Bush At War Part 15

"Plug it in," Bush said, motioning to the location.

"Good afternoon," Bush said at 1 P.M. "On my orders the United States military has begun strikes against al Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan."

The Taliban had not met his demands. "And now the Taliban will pay a price." He didn't mention ground forces, but he came close. "Our military action is also designed to clear the way for sustained, comprehensive and relentless operations to drive them [the terrorists] out and bring them to justice."

The president promised food and medicine to the people of Afghanistan. "We will win this conflict by the patient acc.u.mulation of successes.

"I know many Americans feel fear today," he acknowledged, pledging that strong precautions were being taken by all of the government. To the men and women of the military, he said in effect this would not be Vietnam. "Your mission is defined; your objectives are clear; your goal is just; you have my full confidence; and you will have every tool you need to carry out your duty."

He read a letter he had received from a fourth grade girl whose father was in the military. She had written, "As much as I don't want my dad to fight, I'm willing to give him to you."

At 2:45 P.M. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers appeared in the Pentagon press room. In a long introductory statement, Rumsfeld presented the military strikes as a "complement" to the diplomatic, financial and other pressure. He laid out six goals - sending a message to the Taliban, acquiring intelligence, developing relations.h.i.+ps with the anti-Taliban groups such as the Northern Alliance, making it increasingly difficult for the terrorists, altering the military balance over time, and providing humanitarian relief. He gave no numbers or timetables.

General Myers offered some details - 15 land-based bombers, 25 strike aircraft from carriers and 50 Tomahawk cruise missiles from U.S. and British s.h.i.+ps and submarines. What he did not say was that they had only 31 targets on their strike list, all very low collateral damage targets in remote areas. The targets were the al Qaeda brigade, early warning radar, some command facilities used by al Qaeda and the Taliban, Taliban military aircraft, Taliban military airports and runways, the terrorist training camps, which were largely empty, and several surface-to-air missile sites.

"Was Osama bin Laden targeted in the raid?" a reporter asked.

"The answer is no with respect to him," Rumsfeld replied, though he noted that command facilities in Afghanistan had been targeted.

Rumsfeld lowered expectations; he called it "this so-called war."

Asked how many targets had been hit, he replied, "There is no way to discuss the outcome of this operation." There was a way, but he was not going to do it publicly. The vagueness was a protection from later contradiction, revealing the smallness of the operation and his own frustrations.

Another reporter asked, "Are you running the risk of being characterized as attacking the Afghan people rather than military targets?"

"You know," Rumsfeld replied, "in this world of ours if you get up in the morning you're running a risk of having someone lie and someone mischaracterize what it is you're doing. What the United States of America is doing is exactly what I said." It was defense against those who killed thousands of Americans and now threaten, intimidate and terrorize the world. "Thank you very much."

Bin Laden issued his own threat through a videotape that was released by Al-Jazeera. Sitting in an unidentified rocky site, wearing his military fatigue jacket, holding a microphone like a lounge singer, he said, "Here is America struck by G.o.d Almighty in one of its vital organs, so that its greatest buildings are destroyed.

"G.o.d has blessed a group of vanguard Muslims, the forefront of Islam, to destroy America."

BEGINNING BEFORE 7 A.M. on Monday, October 8, Rumsfeld made brief appearances on all five television network morning shows to offer a low-keyed and hedged a.s.sessment. Of the targets he said to ABC television, "We know they were successfully hit in many respects."

At 9:30 A.M., at the NSC meeting, Tenet said, "The picture is of the Afghans against al Qaeda in the north." The CIA was trying to help with the targeting up north. "The picture in the south is still unresolved. The Predator is flying in the north."

General Myers turned to the target problem. They didn't know what to hit. "Our TAG air are loitering, waiting for emerging targets identified by the Predator." It was an incredible moment, barely imaginable in the annals of modern warfare. After a day of strikes, the airborne might of the United States had been a somewhat helpless giant lumbering around the sky - "loitering," in the words of the nation's top military man, waiting for targets of opportunity.

