The Origins Of Political Order Part 21

11.Ray Huang, Taxation and Government Finance in Sixteenth-Century Ming China Taxation and Government Finance in Sixteenth-Century Ming China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 85. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 85.

12.Herbert Simon, "Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral Science," American Economic Review American Economic Review 49 (1959): 25383; Simon, "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice," 49 (1959): 25383; Simon, "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice," Quarterly Journal of Economics Quarterly Journal of Economics 59 (1955): 98118. 59 (1955): 98118.

13.The idea that Chinese rulers were "revenue maximizers" projects backward in time modern behavioral a.s.sumptions that have no basis in historical fact. Maximization would require a much higher level of effort on their part, and it was likely to increase their costs substantially in the form of political opposition, peasant uprisings, protests from the bureaucracy, and the like. In the later years of the dynasty, there was strong tax resistance from the wealthy gentry of the rich lower Yangtze region, which led to astounding levels of tax arrearages. The government simply did not exert itself to correct this problem, and in fact announced a reduction in tax rates. Huang, "Fiscal Administration During the Ming," pp. 107109.

14.Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization (New York: Free Press, 1957), pp. 18085. (New York: Free Press, 1957), pp. 18085.

15.Twitchett and Mote, Cambridge History of China Cambridge History of China, pp. 5253.

16.Lien-Sheng Yang, "Local Administration," in Hucker and Grimm, Chinese Government in Ming Times Chinese Government in Ming Times, p. 4.

17.Twitchett and Mote, Cambridge History of China Cambridge History of China, p. 21.

18.Charles O. Hucker, "Governmental Organization of the Ming Dynasty," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 21 (1958): 25. 21 (1958): 25.

19.Twitchett and Mote, Cambridge History of China Cambridge History of China, p. 24.

20.Ibid., pp. 3233.

21.Ibid., p. 38.

22.Ibid., pp. 4153.

23.Hucker, "Governmental Organization of the Ming Dynasty," p. 28; Twitchett and Mote, Cambridge History of China Cambridge History of China, pp. 104105.

24.For a more intimate picture of the reign of the Wanli emperor, see Ray Huang, 1587, a Year of No Significance: The Ming Dynasty in Decline 1587, a Year of No Significance: The Ming Dynasty in Decline (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981). (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).

25.Huang, "Fiscal Administration During the Ming," pp. 11216; Mote, Imperial China Imperial China, pp. 73435.

26.See Koenraad W. Swart, Sale of Offices in the Seventeenth Century Sale of Offices in the Seventeenth Century (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1949), chapter on China. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1949), chapter on China.

27.North, Weingast, and Wallis posit three "doorstep conditions" that facilitate the transition from what they label a "natural" order to an "open access" one: civilian control over the military, rule of law for elites, and "permanently lived" organizations (what other social scientists call inst.i.tutions). China met all three of these conditions at least as well as many early modern European states that went on to become "open access" orders, if one accepts my contention that China had "good enough" property rights. See Violence and Social Orders Violence and Social Orders.

28.David S. Landes, Revolution in Time: Clocks and the Making of the Modern World Revolution in Time: Clocks and the Making of the Modern World, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2000), pp. 1516, drawing on Joseph Needham, Ling w.a.n.g, and Derek de Solla Price, Heavenly Clockwork: The Great Astronomical Clocks of Medieval China Heavenly Clockwork: The Great Astronomical Clocks of Medieval China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960). (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960).

22: THE RISE OF POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY.

1.For a discussion, see Francis f.u.kuyama, "The March of Equality," Journal of Democracy Journal of Democracy 11, no. 1 (2000): 1117. 11, no. 1 (2000): 1117.

2.Tocqueville discusses at length the impact of the changing intellectual climate in France in the late eighteenth century in Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the Revolution The Old Regime and the Revolution, Vol. One (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), book III, chap. 1.

3.Herbert b.u.t.terfield, The Whig Interpretation of History The Whig Interpretation of History (London: G. Bell, 1931). (London: G. Bell, 1931).

4.Otto Hintze, The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975); Tilly, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975); Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States Coercion, Capital, and European States. The more fully developed form of Tilly's thesis involves the interplay between war and capital as drivers of European state formation.

5.Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan Birth of the Leviathan.

6.Winfried Schulze, "The Emergence and Consolidation of the 'Tax State,'" in Richard Bonney, ed., Economic Systems and State Finance Economic Systems and State Finance (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 267. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 267.

7.Maddison, Growth and Interaction in the World Economy Growth and Interaction in the World Economy, p. 21.

8.Schulze, "Emergence and Consolidation of the 'Tax State,'" pp. 26970.

9.Ibid., p. 268.

