The History of Woman Suffrage Volume III Part 48

On the death of either, the survivor shall be ent.i.tled to the use for life of one-third the estate of the deceased, which right cannot be defeated by will. If the deceased leaves no children or representatives of children, the survivor is ent.i.tled to one-half instead of one-third. When either party gives a legacy to the other, the latter may choose between its rights under the will, and those under the statute. Abandonment without cause may defeat this provision, and a marriage contract may supersede it entirely. Parties already married may contract to surrender their present rights for those secured by this statute, such contracts to be recorded in the probate court.

Thus we have a new and clear statute framed in accordance with a simple principle of reform, for which the _Republican_ has long done battle--the equality of married persons in their rights and responsibilities of property.

The adoption of the reform is due deeply to the general agitation of the rights of women, the efforts of Mrs.

Isabella Beecher Hooker, the Smith girls' cows, and perhaps some flagrant instance of injustice to rich wives by tyrant husbands near the capital. But the great occasion and immediate cause, without which this generation might have pleaded for it in vain, was the perception of the justice of it by Governor Hubbard, and his open advocacy of it in his message. Lawyers have one answer for all reforms regarding property or civil contracts--they are impossible. But here was undeniably the best lawyer in the State who said, and threw the weight of his first State paper on the proposition, that this thing was possible, and, if he said it was possible, there was no man who could gainsay it. The legislature took the reform on its own sense of justice and on the a.s.surance of Richard D. Hubbard, that it would work.

On June 6, 1870, at a second hearing[165] before the Joint Committee on Woman Suffrage, in the capitol at New Haven, Rev.

Phebe A. Hanaford of the Universalist church, Mrs. Benchley and Mrs. Russell were the speakers. During that session of the legislature Mrs. Hanaford acted as chaplain both in the Senate and House of Representatives, and received a check for her services which she valued chiefly as a recognition of woman's equality in the clerical profession.

Mrs. Hooker was ably sustained in her new position by her husband, a prominent lawyer of the State. Being equally familiar with civil and canon law, with Blackstone and the Bible, he was well equipped to meet the opponents of the reform at every point. While Mrs.

Hooker held meetings in churches and school-houses through the State, her husband in his leisure hours sent the daily press articles on the subject. And thus their united efforts stirred the people to thought and at last roused a Democratic governor of the State to his duty on this question. From the many able tracts issued and articles published in the journals we give a few extracts. In answer to the common objections of "free love" and "easy divorce," in the _Evening Post_ of January 17, 1871, Mr.

Hooker said:

The persons who advocate easy divorce would advocate it just as strongly if there was no woman suffrage movement. The two have no necessary connection. Indeed one of the strongest arguments in favor of woman suffrage is, that the marriage relation will be safer with women to vote and legislate upon it than where the voting and legislation are left wholly to the men. Women will always be wives and mothers, above all things else. This law of nature cannot be changed, and I know of n.o.body who desires to change it. The marriage relation will therefore always be more to woman than to man, and we, who would give her the right to vote, have no fear to trust to her the sanct.i.ty and purity of that relation. It is the opponents of woman suffrage who distrust the fidelity of woman to her divine instincts and dare not let her vote. Our little State has been two hundred years under male legislation, and yet a long memorial from hundreds of clergymen and other Christian men went up to our legislature two years ago, representing our legislation on divorce as demoralizing and as fatal to the best interests of the marriage relation. It really seems as if the incompetency for the management of public affairs which by mere a.s.sumption is charged in advance upon women, has been proved with regard to men by an actual experience of many years. The true idea is for man and woman to share together the responsibilities and duties of legislation, and until this is done I have no hope for any real progress towards purity in the administration of our public affairs. We who favor woman suffrage speak confidently on this subject because the reform works so well wherever it has been tried, in England, Sweden, Austria and Wyoming Territory.

No rational man can suppose for a moment that with woman suffrage established in England and on the continent of Europe, we in this country, which so specially stands on equal representation, are going to refuse it. It must be set down as one of the certain things of the future. And when it has come, and women vote, it will excite no more attention or comment than the voting of our colored people.