Rumsfeld had some good news: "All aircraft are back safely," he said, "including the humanitarian aircraft."

Myers had harder news, the Bomb Damage a.s.sessment, the key after-action a.n.a.lysis about what damage had been inflicted from bombs and cruise missiles. He said lots of targets were not destroyed sufficiently. "We're going to go back today to those things we missed."

The BDA was going to be treated as highly cla.s.sified and the press and the public would not be told much.

Bush said that the latest communications intercepts and other intelligence showed that some major al Qaeda lieutenants, even possibly including bin Laden, were in Tora Bora, a region of natural and man-made caves in the White Mountains along the Pakistan border near Jalalabad. As the mujaheddin did during the Soviet occupation, al Qaeda and Taliban fighters were using the Tora Bora cave bunkers, accessible only by mule, as hideaways and depots.

"What ordnance do we put in Tora Bora?" he asked.

Myers's answer grabbed everyone's attention - 32 individual 2,000-pound bombs.

"We're not hitting a number of Taliban military targets," Rumsfeld said, because of potential high collateral damage. The question for tomorrow, he asked, was whether and when to go after more Taliban military targets.

"Look," Bush said, "we're going to have a series of strikes. We're going to then slow down, we're going to do our intelligence, see what the picture is, then we're going to restrike." At the moment, he seemed to be exhibiting some patience, glad finally to be bombing. But in an interview later, the president said he realized they weren't doing much of consequence militarily. "We're bombing sand. We're pounding sand," he said.

He was still on edge about anthrax. The first victim in Florida had died and a co-worker from the same building was infected. The FBI had launched a ma.s.sive investigation, and anthrax was now front page news.

THE PRINc.i.p.aLS MET later that day. Tenet was happy. Musharraf had dismissed his intelligence chief, Mahmoud, and several of his key lieutenants, a dramatic signal. The bad witch was dead. The Pakistani intelligence service had been the Taliban's sugar daddy, and the removal of Mahmoud meant that Musharraf was increasingly serious. The French had 30 aircraft they wanted to move into the theater, and wanted U.S. support diplomatically with the Tajiks and Uzbeks to find a place to put them.

Rice said, "We'll check with Franks as to the need for those aircraft. And then we can discuss how we can facilitate it diplomatically. I'm grateful that Tommy is allowing the coalition partners to partic.i.p.ate in different ways."

Rumsfeld turned to the sensitive subject of the Bomb Damage a.s.sessment for the second day's strikes. "We destroyed 11 of 12 SA-3 radars. We hit seven of eight airfields. We've hit one half of the long-range radars, we'll go after the rest with our aircraft. We pounded Tora Bora. We don't know what effect. We got three radio towers, we made humanitarian drops. We used 70 attack aircraft doing 166 sorties."

The group turned to one of the most challenging problems they faced. How might the U.S. deter bin Laden and his network from using weapons of ma.s.s destruction?

No one had any great ideas.

"They may not be deterrable," Rice said, "but we can discourage others who would support him in it and incentivize them to turn on him."

But bin Laden was already pretty isolated. He seemed to have little support other than the Taliban, and the U.S. had failed to get them to turn on him.

DURING A MEETING in the Oval Office that day it was suggested to the president that he visit the Pentagon.

"I'm not going over there to say the planes all returned safely," Bush said, "because some day all the planes aren't going to return safely."

TENET BEGAN THE 9:30 A.M. NSC meeting on Tuesday, October 9, addressing the No. 1 problem - the lack of military targets in Afghanistan three days into the bombing campaign. "Today we're focused on working with the CINC to provide new targets, especially in the north," he said. His CIA paramilitary men on the ground in the north, Jawbreaker, might help identify "emerging targets" by flus.h.i.+ng out new information on installations and troop concentrations. The Predator drones, the unmanned aerial vehicles, were also providing excellent reconnaissance video. "We're using the UAV to look at Tora Bora, to validate the maps provided by the Northern Alliance.

