops, despite this "numerical superiority," had not displayed the "offensive qualities" he had expected of them. Worse, there had been "many individual failures" and "grave shortcomings" among his commanders. All too many had not "understood" his Field Regulation; all too many had failed to display the Napoleonic feu sacre; feu sacre; and all too many had shown themselves to be cautious instead of bold. Messimy for a second time in two weeks went so far as to demand that ineffectual commanders ("old fossils") be summarily executed. and all too many had shown themselves to be cautious instead of bold. Messimy for a second time in two weeks went so far as to demand that ineffectual commanders ("old fossils") be summarily executed.72 A shocked President Poincare recalled his liaison officer to GQG for a dose of reality. "Is it defeat?" he bluntly asked Colonel Marie-Jean Penelon. The reply was surprisingly A shocked President Poincare recalled his liaison officer to GQG for a dose of reality. "Is it defeat?" he bluntly asked Colonel Marie-Jean Penelon. The reply was surprisingly* straightforward, "Yes, Mister President." straightforward, "Yes, Mister President."73 That Sunday, 23 August 1914, childhood memories of 187071 could not have been far from the mind of the statesman born in Bar-le-Duc, Lorraine, in 1860. That Sunday, 23 August 1914, childhood memories of 187071 could not have been far from the mind of the statesman born in Bar-le-Duc, Lorraine, in 1860.

The greatest losers by far, of course, were the people and the land of Belgium. The country lay in ruins. Villages had been reduced to rubble and ashes. Hundreds of civilians had been summarily executed for reportedly firing on German troops, and tens of thousands had been forcefully deported to Germany. An endless sea of refugees, pulling their few remaining possessions in ancient small carts, flowed aimlessly away from the fighting fronts. Giant sh.e.l.l craters pockmarked the landscape. Bridges, ca.n.a.ls, railroad tracks, and telegraph wires had been destroyed. Crops were rotting in the fields. The bloated or blasted corpses of horses and cows were left in the sun. Will Irwin, an American reporter for Collier's Weekly Collier's Weekly, was struck by the grayness of "earth and land and sky": "gray transport wagons," "gray motorcycles," "gray biplanes," and "gray machines of men." Ever onward the German "gray machine of death" rolled. Irwin's most lasting memory was a prosaic one: "And over it all lay a smell of which I have never heard mentioned in any book on war-the smell of a half-million un-bathed men, the stench of a menagerie raised to the n nth power. That smell lay for days over every town through which the Germans pa.s.sed."74 * Le borinage Le borinage refers to the coal-mining district of Hainaut Province in southwest Belgium extending to the French border. The term came from refers to the coal-mining district of Hainaut Province in southwest Belgium extending to the French border. The term came from borin borin or or borain borain, pejorative French names for "buddy."* When Apollo, the Greek G.o.d of sunlight and son of Zeus, granted Ca.s.sandra the gift of prophecy and she did not return his love, Apollo placed a curse on her so that no one would ever believe her predictions. When Apollo, the Greek G.o.d of sunlight and son of Zeus, granted Ca.s.sandra the gift of prophecy and she did not return his love, Apollo placed a curse on her so that no one would ever believe her predictions.* All actions on French soil are given in French (GMT) time. All actions on French soil are given in French (GMT) time.* "Why have they come here? But, to fish in the river!" "Why have they come here? But, to fish in the river!"* The extent to which the troops adhered to Kitchener's instruction to keep on guard against "excesses" and "temptations, both in wine and women," cannot be accurately determined. The extent to which the troops adhered to Kitchener's instruction to keep on guard against "excesses" and "temptations, both in wine and women," cannot be accurately determined.* "Forward!" "Forward!"* No record of this order was ever found in the German archives, and Wilhelm II after the war vehemently denied having issued such a command. The British press made a meal of the quote-apparently "invented" by Frederick Maurice in the British War Office. The soldiers of the BEF proudly adopted the moniker No record of this order was ever found in the German archives, and Wilhelm II after the war vehemently denied having issued such a command. The British press made a meal of the quote-apparently "invented" by Frederick Maurice in the British War Office. The soldiers of the BEF proudly adopted the moniker Old Contemptibles Old Contemptibles.* Not to be confused with the future air ace ("Red Baron") of the same name, then serving with German cavalry in East Prussia. Not to be confused with the future air ace ("Red Baron") of the same name, then serving with German cavalry in East Prussia.* The colonel had earned the nickname The colonel had earned the nickname April Smiles April Smiles for his ability to put a positive spin on any news, no matter how bad. for his ability to put a positive spin on any news, no matter how bad.