Now if woman suffrage is to come, is it worth while to be making the impression that the women of our country are not to be trusted with it, and that the marriage relation is to be imperiled by it? Above all, is it manly or just to be charging corrupt motives on nine-tenths of those who advocate the reform?

The notoriety which to some extent its advocates must get is almost universally painful to the women who are the subjects of it. One n.o.ble woman, whose whole soul is in this cause, and the purity of whose motives in this, as in everything else, I have had good opportunity to learn, said to me, on reading Dr.

Bushnell's remark in his book on woman suffrage, that these women were only trying to make themselves men: "Cruel, cruel words! If so n.o.ble a man as Dr. Bushnell so utterly fails to comprehend a woman's nature, shall not she be allowed to speak for herself, and no testimony be taken but hers?"[166]

Much might be said in regard to the most famous women of Connecticut, the historic "Maids of Glas...o...b..ry," celebrated for their resistance to taxation. After the death of Abby, July 23, 1878, Mrs. Elizabeth Oakes Smith, in a beautiful tribute to the sisters, said:

Many years ago they took a stand akin to that of the ill.u.s.trious Hampden, which has made his name a synonym for patriotism as well as just and manly opposition to unconst.i.tutional revenue exaction. "The tax may be a small matter for an English gentleman to pay, but it is too much for a British freeman to pay," was the ground of his n.o.ble resistance, and this view precipitated that great Revolution which more than all other modern movements consolidated and strengthened the rights of the British subject.

These two women deserve to stand upon a platform side by side with the great Hampden. Other women have paid their taxes under protest, but Abby and Julia Smith have done more than protest; they have suffered loss as well as inconvenience, their property having been seized and sold again and again because of their honest conviction that taxation without representation was as unjust to women as to men. Their steadfastness has been the more remarkable because, by their social position, their learning and their wealth, they might be supposed to be indifferent to the ballot-box, as so many thus situated claim to be. Abby and her sister were no ordinary women. The family originally consisted of five sisters, all more or less accomplished. The father was a man of learning, a graduate of Yale and a clergyman. The mother was familiar with French and Italian, and no mean astronomer. Thus parented, it is not surprising that the Glas...o...b..ry sisters were of marked individualism as well as superior scholars.h.i.+p. They were more or less acquainted with Hebrew, Greek and Latin, and have made a translation of the Bible from these sources, giving its original meaning.

The maids of Glas...o...b..ry planted themselves upon the right of the s.e.x to suffrage, from purely philosophic and statesman-like grounds. They had no other disabilities of which to complain--no other grievance--no social ostracism, as is so often charged, and most unjustly, against other advocates of the doctrine. They were unmarried, studious, upright, simple-minded gentlewomen, and were much esteemed and honored in the community in which they lived.

They occupied the old homestead, doing their own work, their interests well cared for in the person of Mr. Kellogg, an intelligent tenant of theirs, as well as friend and neighbor.

_The Hartford Post_, in a tender mention of the life and death of Abby, with a brief sketch of the family, thus bears honorable testimony to her worthiness:

In the death of Miss Smith the cause of woman suffrage has met with a severe loss, as her firm resistance to what she believed to be the unjust treatment of women greatly encouraged her companions in the contest; her sister has lost her chief support, and the community in which she lived a faithful friend and a worthy exponent of the virtues of truthfulness, firmness, and adherence to the right as she understood it.

_The Hartford Times_ said:

A notable woman who died last week was Miss Abigail H.

Smith, of Glas...o...b..ry, Conn., one of the two sisters who resisted the collection of their taxes on the ground that they had no voice in the levy. It will be remembered that their cows were seized and some of their personal property sold two years ago. Of course there were friends who were willing and anxious to pay the taxes, but the plucky old ladies were fighting for a principle, and they would allow no one to stand in the way. The notoriety, which they neither sought nor avoided, undoubtedly did a great deal to call public attention to the anomalous condition of woman under the law. It would be very hard for any man to argue successfully that he possessed any stronger natural claim to the suffrage than was possessed by these shrewd, honest, energetic old ladies.

Many encouraging letters were written the sisters during their many trials, of which the following is a fair specimen:

Near BOSTON, January 14, 1874.