"Tribal groups in the south are not yet moving. We're holding the Northern Alliance in place and there's a question of when we release them."

So the ground situation remained static, partly at the U.S. military's behest, as everyone waited to see what effect the bombing campaign would have.

"In the south they're still on the fence. There are folks in Paktia - that's the most active group in the south," said Tenet, referring to the province due south of Kabul that includes the cities of Gardez and Khowst.

One promising development he could tell the president was the change in leaders.h.i.+p of the ISI, the Pakistani intelligence service. The new chief was cleaning out the agency's pro-Taliban members. This was a big deal for the CIA and a gutsy move by Musharraf. "We'll then ask them for more information," he said. He still distrusted ISI and wasn't sharing all his intelligence with them, and CIA source development in the south was being done independent of the Pakistanis.

Tenet also reported that switching of sides among the less militant Taliban had begun. It was something the agency had antic.i.p.ated. "We're getting some defections of Taliban commanders in the north." Thirty-five to 40 Taliban commanders and about 1,200 men had defected Monday, handing the Northern Alliance control of a key Taliban resupply route northwest of Kabul. The commanders had been bought with CIA money.

"Weather is going to limit the Northern Alliance," said Cheney. "After a month they'll be locked in, so if we're serious about unleas.h.i.+ng the Northern Alliance, we need to do it soon." Given the time constraints, Cheney wasn't convinced that holding the Northern Alliance back was the most expedient strategy. They had to do more than slowly grind down the enemy through bombing and defections. "Is Franks focusing on the targets that will make it easier for the Northern Alliance to move?

"We should encourage the Northern Alliance to take Kabul," Cheney said. "We as a superpower should not be stalemated." He was worried that they had a weak defense at home and a weak offense in Afghanistan.

"We need a victory," Bush said.

"The only victory to the world might be taking the capital," Cheney replied.

"We're going to release the Northern Alliance on Thursday or Friday," Tenet said, "and Franks is going to strike targets in the north to facilitate their move." The CIA director was almost speaking for the CINC - a blurring of operational lines between CIA and Defense that made Rumsfeld uneasy.

Tenet continued, "We can't stop them from trying to take Kabul - the only issue is whether they can do it or not."

How does taking Kabul help us against al Qaeda? someone asked. All agreed that the Afghan capital city could be a symbolic step forward. Since Afghanistan was factionalized, perhaps the capital did not have the political importance it did in other countries.

They discussed how important it was for the U.S. to be mindful of the wishes of Pakistan, which feared the influence of Russia and Iran on a Kabul that would be controlled by the Northern Alliance. Still it would be hard to claim success if the Taliban retained control of the capital through the winter.

Rice asked whether the Northern Alliance was getting uniform advice. Were they hearing one thing from the U.S., another from the Russians and yet another from the other players in the region? No one answered. The group moved on to the Middle East, Indonesia and a timeline to expand the terrorist list beyond al Qaeda to freeze finances of other terrorist groups.

Rumsfeld again raised the question of anti-terrorist actions in a theater beyond Afghanistan. No one seemed interested.

He announced more bad news. "We're unlikely to go with Special Forces in the north," at least in the short term.

Myers said, "In the south we could get boots on the ground on the 16th, 17th or 18th." That was a week away, but it was something.

"We need the American people to understand we're being successful without bragging," the president said.

"We can be more positive now," Rumsfeld said. Most of the Taliban airfields had been damaged and the military could now carry out strikes more or less around the clock.

"I think I'm going to say that the guys have done exactly what we asked them to do and we're well satisfied with the progress," said Bush.

Myers gave the day's Bomb Damage a.s.sessment, the top secret scorecard. "We're doing 70 sorties over Afghanistan. Sixteen of the 35 targets on the second day need to be evaluated." That meant that they may have failed to destroy nearly 50 percent of the targets. Monday's Pentagon press conference had not disclosed this. "Need to go after the transport aircraft. They've got one SA-3 that's still up but it doesn't threaten our forces." The U.S. had wiped out two of the three surface-to-air missile sites that comprised the Taliban's air defenses. They also dropped leaflets and 37,500 humanitarian daily rations into famine-stricken areas.