CHAPTER SIX.

SQUANDERED CLIMACTERICS.

One must never fail to recognize that it is difficult to free oneself from a concept once it is conceived and to throw over board an entire operations plan once it appears that the presuppositions on which it is based are no longer valid.-GERMAN GENERAL STAFF RIDE 1905/06 THE BATTLE OF THE FRONTIERS WAS OVER BY 24 AUGUST. FOR nearly two weeks, two million-man armies had been locked in murderous combat along a front roughly three hundred kilometers wide. There had been planned offensives that quickly degenerated into wild melees in Alsace-Lorraine, Belgium, the Ardennes, and the triangle of the Sambre-Meuse rivers. There had been unexpected skirmishes and unwanted surprises as the opposing forces ran into one another headlong in rugged terrain. There had been severe "wastage" due to senseless ma.s.sed infantry a.s.saults. Artillery and machine guns had proved utterly lethal. France and Germany had each suffered roughly 260,000 casualties. nearly two weeks, two million-man armies had been locked in murderous combat along a front roughly three hundred kilometers wide. There had been planned offensives that quickly degenerated into wild melees in Alsace-Lorraine, Belgium, the Ardennes, and the triangle of the Sambre-Meuse rivers. There had been unexpected skirmishes and unwanted surprises as the opposing forces ran into one another headlong in rugged terrain. There had been severe "wastage" due to senseless ma.s.sed infantry a.s.saults. Artillery and machine guns had proved utterly lethal. France and Germany had each suffered roughly 260,000 casualties.

In boxing terms, the two contenders had sparred for four rounds-at Nancy, Liege, Namur-Charleroi, and Mons. They had landed, and absorbed, jabs and light blows. They had inflicted black eyes, cut lips, and swollen cheeks on each other. But there had been no ma.s.sive combination punches to the body or the head, no knockout blow. The Germans stuck to their game plan-to remain on the offensive everywhere and to knock out their opponent by either a left hook in Lorraine or a right hook at Paris, or both. They circled their prey waiting for an opening. The French had come out looking to land a knockout punch in the first two rounds-in Alsace-Lorraine and then in the Ardennes. When that approach failed, they adopted a "rope-a-dope"* strategy, constantly retreating, conserving energy, allowing the opponent to strike them repeatedly in hopes of tiring him out, and waiting for an opportunity to counterattack. strategy, constantly retreating, conserving energy, allowing the opponent to strike them repeatedly in hopes of tiring him out, and waiting for an opportunity to counterattack.

Round Five had the potential to be deadly-to the French. Alexander von Kluck's First Army was chasing the retreating British Expeditionary Force (BEF) on the right flank. Crown Prince Rupprecht's Sixth and Seventh armies were resting and recuperating from a week of constant combat on the left flank, and preparing to drive past Nancy and across the Meurthe River. Crown Prince Wilhelm of Prussia's Fifth Army and Duke Albrecht of Wurttemberg's Fourth Army had given the French center a terrible pounding in the Battle of the Ardennes. The war's center of gravity now s.h.i.+fted once more to Charles Lanrezac's French Fifth Army. Pointing northeast into the apex (Namur) of the right angle formed by the Sambre and Meuse rivers, Lanrezac was the anchor of the French position. If he failed to hold the line, it would spell doom not only for Sir John French and the BEF on his left, but especially for Pierre Ruffey's Third Army and Fernand de Langle de Cary's Fourth Army on his right, which had been bludgeoned and was now pinned down in the Ardennes by German Fifth and Fourth armies. And, of course, for Paris.