MY DEAR MADAM: The account of your hards.h.i.+ps is interesting, and your action will be highly beneficial in bringing the subject to public notice, and in leading to the correction of a great injustice. The taxation of the property of women, without allowing them any representation, even in town affairs, is so unfair that it seems only necessary to bring it to public view to make it odious and to bring about a change. Therefore you deserve the greater honor, not only because you have suffered in a good cause, but because you have set an example that will be followed, and that will lead to happy results.

Your case has its parallel in every towns.h.i.+p of New England. In the town where this is written a widow pays into the treasury $7,830 a year, while 600 men, a number equal to half the whole number of voters, pay $1,200 in all. Another lady pays $5,042.

Yet neither has a single vote, not even by proxy. That is, each one of 600 men who have no property, who pay only a poll-tax, and many of whom cannot read or write, has the power of voting away the property of the town, while the female _owners_ have no power at all. We have lately spent a day in celebrating the heroism of those who threw overboard the tea; but how trifling was the tea-tax, and how small the injustice to individuals compared with this one of our day! The principle, however, was the same--that there should be no taxation where there is no representation. And this is what we ought to stand by. Please to accept the sympathy and respect of one of your fellow citizens. No doubt you will have the same from all in due time; or, at any rate, from all who love to see fair play.

Very truly yours, AMOS A. LAWRENCE.

_Miss Abby H. Smith, Glas...o...b..ry, Conn._

A marked evidence of the advance of public sentiment was manifested by a decision of the Supreme Court in 1882, by which the women of Connecticut were held to have the right to practice law. The opinion of Chief-Justice Park concerning the legality of the admission of Miss Mary Hall of Hartford to the bar, giving her the right to practice in the courts of the State, is as follows:

This is an application by a woman for admission to the bar of Hartford county. After having completed the prescribed term of study she has pa.s.sed the examination required and has been recommended by the bar of the county to the Superior Court for admission, subject to the opinion of the court upon the question whether, as a woman, she can legally be admitted. The Superior Court has reserved the case for our advice.

The statute with regard to the admission of attorneys by the court is the 29th section of chapter 3, t.i.tle 4, of the General Statutes, and is in the following words: "The Superior Court may admit and cause to be sworn as attorneys such persons as are qualified therefor agreeably to the rules established by the judges of said court; and no other person than an attorney so admitted shall plead at the bar of any court of this State, except in his own cause."

It is not contended, in opposition to the application, that the language of this statute is not comprehensive enough to include women, but the claim is that at the time it was pa.s.sed its application to women was not thought of, while the fact that women have never been admitted as attorneys, either by the English courts or by any of the courts of this country, had established a common-law disability, which could be removed only by a statute intended to have that effect.

It is hardly necessary to consider how far the fact that women have never pursued a particular profession or occupied a particular official position, to the pursuit or occupancy of which some governmental license or authority was necessary, const.i.tutes a common-law disability for receiving such license or authority, because here the statute is ample for removing that disability if we can construe it as applying to women; so that we come back to the question whether we are by construction to limit the application of the statute to men alone, by reason of the fact that in its original enactment its application to women was not intended by the legislators that enacted it. And upon this point we remark, in the first place, that an inquiry of this sort involves very serious difficulties. No one would doubt that a statute pa.s.sed at this time in the same words would be sufficient to authorize the admission of women to the bar, because it is now a common fact and presumably in the minds of legislators, that women in different parts of the country are, and for some time have been, following the profession of law. But if we hold that the construction of the statute is to be determined by the admitted fact that its application to women was not in the minds of the legislators when it was pa.s.sed, where shall we draw the line? All progress in social matters is gradual. We pa.s.s almost imperceptibly from a state of public opinion that utterly condemns some course of action to one that strongly approves it.