"We're going to hit low collateral damage Taliban military targets tomorrow," Rumsfeld said.

"There'll be pressure to step up the targets with higher collateral damage," the president said. "We've been successful so far because we've focused on the military, demonstrably important targets. It's important to maintain this focus."

Bush asked about caves and hitting camps in the south. He said he was going to give an evening press conference in two nights. "We need to think about how to describe the military campaign, what we're trying to achieve." Testing some concepts, he said the next phase of the conventional military operation would be ongoing, but sporadic. "You may not see bombing for a while, and we're not going to tell you when we will resume bombing."

"You're right," said Rumsfeld.

"We're going to strike at the time of our choosing, when it's required for our mission," Bush continued. "UBL may not be caught, but it's still useful to do what we're doing."

The president said he would be asking children to contribute $1 each to an Afghan Children's Fund. "The Department of Education is going to try and sponsor elementary school to elementary school exchanges, and we want to make a pitch to Muslim women and reach out to Muslim women." The Taliban's oppressive treatment of women was one of the most visible affronts of the strict fundamentalist regime, and Bush wanted to show that overthrowing it would liberate women.

Cheney returned to the hard questions they were skirting. "Where will we be in December and January when UBL has not been hit, the weather has gotten bad and the operations have slowed?"

"We're trying to get something going in other parts of the world against al Qaeda," said Rumsfeld again. He still thought that if the anti-terrorism campaign stalled in Afghanistan, they could always do something elsewhere. It would be in keeping with the global nature of the president's war on terror. At the top of the list for expanding anti-terror actions were the Philippines, Yemen and Indonesia. In the Philippines, a predominantly Catholic island nation of 83 million people, Muslim insurgents had rooted in the south, most notably the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf, which had suspected ties to al Qaeda. Yemen continued to sprout a large al Qaeda presence after the October 2000 terrorist attack on the USS Cole, and the country was also home to representatives of Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other terrorist organizations. In Indonesia, Muslim extremists were everywhere.

But he was sounding like a lone drummer.

"I'm thinking a lot about endgames," said Bush, taking them back to Afghanistan. 'And if we're stalled by the weather, are we where we want to be?"

"Look, pressure works," Rumsfeld said, trying to steer the discussion back to terrorist groups worldwide. "Let's get something started against them elsewhere in the world. The focus cannot only be Afghanistan."

Cheney snapped back, "If UBL is in a cave and we get a hit, people won't care what's going on elsewhere."

Rumsfeld launched into a discussion of what should be said publicly about the possible use of U.S. weapons of ma.s.s destruction if the other side used them. It was a frightening prospect, but it had to be addressed.

Look, Cheney retorted, we just need to say we reserve the right to use any means at our disposal to respond to any use of weapons of ma.s.s destruction. That's the Gulf War formula - what had been said in the 1991 war on Iraq - and that's what we ought to do. Ultimately, the use of such weapons was a decision that the president would make.

The current and former secretaries of defense, both deeply concerned about nuclear, biological and chemical warfare, stuck with the topic for a while. The U.S. was at war with an unconventional foe and they had to examine the possibility that bin Laden might have weapons of ma.s.s destruction.

"UBL might not be deferrable," said Cheney.

"Well," the president said, "sponsoring nations of UBL, those that support him, might have some influence with him. Should we send some messages, private or public?"

We need to think some more about this, said Rumsfeld.

The question of al Qaeda's weapons of ma.s.s destruction capability was what Rumsfeld often called a "known unknown" - something they knew they didn't know, something both possible and important but on which they had no definitive intelligence. It was chilling in itself. But it was in some ways less of a concern than the "unknown unknowns," the things that the U.S. didn't know it didn't know, the potential ugly surprises. "unknown unknowns," the things that the U.S. didn't know it didn't know, the potential ugly surprises.