LANREZAC HAD ALREADY CROSSED swords with Karl von Bulow at Charleroi and had come out the loser. German Second Army had chased French Fifth Army south across the Sambre and by 2526 August was making a major effort to encircle it from the northwest. But Lanrezac's problems did not end with Bulow. For on his right flank, another German army was driving west, and it posed the greatest potential threat: Max von Hausen's Third Army. It was a force to be reckoned with: Saxon XII and XIX corps as well as XII Reserve Corps and Prussian XI Corps, a total of 113,000 infantry, 71,000 cavalry, 602 guns, and 198 machine guns. swords with Karl von Bulow at Charleroi and had come out the loser. German Second Army had chased French Fifth Army south across the Sambre and by 2526 August was making a major effort to encircle it from the northwest. But Lanrezac's problems did not end with Bulow. For on his right flank, another German army was driving west, and it posed the greatest potential threat: Max von Hausen's Third Army. It was a force to be reckoned with: Saxon XII and XIX corps as well as XII Reserve Corps and Prussian XI Corps, a total of 113,000 infantry, 71,000 cavalry, 602 guns, and 198 machine guns.1 For much of August, Third Army had advanced through the Belgian province of Namur on the left flank of Bulow's Second Army-both forming the spokes that connected the hub of Fourth and Fifth armies in the Ardennes to the outer rim of First Army in Flemish Brabant. After ordering Hausen to surrender Otto von Pluskow's XI Corps to Second Army to besiege Namur, Army Supreme Command (OHL) on 20 August ordered him to head for the line Namur-Givet with his three remaining corps. His instructions were to support Second Army's advance west of Namur and to coordinate his actions with Prussia's senior field commander. Ahead lay the right flank of French Fifth Army. For much of August, Third Army had advanced through the Belgian province of Namur on the left flank of Bulow's Second Army-both forming the spokes that connected the hub of Fourth and Fifth armies in the Ardennes to the outer rim of First Army in Flemish Brabant. After ordering Hausen to surrender Otto von Pluskow's XI Corps to Second Army to besiege Namur, Army Supreme Command (OHL) on 20 August ordered him to head for the line Namur-Givet with his three remaining corps. His instructions were to support Second Army's advance west of Namur and to coordinate his actions with Prussia's senior field commander. Ahead lay the right flank of French Fifth Army.

Hausen's advance was fraught with both promise and danger. If he and Bulow drove home their attacks on Fifth Army, the Prussian from the north and the Saxon from the east, Lanrezac's forces could be taken between two pincers and crushed.2 But if either Bulow or Hausen failed to press the enemy hard at all times and allowed Lanrezac freedom of action, there was a danger that especially Hausen's Third Army could be driven by French Fifth Army against Langle de Cary's Fourth Army in the Ardennes. Expert coordination between Bulow and Hausen and their respective staffs was essential to success. The man whose job it was to provide this, Chief of the General Staff Helmuth von Moltke, was still at Koblenz, 280 kilometers from the front. But if either Bulow or Hausen failed to press the enemy hard at all times and allowed Lanrezac freedom of action, there was a danger that especially Hausen's Third Army could be driven by French Fifth Army against Langle de Cary's Fourth Army in the Ardennes. Expert coordination between Bulow and Hausen and their respective staffs was essential to success. The man whose job it was to provide this, Chief of the General Staff Helmuth von Moltke, was still at Koblenz, 280 kilometers from the front.