At what point, in the history of this change, shall we regard a statute, the construction of which is to be affected by it, as pa.s.sed in contemplation of it? When the statute we are now considering was pa.s.sed, it probably never entered the mind of a single member of the legislature that black men would ever be seeking for admission under it. Shall we now hold that it cannot apply to black men? We know of no distinction in respect to this rule between the case of a statute and that of a const.i.tutional provision. When our State const.i.tution was adopted in 1818 it was provided in it that every elector should be "eligible to any office in the State," except where otherwise provided in the const.i.tution. It is clear that the convention that framed, and probably all the people who voted to adopt the const.i.tution, had no idea that black men would ever be electors, and contemplated only white men as within any possible application of the provision, for the same const.i.tution provided that only white men should be electors. But now that black men are made electors, will it do to say that they are not ent.i.tled to the full rights of electors in respect to holding office, because an application of the provision to them was never thought of when it was adopted? Events that gave rise to enactments may always be considered in construing them. This is little more than the familiar rule that in construing a statute we always inquire what particular mischief it was designed to remedy. Thus, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that in construing the recent amendments of the federal const.i.tution, although they are general in their terms, it is to be considered that they were pa.s.sed with reference to the exigencies growing out of the emanc.i.p.ation of the slaves, and for the purpose of benefiting the blacks (_Slaughter-house Cases, 16 Wall., 67_; _Strauder vs. West Virginia, 100 U. S. Reps., 306_). But this statute was not pa.s.sed for the purpose of benefiting men as distinguished from women. It grew out of no exigency caused by the relation of the s.e.xes. Its object was wholly to secure the orderly trial of causes and the better administration of justice. Indeed, the preamble to the first statute providing for the admission of attorneys, states its object to be "for the well-ordering of proceedings and pleas at the bar."

The statute on this subject was not originally pa.s.sed in its present form. The first act with regard to the admission of attorneys was that of 1708, which was as follows: "That no person, except in his own cause, shall be admitted to make any plea at the bar without being first approved by the court before whom the plea is to be made, nor until he shall take in the said court the following oath," etc. (Col. Records, 1706 to 1716, page 48). This act seems to have contemplated an approval by the court in each particular case in which an attorney appeared before it.

The first act with regard to the general admission of attorneys appears in the revision of 1750, and is as follows: "That the county courts of the respective counties in this colony shall appoint, and they are hereby empowered to approve, nominate and appoint attorneys in their respective counties, as there shall be occasion, to plead at the bar; * * and that no person, except in his own case, shall make any plea at the bar in any court but such as are allowed and qualified attorneys, as aforesaid." Thus the statute stood until the revision of 1821; when, for the first time, it took essentially its present form. Up to this time the word "person" had been used in this statute only in the clause that "no person" should be allowed to practice before the courts except where formally admitted by the court, a use of the word which, of course, could not be regarded as limited to the male s.e.x, as women would undoubtedly have been held to be included in the term. The language of the statute as now adopted was as follows: "The county courts may make such rules and regulations as to them shall seem proper relative to the admission and practice of attorneys; and may approve of, admit and cause to be sworn as attorneys, such persons as are qualified therefor agreeably to the rules established; * * and no person not thus admitted, except in his own cause, shall be admitted or allowed to plead at the bar of any court." The statute in this form pa.s.sed through the compilations of 1835 and 1838, the revision of 1849 and the compilation of 1854, and appears, with a slight modification, in the revision of 1866. The county courts had now been abolished, and the power to admit attorneys, as well as to make rules on the subject, had been given to the Superior Court; the expression, "such persons," being preserved, and the provision that "no person" not thus admitted should be allowed to plead, being omitted.

The statute finally took its present form in the revision of 1875. It retains the provision that the Superior Court may make rules for the admission of attorneys, and provides that the court "may admit and cause to be sworn as attorneys such persons as are qualified therefor agreeably to the rules established," and restores the provision, dropt in the revision of 1866, that "no person other than an attorney so admitted shall plead at the bar of any court in this State, except in his own cause."