Bush returned the discussion to known problems. "We need to think through how we're going to get some victory before the snow falls. And we need to think through Kabul."

"Do we want to take it?" asked Powell. "Do we want to hold it? If we want to hold it, what are we going to do with it?"

"You know, the Russians never took Kabul," Rice said. That almost suggested it was a good reason to try to take the capital, since the Soviets seemed to have done nearly everything wrong.

"Maybe the U.N. should handle Kabul," the president said.

"Yeah, the U.N. is the best way to handle it," Powell agreed. "If the Northern Alliance take it first, though, they won't give it up." The slain Alliance commander Ma.s.soud had said he would never occupy Kabul single-handedly, but Powell did not think his successor, Fahim Khan, was as disciplined or diplomatically inclined.

Rumsfeld said the weather was still good in the south. Playing off that, the president ended the meeting on an optimistic note. "The weaker troops are in the north so the Northern Alliance can take over the north," he said.

AT 1:15 P.M., Rumsfeld and Myers appeared in the Pentagon briefing room. Rumsfeld announced that the U.S. had struck several al Qaeda terrorist training camps and damaged most of the Taliban's airfields and antiaircraft radars and launchers. "We believe we are now able to carry out strikes more or less around the clock, as we wish."

Myers did not give the same report that he had given to the NSC - that 16 of the 35 targets needed to be evaluated. He said, "U.S. forces struck 13 targets yesterday."

He showed slides of Afghanistan revealing the Day One and Day Two targets. "We did well in our initial strikes, damaging or destroying about 85 percent of the first set of 31 targets." He was being vague. In military terms, the difference between "damaging" and "destroying" is night and day, much as a car damaged in an automobile accident might still function.

"You say you're running out of targets though, Mr. Secretary," said one reporter. "What are you going to continue to hit?"

"Well, for one thing, we're finding that some of the targets we hit need to be rehit," answered Rumsfeld. It was more revealing than what Myers had said.

"Second," he said, "we're not running out of targets, Afghanistan is."

There was laughter. This was vintage Rumsfeld. Yet it left open the question: How do you win a war if the enemy can't be hit?

Other reporters pressed on issues of bombing troop concentrations, providing close air support and otherwise directly supporting the ready-to-advance forces of the Northern Alliance. Both Rumsfeld and Myers responded cautiously, refusing to comment on when or if U.S. ground forces might be deployed, or how they would support anti-Taliban groups. At one point, Myers delivered his view of this new war.

"You know, if you try to quantify what we're doing today in terms of previous conventional wars, you're making a huge mistake," he said. "That is 'old think' and that will not help you a.n.a.lyze what we're doing... . And that's what we've been trying to tell you for three days. It's a different kind of conflict."

Replying to a question about what responsibility the U.S. might have if the Taliban were overthrown, Rumsfeld demurred. "I don't think [it] leaves us with a responsibility to try to figure out what kind of government that country ought to have," he said, adding, "I don't know people who are smart enough from other countries to tell other countries the kind of arrangements they ought to have to govern themselves."

He didn't want the United States committed to nation building.

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 10, the NSC convened in the White House Situation Room at 9:30 A.M.

The president raised the issue of how much cla.s.sified and sensitive intelligence to share with Congress. "It's important for Don and Colin to brief their respective committees," he said. "We're giving the Congress colonel-level operational briefings. We need to do it at a higher level."

They would appease lawmakers by sending Rumsfeld and Powell, both of whom knew how to speak candidly without giving out anything critical. "I want to accommodate Congress without giving up cla.s.sified information," Bush said. In a practical sense this was impossible. Cla.s.sified information tells the story of what is happening, which is what Congress wanted.

The meeting turned to Syria, well doc.u.mented as a state supporter of Hezbollah. Syria had condemned the September 11 attacks.

"Syria needs to be against all terrorism," Powell said.