Hausen took his time. It was stiflingly hot. The roads were narrow and dusty. The local population was hostile. In town after town, from Somme-Leuze to Erezee, and from Champlon to Hargimont, his commanders reported finding vast caches of revolvers, ammunition, and dynamite, as well as destroyed railroad tracks, telegraph wires, and bridges. They notified Hausen of "cowardly attacks" on the men of Third Army by the local militia, the Garde civique. In response, Hausen took estate owners, priests, and mayors hostage, burned manor houses and urban dwellings, and summarily executed those caught obstructing his advance.3 Beginning on 17 August, Bulow almost daily badgered Hausen and his chief of staff, Ernst von Hoeppner, to drive their right wing across the Meuse River and thus secure Second Army's left flank. On 20 August, Bulow frantically cabled: "Where 3. Army today?" Coordinated action by Second and Third armies was "urgently desired." But the next day, he sent a mixed signal: "2. Army will not attack today."4 What was it to be, Hausen must have wondered, a combined-armies attack or individual operations? And where was the controlling hand of Moltke? What was it to be, Hausen must have wondered, a combined-armies attack or individual operations? And where was the controlling hand of Moltke?5 As Third Army approached Achene on the road to Dinant on the afternoon of 21 August, Hausen and Hoeppner called a meeting of their corps and division commanders. All agreed that Dinant was a formidable obstacle. There, the Meuse flowed deep and broad and swift in a gorge that ran from south to north across their path of advance. Its eastern sh.o.r.e consisted of a ridge of high, heavily wooded hills; its western bank, of a precipitous hundred-meter-high rock cliff topped by a ma.s.sive stone citadel.* The city of seven thousand inhabitants was strung out along the west bank of the river and dominated by the onion-domed Cathedral of Notre Dame. French forces-Hausen suspected two army corps-occupied both banks of the river. Three major roads fed into Dinant from the east. The French could be counted on to blow up the Meuse bridges as soon as Third Army hoved into view. The city of seven thousand inhabitants was strung out along the west bank of the river and dominated by the onion-domed Cathedral of Notre Dame. French forces-Hausen suspected two army corps-occupied both banks of the river. Three major roads fed into Dinant from the east. The French could be counted on to blow up the Meuse bridges as soon as Third Army hoved into view.

It was further agreed at the meeting that Dinant could be taken only by way of a frontal a.s.sault. Moltke, having received news that five French corps had begun a concentrated attack in the Ardennes, instructed Hausen to coordinate his a.s.sault with Bulow for 4 AM AM on 23 August. Accordingly, Hausen moved his headquarters up to Castle Leignon, fifteen kilometers east of Dinant, and pushed Karl d'Elsa's XII Corps and Maximilian von Laffert's XIX Corps straight toward the city. Hans von Kirchbach's XII Reserve Corps was to continue its advance on Third Army's right flank in place of XI Corps, recently dispatched to Namur. on 23 August. Accordingly, Hausen moved his headquarters up to Castle Leignon, fifteen kilometers east of Dinant, and pushed Karl d'Elsa's XII Corps and Maximilian von Laffert's XIX Corps straight toward the city. Hans von Kirchbach's XII Reserve Corps was to continue its advance on Third Army's right flank in place of XI Corps, recently dispatched to Namur.6 Saxon field artillery began to "soften" Dinant for the infantry a.s.sault. Engineers gathered barges and brought up pontoon bridges to span the Meuse when the French, as expected, blew up its bridges. The weather continued hot and dry. Saxon field artillery began to "soften" Dinant for the infantry a.s.sault. Engineers gathered barges and brought up pontoon bridges to span the Meuse when the French, as expected, blew up its bridges. The weather continued hot and dry.