These changes, though not such as to affect the meaning of the statute at any point of importance to the present question, are yet not wholly without importance. The adoption by the legislature of the revision of the statutes becomes, both in law and in fact, a reenactment of the whole body of statutes; and though in determining the meaning of a statute, we are not to regard it as then enacted for the first time, especially if there be no change in its phraseology, yet, where there is such a change, it follows that the attention of the revisers had been particularly directed to that statute, as of course also that of the legislature, and that with the changes made it expresses the present intent of both. Thus, in this case, it is clear that the revisers gave particular thought to the phraseology of the statute we are considering, and put it in a form that seemed to them best with reference to the present state of things, and decided to leave the words "such persons" to stand with full knowledge that they were sufficient to include women, and that women were already following the profession of law in different parts of the country. The legislators must be presumed to have acted with the same consideration and knowledge. It would have been perfectly easy, if either had thought best, to insert some words of limitation or exclusion, but it was not done. Not only so, but a clause omitted in the revision of 1866 was restored, providing that no "person" not regularly admitted should act as an attorney--a term which necessarily included women, and the insertion of which made it necessary, if the word "persons" as used in the first part of the statute should be held not to include women, to give two entirely different meanings to the same word where occurring twice in the same statute and with regard to the same subject matter.

The object of a revision of statutes is, that there may be such changes made in them as the changes in political and social matters may demand, and where no changes are made it is to be presumed that the legislature is satisfied with it in its present form. And where some changes are made in a particular statute, and other parts of it are left unchanged, there is the more reason for the inference from this evidence that the matter of changing the statute was especially considered, that the parts unchanged express the legislative will of to-day, rather than that of perhaps a hundred years ago, when it was originally enacted.

But this statute, in the revision of 1875, is placed immediately after another with regard to the appointment of commissioners of the Superior Court, the necessary construction of which, we think, throws light upon the construction of the statute in question. That act was pa.s.sed in 1855, after women had begun, with general acceptance, to occupy a greatly enlarged field of industry and some professional and even public positions; and it has been held by the Superior Court, very properly we think, as applying to women, a woman having three years ago been appointed commissioner under it. Its language is as follows: "The Superior Court in any county may appoint any number of persons in such county to be commissioners of the Superior Court, who, when sworn, may sign writs and subpoenas, take recognizances, administer oaths and take depositions and the acknowledgement of deeds, and shall hold office for two years from their appointment." Here the very language is used which is used in the statute with regard to attorneys. In one it is, "any number of persons," in the other, "such persons as are qualified." These two statutes are placed in immediate juxtaposition in the revision of 1875 and deal with kindred subjects, and it is reasonable to presume that the revisers and legislature intended both to receive the same construction. It would seem strange to any common-sense observer that an entirely different meaning should be given to the same word in the two statutes, especially when in giving the narrower meaning to the word in the statute with regard to attorneys, we are compelled to give it a different meaning from that which the same word requires in the next line of the same statute.

We are not to forget that all statutes are to be construed, as far as possible, in favor of equality of rights. All restrictions upon human liberty, all claims for special privileges, are to be regarded as having the presumption of law against them, and as standing upon their defense, and can be sustained if at all by valid legislation, only by the clear expression or clear implication of the law.

We have some noteworthy ill.u.s.trations of the recognition of women as eligible or appointable to office under statutes of which the language is merely general. Thus, women are appointed in all parts of the country as postmasters. The act of congress of 1825 was the first one conferring upon the postmaster-general the power of appointing postmasters, and it has remained essentially unchanged to the present time. The language of the act is, that "the postmaster-general shall establish post-offices and appoint postmasters." Here women are not included, except in the general term "postmasters," a term which seems to imply a male person; and no legislation from 1825 down to the present time authorizes the appointment of women, nor is there any reference in terms to women until the revision of 1874, which recognizes the fact that women had already been appointed, in providing that "the bond of any married woman who may be appointed postmaster shall be binding on her and her sureties." Some of the higher grades of postmasters are appointed by the president, subject to confirmation by the Senate, and such appointments and confirmations have repeatedly been made. The same may be said of pension agents. The acts of congress on the subject have simply authorized "the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint all pension agents, who shall hold their offices for the term of four years, and shall give bond," etc. At the last session of congress a married woman in Chicago was appointed for a third term pension agent for the State of Illinois, and the public papers stated that there was not a single vote against her confirmation in the Senate. Public opinion is everywhere approving of such appointments. They promote the public interest, which is benefitted by every legitimate use of individual ability, while mere justice, which is of interest to all, requires that all have the fullest opportunity for the exercise of their abilities. These cases are the more noteworthy as being cases of public offices, to which the inc.u.mbent is appointed for a term of years, upon a compensation provided by law, and in which he is required to give bond. If an attorney is to be regarded as an officer, it is in a lower sense.