10.Marjolein 't Hart, "The Emergence and Consolidation of the 'Tax State,'" in Bonney, Economic Systems and State Finance Economic Systems and State Finance, p. 282.

11.Philip T. Hoffman, "Early Modern France, 14501700," in Hoffman and Norberg, Fiscal Crises, Liberty, and Representative Government Fiscal Crises, Liberty, and Representative Government, p. 282.

12.For an overview of the organization of the Spanish army, see Geoffrey Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 15671598: The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries' Wars The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 15671598: The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries' Wars (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 2141. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 2141.

13.In one of the few explicit scholarly comparisons of European and Chinese state building, Victoria Hui points to this difference as a key weakness in the European approach (Hui, War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe, pp. 32, 36). She refers repeatedly to the European failure to engage in state "self-strengthening" as Chinese states did, without explaining why European rulers were constrained from doing so.

14.While this general correlation exists, it is not a perfect predictor of state building. Many European states in this period felt the need for mobilization, in ways that did not correlate well with the objective degree of threat they faced. The Spanish king faced a dynastic rather than an existential threat from his upstart Dutch provinces during the sixteenth century, but this didn't prevent him from bankrupting his kingdom in an ultimately futile effort to keep the Dutch in line. Poland and Hungary, by contrast, did face existential threats from their powerful neighbors and yet failed to spend proportionately as much on military preparations.

23: RENTE SEEKERS.

1.Hoffman, "Early Modern France," p. 276.

2.For an overview, see Swart, Sale of Offices in the Seventeenth Century Sale of Offices in the Seventeenth Century.

3.Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan, Birth of the Leviathan, pp. 9899. pp. 9899.

4.Hoffman, "Early Modern France," p. 230; Richard Bonney, The King's Debts: Finance and Politics in France 15891661 The King's Debts: Finance and Politics in France 15891661 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 1516. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 1516.

5.A large census, "L'etat des paroisses et des feux de 1328" (The State of Parishes and Hearths in 1328), was taken in the fourteenth century.

6.Richard Bonney, "Revenue," in Hoffman and Norberg, Fiscal Crises, Liberty, and Representative Government Fiscal Crises, Liberty, and Representative Government, p. 434. This problem is very common in contemporary developing countries. See the account of the Colombian government's efforts to perform a cadastral survey and property a.s.sessment in Albert O. Hirschman, Journeys Toward Progress: Studies of Economic Policy-Making in Latin America Journeys Toward Progress: Studies of Economic Policy-Making in Latin America (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1963), pp. 95158. (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1963), pp. 95158.

7.Hoffman, "Early Modern France," pp. 23132.

8.Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan Birth of the Leviathan, pp. 7273.

9.Hoffman, "Early Modern France," p. 229.

10.Bonney, The King's Debts The King's Debts, p. 55.

11.Technically, the old law had required that offices revert to the Crown if the officeholder died within forty days of transferring it to another person; the law introduced by Charles Paulet exempted them from this in return for payment of a small annual fee that came to be known as the paulette. Hoffman, "Early Modern France," pp. 24344.

12.Swart, Sale of Offices in the Seventeenth Century Sale of Offices in the Seventeenth Century, p. 15.

13.Bonney, The King's Debts The King's Debts, pp. 7, 12.

14.See Richard Bonney, "Revenues," in Bonney, Economic Systems and State Finance Economic Systems and State Finance, pp. 42425; Bonney, The King's Debts The King's Debts, p. 14.

15.Bonney, The King's Debts The King's Debts, pp. 1415.

16.Richard Bonney, Political Change in France Under Richelieu and Mazarin, 16241661 Political Change in France Under Richelieu and Mazarin, 16241661 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 434. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 434.

17.Bonney, "Revenue," p. 436n.

18.Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the Revolution The Old Regime and the Revolution, pp. 12021.

19.Bonney, Political Change in France Political Change in France, pp. 3233.

20.Hoffman, "Early Modern France," pp. 228, 280; Bonney, Political Change in France Political Change in France, pp. 23940.

21.Bonney, Political Change in France, Political Change in France, pp. 5256. pp. 5256.

22.Francois Furet, Revolutionary France, 17701880 Revolutionary France, 17701880 (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1992), p. 6. (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1992), p. 6.

23.Bonney, Political Change in France Political Change in France, pp. 7174; Tocqueville, The Old Regime The Old Regime, pp. 12224.

24.Root, Peasants and King in Burgundy Peasants and King in Burgundy, p. 49.

25.Tocqueville, The Old Regime The Old Regime, pp. 12425.

26.Ibid., p. 129.

27.Bonney, Political Change in France, Political Change in France, pp. 44142. pp. 44142.