At 10:30 AM AM on 22 August, Bulow was back with another request: "Rapid advance 3. Army with right wing against Mettet urgently desired." on 22 August, Bulow was back with another request: "Rapid advance 3. Army with right wing against Mettet urgently desired."7 In plain language, Bulow demanded that Hausen s.h.i.+ft the direction of his attack to the north of Dinant against Louis Franchet d'Esperey's I Corps at Mettet. Hausen and Hoeppner spent the rest of the day drafting new attack orders. Then, at 10 In plain language, Bulow demanded that Hausen s.h.i.+ft the direction of his attack to the north of Dinant against Louis Franchet d'Esperey's I Corps at Mettet. Hausen and Hoeppner spent the rest of the day drafting new attack orders. Then, at 10 PM PM, they received startling news from Fourth Army. Erich Tulff von Tschepe und Weidenbach, commanding VIII Corps on Duke Albrecht's right flank, reported to his northern neighbor, Laffert of Hausen's XIX Corps, that the French seemed to have only three cavalry divisions in the area west of Dinant.8 Albrecht's Fourth Army had turned southward to ward off the attack by Langle de Cary's Fourth Army and hence could not take advantage of the opening. Tulff strongly suggested that Hausen's Third Army bypa.s.s Dinant to the south, cross the Meuse, and drive a wedge between the joint of French Fifth and Fourth armies. Lanrezac's Fifth Army of 193 battalions and 692 guns might thus be crushed between the pincers of Bulow's Second Army and Hausen's Third Army. Albrecht's Fourth Army had turned southward to ward off the attack by Langle de Cary's Fourth Army and hence could not take advantage of the opening. Tulff strongly suggested that Hausen's Third Army bypa.s.s Dinant to the south, cross the Meuse, and drive a wedge between the joint of French Fifth and Fourth armies. Lanrezac's Fifth Army of 193 battalions and 692 guns might thus be crushed between the pincers of Bulow's Second Army and Hausen's Third Army.

GERMAN THIRD ARMY'S a.s.sAULT ON DINANT What to do? Obey the wishes of Prussia's senior field commander? Heed the advice of a royal prince's corps commander? Seize the moment? Hausen prevaricated for much of the night. Then, at 4:50 AM AM on 23 August, fifty-seven Saxon artillery batteries opened fire on Dinant. It was a dreary, foggy morning. Hausen's spirits were raised immensely at 7:35 on 23 August, fifty-seven Saxon artillery batteries opened fire on Dinant. It was a dreary, foggy morning. Hausen's spirits were raised immensely at 7:35 AM AM when he finally received instructions from Moltke: "Available units to be taken across Maas south of Givet." The news from Koblenz, Hausen recorded in the war diary, "produced great joy at Army Supreme Command 3." when he finally received instructions from Moltke: "Available units to be taken across Maas south of Givet." The news from Koblenz, Hausen recorded in the war diary, "produced great joy at Army Supreme Command 3."9 It was one of those rare moments of opportunity that make history's great captains. At hand lay a golden opportunity to cut off Lanrezac's retreat from the Sambre and envelop French Fifth Army. Within the hour, Hausen ordered Laffert's XIX Corps to dispatch ten infantry battalions, nine artillery batteries, and three cavalry squadrons under Gotz von Olenhusen south to Givet and on to Fumay, there to cross the Meuse and advance against Lanrezac's right flank. It was one of those rare moments of opportunity that make history's great captains. At hand lay a golden opportunity to cut off Lanrezac's retreat from the Sambre and envelop French Fifth Army. Within the hour, Hausen ordered Laffert's XIX Corps to dispatch ten infantry battalions, nine artillery batteries, and three cavalry squadrons under Gotz von Olenhusen south to Givet and on to Fumay, there to cross the Meuse and advance against Lanrezac's right flank.10 Hausen's bold action, of course, split his army into three groups. While Olenhusen's force-mainly 40th Infantry Division (ID)-marched off toward Givet, Kirchbach's XII Reserve Corps continued its advance north of Dinant toward Houx. That left a third group, d'Elsa's XII Corps, to storm the narrow medieval streets of Dinant and to seize the heights between Haut-le-Wastia, Sommiere, and Onhaye.11 In daylong bitter fighting, Horst von der Planitz's 32d ID, followed by Alexander von Larisch's 23d Reserve Infantry Division (RID), crossed the Meuse on barges and pontoon bridges north of Dinant at Leffe. Karl von Lindemann's 23d ID advanced south of Dinant via Les Rivages. The French defense had been severely gutted as Lanrezac, hard-pressed by Bulow south of the Sambre, had ordered Franchet d'Esperey's I Corps to turn northwest to come to the aid of Gilbert Defforges's X Corps, heavily battered by the German Guard Corps at Arsimont. Rene Boutegourd's 51st RID and two brigades of Henri Deligny's 2d ID were all that stood between the Saxons and victory.