We have had pressed upon us by the counsel opposed to the applicant, the decisions of the courts of Ma.s.sachusetts, Wisconsin and Illinois, and the United States Court of Claims, adverse to such an application. While not prepared to accede to all the general views expressed in those decisions, we do not think it necessary to go into a discussion of them, as we regard our statute, in view of all the considerations affecting its construction, as too clear to admit of any reasonable question as to the interpretation and effect which we ought to give it.

In this opinion Carpenter and Loomis, Js., concurred; Pardee, J., dissented.

In 1884, the State society held a spirited and successful convention.[167] Julia Smith gave an extemporaneous talk to the great delight of the audience, who applauded continually; Mrs.

Crane, a fine elocutionist, gave a reading from Carlyle; Mrs.

Hooker closed with a brief resume of the work the society had accomplished.

We are also indebted to Frances Ellen Burr for many facts, as the following letter will show:

HARTFORD, September 17, 1885.

MY DEAR MISS ANTHONY: I have received your letter of inquiry. As to that pet.i.tion in 1867, I was one of the signers, and, probably had something to do with getting the other signatures, though I have nothing but my memory to depend on as to that; but I was pretty much alone here in those days, on the woman suffrage question. Who the other signers were I made an attempt to find out in the secretary of state's office the other day, but found that it would take days, instead of the few hours I had at my command. I find in my journal a reference to Lucy Stone and Mr.

Blackwell addressing the committee in the House of Representatives, and that was the committee that made the report afterwards published in _The Revolution_. Mr. Croffut made the opening address on the day of the hearing. He was always ready to aid us in whatever way he could, and I felt grateful to him, for a helping hand was doubly appreciated in those days. I find by the journal of the House for that year that the vote on the question was 93 yeas to 111 nays. The name of Miss Susie Hutchinson heads one pet.i.tion, with 70 others. How many other pet.i.tions there were that year I do not know, but I believe there have been several every year since, besides a number of individual pet.i.tions. Since that time the House has voted favorably on the question twice, at least, but I believe we have never had a majority in the Senate.

You ask when I first wrote or spoke for the ballot. My first venture in that line was in 1853. I was then at the age of twenty-two, living with my sister in Cleveland, O., and had never given any attention to the subject of woman suffrage, and cared nothing about it any further than the spirit of rebellion--born with me--against everything unjust, might be said to have made me a radical by nature. In the fall of that year a woman's rights convention met in Cleveland, and I attended it alone, none of the rest of the family caring to go. In my old journal I find this entry:

October 7, 1853. Attended a woman's rights convention which has met here. Never saw anything of the kind before. A Mr.

Barker spent most of the morning trying to prove that woman's rights and the Bible cannot agree. The Rev.

Antoinette L. Brown replied in the afternoon in defense of the Bible. She says the Bible favors woman's rights. Miss Brown is the best-looking woman in the convention. They appear to have a number of original and pleasing characters upon their platform, among them Miss Lucy Stone--hair short and rolled under like a man's; a tight-fitting velvet waist and linen collar at the throat; bombazine skirt just reaching the knees, and trousers of the same. She is independent in manner and advocates woman's rights in the strongest terms:--scorns the idea of woman _asking_ rights of man, but says she must boldly a.s.sert her own rights, and _take_ them in her own strength. Mrs. Ernestine L. Rose, a Polish lady with black eyes and curls, and rosy cheeks, manifests the independent spirit also. She is graceful and witty, and is ready with sharp replies on all occasions.

Mrs. Lucretia Mott, a Philadelphia Quaker, is meek in dress but not in spirit. She gets up and hammers away at woman's rights, politics and the Bible, with much vigor, then quietly resumes her knitting, to which she industriously applies herself when not speaking to the audience. She wears the plain Quaker dress and close-fitting white cap. Mrs.

Frances D. Gage, the president, is a woman of sound sense and a good writer of prose and poetry. Mrs. Caroline Severance has an easy, pleasing way of speaking. Mr. Charles Burleigh, a Quaker, appears to be an original character. He has long hair, parted in the middle like a woman's, and hanging down his back. He and Miss Stone seem to reverse the usual order of things.