28.Kathryn Norberg, "The French Fiscal Crisis of 1788 and the Financial Origins of the Revolution of 1789," in Hoffman and Norberg, Fiscal Crises, Liberty, and Representative Government Fiscal Crises, Liberty, and Representative Government, p. 277.

29.Ibid., pp. 27779.

30.Furet, Revolutionary France Revolutionary France, pp. 1718.

31.Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan Birth of the Leviathan, pp. 14344.

32.Furet, Revolutionary France Revolutionary France, pp. 2526.

33.Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan Birth of the Leviathan, pp. 224, 23738.

34.Tocqueville, The Old Regime The Old Regime, pp. 15455.

35.Ibid., pp. 157, 164.

36.Ibid., pp. 15863.

24: PATRIMONIALISM CROSSES THE ATLANTIC.

1.For 2009, upper middle income status is a GNI per capita of $3,856$11,905. Latin American and Caribbean countries in this category include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Source: World Bank website.

2.See the chapters by James Robinson, Adam Przeworski, and Jorge Dominguez in Francis f.u.kuyama, ed., Falling Behind: Explaining the Development Gap Between the United States and Latin America Falling Behind: Explaining the Development Gap Between the United States and Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

3.Latin America has been notably more democratic than East Asia, both before and after the onset of the third wave. See Francis f.u.kuyama and Sanjay Marwah, "Comparing East Asia and Latin America: Dimensions of Development," Journal of Democracy Journal of Democracy 11, no. 4 (2000): 8094. 11, no. 4 (2000): 8094.

4.On the decline in inequality in the 2000s in Latin America, see Luis Felipe Lopez-Calva and Nora l.u.s.tig, eds., Declining Inequality in Latin America: A Decade of Progress? Declining Inequality in Latin America: A Decade of Progress? (Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C.: Brookings Inst.i.tution Press, 2010). (Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C.: Brookings Inst.i.tution Press, 2010).

5.On the general problem of informality, see Hernando De Soto, The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World (New York: Harper, 1989); and Santiago Levy, (New York: Harper, 1989); and Santiago Levy, Good Intentions, Bad Outcomes: Social Policy, Informality, and Economic Growth in Mexico Good Intentions, Bad Outcomes: Social Policy, Informality, and Economic Growth in Mexico (Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C.: Brookings Inst.i.tution Press, 2008). (Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C.: Brookings Inst.i.tution Press, 2008).

6.See, for example, the chapter on Chile in Hirschman, Journeys Toward Progress, Journeys Toward Progress, pp. 161223. pp. 161223.

7.An "electoral authoritarian" regime validates itself through elections, but in a highly manipulated process that does not permit a true level playing field for democratic contestation. See Andreas Schedler, "The Menu of Manipulation," Journal of Democracy Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (2002): 3650. 13, no. 2 (2002): 3650.

8.Quoted in Henry Kamen, Spain's Road to Empire: The Making of a World Power 14931763 Spain's Road to Empire: The Making of a World Power 14931763 (London: Penguin, 2003), p. 124. (London: Penguin, 2003), p. 124.

9.Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, pp. 11831.

10.Ibid., pp. 49.

11.I.A.A. Thompson, "Castile: Polity, Fiscality, and Fiscal Crisis," in Hoffman and Norberg, Fiscal Crises, Liberty, and Representative Government Fiscal Crises, Liberty, and Representative Government, p. 141.

12.Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan Birth of the Leviathan, p. 117.

13.Ibid., p. 116.

14.Thompson, "Castile," p. 160.

15.Ibid., p. 161.

16.Alec R. Myers, Parliaments and Estates in Europe to 1789 Parliaments and Estates in Europe to 1789 (New York: Harcourt, 1975), pp. 5965. (New York: Harcourt, 1975), pp. 5965.

17.Thompson, "Castile," pp. 14546. This was not true for the Aragonese Cortes, which had stronger powers and was anch.o.r.ed in free cities and towns. However, Spain never developed a national Cortes for the peninsula as a whole.

18.Ibid., pp. 18384.

19.Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan Birth of the Leviathan, pp. 11415.

20.Swart, Sale of Offices in the Seventeenth Century Sale of Offices in the Seventeenth Century, p. 23.

21.As one observer remarked, "Why should anybody be willing ... to buy for several thousands of ducats an office of regidor (councilor) to which only a salary of 2000 to 3000 maravedis was attached?" Ibid., p. 26.

22.Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan Birth of the Leviathan, pp. 11819.

23.Kamen, Spain's Road to Empire Spain's Road to Empire, p. 28.

24.Parker, The Army of Flanders The Army of Flanders, chap. 3.

25.Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan Birth of the Leviathan, p. 120.

26.Thompson, "Castile," pp. 14849.

27.J. H. Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 14921830 Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 14921830 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 20. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 20.

28.Ibid., p. 40.

29.Ibid., p. 127.