Fighting quickly degenerated into hand-to-hand combat. At Leffe, an industrial suburb north of Dinant, Planitz's 32d ID was met by a withering hail of bullets from Boutegourd's 51st RID and-according to both Hausen and the German official history-from the "fanatical" Belgian population, including women and children.12 Lindemann's 46th Infantry Brigade (IB) managed to penetrate Dinant, where it, too, was greeted with heavy fire from French reserves and Belgian irregulars. When attempts to smoke out the francs-tireurs failed, Lindemann abandoned the city for an hour-and unleashed his artillery on the inhabitants. Lindemann's 46th Infantry Brigade (IB) managed to penetrate Dinant, where it, too, was greeted with heavy fire from French reserves and Belgian irregulars. When attempts to smoke out the francs-tireurs failed, Lindemann abandoned the city for an hour-and unleashed his artillery on the inhabitants.

Boutegourd frantically appealed to Franchet d'Esperey for relief, informing I Corps' commander that one of his brigades had been "crushed by artillery fire, with heavy losses."13 Franchet d'Esperey at once realized the mortal danger to Fifth Army's right flank. Without consulting Lanrezac, he ordered I Corps to retrace its steps of the night before. Along the way, he ran across a colleague from the colonial wars, Charles Mangin, whose 8th Brigade stood in reserve. "General, the enemy has crossed the Meuse behind our right. The [51st] Reserve Division is giving ground. ... Go immediately and take your two battalions." Franchet d'Esperey promised to follow "as fast as I can with the main body of the corps." Franchet d'Esperey at once realized the mortal danger to Fifth Army's right flank. Without consulting Lanrezac, he ordered I Corps to retrace its steps of the night before. Along the way, he ran across a colleague from the colonial wars, Charles Mangin, whose 8th Brigade stood in reserve. "General, the enemy has crossed the Meuse behind our right. The [51st] Reserve Division is giving ground. ... Go immediately and take your two battalions." Franchet d'Esperey promised to follow "as fast as I can with the main body of the corps."14 It was Mangin's first appearance as a major actor on the Western Front. It was Mangin's first appearance as a major actor on the Western Front.

In one of the few bright moments for the French in this early part of the campaign, Mangin picked up a cavalry regiment along the way and headed for Onhaye. En route, he encountered the shattered remains of French 33d Battalion stumbling back from Dinant. Trooper Christian Mallet, 22d Dragoons, was "stupefied" at seeing terrifying beings, livid, stumbling along, with horrible wounds. One has his lips carried away, an officer has a crushed hand, another has his arm fractured by a sh.e.l.l splinter. Their uniforms are torn, white with dust, and drip with blood. Amongst the last comers the wounds are more villainous, in the wagons one sees bare legs that hang limp, bloodless faces.15 Mangin pushed on. Two kilometers west of Dinant, he reorganized Boutegourd's shattered reserve division and ordered a gallant bayonet charge that drove the enemy back from Dinant. The situation had been thus stabilized by the time Franchet d'Esperey's I Corps arrived on the scene. Still, losses had been severe.

Among the thousand French casualties at Dinant was Lieutenant Charles de Gaulle, serving in Colonel Henri-Philippe Petain's 4th IB. He later recalled the fierce fight around the city: Suddenly the enemy's fire was precise and concentrated. Second by second the hail of bullets and the thunder of the sh.e.l.ls grew stronger. Those who survived lay flat on the ground, amid the screaming wounded and the humble corpses. With affected calm, the officers let themselves be killed standing upright, some obstinate platoons stuck their bayonets in their rifles, bugles sounded the charge, isolated heroes made fantastic leaps, but all to no purpose. In an instant it had become clear that not all the courage in the world could withstand this fire.16 To the south, Olenhusen's forces-in the strength of a brigade-had fallen prey to Carl von Clausewitz's "friction" of war and "fog of uncertainty." Advancing down the eastern sh.o.r.e of the Meuse, Olenhusen's troops planned to make Fumay by 23 August, and then to march southwest on Rocroi. But the troops never reached Fumay. The sun beat mercilessly on them. The roads were narrow and twisted, the woods dense, the slopes steep. Legs gave out. Horses collapsed. Units got lost. Orders were misread. West of Onhaye, it was this force that had the misfortune of running into Mangin's fierce bayonet charges. Their advance ground to a halt on the heights north of Bourseigne-Neuve.17 And so, Hausen's opportunity to become a great captain was lost. And so, Hausen's opportunity to become a great captain was lost.

Late on 23 August, d'Elsa's XII Corps finally seized the smoking ruins of Dinant, l.u.s.tily singing "Deutschland uber alles." The Saxon 1st Jager Regiment, bayonets fixed, stormed the citadel. Angered by having their antic.i.p.ated easy march through neutral Belgium halted and having received reports of civilians firing on soldiers, d'Elsa's troops took their revenge.18 For most, including Major Johannes Niemann of 9th Infantry Regiment (IR), this took the form of burning the homes of known resisters, executing suspected civilian shooters, and "requisitioning" stocks of "marmalade, pineapples, champagne, red wine, and other delicacies." For most, including Major Johannes Niemann of 9th Infantry Regiment (IR), this took the form of burning the homes of known resisters, executing suspected civilian shooters, and "requisitioning" stocks of "marmalade, pineapples, champagne, red wine, and other delicacies."19 What then followed, in the words of historians John Horne and Alan Kramer, was "the systematic, premeditated elimination of presumed civilian resistance." What then followed, in the words of historians John Horne and Alan Kramer, was "the systematic, premeditated elimination of presumed civilian resistance."20 For those with historical interest, it was a repeat of 1466, when Charles the Bold had sacked the city and murdered its inhabitants. For those with historical interest, it was a repeat of 1466, when Charles the Bold had sacked the city and murdered its inhabitants.

Almost one resident in ten was killed. Corporal Franz Stiebing, 3d Company, 178th IR, noted the violence at Leffe: "We pushed on house by house, under fire from almost every building, and we arrested the male inhabitants, who almost all carried weapons. They were summarily executed in the street." Groups of suspected resisters were put up against city walls and shot; others were gunned down in the city's squares or in their places of work. An anonymous lieutenant in the same 178th IR wrote home on 21 August: The battle now becomes a wild melee, a street brawl. These mean-spirited brothers bring us a.s.sa.s.sin's losses from cellar windows, from apartments, from attics, from trees. The doors are broken down with rifle b.u.t.ts and hatchets, the houses searched with bayonets fixed, the guilty arrested. They are all taken down to the local prefecture. ... The scoundrels are executed in groups in front of all witnesses. A terrible sight.21 Private Kurt Rasch informed his parents in Dresden that his battalion had been selected to storm Dinant with but one purpose: "to level everything in sight and to make one part [of the city] left of the Maas disappear from view." They did their jobs well. "Dinant has fallen, everything burned to the ground. ... We shoot the men, plunder and burn down the houses."22 A. Ruckauer, a noncommissioned officer with 9th Foot Artillery Regiment, wrote home in a similar manner. Priests had led the civilian a.s.saults on the Saxons. They were "rounded up and gunned down. [Dinant's] inhabitants lay about in heaps." Cattle and horses roamed the streets bellowing in terror. "By nightfall, Dinant resembled only a sea of fire and a heap of rubbish." A. Ruckauer, a noncommissioned officer with 9th Foot Artillery Regiment, wrote home in a similar manner. Priests had led the civilian a.s.saults on the Saxons. They were "rounded up and gunned down. [Dinant's] inhabitants lay about in heaps." Cattle and horses roamed the streets bellowing in terror. "By nightfall, Dinant resembled only a sea of fire and a heap of rubbish."23 Eight villages on the ridge above the city likewise were ablaze. Eight villages on the ridge above the city likewise were ablaze.

On the Belgian side, Public Prosecutor Maurice Tschoffen recalled the manner of execution.24 "The [Germans] marched in two columns down the deserted street, those on the right aiming their rifles at the houses on the left, and inversely, all with their fingers on the trigger and ready to fire. At each door a group stopped and riddled the houses, especially the windows, with bullets." Almost as if to change the routine, other soldiers threw grenades and small bombs into the cellars of homes. "The [Germans] marched in two columns down the deserted street, those on the right aiming their rifles at the houses on the left, and inversely, all with their fingers on the trigger and ready to fire. At each door a group stopped and riddled the houses, especially the windows, with bullets." Almost as if to change the routine, other soldiers threw grenades and small bombs into the cellars of homes.

The killings continued into 24 August. Some houses still burned; others were already cold, smoking sh.e.l.ls. Public and historic buildings that had escaped the original orgy of destruction were systematically set to the torch. The stench of bodies decomposing under the searing sun became almost unbearable for inhabitants and occupiers alike. When it was all over, somewhere between 640 and 674 civilians had been killed and 400 deported to Germany. Two-thirds of the city's houses had been torched; twelve hundred were but burned-out sh.e.l.ls.25 At the height of the orgy of fire and death, around 5:30 PM PM, Bulow rudely interrupted Hausen's operations: Another frontal a.s.sault by Karl von Plettenberg's Guard Corps had been stopped cold at Saint-Gerard. Relief by the right wing of Third Army was "urgently wanted." The demand hit Hausen like a cold shower. Confusion and uncertainty reigned at his headquarters. What to do? Follow Moltke's orders to advance across the Meuse south of Dinant at Fumay? Recall Olenhusen's units and rush them to Houx, north of Dinant, to come to Plettenberg's aid? It was a cruel dilemma. Hausen resolved it as he had done before: "giving ear to Second Army's distress," as Chief of Staff von Hoeppner later put it,26 Third Army grudgingly recalled most of its units from the south. Chaos ensued as Olenhusen's weary units dutifully about-faced to retrace their steps to Dinant. Third Army grudgingly recalled most of its units from the south. Chaos ensued as Olenhusen's weary units dutifully about-faced to retrace their steps to Dinant.

Still, Hausen believed that all was not yet lost. Although having sustained almost 1,275 dead and 3,000 wounded at Dinant, he planned to drive his remaining forces southwest, belatedly to cross the Meuse south of Givet and to strike French Fifth Army in the right flank. Saxon XII Corps and XII Reserve Corps were to march on Rocroi, XIX Corps on Fumay and Revin. But no sooner had Hausen issued his orders than an emissary (Major von Fouque) arrived from Bulow's headquarters at 3 AM AM on 24 August and "urgently requested" that Third Army wheel around on a westerly course toward Mettet to take the pressure off Second Army's left wing. No fewer than five French corps were a.s.saulting Second Army. on 24 August and "urgently requested" that Third Army wheel around on a westerly course toward Mettet to take the pressure off Second Army's left wing. No fewer than five French corps were a.s.saulting Second Army.27 Sunrise was less than three hours away. A decision had to be made at once. For the second time in half a day, Bulow had directly interfered with Hausen's comma